G.R. No. 67583. July 31, 1987
BASILISA S. ESCONDE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. SAMILO N. BARLONGAY AND RAMON V. DELFIN, RESPONDENTS.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the April 16,
1984 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Bulacan, Branch CLXXII,
dismissing petitioner’s complaint.
The facts admitted by the parties are the following:
Private respondent Ramon V. Delfin is the applicant in the
“Application for Registration of Title” dated April 14, 1969,
docketed as LRC Case No. 710-V at the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch III, Valenzuela, Metro Manila (now RTC, NCJR, Branch 171,
Valenzuela). The land subject of the
Application, Reconveyance and the present petition is one and the same parcel
of land containing an area of 2,273 sq. m.
The application was granted in a “Decision” dated December 8,
1969, and private respondent received copy thereof on the same date. Said parcel of land is now covered by OCT No.
0-5002 issued on January 23, 1971 by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. On February 13, 1978 said private respondent
Ramon V. Delfin, as applicant in the LRC Case filed his “Petition for Writ
of Possession” against the spouses Francisco and Basilisa Esconde (Brief
for Petitioner, pp. 6-7, Rollo, p. 120).
On March 6, 1978, Judge Crispin V. Bautista issued an Order
denying for lack of merit the opposition filed by the Esconde spouses to the
petition for Writ of Possession.
On September 26, 1978, Judge Avelino M. Constantino, who took
over the same branch presided over by Judge Bautista, issued an Order for a writ of possession against the said
spouses.
Petitioner filed with the same court a Petition to Quash the Writ
of Possession to which an Opposition was filed by the private respondent
(Comment, Rollo, pp. 88-90).
On October 6, 1978, herein petitioner filed with the then Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, 5th Judicial District, Branch VIII (now RTC,
NCJR, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Bulacan) a complaint for reconveyance, against
the herein private respondent, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 721-V-78 (Record, pp. 24-28).
On October 14, 1978, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint with
prayer for stay of execution of judgment in LRC Case No. V-710 (Ibid., pp.
29-33).
Private respondent, in a
Motion to Dismiss dated December 26, 1978, moved for the dismissal of
the case on the grounds, among others, that (1) the cause of action, if any, is
barred by res judicata; (2) the complaint fails to state
sufficient cause or causes of action for reconveyance; and (3) the plaintiff is
barred by prescription or laches from filing the case (Ibid., pp.
34-39).
On January 15, 1979, petitioner filed a Rejoinder to Motion to
Dismiss and Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Complaint to Include Plaintiff’s
Husband as Party-Plaintiff (Ibid., pp. 40-44). On the same date, the Amended Complaint was
filed (Ibid., pp. 45-50).
Private respondent filed a Reply to Rejoinder (Opposition) to
Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Motion For Leave of Court to Amend
Complaint, dated January 18, 1979 (Ibid., pp. 51-54).
On June 5, 1979, Judge Constantino denied Petition to Quash Writ
of Possession (Rollo, p. 108). The
Sheriff then delivered possession to the private respondent, but then petitioner
re-entered the premises and took possession thereof, hence private respondent
filed a Motion for an Alias
Writ of Possession on March 2, 1983.
On March 4, 1983, an Order directed the issuance of an alias writ of possession.
On March 29, 1983, the Sheriff turned over possession of the
premises to the representative of the private respondent. This notwithstanding, when private respondent
went to the premises, he was barred by the petitioner from entering the property.
Consequently, private respondent asked for a writ of demolition
for the removal of any construction of the Esconde family on the premises and
to cite petitioner Basilisa Esconde for contempt of court.
On November 17, 1983, private respondent moved for a second alias
writ of possession in view of the failure of the petitioner to turn over
possession of the premises to private respondent and the same was granted in
the Order of November 21, 1983.
Petitioner then filed with Judge Avelino M. Constantino of the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan a Motion to Quash and/or to Hold in Abeyance
Execution of Second Alias Writ of Possession on the ground that they have filed
a civil action for
reconveyance.
On February 1, 1984,
petitioner filed a Motion to
Expedite Resolution of Pending Incidents and Motion For Issuance of Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction (Ibid., pp. 57-59).
On February 13, 1984, private respondent filed a Manifestation With Opposition to
Motion for Issuance of Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction (Ibid.,
pp. 60-62).
Respondent Judge, in an Order dated April 16, 1984 (Ibid.,
pp. 63-64), dismissed the complaint for reconveyance on the grounds: (1) that plaintiff’s cause of action is
barred by res judicata; and (2) that the Motion to Admit Amended
Complaint and for Issuance of Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
is not proper as it seeks to enjoin the enforcement of a writ of possession issued by another branch
of this Court which is not allowed.
