RICARDO P. PRESBITERO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND HELEN CARAM NAVA, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

Petitioner is the executor of the estate of Esperidion Presbitero under
Special Proceeding No. 9236 of the then Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental.

On June 15, 1963, as such executor, he filed with the then Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint which was docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 7011 against herein respondent Helen Caram
Nava, praying that judgment be rendered:

“(a) Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P32,102.55 with legal interest from the filing of this case, as the net
value of the sugar of the Estate of Esperidion Presbitero, that she took
from the Ma-ao Sugar Central and sold without waiting for the courts to
decide by the final judgment whether she had legally acquired the
ownership of the sugar quotas that the Provincial Sheriff had sold at
public auction;

“(b) Ordering the defendant to vacate the two (2) hectares of
palay land within Lot 608 of Valladolid that is in her possession, and
to pay to the plaintiff the value of the products or fruits of the said
two (2) hectares at the rate of 25 cavans of palay per hectare per year
from October 19, 1960 until she vacates the said land;

“(c) Ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P23,000.00 as damages and attorney’s fees, plus an additional P2,000.00
if this case should reach a higher court; from all of which the
plaintiff may deduct the sum of P17,500.00 in lieu of a 7-hectare
portion of Lot 608 of Valladolid, and the damages awarded to her by the
Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. 3492 of this Court;

“(d) The plaintiff further prays for all other remedies to which
he is entitled in law and in equity, with costs to the defendant.” (pp.
4-5, Petitioner-Appellant’s Brief)

In her Amended Answer respondent Nava, among others, alleged that the
decision of the Supreme Court in G. R. No. L-19527, “declaring null and
void the deed of sale executed on November 7, 1960, by the Provincial
Sheriff in favor of the herein defendant of the sugar quota allocations
above-mentioned, had the effect of reviving, as it has revived, the now
final decision of the Hon. Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. L-20879-R
wherein Esperidion Presbitero was ordered to:

‘execute in favor of the plaintiff, within 30 days from the time this
judg­ment becomes final, a deed of reconveyance Lot No. 788 of the
cadastral survey of Valladolid, free from all liens and encumbrances,
and another deed of reconveyance of a 7-hectare portion of Lot No. 608
of the same cadastral survey, also free from all liens and encumbrances,
or, upon failure to do so, pay to the plaintiff the value of each of
the said properties, as may be determined by the Court a quo upon
evidence to be presented by the parties before it. The defendant is
further adjudged to pay to the plaintiff the value of the products
received by him from the 5-hectare portion of Lot No. 608 which has
remained in his possession, equivalent to 25 cavans of palay per
1hectare every year, or 125 cavans yearly, at the rate of P10.00 per
cavan, from 1951 until possession of said 5-hectare portion is finally
delivered to the plaintiff, with legal interest thereon from the time
the complaint was filed; and to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P1,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees, plus cost’;

and prayed that:

‘b) The plaintiff be ordered to reconvey unto the defendant seven hectares of Lot 608 of Valladolid Occidental Negros;

‘c) The plaintiff be sentenced to pay the defendant the sum of
P22,662.02 representing the balance of the amount that Esperidion
Presbitero should have paid the defendant according to the decision
Annex ‘A’ of the answer, and P13,000.00 as damages and attorney’s fees,
and treble the cost of this proceeding.’ ” (pp. 5-7, Petitioner-
Appellant’s Brief)

On May 31, 1965, the trial Court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“The Court does not see any jus­tification in plaintiff’s claim
for damages simply because if the defendant did not sell the sugar
rental at an early date, same sugar could have been sold at the maximum
price of sugar prevailing in 1963. It should be borne in mind that if
the plaintiff or his father had complied with the judgment rendered by
the appellate Court by paying the defendant the sum of P17,500.00 as
demanded by her and implemented in a writ of execution, the plaintiff
would have received the rental due the estate in the year 1962 and the
chances are that the plaintiff would have sold the same sugar rental in
the very same month the said sugar rental was sold in the month of April
1962.

“As a matter of fact, the subsequent litigation in the appellate
Court for certiorari and the issuance of the preliminary writ of
injunction was a blessing in disguise in favor of the plain-sic.
(plaintiff) sugar rental corresponding to the year 1962 was not sold
earlier and waited until the sugar rentals corresponding to the year
1962 were sold at the maximum price of about P46.00 in the year 1963.
The plaintiff should thank the defendant for the action taken by her.
Any other creditor who obtained a judgment in his favor would have done
the same action as the defendant did in securing a writ of execution
when the debtor failed to pay his obligation.. The plaintiff or his
father could have easily paid the defendant the amount of P17,500.00,
taking into consideration that the value of the estate of the plaintiff
or his father is worth over a million pesos. Furthermore, the defendant
in selling the quota in public auction and selling later the sugar
rentals collected by her, did in good faith because her action was
undoubtedly supported by Branch V of this Court.

