G.R. No. 56864. September 15, 1983
ROQUE GABAYAN, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE EXALTACION A. NAVARRO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CAR, 14TH REGIONAL DISTRICT, BRANCH I, CEBU CITY AND PERPETUA LEONARDO …
FERNANDO, C.J.:
In this certiorari and prohibition proceeding against the
then Presiding Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Exaltacion
A. Navarro, the question raised was one of jurisdiction, reliance being placed
on the appropriate provision of Presidential Decree No. 946[1]
to the effect that jurisdiction over such question is vested in the Ministry
of Agrarian Reform, not in such court. The complaint
before respondent Judge sought the ejectment of
defendant, now petitioner, from a portion of a parcel of land, to enable
plaintiffs, now private respondents, to regain possession.
Private respondents were required to comment. They did so invoking Presidential Decree No.
316, section 2 of which reads as follows:
“Unless certified by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform as a proper
case for trial or hearing by a court or judge or other officer of competent
jurisdiction, no judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Court of First
Instance municipal or city court, or any other tribunal or fiscal shall take
cognizance of any ejectment case or any other case
designed to harass or remove a tenant of an agricultural land primarily devoted
to rice and corn and if any such cases are filed, these cases shall first be
referred to the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform or his authorized representative in the locality for a preliminary
determination of the relationship between the contending parties. If the Secretary of Agrarian Reform finds
that the case is a proper case for the Court or Judge or other hearing officer
to hear, he shall so certify and such court, judge or other hearing officer may
assume jurisdiction over the dispute or controversy.”[2]
It was contended that before there could be a referral to the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform, “it should be established first that the defendant is a
tenant on the landholding in question; second that the case is for ejectment or designed to harass or remove the tenant; third
that the land is agricultural; and
fourth that it is primarily
devoted to rice and corn. These elements
are pre-requisites to referral and not, as petitioner contends matters which
the Ministry have to determine. For the
function of said office is merely to make a preliminary determination of the
relationship between the contending parties, as provided for in the law.”[3]
The parties were required to submit memoranda. Petitioner did so, but private respondents
submitted a manifestation that they were adopting their comment as their
memorandum. Public respondent, after
asking for extension of time to file memorandum with such extension being
granted, thereafter manifested that she is adopting her comment as her
memorandum.
Then on September 6, 1983
came this compromise agreement between petitioner and private respondents. “[Come Now] petitioner Roque Gabayan and private respondents Perpetua
Leonardo and Filiberto Leonardo, assisted by their
respective counsel, and before this Honorable Supreme Court they respectfully
state that they have arrived at an amicable settlement of their controversy,
the terms and conditions of which are as follows: 1. That petitioner Roque
Gabayan hereby agrees to vacate and return to herein
private respondents his physical possession and cultivation of the parcel of
land subject matter of the above-entitled case after realizing that he is not a
tenant thereon in contemplation of law; 2. That private respondents hereby
agree to give to petitioner the sum of [Five Thousand Pesos] (P5,000.00),
Philippine currency, by way of reimbursement of the expenses incurred by said
petitioner in keeping the parcel in question free from weeds and other
obnoxious growth; 3. That petitioner further agrees to demolish, remove and/or
transfer his house constructed within the parcel in question within seven (7)
days from the execution of this Agreement, totally or wholly at his own effort
and expense; 4. That private respondents shall deliver to petitioner one-half
(1/2) of the sum herein agreed upon the signing and/or execution of this
Compromise Agreement; 5. That by virtue of this Compromise Agreement,
petitioner and private respondents hereby waive in favor of each other all
claims or counterclaim which each may have against each other by reason of this
case and of their previous relationship.
[Wherefore] petitioner
and private respondents respectfully pray this Honorable Supreme Court that the
foregoing Compromise Agreement be approved and made the basis of the decision
of the above-entitled case.”[4]
Under the circumstances, no useful purpose would be served in
resolving the jurisdictional question as the parties had arrived at a
compromise, thus putting an end to their controversy. In that sense the matter has become moot and
academic. Even counsel for petitioner
who is with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform assisted in such compromise.
WHEREFORE, the compromise agreement submitted is approved
and the parties are ordered to comply with its terms and conditions. Accordingly, the case is dismissed. No costs.
Makasiar, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad
Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Escolin, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., no part.
De Castro, J., on sick leave.
[1]
Section 12, par(b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 reads as follows: “(b) * * * Provided, however, that
matters involving the administrative implementation of the transfer of the land
to the tenant-farmer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and amendatory and
related decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations, shall be
exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, namely: 1. classification and identification of
landholdings; 2. identification of tenant-farmers and landowners and
determination of their tenancy relationship;
3. parcellary mapping; * * *.”
[2] Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 316.
[3] Comment of Public Respondent, 2.
[4] Compromise Agreement dated September
6, 1983.