G.R. No. 69579. January 07, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EMILIO RAMILO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XV, at Palo, Leyte, finding appellant Emilio
Ramilo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Pablo CaƱeda the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the accused alleged:
“That on or about the 10th day of August, 1980, in the
Municipality of Burauen, Province of Leyte, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, stab and wound one Pablo CaƱeda with the use of a long bolo which the said accused
had provided himself for the purpose thereby hitting and inflicting upon Pablo
CaƱeda wounds which caused his
death.”
The lower court findings, upon which guilt beyond reasonable
doubt was established, are summarized as follows:
xxx
“[T]hat on August 10,
1980, at about 11:00 o’clock[*] in the evening, Pablo CaƱeda took shelter in the house of Antonio Ramilo at Barangay Balorinay, Burauen,
Leyte, because it was
raining. When the rain stopped at about
seven
o’clock that evening, Pablo CaƱeda left the house of Antonio Ramilo with a lighted bottle since the night was
dark. Just after Antonio closed the door of his house, he
heard the voice of Pablo CaƱeda shouting for help
because he was wounded by Emilio. When Antonio opened his door,
Antonio saw Emilio Ramilo running on his yard towards
the road bringing with him a short bolo. Antonio went to the place
where the voice of Pablo CaƱeda came from and he found
Pablo CaƱeda lying on the ground already wounded at a
distance of about ten (10) meters from his house.
“After tying the wound on the arm of Pablo CaƱeda, Antonio proceeded to Brgy.
Arado to
get a motorcycle to bring Pablo to the hospital. Failing to
secure a motorcycle, Antonio went back to the place where Pablo CaƱeda was lying down, but Antonio found Pablo CaƱeda already dead. Antonio then proceeded to
the house of the barangay captain, Iluminado Rael, to inform the
latter of the incident.
“Antonio Ramilo admits that he did not see
the incident but he only knew that Emilio Ramilo was
the one who wounded Pablo CaƱeda because the latter
told him.
“The motive of this stabbing incident is that, about two years
before, Emilio Ramilo was stabbed by Ignacio CaƱeda the son of Pablo CaƱeda.
“At about 10:30 o’clock in
the evening of August 10, 1980, Pat.
Jovencio
Perido and Pat. Resurreccion Coral proceeded to Brgy. Balorinay, Burauen, Leyte to conduct an investigation of this
incident. The two patrolmen made a sketch of the crime scene
(Exhibit “D) and submitted their Investigation Report (Exhibit
“C”).
“Dr. Dionisio Conde conducted an autopsy examination on the body of Pablo
CaƱeda on August 11, 1980 and issued a Medical Certificate (Exhibit
“A) describing the three wounds of Pablo CaƱeda. Dr. Conde
also issued a Sketch of Human Body (Exhibit “B”) indicating therein the location
of the three wounds of Pablo CaƱeda. The
weapon used was a sharp pointed bladed instrument. The cause of
death of Pablo CaƱeda is profuse hemorrhage due to
stab wounds.”
The appellant raised the following assignments of errors in this
appeal.
A. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ANTONIO RAMILO;
B. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE
ACCUSED;
C. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
AS MERITORIOUS THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.
All the assignments of errors center on whether or not the trial
court erred in determining the credibility of the evidence presented and the
weight to be given to it.
We have held in a long line of cases that trial courts’ findings
of facts carry great weight for these courts have the privilege of
examining the deportment and demeanor of witnesses and, therefore, can discern
if such witnesses are telling the truth or not. (People v.
Natipravat, G.R. No. 69876, November 13, 1986; People v. De Jesus,
G.R. Nos. 71942-43, November 13, 1986; People v. Adones, G.R. No.
63453, September 24, 1986; People v. Dondoy, G.R. No. 63728, September
15, 1986; and People v. Patog, G.R. No. 69620, September 24,
1986). We have carefully examined the records and we find no
reason to depart from the trial court’s appreciation of the evidence of the
prosecution and that of the defense.
The appellant tries to impeach the testimony of Antonio
Ramilo, the lone prosecution witness by alleging
conflicts of facts and inconsistencies in his statements. In
court, witness Antonio stated:
“A. When he left I closed my exit because I was
already about to go to sleep when all of a sudden while I was already along the
path I heard shout saying, ‘Padi, help me, I was
wounded by Emilio.’ Then I went out to verify.
