STEPHEN L. MONSANTO, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. POMPEYO L. PALARCA, CITY JUDGE, ILIGAN CITY COURT, RESPONDENT.

In a verified complaint dated January 3, 1978, com­plainant Atty.
Stephen L. Monsanto charged City Judge Pompeyo L. Palarca of the City Court of
Iligan City, who has been reappointed City Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Branch
I, Iligan City, 12th Judicial District, following the reorganization of the
Judiciary pursuant to the Judi­ciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (Batas 129) of
gross ignorance of the law and/or gross incompetence warranting dismissal from
the Judiciary. In support of these
charges, complainant attached to the complaint documentary evidence to prove
the veracity of his accusations.

As synthesized by Deputy Court Administrator Leo D. Medialdea in
his Memorandum to the Chief Justice dated February 27, 1981, the complaint
together with the annexed documents points out the following issues for the
Court’s consideration, to wit:

“1.  In at least thirty (30) criminal cases decided by the respondent
judge from October 31, 1969 to November 17, 1977, he had prescribed the penalty
of subsidiary imprisonment in case of incapacity of the committed prisoner to
pay the indemnity imposed in addition to the principal penalty (Exhibits
“A”-“A-29”, “K”,
“K-1”-“K-13”), which imposition is in violation of Republic
Act No. 5465, abolishing subsidiary imprison­ment for civil indemnity or
liability, which took effect on April 21, 1969 as an amendment to Article 39 of
the Revised Penal Code.

2.      Respondent
Judge refused permission for complainant to examine the Docket Books for
Criminal Cases of the City Court of Iligan City despite repeated requests from
the com­plainant (Exhibits “E” and “F”), in violation of
Rule 135, Section 2 of the Rules of Court until the Honorable Nathaniel M.
Grospe, Exe­cutive Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Iligan City, wrote the
respondent judge urging him to grant the permission requested by the complain­ant
for the reason that under the circumstances, there is no rule or law that would
serve as basis in denying the complainant the privilege of examining the Docket
Books of Criminal Cases of the City Court of Iligan City. The Execu­tive Judge advised respondent to
allow complainant to have access to the criminal docket books should the latter
express a desire to do so, further venturing the comment that ‘the
administration of justice would be better served thus, specially so as in this
case where the interested party is a member of the bar and a practicing
lawyer.’ (Exhibits “G” and “H”).

3.      In
the transcripts of the stenographic notes of several hearings in the cases of
People of the Philippines vs. Ramona Vda. de Geonson and People of the
Philippines vs. Asuncion Surban, complainant tried to show the Court in
recorded documents the overbearing manner, and apparent partiality of
respondent judge against the complainant and his clients. (Rollo, pp. 50-58).

4.      In
the particular case of People of the Philippines vs. Cornelio Surban, Criminal
Case No. 10102-AF for serious physical injuries, the records show that
respondent judge imposed subsidiary imprisonment upon the accused, Cor­nelio
Surban, in case of accused’s incapacity to pay the damages imposed in addition
to the principal penalty, in a decision dated October 5, 1977. As a result of this wrongful imposi­tion,
Cornelio Surban suffered incarceration for two (2) days and four (4) hours more
than the legal period of time he would have served if the subsidiary imprisonment
were not added to his prison term inspite of complainant’s protests for
correction of the illegal imposi­tion of the subsidiary imprisonment. (Rollo, pp. 7-12 and 26, Exh.
“A”).

5.      The
respondent judge had been scolding and upbraiding the accused and counsel in
open court, in the full view of the public. (Rollo, pp. 8; 18-19).

6.      In
the case of People vs. Banaan, Criminal Cases Nos. 12094-AF, 12095-AF and
12044-AF and People vs. Lapida docketed as Criminal Case No. 699-V-120 of the
Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, com­plainant charged respondent
judge of reckless disregard of the Rules of Court regard­ing the procedure in
conducting preliminary examinations and investigations in criminal cases before
the issuance of warrants of arrests. In
these cases which are not iso­lated cases according to the complainant, the
warrants of arrest were issued before the preliminary examinations and investi­gations
were made. Preliminary examinations and
investigations were allegedly made in a haphazard manner without due regard to
finding out if there were probable causes that the crimes charged were
committed. (Rollo, pp. 13-17).