“With respect to the second issue, the Court believes that
inasmuch as the defendant has already signified in writing and approved
by the Court that she had chosen to receive the amount of P17,500.00 in
lieu of the delivery of 7-hectare portion of Lot 608, Valladolid
Cadastre, said choice of the defendant should stay undisturbed. It
should be recalled that if delay there was in the delivery of the
7-hectare portion of Lot 608 it was due to the segregation, survey and
approval by the Director of Lands in the subdivision plan. Failure to
deliver the 7-hectare portion was not a deliberate refusal of plaintiff
and his predecessor. And defendant formally demanded the payment of
P17,500.00 in lieu of the said portion of land. Indeed, plaintiff was
rather remiss in not paying promptly the said amount. Plaintiff’s
requirement to have the defendant present a claim in the intestate
proceeding of the late Esperidion Presbitero is unnecessary inasmuch as
the obligation to pay arose before the death of the deceased and the
plaintiff could have included the judgment amount in his inventory, for
which he was and is in duty bound to pay without resorting to the
cumbersome and impractical adherence to rules and technicalities of the
law. Evidently, defendant did not file her claim in the intestate
proceeding because lately she preferred to take delivery of the
7-hectare portion of Lot 608, after realizing that the value of the
land had risen. This Court does not sanction a seesaw stand in this
particular issue. Defendant is estopped to take delivery of the lot,
the moment she filed in Court her preference to be paid P17,500.00 in
lieu of said portion of land.

“All the judgment amounts stated in the decision of the Court of
Appeals in Civil Case No. 3492 which plaintiff should pay to the
defendant, including the P17,500.00 value of the 7-hectare portion of
Lot 608 should be offset from the amount of P19,917.70 proceeds of the
sugar rental sold by the defendant.” (pp. 7-10, Petitioner-Appel­lant’s
Brief)

The foregoing judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeals which
rendered a decision with the dispositive portion as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the decision is affirmed as regards the appeal of the
plaintiff, Ricardo P. Presbitero, and reversed as to the appeal of the
defendant Helen Caram Nava. The plaintiff-appellant is hereby ordered
to reconvey to the defendant-appellant the portion of seven hectares of
Lot No. 608 of the Cadastral Survey of Valladolid, Negros Occidental and
to deliver to her the possession of five hectares of said portion which
has remained with the plaintiff and to pay the defendant-appellant 125
sacks of palay a year from 1951, representing the products received by
Esperidion Presbitero and, after his death, by his estate, or pay to
said defendant-appellant the current price thereof, until said
possession is finally delivered to Helen Caram Nava and to pay the
costs.” (pp. 10-11, Id.)

In this appeal before Us, petitioner submits that respondent Court of
Appeals erred in altering or modifying a judgment which has not only
been final and executory but has also been executed in part and prayed
“that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed, and
that the judgment in CA-G.R. No. 20879-R (Civil Case No. 3492 of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental), in so far as reconveyance
of Lot No. 788 and 7 hectares of Lot 608, both of the cadastral survey
of Valladolid, Negros Occidental, be declared as having (been)
satisfied, and that the value of the palay which the petitioner
appellant has been ordered to pay be fixed at the rate of P10.00 per
cavan in accordance with the judgment in said CA-G.R. No. 20879-R; it
being further prayed that the petitioner-appellant be granted such other
and further relief as may be deemed just and equitable, under the
premises.” (pp. 1-2, Respondent-Appellees Brief)

On March 23, 1972, the Court gave due course to the petition “only and solely with respect to the legal issue of whether that portion of the judgment in CA-G.R. No. 37027-R which reads:

‘… The plaintiff-appellant is hereby ordered to pay … the
defendant-appellant 125 sacks of palay a year from 1951, representing
the products received by Esperidion Presbitero and, after his death, by
his estate, or pay to said defendant-appellant the current price thereof…’

has modified that portion of the judgment in CA. G.R. No. 20879-R which reads:

