UNITED CMC TEXTILE WORKERS UNION, PETITIONER, VS. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HON. CARMELO NORIEL, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS, (JULY CONVENTION), RESPONDENTS.

The question to resolve is whether or not public respondent acted with
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the Order of the Med-Arbiter
calling for a certification election despite: (a) the pendency of an
unfair labor practice case filed by petitioner charging respondent PAFLU
as being company-dominated; (b) the existence of a deadlock in
negotiations for renewal of the collective bargaining agreement between
petitioner and the Central Textile Mills, Inc. (CENTEX, for short); and
(c) a reasonable doubt as to whether the 30% requirement for holding a
certification election has been met.

Petitioner is a legitimate labor organization, the incumbent collective
bargaining representative of all rank and file workers of CENTEX since
1956. Respondent PAFLU is also a legitimate labor organization seeking
representation as the bargaining agent of the rank arid file workers of
CENTEX.

On August 31, 1978, petitioner filed a complaint for Unfair Labor
Practice (R4-LRD-C-8-1493-78) (the ULP Case, for brevity) against CENTEX
and PAFLU alleging that CENTEX had “helped and cooperated in the
organization of the Central Textile Mills, Inc. Local PAFLU by allowing
the organizing members of the PAFLU to solicit signatures of employees
of the company who are members of the complainant union to disaffiliate
from complainant union and join the respondent PAFLU, during company
time and inside the company premises on August 21, 1978 and the
following days thereafter.”^[1]

While the ULP Case was pending, PAFLU, on September 5, 1978, filed a
Petition for Certification Election (R4-LRD-M-9-432-78) (the
Certification Case, for short) among the rank and file workers of
CENTEX, alleging that: 1) there has been no certification election
during the 12 months period prior to the filling of the petition; 2) the
petition is supported by signatures of 603 workers, or more than 30% of
the rank and file workers of CENTEX; 3) the collective bargaining
agreement between CENTEX and petitioner will expire on October 31, 1978;
4) the petition is filed within the 60-day-freedom-period immediately
preceeding the expiration of the CBA, and 5) there is no legal
impediment to the filing of the petition.^[2]

Petitioner intervened in the Certification Case and filed a Motion to
Dismiss on September 27, 1978 on the grounds that: 1) the ULP Case
charging that PAFLU is a company-dominated union is a prejudicial
question and bars the holding of the certification election; and 2)
PAFLU failed to comply with the 30% requirement for mandatory
certification election since only 440 of the 603 are valid signatures
and that 719 signatories are required as consti­tutive of 30% of the
rank and file workers totalling 2,397 and not 1,900 as alleged by PAFLU.^[3]

On October 16, 1978, petitioner filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau
of Labor Relations for deadlock in the CBA negotiations with CENTEX.
The parties having failed to effect a conciliation, the Labor Minister
assumed jurisdiction on November 9, 1978 in Case No. AJML-033-78^[4] (referred to hereafter as the Deadlock Case).

A Supplemental Motion to Dismiss in the Certification Case was filed by
petitioner on December 7, 1978 alleging that the Labor Minister had
already taken cognizance of the deadlock in the CBA negotiations and
constituted an impediment to the holding of a certification election.^[5]

On December 18, 1978, in the Deadlock Case, the Deputy Minister of Labor
released a Decision directing petitioner and CENTEX to execute and sign
a CBA to take effect on November 1, 1978 up to October 30, 1981 based
on the guidelines enumerated therein, and to furnish the Office of the
Minister of Labor with a signed copy of the renewed agreement not later
than January 31, 1979.^[6]

On January 23, 1979, in the Certification Case, the Med-Arbiter issued
an Order for the holding of a certifica­tion election among CENTEX rank
and file workers, whereby qualified voters could choose either PAFLU or
petitioner as the collective bargaining representative or No Union at
all.^[7] This was affirmed by
respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations on appeal, in the
challenged Resolution, dated May 25, 1979, stating that: 1) the Bureau
has discretion to order certification election where several unions are
contending for representation and when there is doubt as to whether the
30% requirement has been met; and 2) to preclude the filing of a
petition for certification election the notice of strike for deadlock in
CBA nego­tiations must occur prior to the petition.^[8]

A Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution of August 20, 1979^[9] , also assailed herein.

Hence, this petition, on the general proposition that public respondent
has committed serious error of law and acted with grave abuse of
discretion, and that petitioner has no plain and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

We issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the conduct of the
certification election, and eventually gave the Petition due course.

The issues raised are: (1) is the pendency of the ULP Case charging a
participating union in the certification election proceedings as
company-dominated a prejudicial question to the conduct of the election?
(2) Does the decision in the Deadlock Case directing the parties to
execute a CBA have the effect of barring the certification election?
(3) Does respondent Director have the discretion to call for a
certification election even if the 30% consent requirement is lacking?

