G.R. No. 62406. March 22, 1984

GREGORIO MEDINA, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSA­TION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (BUREAU OF DOMESTIC TRADE), RESPONDENT.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions March 22, 1984 SECOND DIVISION MAKASIAR, Actg. C.J.:
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MAKASIAR, Actg. C.J.:


This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees’
Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 1924, of October 21, 1982
affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System which
denied compensation benefits to herein petitioner Gregorio Medina under
the provisions of the New Labor Code for permanent total disability.

Petitioner Gregorio Medina had served the government since 1947. At the
time of his retire­ment on December 1, 1980, he was holding the
position of a senior trade promotion and regulation officer at the
Bureau of Domestic Trade assigned in Batangas City (p. 8, rec.).

The records disclose that on July 18, 1980, petitioner attended a
conference at their head office in Quezon City and on his way home on
the same date at 5:30 P.M., he met an accident at Barrio Payapa, Lemery,
Batangas. As a result, he sustained head injuries medically described
as subdural hematoma, fronto parietal (R) and under­went craniotomy at
the Makati Medical Center. He was confined from August 29 until
September 11, 1980 (p. 8, rec.).

Due to the nature of his injury, petitioner was forced to retire at the
age of 55 years. He received the amount of P45,516.53 as retirement
benefits (p. 14, rec.).

Thereafter, petitioner filed a claim for disability compensation under
P.D. 626, as amended, with respondent GSIS. He was granted income
benefits amounting to P1,500.00 corresponding to temporary total
disability. Petitioner protested this decision and his case was
re-studied. The respondent GSIS re-classified petitioner’s disability
into permanent partial disability and granted him additional income
benefits in the amount of P14,634.60 covering a period of 15 months,
from July, 1980 to September, 1981. Petitioner received a total award
amounting to P16,134.60 (pp. 14-15, rec.).

Petitioner filed a second motion for recon­sideration which respondent
GSIS denied, but reimbursed petitioner’s hospital expenses in the amount
of P5,708.22 (pp. 14-15, rec.; p. 15, rec.).

When the third and final motion for recon­sideration was again denied,
petitioner appealed to respondent Employees’ Compensation Commission.

Respondent ECC affirmed the findings of re­spondent GSIS and pertinent portions of the deci­sion state the following:

“After carefully weighing the facts of the case and the evidence
submitted, we concur with the respondent System. Indeed, appellant’s
present physical condition does not to our mind warrant an award of PTD
benefits not­withstanding the certification of his attending physician.
On the contrary, his disability — functional loss due to hemiparesis
— is rated only as permanent partial (PPD) under the group of
non-scheduled disabilities with a percentage rating of 25% non-scheduled
disability (NSD). However, the period of 15 months should be increased
to 19 months pursuant to Sec. 7 of PD 1368, further amending PD 626, as
amended.

“Inasmuch as appellant had already received the benefits
corresponding to the above-stated period in the total amount of
P14,634.60, appellant should be further entitled to the remaining four
(4) months or the amount of P3,902.56” (pp. 13-14, ECC rec.; p. 16,
rec.).

Hence, this petition.

The only issue to be resolved is whether petitioner’s disability would
entitle him to compensation benefits corresponding to permanent total
disability under Article 192 of the New Labor Code or to permanent
partial disability under the group of non-scheduled disabilities
established by the GSIS.

Petitioner contends that based on the findings of his attending
physician, Dr. Romeo Gustilo, a well-known neurologist and chairman of
the Department of Neurological Sciences at the Makati Medical Center,
his disability was classified by said doctor in a guarded prognosis as
total disability and that because of an extensive hemorrhagic pathology,
he may, in the future, develop mental and neurological deficits.