Hence, the instant
petition (Ibid., pp. 10-23).
The Second Division, in a Resolution dated August 29, 1984, resolved
to require the respondents to comment (Ibid., p. 75).
On October 20, 1984, respondents, in compliance with the
above-mentioned Resolution, filed their Comment (Ibid., pp. 87-101).
In a Resolution dated December 3, 1984, the Second Division
resolve to give due course to the petition; and to consider respondents’
comment to the petition as an answer (Ibid., p. 110).
In a letter dated January 21, 1985, counsel for
the petitioner was required to file petitioner’s brief (Ibid., p.
112).
In compliance therewith, said brief was filed on March 23, 1985 (Ibid.,
p. 120).
On April 1, 1985,
petitioner filed a Motion to Include Additional
Party-Respondent and Motion for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction,
praying, among others, that the Sheriff be included as additional
party-respondent (Ibid., pp. 122-126).
The Second Division, in a
Resolution dated April 17, 1985, resolved to require the respondents to comment
on the motion by counsel for the petitioner to include an additional
party-respondent and the motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction (Ibid., p. 141).
On May 7, 1985,
respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to Include Additional
Party-Respondent and Motion for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction (Ibid.,
pp. 142-146).
On June 21, 1985, Brief
for the Respondents was filed (Ibid., p. 148).
The Second Division, in a Resolution dated November 11, 1985, resolved to consider the case
submitted for deliberation (Ibid., p. 158).
On November 26, 1985,
petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Resolution of her motion of April 1,
1985 – motion to include the Sheriff as party-respondent and
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction (Ibid., pp.
159-162). This motion of petitioner, in a Resolution dated December 11, 1985, was noted by said Division (Ibid.,
p. 165).
On February 1, 1986,
petitioner filed an Urgent Motion, praying, among others, for the inclusion of
the Sheriff as party-respondent, and thereafter, for an injunction directing
the Sheriff to restore the peaceful possession of the land to petitioner (Ibid.,
pp. 166-171).
The Second Division, in a Resolution dated February 17, 1986,
resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order directing the Sheriff and private respondent to refrain from
enforcing and/or carrying out the Third Alias Writ of Possession (Ibid.,
p. 176).
On March 4, 1986,
petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Resolution and Temporary Restraining Order
both dated February 17, 1986, either nullifying the Third Alias Writ of
Possession served or in the alternative to issue a mandatory injunction (Ibid.,
pp. 179-183). This motion was denied by
the Division in a Resolution
dated May 21, 1986 (Ibid., p. 185).
The issues in this case are –
1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER’S CAUSE OF ACTION
IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA; and
2. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER’S MOTION TO ADMIT
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND FOR ISSUANCE OF
RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS PROPER.
The petition is devoid of
merit.
Land registration
proceedings in this case commenced on April 14, 1969 and decision thereon was
rendered on December 8, 1969. Hence,
the law in force at the time was Act 496, P.D. 1529 (otherwise known as Property
Registration Decree) having taken effect only on Jan. 23, 1979.[1] The pertinent provisions of said Act 496
read:
“SEC. 34. Any person
claiming an interest, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file
an answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be
allowed by the court. The answer shall
state all the objections to the application, and shall set forth the interest
claimed by the party filing the same and apply for the remedy desired, add shall
be signed and sworn to by him or by some person in his behalf. (As amended by Sec. 1, Act No. 3621).”
“SEC. 35. If no person
appears and answers within the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion
of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, order a general
default to be recorded and the application to be taken for confessed. By the description in the notice, ‘To all
whom it may concern,’ all the world are made parties defendant and shall be
concluded by the default and order.
After such default and order, the court may enter a decree
confirming the title of the applicant and ordering registration of the
same. (As amended by Sec. 8, Act No.
1699).”
On the other hand, under Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the
effect of such order is as follows:
“SEC. 2. Effect of
order of default. -Except as provided in
section 9 of Rule 13, a party declared in default shall not be entitled to notice or
subsequent proceedings, nor to take part in the trial.”
Petitioner’s claim that she came to know of the land registration
case only upon receipt of a Petition for Writ of Possession is completely
rebutted by private respondent’s evidence.
In the Notice of Initial Hearing (Rollo, p. 148-a) she is one of those
cited to appear; in the Survey Notification Letter (Rollo, p. 148-c) her
husband was notified of the scheduled survey of the land as indicated by his
signature opposite his name and in the Surveyor’s Certificate (Rollo, p.