The case can be resolved on the basis of the first issue alone, which
must be answered in the affirmative. Under settled jurisprudence, the
pendency of a formal charge of company domination is a prejudicial
question that, until decided, bars proceedings for a certification
election^[10] , the reason being that the votes of the members of the dominated union would not be free.^[11]
The ULP Case herein was filed on August 31, 1978, or anterior to the
Certification Case, which was presented on September 5, 1978. The
pendency of the charge was known to respondent public official by virtue
of the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner as intervenor in the
Certification Case. No allegation has been made that said ULP Case vas
instituted in bad faith to forestall the Certification Case. The
following ruling is thus squarely in point:

“There is no assertion that such complaint was flimsy, or made in
bad faith filed purposely to forestall the certification election. So,
no reason existed for the Industrial Court to depart from its
established practice of suspending the election proceeding. And this
seems to be accepted rule in the law of labor relations, the reason
being, in the words of Mr. Justice Montemayor, ‘if there is a union
dominated by the company, to which some of the workers belong, an
election among workers and employees of the company would not reflect
the sentiment and wishes of the said workers and employees because the
votes of the members of the dominated union would not be free.’ (Manila
Paper Mills Employees vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 104 Phil. 10).

“And we have held, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that such
charge of company domination is a pre-judicial question that until
decided, shall suspend or bar proceedings for certification election.
(Standard Cigarette Workers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 101
Phil. 126).

“Indeed, if as a result of the Pelta’s complaint in Case No.
255-ULP, the Workers Union should be ordered dissolved as a
company-dominated union, any election held in the meantime would be a
waste of energy and money to all parties concerned.”^[12]

The rationale for the suspension of the election proceedings has been further amplified as follows:

“What is settled law, dating from the case of Standard Cigarette
Workers’ Union v. Court of Industrial Relations (101 Phil. 126), decided
in 1957, is that if it were a labor organization objecting to the
participation in a certification election of a company-dominated union,
as a result of which a complaint for an unfair labor practice case
against the employer was filed, the status of the latter union must be
first cleared in such a proceeding before such voting could take place.
In the language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes as ponente: ‘As
correctly pointed out by Judge Lanting in his dissenting opinion on the
denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, a complaint for
unfair labor practice may be considered a prejudicial question in a
proceeding for certification election when it is charged therein that
one or more labor unions participating in the election are being aided,
or are controlled, by the company or employer. The reason is that the
certification election may lead to the selection of an
employer-dominated or company union as the employees’ bargaining
representative, and when the court finds that – said union is
employer-dominated in the unfair labor practice case, the union selected
could be decertified and the whole election proceedings would be
rendered useless and nugatory.’ (Ibid., 128). The next year,
the same jurist had occasion to reiterate such doctrine in Manila Paper
Mills Employees and Workers Association v. Court of Industrial Relations
(104 Phil. 10[1958]), thus: ‘We agree with the CIR on the reasons
given in its order that only a formal charge of company domination may
serve as a bar to and stop a certification election, the reason being
that if there is a union dominated by the Company, to which some of the
workers belong, an election among the workers and employees of the
company would not reflect the true sentiment and wishes of the said
workers and employees from the standpoint of their welfare and
inte­rest, because as to the members of the company dominated union, the
vote of the said members in the election would not be free. It is
equally true, however, that the opposition to the holding of a
certification election due to a charge of company domination can only be
filed and maintained by the labor organization which made the charge of
company domination, because it is the entity that stands to lose and
suffer prejudice by the certification election, the reason being that
its members might be overwhelmed in the voting by the other members
controlled and dominated by the Company,’ (Ibid., 15). It is
easily understandable why it should be thus. There would be an
impairment of the integrity of the collective bargaining process if a
company-dominated union were allowed to participate in a certification
election. The timid, the timorous, and the faint-hearted in the ranks
of labor could easily be tempted to cast their votes in favor of the
choice of management. Should it emerge victorious, and it becomes the
exclusive representative of labor at the conference table, there is a
frustration of the statutory scheme. It takes two to bargain. There
would be instead a unilateral imposition by the employer. There is need
therefore to inquire as to whether a labor organization that aspires to
be the exclusive bargaining representative is company-dominated before
the certification election.”^[13]

With the suspension of the certification proceedings clearly called for
by reason of a prejudicial question, the necessity of passing upon the
remaining issues is obviated.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of August 20, 1979 issued by public respondent
affirming the Order of the Med-Arbiter, dated January 23, 1979, calling
for a certification election is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued by this Court shall
continue to be in force and effect until the status is cleared of
re­spondent Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (July
Convention) in Case No. R4-LRD-M-9-432-78 entitled “In the Matter of
Certification Election Among Rank and File Workers of Central Textile
Mills, Inc., Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions, Petitioner,
United CMC Textile Workers Union, Intervenor.”

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De La Fuente, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., (Chairman), on official leave.

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^[1] p. 22, Rollo.

^[2] pp. 11-12, ibid.

^[3] pp. 15-21, ibid.

^[4] p. 32, ibid.

^[5] p. 130, ibid.

^[6] pp. 32-34, ibid.

^[7] pp. 35-37, ibid.

^[8] pp. 47-48, ibid.

^[9] pp. 49-55, ibid.

^[10] Standard Cigarette Workers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 126 (1957).

^[11] Manila Paper Mills Employees vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 104 Phil. 10 (1958).

^[12] Acoje Mines Employees
and Acoje United Workers Union vs. Acoje Labor Union and Acoje Mining
Co., 104, Phil. 814 at 816 & 817 (1958).

^[13] B.F. Goodrich
Philippines, Inc. vs. B. F. Goodrich (Marikina Factory) Confidential
& Salaried Employees Union-NATU, 49 SCRA, 532 at 538 – 540 (1973).