EDGARDO P. TOLEDO, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND TRADERS COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORP., RESPONDENTS.

THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN THIS CASE IS AGAINST THE
(A) RESOLUTION* DATED AUGUST 16, 1983 OF RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT (NOW COURT OF APPEALS) IN AC-G.R. CV NO. 00089, WHICH DENIED PETITIONERS’
“URGENT MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE APPELLANT’S BRIEF”
FILED ON JULY 16, 1983, FOR BEING FILED LATE AND ACCORDINGLY DISMISSED THE
APPEAL, AND (B) RESOLUTION* DATED
SEPTEMBER 12, 1983 WHICH DENIED PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

IT APPEARS THAT HEREIN PETITIONER, EDGARDO TOLEDO BOUGHT FROM
FABAR SALES INC. IN 1977 A CAR
(TOYOTA CORONA STANDARD), FOR WHICH HE AND HIS WIFE CARMEN TOLEDO EXECUTED A
PROMISSORY NOTE FOR P50,599.92 PAYA­BLE
IN INSTALLMENTS AND A CHATTEL MORTGAGE ON THE CAR, BOTH IN FAVOR OF FABAR
SALES, INC.  THE CHATTEL MORT­GAGE WAS
ASSIGNED BY FABAR SALES INC. TO THE TRADERS COMMERCIAL BANK, HEREIN PRIVATE
RESPONDENT, WITH THE CONSENT OF THE SPOUSES.

THE PETITIONERS DEFAULTED IN THE PAYMENT OF THEIR INSTALLMENTS,
SO ON JUNE 28, 1979, PRIVATE
RESPONDENT FILED AN ACTION AGAINST THEM FOR A SUM OF MONEY BEFORE THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA.

SUMMONS AND COPIES OF THE COMPLAINT WERE PROPERLY SERVED UPON
PETITIONERS ON JULY 12, 1979.  FOR THEIR FAILURE,
HOWEVER, TO FILE AN ANSWER WITHIN THE REGLEMEN­TARY PERIOD, PRIVATE RESPONDENT
AS THE THEN PLAINTIFF FILED AN “EX-PARTE URGENT MOTION TO DECLARE
DEFENDANTS IN DEFAULT AND TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
EX-PARTE”, WHICH WAS GRANTED BY THE LOWER COURT IN ITS ORDER DATED JANUARY 23, 1980.

THEREAFTER, PRIVATE RESPONDENT PRESENTED ITS EVI­DENCE AND ON
JUNE 30, 1980, THE LOWER COURT
RENDERED ITS DECISION,** THE
DECRETAL PORTION OF WHICH READS –

“WHEREFORE, FINDING
THE EVIDENCE, BOTH ORAL AND DOCUMENTARY, TO HAVE SUF­FICIENTLY PROVED THE
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED ORDERING THE
DEFENDANTS EDGARDO AND CARMEN H. TOLEDO
TO JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY PAY THE PLAINTIFF THE FOLLOWING:

1.  THE SUM OF P21,984.50 WITH ACCRUED PENALTY INTEREST THEREON AT THE RATE OF 3% PER MONTH FROM JUNE 20, 1979 UNTIL FULLY PAID;

2.  THE SUM OF P640.33, REPRE­SENTING ACCRUED PENALTY
INTEREST;

3.  THE AMOUNT OF P2,000.00 AS AND FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES;
AND

4.  THE COSTS OF SUIT.

SO ORDERED.”

PETITIONERS FILED A MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE AFORE­SAID DECISION
BUT THE SAME WAS DENIED.  PETITIONERS’
MOTION TO RECONSIDER WAS LIKEWISE DENIED. 
SO PETITION­ERS FILED A NOTICE OF APPEAL, APPEAL BOND AND THE RECORD ON
APPEAL WITH THE LOWER COURT.