‘ . . . The defendant is further adjudged to pay the plaintiff the
value of the products received by him from the 5-hectare portion of Lot
No. 608, … equivalent to 25 cavans of palay per hectare every year,
or 125 cavans yearly, at the rate of P10.00 per cavan. . .’ ” (p. 195,
Rollo)

Private respondent Helen Caram Nava submits the proposition that:

“The Honorable Court of Appeals did not modify or alter
substantially the decision in CA-G.R. No. 20879-R (Civil Case No. 3492
of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros) when it ordered the
second case, CA G.R. No. 37027 (Civil Case No. 7011 of the Court of
First Instance of Occi­dental Negros) from which the appeal herein was
taken, that herein peti­tioner, Ricardo P. Presbitero, should pay the
125 cavans of palay in question at its current price instead of P10.00
per cavan as ordered in the first decision and that the only substantial
amendment in the decision consisted of the abolition of the attorney’s
fees in the sum of P1,000.00 which petitioner was ordered to pay counsel
for herein private respondent (plaintiff in said first civil case).”
(pp. 3-4, Respondent-Appellee’s Brief)

In its decision in CA-G.R. No. 20879-R (Civil Case No. 3492 of the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Caram vs. Presbitero) the then
Court of Appeals ordered herein petitioner to deliver, among others:

” x x x                                    x x x                             x x x.

“3. Value of products received by defendant
(petitioner-appellant) from 5 ha. portion of Lot 608 equivalent to 20
cavans of palay (this should be 25 cavans) or 125 cavans yearly at the
rate of P10.00 per cavan from 1951 until possession of lot is delivered,
with interest at legal rate from filing of the complaint;” (p. 5, Id.)

And, in its decision in CA- G.R. No. 37027-R (Presbitero vs. Caram),
said appellate court, among others, made the following award against
herein petitioner-appellant:

“ x x x                                    x x x                             x x x

“2. Payment to defendant-appellant of 125 sacks of palay a year
from 1951, representing the products received by Esperidion Presbitero
and, after his death, by his estate, or to pay to said
defendant-appellant the current price thereof, until possession is
finally delivered;” (p. 5-6, id.)

The appeal lacks merit.

When respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 20879-R ordered herein
petitioner to pay yearly the value of 125 cavans of palay at the rate of
P10.00 per cavan, it is clear that petitioner is to pay whatever is the
price of the palay for the current year. Ten pesos (P10.00) per cavan
is obviously the price of the palay at the time the decision was
rendered. It cannot mean that in the succeeding years the price would
still be the same; otherwise, the appellate court did unwittingly fix
the price at P10.00 per cavan in all the years to come, until delivery
of the land is made. The proper wordings should have been “the current
rate of P10.00 per cavan” which means that whenever peti­tioner shall
deliver the 125 cavans of palay he may pay the current price at the
time. To say that the price of palay is anchored at P10.00 per cavan
regardless of the time delivery thereof is made to the private
respondent would be unfair to the latter considering that the price goes
up every year. As aptly pointed out in the appellate court’s decision:

“x x x If there is any ‘see saw attitude’ in the instant case it
is that of plaintiff herein Presbitero who avoided the delivery of the
pro­perty putting up one excuse after another and when Helen Caram Nava
resigned herself to receiving only the market value of said lots and
succeeded in securing the sale of the sugar quotas in question to
satisfy that portion of the judgment, Presbitero objected although at
the time the estate had the money to pay the value of the lot and sought
to invalidate said sale which he succeeded in doing, and now that the
value of real property is up and the value of money is down, he resorts
to the present complaint to compel Helen Caram Nava to accept the
P17,500.00 in lieu of the 7 hectares of Lot 608. To our mind it is that
kind of a conduct as displayed by plaintiff Presbitero which deserves
censure instead of a reward.” (pp. 120-121, Rollo)

The same could be true with respect to the delivery of the palay. Delay
in its delivery to the private respondent would be advantageous to the
obligor because even if the price goes up as in fact it did, he would
pay P10.00 per cavan only. As stated in Filipino Legion Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, 56 SCRA 674:

“Where there is ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the
dis­positive portion of a decision the court may clarify such ambiguity
by an amendment even after the judgment had become final, and for this
purpose it may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties, the court’s
findings of facts and conclusions of law as expressed in the body of
the decision. The correction of a clerical error is an exception to the
general rule that no amendment or correction may be made by the court
in its judgment once the latter had become final.”

ACCORDINGLY, on this legal issue alone as called for in the resolution
of this Court, dated March 23, 1972, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.