JOSE CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND CESAR SANTIAGO, RESPONDENTS.

A petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent
appellate court affirming in toto the decision of the former Court of
First Instance of Bulacan sentencing petitioner as defendant below to
pay respondent-plaintiff Cesar Santiago the sums of P5,000 as moral
damages, P2,000 as exemplary damages, P2,000 as attorney’s fees and the
cost of suit.

The above-said damages were awarded to respondent for alleged malicious
prosecution by petitioner against him arising from three separate
complaints that petitioner (executive vice president and general manager
of the Baliuag Electric Light and Power Co., Inc.) had filed in 1972-74
for alleged estafa against said respondent based on a personal check
that said respondent had issued in the amount of P2,000 in favor of the
said electric company as partial payment of the ice plant’s electric
bill in the total sum of P14,733.60, which check, however, when
presented to the bank was dishonored. (Said respondent is said to be
the manager of the ice plant’s office owned by his father.) The said
criminal complaint was filed by petitioner with the office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan which dismissed it on January 3, 1973 “for
being civil in nature.” In May and June, 1974, respondent was advised to
report to the Philippine Constabulary Headquarters at San Rafael,
Bulacan and to the Civil Relations Office headed by Col. Noel Andaya
with regards to the same complaint for alleged estafa which said
agencies, however, dismissed upon being advised of the Provincial
Fiscal’s resolution. Thereafter, on August 29, 1974, respondent
instituted this civil action for damages against petitioner based on
alleged malicious prosecution and alleging that “in bringing said
actions, the defendant [petitioner] acted without probable cause and was
actuated or impelled by legal malice.” Respondent appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s judgment for damages stating that from the
filing of the various complaints “it can be concluded with certitude
that appellant’s actuation was primarily intended to harass or vex the
appellee.”

The Court finds no factual nor legal basis for the conclusion that
petitioner’s filing of his complaints was “primarily intended to harass
or vex the appellee.” Prescinding from the certification issued by the
Commanding Officer of the Philippine Constabulary Headquarters at San
Rafael, Bulacan that petitioner had not filed nor signed any complaint
against respondent, the acts of petitioner as an official of the
electric company in filing the criminal complaint with the Provincial
Fiscal’s office for alleged estafa because of the rubber check issued by
respondent cannot be said to be malicious nor an act of harassment.
Petitioner was merely pursuing his company’s lawful cause of action
against respondent for what he believed to be a criminal act of issuing
checks without funds. The same can be said of the complaints that were
apparently filed by petitioner with the Philippine Constabulary and the
Civil Relations Office for assistance in connection with the matter.
Noteworthy also is part of the answer made by petitioner in his answer
in the trial court “that the subject matter of this complaint in the
amount of P2,000 [covered by the rubber check of respondent] has not yet
been paid up to the present time,” as reproduced in the appellate
court’s decision (Rec., p. 28).

In fine, no valid conclusion of malice in petitioner’s pursuit on behalf
of the electric company of the various actions taken by him with the
various agencies to compel respondent to answer for his issuance of the
rubber check (in supposed payment of the electric bill due and owing
from respondent’s ice plant to petitioner’s company) can be drawn from
the admitted evidence of record. Malice and bad faith cannot be
presumed. It may be noted furthermore that the legal question of
whether the issuance of such bouncing check constitutes estafa under the
Padilla amendment of Art. 315, sec. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code
(Republic Act No. 4885 approved on June 17, 1967), which according to
its author, former Senator Ambrosio Padilla, was intended to penalize
the issuance of checks without funds (bouncing or rubber checks) [Book
II, Vol. 3, pp. 366-367], even though the check is issued in payment of a
pre-existing obligation, was not resolved until this Court’s negative
decision on November 20, 1978 in the cases of People vs. Sabio, Sr.,
Liap vs. Court of Appeals and Lagus vs. Hon. Cusi, Jr. (86 SCRA 568).
Many criminal cases were filed in court under the said Act on the
premise that the issuance of bouncing checks was thereby made a criminal
act of swindling. The Court’s decision was by a bare majority of eight
members with four members led by the now Chief Justice dissenting.
Under such circumstances, petitioner’s act of pursuing his criminal
complaint could not be said to be tainted with malice. It is a matter
of common knowledge that thereafter, B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted on April
3, 1979 making the act of issuance of a check without sufficient funds a
special criminal offense.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved, dispens­ing with further proceedings
and the filing of briefs or memoranda, to GRANT the petition and to SET
ASIDE the decision of respondent appellate court. With costs against
private respondent in all instances.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.