“Q When you went out to verify what did you find,
what did you see?
“A I helped my pari because he was already fallen to the ground and he was
shouting for help.
“Q Who were the persons there when
you arrived at the place where you saw your compadre?
“A Nobody was there because
he informed me that he ran.
“Q Who?
“A The person who wounded
him.”
(TSN, August 25, 1983, pp.
6-7).
Later on, Antonio affirmed an allegation in his affidavit that “x
x x there and then I
immediately open (sic) my door and I saw Emilio Ramilo
running on my yard towards the road bringing with him a short bolo approximately
12 inches long more or less (tsn., supra, p.
9).
In the course of cross examination, Antonio
stated:
“Q Is it not a fact that you were only
told that it was Ramilo who stabbed Pablo CaƱeda as you said in your direct testimony Ramilo has already ran away when you arrived at the
victim, Pablo CaƱeda?
“A I was told by
him.
“Q What?
“A CaƱeda said, ‘help me
because I was wounded by Emilio’.
“Q Actually you did not see Emilio delivered stab
blows at Pablo CaƱeda because according to you, you
have only closed your door?
“A I did not see because my doors were
closed.
“Q It is clear now that you only know that it was
Emilio Ramilo who stabbed CaƱeda because CaƱeda told you
about that?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q What happened to that lighted lamp which you gave
to Pablo CaƱeda?
“A It was thrown to
the ground.
“Q And the light fell out?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q So, when you went out you could not
see anymore anybody because it was
dark?
“A Yes, sir.”
(TSN., supra, pp.
10-11).
The appellant emphasizes his conclusion that in fact Antonio Ramilo was not a witness to the incident and therefore “the
whole case for the prosecution immediately ends there, for there is no other
piece of evidence for the prosecution on the identity of the perpetrator of the
crime”.
The contradiction mentioned by the appellant is more apparent than
real. The question of whether or not Antonio witnessed the
stabbing incident was never in dispute. The trial court
stated:
“Antonio Ramilo admits that he did not see
the incident but he only knew that Emilio Ramilo was
the one who wounded Pablo CaƱeda because the latter
told him.”
The statement by the deceased CaƱeda was
merely reinforced by the fact that Antonio saw the accused-appellant running
away with a bolo in his hand from the place where CaƱeda was found. On this point, the trial
court stated that:
“Antonio Ramilo, uncle of the accused
Emilio Ramilo, positively identified Emilio Ramilo running across the yard of Antonio’s house just after
the deceased Pablo CaƱeda shouted for help because he
was wounded by Emilio Ramilo.”
The witness does not claim to have seen the actual stabbing.
The appellant doubts if Antonio positively recognized the
assailant because ā (1) there was a lapse of a few minutes between the time he
heard CaƱeda’s shouts and the time he opened the door
and (2) the lamp he carried could not have sufficiently aided him in recognizing
the assailant whom was 15 meters away from his house.
We agree with the Solicitor General that what bears emphasis
is the testimony of Antonio regarding the time frame being assailed by the
appellant. Antonio testified as follows:
“Q What was that incident?
“A When he left I closed my exit because I was
already about to go to sleep when all of a sudden while I was already
along the path I heard shout saying, ‘Padi, help
me, I was wounded by Emilio’. Then I went out to
verify.” (underscoring
supplied)
(TSN., supra, pp.
6-7)
Antonio’s reaction to the shouts of CaƱeda was, therefore, immediate. This
explains why he was able to see the accused Ramilo
running away.
Moreover, the records show that Antonio did not state that
the assailant was 15 meters away from Antonio’s house as assumed by the
appellant but rather that it was the fallen body of CaƱeda which was 15 meters away (tsn., August 25, 1983, p.
12).
The contradictions raised by the appellant do not merit
serious consideration.
The appellant also contends that it seems out of the
ordinary that a person shouting under the circumstances of CaƱeda at the time would mention both the christian name and family name of
the assailant.
This contention is untenable. As held in the
case of People v. Quinlob (119 SCRA
130):
xxx
“x x x It is
submitted that the deceased statement calling out his assailants’ full names
considering they were his brothers, does not make this improbable.