ON MARCH 30, 1983 RESPONDENT
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ISSUED A NOTICE REQUIRING PETITIONERS TO FILE
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF WITHIN FORTY FIVE (45) DAYS FROM RE­CEIPT, COPY OF WHICH WAS
RECEIVED BY COUNSEL FOR PETI­TIONERS ON APRIL 11, 1983.  HENCE, THE
45-DAY PERIOD WOULD EXPIRE ON MAY 26,
1983.

ON MAY 21, 1983, PETITIONERS
FILED A “MOTION TO LIFT THE ORDER TO FILE APPELLANTS’ BRIEF WITHIN FORTY
FIVE DAYS”, WHICH WAS DENIED BY RESPONDENT COURT IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED
JULY 5, 1983.

ON JULY 16, 1983, PETITIONERS
FILED AN “URGENT MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE APPELLANTS’
BRIEF” PRAYING FOR A THIRTY-DAY EXTENSION. 
ON AUGUST 12, 1983, PETITIONERS
FILED THE REQUIRED “BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT”.

BUT, ON AUGUST 16, 1983,
RESPONDENT COURT ISSUED ITS NOW ASSAILED RESOLUTION DENYING PETITIONERS’ MOTION
FOR EXTENSION AND DISMISSING THE APPEAL. 
THE SAID RE­SOLUTION IS QUOTED AS FOLLOWS:

“CONSIDERING APPELLANTS’ ‘URGENT MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF
TIME TO FILE APPELLANTS’ BRIEF’ FILED ON
JULY 16, 1983 AND
APPELLEE’S OPPOSITION TO ‘URGENT MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE BRIEF’
FILED ON JULY 25, 1983, AND IT APPEARING THAT THE NOTICE TO FILE APPELLANTS’ BRIEF
DATED MARCH 30, 1983 WAS
RECEIVED BY APPELLANTS ON APRIL 11, 1983
(P. 21, ROLLO); AND HENCE APPELLANTS’ ‘URGENT
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE APPELLANTS’ BRIEF’ WAS FILED WAY BEYOND
THE REGLE­MENTARY PERIOD, THE COURT RESOLVED TO DENY THE MOTION FOR EXTENSION AND TO DISMISS THE APPEAL OF DEFENDANTS-APPEL­LANTS (SECTION 1[F], RULE 50 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT).”

HENCE, THIS PETITION AFTER THEIR MOTION FOR RECON­SIDERATION WAS
DENIED.  PETITIONERS ASSIGN THE FOLLOWING
ERRORS:

1. THE RESPONDENT
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL CONTRARY TO LAW AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE LAID DOWN BY THIS HON. COURT, AND

2.  THE RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FILING OF PETITIONERS’ “MOTION TO LIFT THE ORDER
TO FILE APPELLANTS BRIEF”, DID NOT SUSPEND THE PERIOD TO FILE APPELLANTS
BRIEF.

WHICH ESSENTIALLY BOILS DOWN TO THE ISSUE
OF WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PETITIONERS’ APPEAL.

SECTION 1 OF RULE 50 OF
THE REVISED RULES OF COURT PROVIDES –

“SECTION 1.  GROUNDS FOR
DISMISSAL OF APPEAL – AN APPEAL MAY BE DISMISSED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, ON
ITS OWN MO­TION OR ON THAT OF THE APPELLEE, ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS –

X X X

(F) FAILURE OF THE APPELLANT
OR OF HIS PRINTER TO SERVE AND FILE THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF COPIES OF HIS BRIEF
WITHIN THE TIME PROVIDED BY THESE RULES;”

AS ALLEGED BY PETITIONERS THEMSELVES, THE 45-DAY REGLEMENTARY
PERIOD TO FILE THEIR APPELLANTS’ BRIEF WAS TO EXPIRE IN MAY 26, 1983. 
CLEARLY THEN, THE BRIEF FILED ON AUGUST 12, 1983 WAS FILED OUT OF TIME. 
THIS, UNDER THE AFOREQUOTED RULE, WARRANTS THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL.

IN SOME CASES WE HAVE ALLOWED THE FILING OF AN APPEAL WHERE A STRINGENT
APPLICATION OF THE RULES WOULD HAVE DENIED IT, BUT ONLY WHEN TO DO SO WOULD
SERVE THE DEMANDS OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND IN THE EXERCISE OF OUR EQUITY
JURISDICTION.