Respondent Judge was required on January 25, 1978 to submit his
comment to the verified complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice,
and was received by the Court on February 28, 1978. To refute the charges of the com­plainant, respondent raised the
following contentions simi­larly drawn-up by Deputy Court Administrator
Medialdea in his Memorandum to the Chief Justice, to wit:

“1. Respondent
admitted having imposed subsidiary imprisonment on Cornelia Surban, the accused
in Criminal Case No. 10102-AF, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment of
ONE MONTH and ONE DAY, in case of insolvency in paying the indemnity of P1,000.00
for the injuries sustained by the offended party, but he claimed that such
imposition was done without malice on his part, further explaining that upon
being apprised of his mistake, he immediately rectified the same by issuing an
Order amend­ing the decision containing the aforesaid subsidiary imprisonment
clause on November 2, 1977. However,
the inclusion of the pro­vision pertaining to subsidiary imprisonment in the
Order of Commitment of Cornelia Surban was a clerical inadvertence and he tried
to extricate himself by explaining that he took immediate steps to correct said
error upon realizing the same, so that the concerned prisoner did not suffer
any part of the sub­sidiary imprisonment mistakenly written in the Commitment
Order but in fact he was released two (2) days before the completion of his
principal penalty. Respondent,
therefore, contended that since he had ordered the deletion of the subsidiary
imprisonment clause before any harm could be done, he incurred no liability,
either criminal or administrative. (Rollo, pp. 78-81).

2.  It is true that he denied permission to
complainant to examine the public records of the City Court of Iligan City but
said denial was prompted by his desire as head of the office and custodian of
its records to protect the integrity of those records, to prevent their loss
and to see to it that said records do not fall into unauthorized hands. (Rollo, pp. 81-82).

3.  Picking out the cases of People of the
Philippines vs. George Bado for Theft, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11392-AF
by way of explaining the imposition of subsi­diary imprisonment which
respondent claimed was a mere clerical error that was corrected immediately
upon his learning of the mistake; People of the Philippines vs. Lacida, et al.,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 12454-AF and People of the Philippines vs.
Banaan, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 12094-AF; 12044-AF; and 12095-AF in
which respondent judge was charged to have issued warrants of arrest against
the accused before the preliminary examination and investigation required by
law was conducted by him, from among the varied and numerous recorded criminal
cases illustrated by complainant to prove the lat­ter’s charges, respondent
judge raised the defense of waiver on the part of accused and their respective
counsel and clerical error committed by his clerk in writing June 24, 1977 as
the date that the Warrant of Ar­rest of Lacida was signed by him instead of
June 29, 1977 which was the real and actual date.”

Respondent Judge, in his Comment, submitted the following, with
reference to the other cases cited by complainant:

“(a)  the accused in said cases had already served
their corresponding sentences;

“(b)  the accused in said cases were duly
represented by counsel;

“(c)  the accused and their counsel in said cases
could have appealed the erroneous decisions assuming they were erroneous;

“(d)  the accused and their counsel in said cases
did not appeal the supposedly erroneous decisions;

“(e)  the accused and their counsel in said cases
could have filed habeas corpus proceedings but they did not file such
proceedings.

“In other words, the accused and their counsel could have
called the attention of the undersigned to the allegedly erroneous
decisions. They did not. They could have gone to the appellate courts
to correct such erroneous decisions. They did not. In short, there
was no judicial finding that such decisions were erroneous. Having failed to question the decisions in
the proper appellate forum, the accused in said cases are deemed to have waived
their rights to appeal, for the right to appeal ‘is not an inherent right of a
convicted person.’ (Fran­cisco, Criminal Procedure, Second Edition, 1969, p.
880). ‘He may avail of it or not, as he
pleases. He may waive it either
expressly or by implication.’ (Francisco, supra, p. 880-881). To correct those decisions, appeal was the
proper remedy (Francisco, supra, p. 882), and not to hold the judge
rendering them administratively accountable.

‘To hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous
ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing
short of harassment and would make his position unbearable.’ (Dizon vs. De
Borja, 57 SCRA 48).’

“By way of information, the undersigned has been the City
Judge for twenty-four (24) years now. Until recently, he was the only judge in the only City Court of Iligan,
hearing and calendaring fifteen (15) to twenty (20) cases for trial every day
aside from hearing motions and incidental matters. In addition thereto, he had to attend to the administrative
functions of his Office. Errors under
such a situation or circumstance are to be expected. After all, to borrow an expression, there is a limit to human
endurance. The undersigned might have
erred for after all he is only human. Errare
humanum est. He might have erred,
but again to borrow an expression, ‘with malice towards none.'”

