PERFECTO DEL ROSARIO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. ALFREDO A. ROSERO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XXVI, NAGA CITY, RESPONDENT.

The Court resolved to give due course to the petition, to
consider the comment of the Solicitor General as a responsive pleading, and to
decide the case.

As recounted by the Solicitor General in his comment, it is
undisputed that on February 16, 1983, petitioner was charged with theft of some
articles valued at Three Hundred Seventy-Five (P375.00) Pesos. Petitioner was detained for failure to post
bail. Assisted by CLAO counsel, upon
arraign­ment, petitioner pleaded guilty. In a decision dated May 5, 1983 but promulgated on May 11, 1983 at 2
o’clock in the afternoon, respondent Judge Alfredo A. Rosero sentenced him to
an indeterminate imprisonment of from six months as minimum to one year and one
month as maximum and to pay the offended party the sum of P375.00, crediting
him however with the entire period of his preventive imprisonment.

Immediately after the sentence was read to petitioner, respondent
Judge issued a “Commit­ment on Final Sentence” that very same day,
May 11, 1983, addressed to the Provincial Jail Warden to whom the petitioner
was committed. Also, that very same
day, May 11, 1983, petitioner prepared his application for probation which was
received by the Court on May 18, 1983.

On May 20, 1983, respondent Judge denied the application for
probation on the ground that “the sentence of conviction became final and
executory on May 11, 1983, when the accused actually commenced to serve his
sentence.”

On June 7, 1983, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order dated May 20, 1983 denying his application for probation, on the
ground that his having been whisked to jail on May 11, 1983 did not constitute
the commence­ment of the service of sentence as the judgment promulgated on May
11, 1983 had not yet become final on May 18, 1983 when he filed his application
for probation. Said motion for
reconsideration was denied by the respondent Judge in a resolution dated June
21, 1983.

Hence, this petition, which We find very meritorious.

The respondent Judge committed a grave error. The judgment of conviction did not become
final by the mere fact that petitioner was sent back to jail. The petitioner had no choice but to go back
to jail since he could not post bail for his provisional liberty before
arraignment and after the reading of the sentence to him. He had fifteen days from the promulgation of
the judgment within which to appeal or to file an application for
probation. As a matter of fact, he
prepared his application for probation that very same day, May 11, 1983 when
the judgment of conviction was promulgated and his application was filed on May
18, 1983. A judge cannot make his
decision final by simply issuing a commitment order immediately after the
reading of the sentence that very same afternoon of May 11, 1983. Respondent Judge practically amended
Sections 6 & 7 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court without any legal
authority therefor.

It should be stressed
that petitioner’s returning to jail after the reading of the sen­tence, as aptly stated by the Solicitor
General, was simply a continuation of his detention due to his inability to post bail from the time he was arrested, and petitioner thereby did not actually commence
any service of the sentence.

The respondent Judge
acted very precipitately in issuing the commitment order as well as in denying
the application for probation filed by petitioner. He should have hearkened to the teachings in the cases cited by
the Solicitor General (Flores vs. Dalisay, 84 SCRA 46
[1978]; Mabuhay Ins. & Guaranty Inc. vs. CA, L-28700, March 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 245; People vs.
Valle & Alto Surety & Ins. Co., Inc., 117 Phil. 1034; People vs. Rodillas, et al., 89 Phil. 99;
People vs. Prieto, 2 CA-Rep. 180). He failed to obey the principle that criminal laws should be liberally
interpreted in favor of the accused. In
the application of the probation law, a judge like the respondent herein,
should, as much as possible, adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the accused,
since the evident purpose of the probation law is to afford the accused a chance to
reform and rehabi­litate himself without the stigma of a prison record, to save
government funds that may otherwise be spent for his food and maintenance while
incarcerated, and to decongest the jails of the country.

It should be emphasized that Batas Pambansa Blg. 76 enacted on June 13, 1980, amending the Probation Law of 1976, otherwise
known as P.D. No. 968, as amended, disqualifies from availing of the benefits of the probation
law, those: (a) sentenced to serve a
maximum imprisonment of more than six [6] years and one [1]
day; (b) those convicted of any
offense against the security of the State; (c) those previously con­victed by
final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one [1]
month and one [1] day and/or a fine of not more than P200.00; and (d) those who
have been once on probation under said decree.

Batas Pambansa Blg. 75
however allows even those sentenced to 6 years and 1 day imprisonment on
January 3, 1978 to apply for probation (Sec. 2, B.P. Blg. 75). The
petitioner is entitled to greater liberality in the application of the said
probation law because his maximum sentence was only one year and one
day.

Because petitioner was detained for over six months, as he was
denied probation since May 20, 1983, aside from the fact that he had been
detained since his arrest in or about February, 1983, the Solicitor General
recommends the immediate release of petitioner, which recommenda­tion is
meritorious.

WHEREFORE, THE ORDERS OF RESPONDENT DATED MAY 20, 1983
AND JUNE 21, 1983 ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE
AS NULL AND VOID AND THE IMMEDIATE
RELEASE OF HEREIN PETITIONER, PERFECTO DEL ROSARIO, JR., IS HEREBY ORDERED
UNLESS HE IS HELD ON OTHER VALID
CHARGES. NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.

Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Escolin, JJ., concur.