WE HAVE REVIEWED THE RECORDS OF THIS CASE IN OUR DESIRE TO RELAX
THE RULES BECAUSE ANYWAY PETITIONERS, BEFORE THE ISSUANCE OF THE ASSAILED
RESOLUTION DISMISSING THEIR APPEAL, HAD ALREADY FILED THEIR APPELLANTS’
BRIEF.  BUT WE FIND THE CASE OF
PETITIONERS PATENTLY UNMERITO­RIOUS.  IN
THEIR ATTEMPT TO ESCAPE LIABILITY, PETITION­ER EDGARDO TOLEDO DENIES HAVING
RECEIVED THE CAR IN QUESTION, HE ALSO DENIES HIS SIGNATURE ON THE PROMISSORY
NOTE AND IN THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

THIS, HOWEVER, IS CONTRADICTED BY THE FINDINGS OF THE CITY FISCAL
OF QUEZON CITY THROUGH ASSISTANT FISCAL FELIX M. CARIÑO, IN AN ESTAFA CASE UNDER ART. 319, PAR. 2 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, THE PERTINENT PORTION OF WHICH READS –

“THE RESPONDENT DENIES HAVING RECEIVED THE CAR IN QUESTION; HE
ALSO DENIED HIS SIGNATURE ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND IN THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE
SUBMITTED BY THE COMPLAIN­ANT.

THE DENIAL OF THE RESPONDENT OF RECEIPT OF THE CAR IS OVERCOME BY
FABAR SALES, INC. INVOICE NO. 4371, AND HIS
DENIAL OF HIS ALLEGED SIGNATURES ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND CHATTEL MORTGAGE
ARE DEFENSES WHICH HE MUST PROVE WITH COMPETENT EVIDENCE ASIDE FROM HIS DENIAL
AS THE SAID DOCUMENTS APPEAR ON THEIR FACE TO HAVE BEEN REGULARLY EXECU­TED.  FURTHERMORE, HIS SIGNATURE IN THE DEED OF
SALE OF THE CAR TO EMILIO BALANGUE DATED OCTOBER 30, 1978, WHICH HE DOES NOT QUESTION, ARE VERY SIMILAR TO THE
SIGNATURES IN THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND IN THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

FINDING NO MERIT TO THE DEFENSES OF RESPONDENT AND FINDING THAT THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BY COMPLAINANT, THE
UNDERSIGNED INVESTIGATING FISCAL HEREBY RECOMMENDS THE FILING OF AN INFORMATION
IN THE CITY COURT OF QUEZON CITY AGAINST MSSR. EDGARDO TOLEDO FOR VIOLATION OF
PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE 319 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

BAIL RECOMMENDED FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY IS FIXED AT P1,000.00.

QUEZON CITY, PHILIPPINES, MAY 22,
1981.

S/ ILLEGIBLE

T/ FELIX M. CARIÑO

ASSISTANT CITY
FISCAL”

(PP. 117-118, ROLLO)

IN THE CASE OF VDA. DE CRISOLOGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS (137 SCRA 238) WE RULED:

“ON CERTAIN OCCASIONS, THIS COURT HAS ALLOWED THE FILING OF AN
APPEAL OUTSIDE THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY LAW IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.  EMPHATIC IN THE DECISIONS CITED BY THE
PETITIONER ARE STRONG CONSIDERATIONS OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.  THE PRESENT CASE DOES NOT WARRANT SUCH
LIBERALLY BECAUSE THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IS SATISFACTORILY SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORDS.”

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS DENIED. 
COSTS AGAINST PETITIONERS.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz,
and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

* PENNED BY JUSTICE RAMON G.
GAVIOLA, JR. WITH JUSTICES EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA AND MA. ROSARIO QUETULIO-LOSA,
CONCURRING.

** PENNED BY JUDGE JOSE P. ALEJANDRO.