By way of Counter-Complaint, respondent Judge charged the
complainant for using and employing offensive and abusive language in his
complaint, citing one by one the pertinent passages (Rollo, pp. 88-90) for
which complainant should be punished for contempt. He further prayed that the complaint be dismissed and stricken
from the records. To substantiate his
defenses, respondent Judge submitted Annexes “i” to “4”
(Rollo, pp. 94-97).

On February 16, 1978, complainant submitted to the Court an
Urgent Petition for Preventive Suspension of the Respondent, citing among other
things his reasons, as follows: (1)
respondent judge’s ignorance of the law which appears to be incorrigible
because he continues to illegally impose subsidiary imprisonment despite the
numerous calls for correction; (2) respondent judge’s lack of judicial decorum
and propriety; (3) respondent judge’s non-observance of the rules of procedure
requiring punctuality and main­tenance of dignity of the court; (4) respondent
judge’s oppression of litigants and their counsel; and (5) respondent judge’s
lack of consideration of the local I.B.P. His con­tinued stay in the bench, the petition averred, would alle­gedly
cause immeasurable harm to the administration of justice and the image of the
New Society in that part of the country. (Rollo, pp. 98-105).

Acting on the petition for preventive suspension, the Court in
its Resolution dated March 31, 1978 required res­pondent Judge to comment on
the petition, and at the same time referred the complaint to Executive Judge
Nathaniel Grospe of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Iligan City
for investigation, report and recommendation.

Complying with the above Court resolution, respondent Judge
submitted his comments wherein he adopted, reiterated and reproduced all the
allegations and defenses contained in his comments dated February 28,
1978. He stated further that the
preventive suspension sought by complainant is not proper for lack of
sufficient legal and factual justification, claiming moreover that despite the
insolent conduct of complainant in court, respondent had been courteous to him
because the latter is young and inexperienced and that com­plainant had not
submitted anything concrete or definite to support his allegations in the
petition which merely aver general sweeping statements without specific
basis. Respondent further stressed that
in his past 25 years as a judge, he had never acted with malice, had always
shown courtesy to counsel and litigants, although he was ready to utilize his
opportunity to criticize, correct and curb unprofessional conduct of attorneys
and counsellors. He had always main­tained
his accessibility to both the rich and the poor alike during office hours. In resume, respondent denied each and every
charge levelled against him in the Urgent Petition for Preventive Suspension
and prayed that the petition be denied, the complainant be disciplinarily dealt
with for the use of improper and intemperate language and for having invaded
respondent’s privacy. (Rollo, pp.
111-116).

District Judge Nathaniel M. Grospe, to whom the case was referred
for investigation, report and recommendation having been assigned to the
defunct Court of First Instance of Pam­panga, the Court resolved on June 14,
1978 to designate in his stead the Presiding Judge of the defunct Court of
First Instance of Iligan City to conduct the investigation and to submit the
corresponding report and recommendation. Accordingly, the case was assigned and duly forwarded to Honorable
Moises Dalisay, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance, Iligan City. (Rollo, pp. 118-120).

Hearings of the case were held on August 7, 21, 22 and September
5, 12, 19, 1978.

On October 18, 1978, District Judge Moises F. Dalisay submitted
his report to the Court with the following:

“FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

Upon going over the evidence presented by the Complainant and the
Respondent, the matter hinges on Surban and Lacida cases. In the Surban case, Cornelio Surban was
convicted to an imprisonment of one month and one day and served 28 days
imprisonment. In fact, this was the
basis for Cornelio Surban filing an action for damages in Court – Civil Case
No. V-243 against Judge Pompeyo Palarca which was dismissed by this Court for
lack of cause of action and which dismissal was appealed to the Court of
Appeals by the complainant, Atty. Monsanto, counsel for Cornelio Surban.

In the case of Franco Lacida, he filed his bail bond after a
warrant of arrest was issued against him and the second stage of preliminary
investigation having been waived by him, the case was remanded to Branch V and
later on was dismissed upon motion of the Prosecution as the records will show.

The other grounds relied upon by the complainant need not be
touched by the under­signed considering that the matter seem trivial and which
redress to the Executive Judge, Judge Nathanael Grospe, for the authority to
examine records was granted and the other with respect to the incident between
complainant and City Fiscal Jurado during the proceedings before the
respondent.

