PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EMILIO RAMILO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

People versus Ramilo

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Emilio Ramilo, an appeal from a conviction for murder. The accused was charged with stabbing to death one Pablo Cañeda with a long bolo on the night of August 10, 1980, in Burauen, Leyte, and the trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The case matters for two reasons a reviewee must hold on to. First, it is a clean illustration of how the Supreme Court treats the findings of the trial court on credibility, and how it handles an apparent contradiction in the testimony of a lone prosecution witness. Second, and more importantly for the bar, it shows that a statement of a dying man naming his assailant may be admitted not as a dying declaration but as part of the res gestae, when it is natural and spontaneous and made before the speaker could contrive a story.

Procedural History

The accused was charged by information with murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch Fifteen, at Palo, Leyte. After trial, that court rendered a decision finding Emilio Ramilo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. It sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, ordered him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of twelve thousand pesos, and to pay the costs. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court, raising three assigned errors, all of which the Court reduced to a single question: whether the trial court erred in determining the credibility of the evidence and the weight to be given to it. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but modified the award of indemnity.

Facts

On the evening of August 10, 1980, Pablo Cañeda took shelter in the house of Antonio Ramilo at Barangay Balorinay, Burauen, Leyte, because it was raining. When the rain stopped, Cañeda left the house carrying a lighted bottle, since the night was dark. Just after Antonio closed the door of his house, he heard the voice of Pablo Cañeda shouting for help, saying that he had been wounded by Emilio.

Antonio opened his door and saw Emilio Ramilo running across his yard toward the road, carrying a short bolo. Antonio went to the place where the voice came from and found Pablo Cañeda lying on the ground, already wounded, about ten meters from his house. Antonio tied the wound on Cañeda's arm and went to another barangay to get a motorcycle for the hospital. Failing to secure one, he returned and found Cañeda already dead. He then went to the barangay captain to report the incident.

Antonio admitted that he did not see the actual stabbing. He knew that Emilio was the assailant because Cañeda told him so. The motive traced by the prosecution was that about two years earlier, Emilio Ramilo had himself been stabbed by Ignacio Cañeda, the son of the deceased. A police investigation and sketch were made that same night, and an autopsy the following day showed three wounds caused by a sharp pointed bladed instrument, with death resulting from profuse hemorrhage due to stab wounds. The defense set up alibi, claiming that the accused was in another barangay that evening, working and then taking supper and tuba at the house of Francisco Timosan, and later fetched by his uncle.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the lone prosecution witness, Antonio Ramilo, despite the alleged contradictions and inconsistencies in his statements.
• Whether or not the prosecution failed to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in not considering the evidence for the defense, including the defense of alibi, as meritorious.

Applicable Provisions

The appellant invoked Section 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court on dying declarations, which the Court discussed in resolving whether Cañeda's statement was admissible. The Court held that even if the statement were not admissible as an anti-mortem declaration, it may still be considered as part of res gestae. The provision reads:

Section 31. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

This provision bears on the case because the Court did not need to rest on it; the statement qualified independently as part of the res gestae.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court's findings of fact carry great weight, because trial courts have the privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor of witnesses and can discern whether they are telling the truth. After examining the records, the Court found no reason to depart from the trial court's appreciation of the evidence.

The alleged contradiction was, in the Court's words, more apparent than real. Whether Antonio witnessed the stabbing was never in dispute; he admitted he did not see it. His testimony that Cañeda named Emilio as his assailant was reinforced by the fact that Antonio saw the accused running away with a bolo from the place where Cañeda was found. On the claim that Antonio could not have recognized the assailant because of a lapse of time and the distance, the Court stressed that Antonio's reaction to the shouts was immediate, which explains why he saw the accused running away. The Court also corrected the premise: it was the fallen body of Cañeda, not the assailant, that was fifteen meters away.

On the argument that it was unnatural for a dying man to call out both the Christian name and the family name of his assailant, the Court, quoting People versus Quinlob, held that it is not uncommon for a man on the brink of death to call out his assailant's full name to remove any doubt as to identity. On the admissibility of the statement, the Court ruled that even if it were not admissible as an anti-mortem declaration, it may still be considered as part of res gestae, being natural and spontaneous and made before the deceased could contrive or devise a plan to incriminate the appellant.

On the second and third issues, the Court held that alibi is the weakest of all defenses because it can be easily concocted, and that to sustain it the accused must show not only that he was elsewhere but that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene. The Court also rejected the imputed ulterior motive of the witness over an inheritance dispute, noting that it was the accused, not the witness, who felt dispossessed. Motive, the Court held, is essential for conviction only when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit. Here there was no doubt, given that the deceased named him, he was seen running from the scene, and he had a motive.

Doctrine

First, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight on appeal, because that court observed their deportment and demeanor. Second, a statement of a dying man naming his assailant, even if it fails the requirements of a dying declaration under Section 31, Rule 130, may be admitted as part of the res gestae if it is natural and spontaneous and made before the declarant could contrive a plan. Third, alibi is the weakest of defenses; it succeeds only if the accused proves it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. Fourth, motive is essential for conviction only when the identity of the culprit is in doubt. These rules tie directly to the quoted provision: the dying declaration rule is not the only door through which a dying man's words may enter; the res gestae doctrine opens another.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, modifying only the civil indemnity by increasing it to thirty thousand pesos.

Remember This

Memorize this line: even if a statement is not admissible as a dying declaration, it may still be admitted as part of the res gestae if it is natural and spontaneous. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between dying declarations and res gestae, and to test the rule that alibi is the weakest of defenses.