At any rate, it is not uncommon for a man, who is on the brink of
death, to call out his assailants’ full names, to remove any doubt as to their
identities. Nor was there any reason for the deceased to call out
the assailants’ nicknames. When the deceased was attacked
treacherously by the appellants, any love or attachment the former may have to
the latter was completely destroyed. From that moment on, to the
deceased, the appellants ceased to be his brothers. In the natural
course of human conduct, it is not uncommon to name hated persons in their full
names.”
Appellant Ramilo also asserts that
the statement of CaƱeda does not satisfy the
requirements of a dying declaration pursuant to Sec. 31, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.
Even if the statement were not admissible as an
anti-mortem declaration, it may still be considered as part of res gestae. The statement was natural and
spontaneous and made before the deceased could contrive or devise a plan to
incriminate the appellant (Peope v. Araja, 105
SCRA 133; and People v. Laquinon, 135 SCRA 91).
The defense of alibi cannot assume importance in the case at
bar.
The defense interposed an alibi through the testimony of the
accused Emilio Ramilo, corroborated by the testimonies
of Francisco Tinoran, Alfredo Capongcol, Hugo Manacpo and Segundina T. Apo:
xxx
“x x x [T]hat on
August 10, 1980, the accused, Emilio Ramilo, started
working for Francisco Timosan at Sitio Bencay, (also known Sebucao), Brgy. Salvacion, Dulag, Leyte at about seven o’clock in the morning unhusking coconuts. Bencay is about two kilometers from the barrio proper
of Brgy. Salvacion. The
accused stopped working at about 5:30 o’clock
in the afternoon. The accused accompanied Francisco
Timosan to the house of the latter in Barangay Salvacion where the
accused ate his supper at 8:00
o’clock upon invitation of Francisco.
After supper the accused was given one half gallon of tuba which the
accused drank by himself in the balcony of the house of Francisco because the
latter does not drink. At ten o’clock that evening the accused was
fetched by his uncle, Hugo Manacpo, Jr. from the house
of Francisco Timosan. The house of Hugo
Manacpo, Jr. is more than hundred meters from the
house of Francisco Timosan in the same barangay of Salvacion.
The accused went home with his uncle, Hugo Manacpo, but they passed by the house of Alfredo Capongcol to return a tool.”
As held in the case of People v. Quinlob,
supra:
xxx
“x x x Alibi is
the weakest of all defenses because it can be easily concocted. To
sustain the defense of alibi, the accused must not only show that he was at some
other place at the time the crime happened, but also, that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was
committed.”
An ulterior motive has been imputed against Antonio Ramilo for testifying against his nephew, appellant Emilio
Ramilo. The latter believes that
Antonio, brother of his father, Senando Ramilo, testified against him because of a dispute over
their inheritance which his uncle refused to give to Senando’s family.
The lower court did not err in ruling that such a theory
does not inspire belief considering the admission of the accused that it is
Antonio Ramilo who is in possession of the land
alluded to by the appellant as their inheritance.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General: “If there is anybody who should feel aggrieved, it is the
accused himself, Emilio Ramilo, not Antonio Ramilo, because it was the former who felt dispossessed of
what he claims to be rightfully his”.
On the other hand, it is the appellant who possesses a
motive. The records show that about two years before the stabbing
incident, Emilio Ramilo was stabbed by Ignacio CaƱeda, the son of the deceased Pablo CaƱeda.
It is a well-settled rule that motive is essential for conviction
only when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit or where there are no
eyewitnesses and where suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of persons
(People v. Manalo, 135 SCRA 84). Thus, there can be no
doubt about the guilt of the appellant in the face of the prosecution evidence
clearly and sufficiently warranting his conviction namely that the deceased
CaƱeda named him as his assailant, he was seen running
away from the scene of the crime, and he had a motive to commit the crime.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the indemnity to be paid is increased to THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00).
SO
ORDERED.
Feria, (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay, and Paras, JJ., concur.
[*] It is impossible for CaƱeda to seek shelter at 11:00 p.m. and then leave at 7:00 p.m. on the same night. This must have
been either a typographical error or an oversight on the part of the trial
court.