With such findings, petitioner avers that he suffered mental lapses
which forced him to seek an early retirement on December 1, 1980 at the
age of 55 years. He asserts that considering that he was forced to
retire from the service due to his inability to continue with his work,
he should be entitled to benefits due for permanent disability (Galang
vs. WCC, 72 SCRA 454). An employee forced to retire ahead of his
compulsory retirement, not due to old age, but due to his illness, is
entitled to compensation for the remaining days before his retirement,
aside from his retirement benefits (Cayaba vs. WCC, 102 SCRA 346;
Hernandez vs. WCC, 14 SCRA 219).

Furthermore, petitioner contends that from the time he retired on
December 1, 1980 up to the present, more than 120 days had elapsed and
under Article 192 of the New Labor Code, a disability lasting
continuously for more than 120 days is compensable as a permanent total
disability.

He also contends that he has not been able to work since the time he
retired. Permanent total disability does not mean a state of absolute
helplessness, but means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the
same kind of work, or work of similar nature, that he was trained for or
any work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do
(Riesenfield X Maxsell, Modern, p. 301, cited in Quiazon and Fernandez,
Labor Law Series, Vol. IV, p. 87, 1964 ed.). Permanent total disability
means an incapacity to perform gainful work which is expected to be
permanent. This status does not require condition of complete
helplessness (Marte vs. ECC, 96 SCRA 884). Evidence that claimant has
been able to earn occasional wages or perform certain kinds of gainful
work does not necessarily rule out a finding of total disability nor
require that it be reduced to partial disability (The Law of Workmen’s
Com­pensation, A. Larson, Vol. II, p. 25, 1975 ed.).

On the other hand, respondent ECC maintains that the disability of
petitioner — functional loss due to hemiparesis — is not covered by
Article 192 of the New Labor Code on permanent total disability.
Respondent contends that petitioner does not suffer from total paralysis
nor does the medical certificates of his attending physician prove that
at the time of evaluation of his disability, petitioner was already
suffering from mental and neurological deficit which might serve as
basis for petitioner to qualify for permanent total disability benefits.

Respondent ECC further contends that its decision is not without
substantial evidence. Its findings were based on the reports of the
doctors of respondent GSIS as reviewed by the Medical Officer of the
ECC, which doctors actually conducted a physical examination on
petitioner. It was only after then that petitioner’s disability was
classified as permanent partial based on the schedule of disabilities
formulated specially to provide standard for calculation of disabilities
of injured workers patterned after various countries where application
was successful in solving problems of industrial physicians and
revisions and improvements made to enlarge coverage and give increased
benefits to the injured workers.

Respondent ECC reiterates in its contentions that the findings of fact
by an administrative agency is conclusive upon the courts.

WE find for the petitioner.

Petitioner’s claim that he is suffering from a permanent total
disability is not without substantial evidence. The certificate of his
attend­ing physician (p. 17, rec.) dated October 21, 1980 and submitted
to respondent GSIS, reads as follows:

“Diagnosis: Subdural Hematoma(R) Fronto Parietal Post Traumatic

Prognosis: Guarded

xx                     xx                      xx

As date of this examination, do you believe that the patient is
still incapacitated from engaging in any gainful occupation? If so, how
long in your opinion will the patient be still unable to engage in any
gainful occupation? — ­Total Disability.”

Thus, as per his physician’s opinion, petitioner is totally incapacitated and incapable of engaging in any gainful occupation.

In the case of Marte vs. ECC (96, SCRA 884), the Supreme Court ruled:
“Doctor’s certification as to the nature of claimant’s disability may be
given credence as he would not normally make a false certification for
the sake of a slowly school teacher.” The findings, however, of the
doctors and the Chief Medical Officer of respondents GSIS and ECC,
respectively, are not binding on this Court as they are not considered
experts. Opinion of the medical rating officer who did not physically
examine the claimant cannot be relied upon (Nuguid vs. WCC, 93 SCRA
374). Physician’s report that the injury caused the workmen’s temporary
disability rebutts WCC’s findings of claimant’s suffering no disability
during his employment with respondent (Abordo vs. WCC, 84 SCRA 385).

