PRIMITIVO MARCELO, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

The petitioner was indicted for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act in an information reading as follows:

That on or about March 6, 1982, in the Municipality of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused Primitivo Marcelo, a public
officer being then a Deputy Sheriff in the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan and Atty. Alberto Domingo, a private law
practitioner, conspiring, confederating and confabulating with one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
cause undue injury to Reynaldo Sanchez and give Osaka Merchandising Co., Inc.
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge by accused Primitivo Marcelo of his official and administrative
functions in connection with the enforcement of the Writ of Execution issued by
the CFI of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 6336-M, entitled
“Osaka Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Sanz Steel
Corp.” through manifest partiality and evident bad faith, by unlawfully
taking, carrying and seizing one (1) Ford Fiera with
Plate No. DCK 863, owned by and registered in the name of Reynaldo Sanchez, and
as such not belonging to Sanz Steel Corp., which
vehicle was not included in the notice of levy or execution of leased
properties and without issuing any receipt therefor
nor mentioning the same in the partial sheriff’s returns on execution thereby
making it appear that said vehicle was not seized, levied or taken away by
accused Primitivo Marcelo and Alberto Domingo and,
consequently deprived Reynaldo Sanchez of the use and possession of said
vehicle.

After trial, he was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment from
three to six years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and to pay
the costs.  His co-accused was acquitted
on reasonable doubt that he had
conspired with the petitioner.^[1]

The petitioner now comes to us seeking reversal of the judgment
on the ground that it is tainted with error and grave abuse of discretion.

The respondent court found that the petitioner abused his
functions as a deputy sheriff in
the implementation of a writ of execution. 
Specifically, he was held liable under Section 3(e) of the
above-mentioned law, to wit:

(e)  Causing any undue injury
to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. 
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

It was established at the trial that on March 5, 1982, the petitioner went to the premises
of the Sanz Steel Corporation to enforce a writ of execution against it in favor of the Osaka Merchandising
Company.

Instead of limiting himself to the properties he had earlier
listed in the notice of levy,^[2]
he also took a Ford Fiera with license plate No. DCK
863 over the objection of Reynaldo Sanchez, who said the vehicle
belonged to him.

The petitioner did not issue a receipt for the vehicle.^[3]
He also did not list it in the partial sheriff’s return on execution as among
the properties seized by him in satisfaction of the judgment.^[4]

Testifying on his behalf, the petitioner declared that the Ford Fiera had originally been included in the notice of levy
but he had to erase the entry on orders of Sanchez, who had threatened him.^[5]
Curiously, though, the vehicle was seized nonetheless.  The petitioner gave no explanation for the
non-inclusion of the Ford Fiera in the sheriff’s
return except to say that Atty. Domingo told him he would deny any involvement
in the seizure.^[6]

The averment that the petitioner had been threatened is not
acceptable in the light of the evidence that he was accompanied at the time by
two armed constables.^[7]
The petitioner said that Sanchez closed the gates of the compound and turned
off all the lights.  Nevertheless, the
petitioner does not deny that he was able to take out the Ford Fiera, along with all the articles listed in the partial
return.

We agree with the respondent court that the petitioner did not
act toward the judgment creditor with manifest partiality, which it described
as “a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one
side rather than the other.”^[8]
The record does not disclose such motivation. 
As the respondent court observed, “the evidence falls short of that
quantum necessary to establish the fact that he had been manifestly or patently
partial to the plaintiff’s corporation.”

But while absolving the petitioner of such fault, the respondent
court ascribes to him evident bad faith in acting as he did, resulting in
injury to the complaining witness and incidental benefit to the judgment
creditor.  Citing authorities, the
decision stresses that –

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imputes a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or
ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. 
(Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2nd Series,
895, 1007).  It contemplates a
state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of
self interest or ill will for ulterior purposes.  (Air France v. Carrascoso,
18 SCRA 155, 166-167).  Evident bad faith
connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or
cause damage.

Applying these very same definitions, we feel that the petitioner
cannot in fairness be held liable under the indictment.  We are persuaded from a study of the evidence
that he was not actuated by a dishonest purpose or ill will partaking of a
fraud or some furtive design or ulterior purpose to do wrong and cause damage.