148-b) her husband was reported one of the adjoining owners present. There is no question that notice to her
husband is notice to her under the law, her husband being the administrator of
the conjugal partnership (Art. 165, Civil Code). Otherwise stated, there was no concealment on
the part of private respondent. In fact,
the records show that private respondent stated in his application for
registration of title that a portion of the land was being occupied by
petitioner sometime in September 1967, by breaking the stone wall fence without
his knowledge and consent (Application for Registration of Title; Rollo, p.
102). However, petitioner and her
husband, despite the chance given them to be heard in the land registraiton
proceedings, opted not to appear.
Thus, as aptly stated by respondent Judge, “A land
registration proceedings which is in rem, is valid and conclusive
against the whole world. The failure of
the plaintiff and her husband, despite the notice of the publication and
posting by the sheriff of the notice of hearing, to oppose the defendant’s
application for registration will bar her from filing this action.”
(Order, dated April 16, 1984; Civil Case No. 721-V-78; Rollo, p. 64).
Under Section 38 of Act 496 ‘x x x Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet
title thereto x x x. It shall be conclusive upon and against
all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof,
whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation or included in
the general description ‘To all whom it may concern’.” That under said
section, this decree became conclusive after one year from the date of the
entry, is not disputed (Severino v. Severino, 44 Phil. 354 [1923]). On the contrary, this Court has invariably
ruled that “Land Registration is a proceeding in rem and
binds all persons known and unknown.” (Moscoso v. C.A., 128 SCRA 70
[1984]). It is a settled doctrine that when a decree of registration has been obtained by fraud, the party
defrauded has only one year from entry of the decree to file a petition for review before a
competent court, provided that the land has not been transferred to an
innocent purchaser for value. Said
Section 38 categorically declares that “upon the expiration of the said
term of one (1) year, every
decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be
incontrovertible (Albienda v. C.A., 135 SCRA 406-407 [1985]).
Hence, it was established
that when no answer in writing nor any opposition is made to an
application for registration of property in Court, all the allegations
contained in the application shall be held as confessed by reason of the
absence of denial on the part of the opponent.
A person who has not challenged an application for registration of land
even if the appeal afterwards interposed is based on the right of dominion over
the same land, cannot allege damage or error against the judgment ordering the
registration inasmuch as he did not allege or pretend to have any right to such
land (Cabanas v. Director of Lands, 10 Phil. 393).
In the same manner, it
has been held that a claimant having failed to present his answer
or objection to the registration of a parcel of land under
the Torrens System or to question the validity of such registration within a period of one year after the certificate of title had been issued, had
forever lost his right in said land even granting that he had any right therein
(De los Reyes v. Paterno, 34 Phil. 420).
However, an action for
reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful
owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name
of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the
land to him (Bilog, “Remedies Available to Aggrieved Parties As a
Consequence of Registration Under the Torrens System”; Property
Registration 1979; pp. 122-123). The
prevailing rule in this jurisdiction does not bar a land-owner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously registered
under the Torrens System from bringing an action, after one year from the
issuance of the decree, for the reconveyance of the property in question. Such an action does not aim or purport to
re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration,
but only to show that the person who secured the registration of the questioned
property is not the real owner thereof (Rodriguez v. Toreno, 79 SCRA 357 [1977]). An ordinary civil action for reconveyance
does not seek to set aside the decree but respecting the decree as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey
the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner (Director of Lands,
et al. v. Register of Deeds, et al. 92 Phil. 827 [1953]).
Under the circumstances in the case at bar, it is apparent that
reconveyance is not the proper remedy.
As earlier stated, there was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of
title, nor in the proceedings incident thereto, nor was it established that
fraud had indeed intervened in the issuance of said title, and the period of
one year within which intrinsic fraud could be claimed had long expired. Under similar conditions, the Court ruled
that the land should be adjudicated to the registered owner (Paterno, et al. v.
Salud, 118 Phil. 933-934 [1963]). Even
more implicitly, this Court held in Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. v. Remolado
(135 SCRA 412 [1985]) that:
“Justice is done according to law.
As a rule, equity follows the law.
There may be a moral obligation, often regarded as an equitable consideration (meaning compassion), but if there
is no enforceable legal duty, the action must fail although the disadvantaged
party deserves comiseration or sympathy.”
Moreover, petitioner’s action for reconveyance had already
prescribed. An action for reconveyance
of real property on the ground of fraud must be filed within four (4) years
from the discovery of the fraud. Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of an original
certificate of title (Balbin v. Medalla, 108 SCRA 666; and Alarcon v. Bidin,
120 SCRA 390).
The first issue being without merit and the second issue being a
mere incident thereto, there appears to be no necessity to discuss the latter.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DENIED
and the assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Bulacan is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
[1]
Published in the Official Gazette,
January 8, 1979, 75 O.G. No. 2, 185 (Tanada v. Tuvera).