Suffice it to say, no sufficient and/or satisfactory evidence have
been adduced by the complainant on the grounds relied upon, supra. The undersigned is aware that the City Court
of Iligan City is a very congested Court with only one Judge Presiding and
trying cases to the tune of from three to four thousand cases to date. It was only lately that the Court have been
extended the much needed relief by the assignment of two Municipal Judges to
try cases in the City Court by the Honorable Supreme Court. Judge Palarca, the respondent, have been in
the service for more than 25 years as City Judge of Iligan City and have pre­viously
served as Assistant City Fiscal in Davao City.

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned hereby recommend the
exoneration of the respondent, Judge Pompeyo Palarca, of the administrative
charges filed against him by the complainant, Atty. Stephen Monsanto.”

Notwithstanding the above report and recommendations submitted by
Judge Dalisay, the Court in its Resolution of October 15, 1979, directed the
Court Administrator to make a study, report and recommendation in the case, and
as adverted to earlier, the Deputy Court Administrator, with the concurrence of
Court Administrator Lorenzo Relova, submitted on February 27, 1981 his
Memorandum to the Chief Justice. Disagreeing with the recommendation of District Judge Dalisay, the
Deputy Court Administrator recommended the following:

“ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully recom­mended that respondent
City Judge Pompeyo L. Palarca of the Iligan City Court be held guilty of
ignorance of the law, particularly on the application of subsidiary
imprisonment as provided for in Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, and that
he be meted the penalty of fine equivalent to his three (3) months salary, with
a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar offense in the future
will be dealt with more severely.”

The above recommendation for a finding of guilt for ignorance of
the law and the imposition of a penalty equi­valent to three (3) months pay is
grounded on the following findings concluded by the Deputy Court Administrator
which We quote below:

“To our mind, the records are replete with proof to show that
the charges were actually true and disciplinary action is called for. It is not correct to say here that the
matter hinges only on the Surban and Lacida cases as the Honorable Investi­gator
wants us to believe and that the other grounds seem trivial. (Rollo, p. 128). Those two named cases were only lead examples of a series of
similar cases that show lapses committed by respondent judge in applying the
laws in the discharge of primary judicial duties.

“The first above-named case was presented before the court for
the purpose of showing in detail what really happened in cases of similar
nature where due to the ignorance of respondent judge, subsidiary imprison­ment
in violation of Republic Act No. 5465 was imposed. The other properly documented cases, thirty (30) in number, were
presented as proofs to show the repeated instances and the length of time –
1969 to 1977 – said respondent judge had violated the law until his attention was
called repeatedly to the series of mistakes. Respondent’s attempts at exoneration such as congested dockets, harried
trials, inadvertence of his clerks and his ignorance of amendments to the law
because he had not memorized the Revised Penal Code are very poor attempts at
exo­neration and did not in any way mitigate, much less condone the mistakes he
had repeatedly committed in the span of almost a decade. Respondent judge’s harping on his long years
of judicial service (25 years) could not cure the undermined public faith in
the Judicial Branch of the government which his ignorance had wrought. For as this Court had opt-repeatedly
upheld: ‘Judges are required to adhere
to the rules prescribed for the imposition of penalty for violation of the
law. He must strictly adhere to the
pertinent rules prescribed thereby, having due regard for the duration thereof
x x x. If because of gross igno­rance,
serious misconduct or grave abuse of discretion he runs counter to the law and
tries to justify his action by one reason or another, he thereby exposes him­self
to disciplinary action.’ (Soriano vs. Mabbayad, Adm. Matter No. 378-MJ, Oct.
24, 1975, 67 SCRA 385, 392-393; Abibuag vs. Estonina, Adm. Matter No. 91-MJ and
No. 319-MJ, July 23, 1944, 58 SCRA 49, 56-57)