In fact, what we see here is a rather confused person, prodded on
the one hand by the judgment creditor’s counsel and resisted on the other by
the president of the judgment debtor. 
Both apparently exerted some kind of influence upon him that befuddled
his mind and warped his judgment.  In the
end, he was left holding the bag, so to speak, and hardly able to explain
himself.

But despite his general confusion, this much he could say
convincingly about the Ford Fiera.  It was not unreasonable for him to mistake it
as property of the judgment debtor because the name of Sanz
Steel Corporation was clearly painted on its sides.  Anyone would have assumed that it belonged to
the corporation.  Sanchez claimed having
exhibited his registration certificate, but the petitioner denies this; and the
respondent court noted that this document was produced only much later.^[9]
Significantly, after the vehicle had been towed away, Sanchez merely reported
to the police that it had been “carnapped”
and then simply left it at that.^[10]
As the respondent court observed:

x x
x Sanchez could have filed a third-party claim with the court
issuing the writ of execution or he could have officially notified the Sheriff
that he was adversely claiming the same. 
The fact remains that he submitted the certificate of registration long
after the seizure.

Our reading of this sorry mess is that because of the conflicting
pressures exerted on him by Domingo and Sanchez, the petitioner excluded the
Ford Fiera in the notice of levy he had earlier
prepared and then, to be consistent, omitted it also in the list of the seized
articles in his partial sheriff’s return on execution.

The petitioner says it was only after his arrest that he realized
he had not included the vehicle in the return. 
This may or may not be
true.  But what we may ourselves say is
that this omission was as much the fault of the petitioner as of the complaining witness, who should
have demanded its inclusion for his own protection.

We go further and add this. 
We believe that the petitioner is not liable even for “gross
inexcusable negligence,” as there is no showing that he had acted in
a wantonly careless manner to the prejudice of the complaining witness.  The breach of duty was not flagrant and
palpable.^[11]
The petitioner had not acted recklessly or in utter disregard of consequences
so as to suggest some degree of intent to cause injury.^[12]

Notably, the petitioner did not appropriate the vehicle for himself but left it in the compound of the judgment
creditor.^[13]
As previously observed, there was plausible reason to suppose that the Ford Fiera belonged to the Sanz Steel
Corporation which, signifi­cantly, was a family corporation with Sanchez as its
president.^[14]
If the petitioner mistook the vehicle for property of the corporation, such
mistake certainly cannot be considered so gross or
inexcusable as to come under the sanctions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

In any event, we are not prepared to affirm that the petitioner’s
acts and omissions border on the criminal and justify the penalty imposed on
him.

It seems to us that a more appropriate relief against the petitioner would be a civil action for damages
or an administrative complaint for the faulty implementation of the writ of
execution.  This observation should, of
course, not be taken as a prejudgment
of such cases if they are
filed.  We do feel, though, that the
criminal action lodged against the petitioner was ill-advised and that his
conviction, on the basis of the meager evidence submitted, was less than
warranted.

While this Court has always been implacable in the face of guilt
that must be punished, it has also never hesitated to protect the innocent
against an accusation that is palpably unjust, as in the case at bar.  In earlier decisions, we have cautioned the
prosecution against hasty indictments, lest the accused be needlessly molested
and irreparably stigmatized.  We now
address a similar admonition, and in the same spirit, to the lower courts.  That the innocent may not suffer from an
undeserved sentence, we urge the judges to be more careful in their evaluation
of the evidence, always remembering that what is presumed in the free society
is not the guilt of the accused but his innocence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged
decision is REVERSED.  The petitioner is
ACQUITTED, with no pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., on leave.

^[1]
Decision penned by Quimbo, J., with Guerrero
and Molina, JJ., concurring.

^[2]
Exhibit “C.”

^[3]
TSN, June 13, 1984, p. 10.

^[4]
Exhibit “D.”

^[5]
TSN, June 13, 1984, p. 6.

^[6]
Ibid, p. 12.

^[7]
Id., p. 16.

^[8]
Rollo,  p.
25.

^[9]
Ibid., p. 16.

^[10]
Exhibit “2.”

^[11]
Juan vs. Arias, 72 SCRA 404.

^[12]
Ballentine’s Law Dictionary.

^[13]
Exhibit “D.”

^[14]
Exhibit “1.”