The attending physician of herein petitioner is Dr. Romeo Gustilo, a
well-known neurologist. He is a neurosurgeon and the chairman of the
Department of Neurological Sciences at the Makati Medical Center, one of
the biggest and the best hospitals in the country. Dr. Gustilo is an
expert in his chosen field of practice and his opinion as to the nature
of petitioner’s injury must be respected. According to the earlier
decisions of this Court, where physician’s report of sickness
established not only the causal relation between claimant’s work and his
complained sickness but also his permanent and total disability,
petitioner’s claim for permanent total disability should be granted
(Francisco vs. WCC, 83 SCRA, 536). The physician’s report of sickness
or accident substantiates the disability claim (Relente vs. Republic,
106 SCRA 505; Octavio vs. WCC, 87 SCRA 416; Bandayan vs. WCC, 77 SCRA
305; Caling vs. WCC, 77 SCRA 309; Evangelista vs. WCC, 77 SCRA 497;
Romeo vs. WCC, 77 SCRA 482; Sudario vs. Republic, 77 SCRA 337).

In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated,
but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of
one’s earning capacity (Ulibas vs. Republic, 83 SCRA 819; Roma vs. WCC,
80 SCRA 170).

Suffering from mental lapses which made him unfit for work, petitioner
was forced to seek an early retirement on December 1, 1980 at the age of
55 years. From that time to the present, he has not been able to work
nor engage in any gainful occupation. In Marcelino vs. Seven-Up
Bottling Co. (47 SCRA 343), petitioner was considered permanently, and
totally disabled to work when he was incapacitated or disabled to
perform any substantial amount of labor in the line of work where he was
formerly engaged or any other kind of work to which he could be
assigned. Total disability does not mean a state of absolute
helplessness, but disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same
kind of work, or a work of similar nature, that he was trained for or
accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his
mentality and attainments could do (Landicho vs. WCC & Canlubang
Sugar Estate, 89 SCRA 147).

The second medical certificate issued by petitioner’s attending
physician, dated December 12, 1981, states that “he may, in the future
develop neurological and mental deficit.” Respondents now contend that
such findings do not prove that petitioner is already suffering from
mental and neurological deficit. They further contend that
peti­tioner’s disability is not total and permanent because there is no
complete paralysis nor does it fall under any of the cases enumerated
under paragraph c, Article 192 of the Labor Code, as amended. But
permanent total disability, when not defined by the statute, must depend
on the circumstances of each particular case and it has been held that
claimant must have been rendered wholly and permanently incapable of
work at a gainful occupation at least without endangering his health.
An award for permanent total disability is not limited to cases in which
claimant suffers actual loss of members of the body, although the
statutory provision for total disability benefits specifies that loss of
such members shall be total disability, since this is not exclusive (99
C.J.S. Workmen’s Compensation 299, pp. 1068-1-69, 1958 ed.). Permanent
and total disability is further defined as lack of ability to follow
continuously some substantially gainful occupation without serious
discomfort or pain and without material injury to health or danger to
life (footnote no. 97, 99 C.J.S. Workmen’s Compensation 299, p. 1068,
1958 ed.).

The approval of claimant’s application for optional retirement for
disability although he has not yet reached the compulsory retirement
age, is an indication of his physical incapacity to render further
efficient service (Romero vs. WCC, 77 SCRA 482; Ybañez vs. WCC, 77 SCRA
501).

Thus, it is the conclusion of this Court that the nature of petitioner’s disability is one of permanent total disability.

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS
HEREBY MODIFIED AND THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM IS HEREBY
ORDERED TO PAY PETITIONER THE COMPENSATION BENE­FITS AS PROVIDED FOR IN
ARTICLE 192 OF P.D. 626, AS AMENDED, FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY,
EFFECTIVE AS OF FEBRUARY, 1982.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., no part.