“Without doubt it had been shown in the trial that respondent
judge had exhi­bited his ignorance of the law and therefore his incompetence
when he imposed the penalty of subsidiary imprisonment in case of accused’s
inability to pay indemnity due to the offended party as part of the principal
penalty in no less than thirty (30) criminal cases. That fact is deeply written in the dockets of the City Court of
Iligan City and in the minds of the people whose lives have been touched by the
scandalous ignorance of the law displayed by respondent in the discharge of his
judicial duties. What clearer proof of
ignorance of the law is demanded under the present circumstances? The rule which states that ‘it is the duty
of every judge to keep abreast of the latest laws and jurisprudence affecting
their jurisdiction’ is still a very good law up to the present. Respon­dent’s claim that those criminal
cases where he had mistakenly imposed the penalty of subsidiary imprisonment
were appealed and said erroneous impositions were either cor­rected or erased
by the appellate court, therefore, no harm was incurred, did not in any way
erase, wipe away or lessen his cul­pability for the wrong imposition of the
penalty. Respondent judge’s other
defense that Cornelio Surban, the accused in Crimi­nal Case No. 10102-AF, only
stayed in jail for twenty (28) days, so that he did not suffer any portion of
the penalty or subsi­diary imprisonment mistakenly imposed upon him is not true
because when Surban was freed on December 2, 1977 he had stayed in prison two
(2) days and four (4) hours more than the legal period of his incarceration
after deducting from his penalty the five (5) days grace allowance given him by
prison rules for good behavior/conduct. Respondent’s efforts to skirt this particular issue did not for an
instant blur the indelible mark of the truth in the records. The mistaken inclusion of the clause
regarding the subsidiary imprisonment in the Commitment Order of prisoner
Cornelio Surban to the jail warden of Lanao del Norte due to alleged
inadvertence of his clerk cannot easily be explained away like erasing chalk
etchings on a blackboard. Well can we
apply at this instance the admo­nition of the Court to an erring judge when it
said, ‘The respondent judge cannot plead in avoidance the negligence or
ignorance of the clerk of court, especially in view of the provisions of the
last paragraph of Section 75 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by
Republic Act No. 3828, that the clerk of court, stenographers and other minor
employees of the City Courts are appointed by their respective City
Judges. It is the obligation of judges
to see that the officers appointed by them comply fairly and strictly with the
duties that the law imposes upon them.’ (Rodriguez vs. Barro, 84 SCRA 663,
666).

“The second named case which the Hono­rable Investigator
selected as the alleged real crux of this controversy, the Lacida case, is also
the lead case shown, together with other cases to prove the careless and
unbusinesslike manner the respondent judge deals with the rights and liberties
of the accused persons who had the misfortune of finding themselves before his
sala. Res­pondent judge’s irregular
procedure of issuing warrants of arrest against accused persons before the
preliminary investigations have been properly conducted by him in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, was substantially proven before
the investigator by testimonial and documentary evidence. The records show that respondent judge
impliedly admitted this fact and the defenses proferred by him that whatever
irregularity were com­mitted in the issuance of warrants of arrest of accused
persons as charged by complainant were waived and cured by accused and their
respective counsel when they went on to the trial of the case in the Courts of
First Instance without their questioning the alleged irregularities com­mitted
in the issuance of warrants of ar­rests and the conduct of the preliminary
investigations. He argued that the
waiver on the part of the accused and their res­pective counsel cured every
defect therein rendering himself free, and extenuated liability, if any, either
administratively and/or criminally. This line of reasoning of respondent judge, his panel of lawyers and the
court investigator in his report misses the point of all administrative mat­ter
cases such as the present one, where by the very nature of the proceedings, the
sole purpose is to ferret out and determine the fitness or unfitness of a
member of the judiciary to occupy his position because it affects public
interest, involving as it does the administration of justice. In other words, an administrative proceeding
against a judge is predicated on his right to hold the office or position of a
judge. It is a pity that respondent judge
who had stayed in the judicial branch of the govern­ment for twenty-five (25)
years could have failed to perceive the real import of the administrative
proceedings filed against him, which to repeat, is mainly for the purpose of
defining his qualifications as a member of the Philippine bench.”

With respect to complainant’s charge of arbitrary denial of free
access to the criminal docket books of the City Court of Iligan City and the
unreasonable oppression and harassment of accused and counsel by respondent
judge, the Deputy Court Administrator showed that the same were proven at the
hearings but respondent’s disclaimer of the accusations, citing reasons in
denying the access to the docket books such as for the protection of said books
and records and claiming good faith in correcting and teaching complainant
proper court decorum and attitudes as well as his lack of malice, appear to be
and accepted as well-intentioned.

That the respondent has more than twenty-five (25) years of
service in the judiciary and that this is the first administrative case filed
against him have been recommended to serve as mitigating circumstances in res­pondent
Judge’s favor.

