NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, (NASIR AHMAD, RAMON ABUNDO, LUIS ARANETA, RAFAEL ACEJAS, ANTONIO ALFONSO, HERNANI ASURA, EMERITO ABELLA, ANASTACIO ALCUIZAR, ROGELIO ALPUERTO, VICE…

It was the failure of respondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. to
admit striking petitioners, eighty-one in number, back to work after an order
of Minister Blas F. Ople certifying to the National Labor Relations Commission
the labor dispute for arbitration pursuant to Article 264(g) of the Labor Code
of the Philippines, that prompted the filing of this mandamus
proceeding. As set forth in such order: “In line with this certification, all
striking workers including those terminated by the company, must return to work
immediately and Management shall accept all returning workers under the same
terms and conditions prevailing previous to the work stoppage. The assistance of the military and police
Authorities is requested for the effective and orderly implementation of this
order. The NLRC is given thirty (30)
days from receipt hereof to terminate proceedings.”^[1] On the face of it, it seems difficult to
explain why private respondent would not comply with such order considering
that the request for compulsory arbitration came from it.^[2]
It ignored this notification by the presidents of the labor unions involved to its resident manager that the
striking employees would lift their picket line and start returning to work on
August 20, 1982.^[3]
Then, too, Minister Ople denied a partial motion for reconsideration insofar as
the return-to-work aspect is concerned which reads: “We find no merit in the said Motion for
Reconsideration. The Labor Code, as amended, specifically Article 264 (g),
mandates that when­ever a labor dispute is certified by the Minister of
Labor and Employment to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory
arbitration and a strike has already taken place at the time of certification,
‘all striking employees shall immediately return to work and the employees
shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.'”^[4]

As of the time of the filing of the petition, ten months from the
return-to-work order, no such compliance was effected. The Court, in a resolution dated June 22,
1983, required comment from respon­dents.^[5]
In the comment submitted by the private respondent, it was argued that the mandamus
suit should be dismissed on the ground that there was no right to the writ
prayed for. Such an argument is based
on the fact that with the case being consolidated with G.R. No. 62893, it cannot
be said that the right of the laborers to return to work has been established.

The comment of the Solicitor General for public respondents on
the other hand, after setting forth that the only issue is the right to compel
private respondent to execute the return-to-work order, was quite
categorical. Petitioners must
prevail. It explained why, citing
the relevant provision of the Labor Code which reads: “If one [a strike] has already taken place at the time of assumption or
certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to
work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevail­ing before the strike or
lockout.”^[6]
It also pointed out that such a norm merely reaffirms what was set forth in an
earlier decision, Philippine Air Lines Employees Association (PALEA) v.
Philippine Air Lines, Inc.:^[7] “The very nature of a return-to-­work
order issued in a certified case lends itself to no other construction. The certification attests to the urgency of
the matter, affecting as it does an industry indispensable to the national
interest. The order is issued in the
exercise of the court’s compul­sory power of arbitration, and therefore must be
obeyed until set aside. To say that its
effectivity must await affirmance on a motion for reconsideration is not only
to emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import, for by then the deadline
fixed for the return to work would, in the ordinary course, have already passed
and hence can no longer be affirmed insofar as the time element is
concerned.”^[8]

It is quite apparent, therefore, why this case calls for prompt
decision. After this long lapse of
time, respondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. had failed to abide by the clear
and mandatory requirement of the law. It would negate the very purpose of a compulsory arbitration, which
precisely is intended to call a halt
to a pending strike by requiring that the status quo prior
to its decla­ration be preserved, if one of the parties fails to live up to
such a norm. The inconsistencies
between what was sought by private respondent, namely, compulsory arbitration,
and the failure to admit the striking employees back to work in the meantime,
cannot be countenanced. As noted
earlier, time is of the essence as far as the eighty-one petitioners are
concerned.

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is
granted. Public respondents are hereby
ordered to implement their return-to-work order, and private respondent must respect
the right of the eighty-one petitioners to resume their respective positions as of the
time the strike was called. The
question as to the back wages and their seniority rights will be determined in
the compulsory arbitration proceeding. This decision is immediately executory.

Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad
Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, and Gutierrez,
Jr., JJ., concur.

Relova, J., no part.

De Castro, J., on sick leave.

^[1]
Annex A to Petition, 2.

^[2]
Annex B to Petition.

^[3]
Annex C to Petition.

^[4]
Annex D to Petition.

^[5]
The case was originally
assigned to the Second Division as no legal question was raised. How­ever, it being related to G.R. No. 62893 entitled Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. v. Hon. Blas F. Ople, et
al., the case was endorsed to the Court en banc.

^[6]
Comment of Public Respondents, 5, citing Article 264(g) of the Labor Code of
the Philippines, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 227.

^[7]
L-32740, March 31, 1971, 38 SCRA 372.

^[8]
Ibid, 377. Cf. Philippine Airlines Employees Asso. v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-26063, Nov. 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 100;
Free Telephone Workers Union v.
Minister of Labor, 58184, Oct. 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 757.