We have further reviewed the evidence on record and We affirm
that said evidence clearly and fully prove that respondent Judge was in truth
and in fact grossly ignorant of the law in meting the penalty of subsidiary
imprisonment in the numerous cases cited by complainant in palpable violation
of Republic Act 5465 abolishing subsidiary impri­sonment for civil indemnity
amending Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, which Act took effect on April
21, 1969. These cases decided by
respondent Judge during the period from October, 1969 to November 17, 1977 are
fully documented in Exhibits “A” to “A-29”, “K”,
“K-1” to “K-13”. They num­ber about 30 criminal cases which needless to list them here
have not been denied by respondent Judge. (See pp. 15-16, Rollo).

We also accept and affirm the report of the Deputy Court
Administrator that in the specific case of People vs. Cornelio Surban, the
accused therein was detained two (2) days and four (4) hours more than the
legal period of his incarceration after deducting from his penalty the five (5)
days grace allowance given him by prison rules for good behavior and conduct,
as a result of the erroneous impo­sition of subsidiary imprisonment meted by
respondent Judge. We agree that the
mistaken inclusion of the subsidiary imprisonment in the Commitment Order of
prisoner Cornelio Surban attributed to the inadvertence of respondent Judge’s
clerk “cannot easily be explained away like erasing chalk etchings on a
blackboard.” Indeed, Our admonition to an erring judge in Rodriguez vs.
Barro, 84 SCRA 663, 666, is well-nigh pertinent and applicable to respondent
Judge, to wit: “The respondent
judge cannot plead in avoidance the negligence or ignorance of the clerk of
court, especially in view of the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 75
of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, that the clerk
of court, stenographers and other minor employees of the City Courts are
appointed by their respective City Judges. It is the obligation of judges to see that the officers appointed by
them comply fairly and strictly with the duties that the law imposes upon
them.”

The charges of irregular procedure in the conduct of preliminary
examination by means of searching questions and answers before issuing the
warrant of arrest in the specific cases of People vs. Lacida and People vs.
Banaan filed in the court of respondent Judge likewise are clearly
substantiated. The defense of
respondent Judge that the Lacida case was later dismissed for lack of
interest of the prosecution because of monetary consideration and that the
failure of the accused in the Banaan case to question any irregularity
in the conduct of the preliminary investigation was a waiver of whatever
anomaly had been committed in said investigation and whatever defect was
incurred had been cured when the CFI found the accused guilty in the three (3)
informations filed against him, is absolutely without merit. The erroneous pro­cedure taken by respondent
Judge is manifestly prejudicial to the rights and liberties of the accused and
no amount of shifting the blame to the accused or his counsel by reason of
alleged waiver or failure to complain about the error can exculpate respondent
who stands by himself alone for inefficiency and unworthiness as a dispenser of
justice.

Respondent Judge’s attempt to defend himself on the ground that he
was not aware of Republic Act 5465; that he had not memorized the Revised Penal
Code; that the accused in the more than thirty (30) cases cited by complainant
had already served their corresponding sentences; that said accused were duly
represented by counsel; that the accused and their counsel should have appealed
the erroneous decisions or could have filed habeas corpus proceedings but did
not do so, are, to say the least, irresponsible, unsatis­factory and
ridiculous. Given the above poor and
puerile protestation, it confounds this Court to note and understand how
respondent Judge could have served twenty-four (24) years as City Judge of
Iligan City and preside over the lives and liberties, the fortunes and
properties of party litigants coming to his court.

The serious nature of the charges imputed to the respondent Judge
warrants a heavier penalty than that recom­mended by the Deputy Court
Administrator. While it may be true
that said charges were committed during his incumbency as City Judge of the
City Court of Iligan which was abolished and reorganized under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 including his position but was recreated as
Municipal Trial Court, Branch I, Iligan City, 12th Judicial District and
respondent Judge appointed as City Judge thereof, and may be considered moot
and academic, We hold that com­pelling reasons dictate said charges should be
continued and be resolved since they affect the judicial competency and
integrity of the respondent in the present position that he holds.

WHEREFORE, We find the respondent Judge guilty as charged
for gross ignorance of the law and gross incompetence and he is hereby imposed
the penalty of fine equivalent to his six (6) months salary, with a stern
warning that repe­tition of the same or similar offenses in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro,
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, and Gutierrez,
Jr., JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., and Aquino,
J., no part.