TEOFILO REGATCHO, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE EMMANUEL G. CLETO, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, LINGAYEN BRANCH II, AND ISABELO CLEMENTE, RESPONDENTS.

This case involves the issue of whether a quo warranto proceeding against a barangay
captain on the ground of illiteracy falls within the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, or the Commission on
Elections, as held by respondent Judge in his dismissal order of July 27, 1982
which was appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440 (Civil Case No.
15792).

In
the election of May 17,
1982 held at Barangay Bolaoen, Sual, Pangasinan, Isabelo Clemente obtained ninety-seven votes while Teofilo Regatcho obtained seventy
votes for barangay captain.  Clemente was
proclaimed the winner and was scheduled to take his oath of office on June 7,
1982.

Nine days after the
election of Clemente, or on May 26, 1982, Regatcho, the defeated candidate, filed with the municipal
circuit court of Labrador-Sual a “petition
contesting the election” of Clemente, docketed
as Election Case No. 2-S (pp. 20 and 28, Annexes B and D of Petition).

Instead of pursuing that
municipal court case, Regatcho filed on June 4, 1982
with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a quo
warranto action against Clemente
on the ground that he does not know how to read and write, as required in
section 7 of the Barangay Election Law, and,
therefore, ineligible to hold office, and praying that Regatcho
be declared the winner and entitled to hold the office of barangay
captain (p. 18, Rollo).

On June 26,
1982, the municipal
court dismissed Election Case No. 2-S because of Comelec
Resolution No. 1566 approved on May 24, 1982, regarding unresolved petitions for
disqualification.  It is noteworthy that
the ground for dismissal was erroneous because Resolution No. 1566 referred to “pre-election petition for
disqualification of barangay candidates
and not to an action to declare ineligible a duly proclaimed barangay captain.

On July 5,
1982, Clemente opposed the petition for quo warranto filed in the Court of First Instance.  He interposed the defenses that he “can
read and write a little in Ilocano“, that Regatcho had already filed a similar case in the Sual municipal court and that the action had
prescribed because it was filed twenty days after Clemente’s
proclamation  (pp.
20-21, Rollo).

Then, Clemente
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, prescription
and lack of personality to file the petition since even if Clemente
were declared ineligible, Regatcho could not be
proclaimed barangay captain because he did not obtain
a plurality of votes.  Regatcho opposed the motion.

As already stated
earlier, the lower court dismissed the quo warranto
petition on the ground that the Comelec has
jurisdiction over the case because of paragraph 2, section 189 of the 1978
Election Code which provides that “any voter contesting the
election of any officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines
may file a petition for quo warranto
with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of his
election”.

On the other hand, the
same Code vests in the inferior court jurisdiction over election
contests for barangay offices:

“SEC. 191.  Election contests for barangay
offices. –  A sworn petition
contesting the election of a barangay officer shall
be filed with the proper city or municipal court by any candidate for the same
office who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy, within ten days after the
proclamation of the election.”

We hold that the municipal trial court or the municipal circuit trial
court has jurisdiction, and
not the Comelec nor the Regional Trial Court, over
the said quo warranto case regarding
the barangay captain’s ineligibility.

Jurisdiction over such
cases is vested in the appropriate city or municipal or metropolitan trial
court pursuant to the 1982 Barangay Election Law,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 222,
which provides:

“SEC. 
20.  Inclusion and exclusion
cases; and protest.- x x
x       x x x.

“A sworn petition contesting the election of any barangay official shall be filed with the city or municipal
or metropolitan trial court, as the case may be, within ten days from the date
of the proclamation of the winners.  The
trial court shall decide the election protest within fifteen days after the
filing thereof.  The decision of the
municipal or city or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten days
from receipt of a copy thereof to the Regional Trial Court (CFI) which shall
decide within thirty days from submission, and whose decision shall be final.”

That second paragraph of
section 20 of the Barangay Election Law is a modified
reenactment of section 8 of the Revised Barangay
Charter and section 7 of the Barrio Autonomy Law.

Although section 20
refers to “election protests”, it may be construed as embracing Regatcho’s quo warranto
action which is not as complicated as an ordinary quo warranto case.

The writ of quo warranto is an ancient common-law prerogative writ
and remedy.  In its broadest sense it is
a proceeding to determine the right to the use or exercise of a franchise or
office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment,
if his claim is not well founded, or if he has forfeited his right to
enjoy the privilege.  It is a demand made
through the State by some individual to show by what right an individual
or corporation exercises a franchise or privilege belonging to the State, which
according to the laws of the land they cannot legally exercise except by virtue
of a grant or authority from the State (74 C.J.S. 174).

So, usually, the quo
warranto action is commenced by the Solicitor
General or a fiscal, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has
good reason to believe that proper action by the State against an individual or
a corporation would lie (Sec. 3, Rule 66, Rules of
Court).

The application of the
writ has been expanded to include an action by a person claiming to be entitled
to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another (Sec. 6, Rule 66, Rules of Court).

Original jurisdiction to
issue the writ of quo warranto is
vested in this Court, the Intermediate Appellate Court and the Regional Trial
Court (Sec. 9[1] and 21[1], Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; Sec. 17, Judiciary Law; sec. 5[1], Article X,
Constitution.

The remedy of quo warranto has been extended to cover a voter’s action
contesting the election of any officer on the ground of ineligibility or
disloyalty to the State and jurisdiction over such action is vested in the Comelec (2nd paragraph, sec. 189, 1978 Election Code).

Undoubtedly, a quo
warranto action on the ground of ineligibility
of a member of the interim Batasang Pambansa or any provincial or city official falls within
the Comelec’s jurisdiction under section 189.

This Court in Gabatan vs. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 58113, May 2, 1983, 122
SCRA 1, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that the Comelec
has jurisdiction also over a quo warranto
proceeding against a municipal official. 
Justices Teehankee and Abad
Santos dissented.

But the instant case
involves a quo warranto proceeding
against a barangay captain.

There is a clear and manifest
intention of the lawmaker that the inferior court should have
jurisdiction over all disputes regarding the election of barangay
officials, whether the dispute be an election contest or a quo warranto proceeding. 
This is the opinion of Zoilo Gomez, Jr., the manager of the Comelec law department, in his comment as amicus curiae.

Lawyer Gomez cited Election Case No. 4-P of the municipal trial
court of Pateros and Fort Bonifacio,
Metro Manila, a quo warranto case entitled “Edgardo B. Valencia vs. Venancio
T. Osano“, involving barangay
elections.  In that case the Pateros municipal court issued an order dated June 3, 1982, forwarding to the Comelec the records
of the case.

The Comelec
in its resolution of June 10, 1982 returned the case to the Pateros municipal trial court with the directive to
continue hearing the quo warranto
case.  The Comelec
cited Republic Act No. 3590, the Revised Barangay
Charter, which provides:

“SEC. 8.  Election of barangay
council.- x x x

x
x x                                  x x x                             x
x x                             x x x

“All disputes over barangay
elections shall be brought before the city or municipal court of the city or
municipality concerned; And in the determination and decision thereof, the
court shall follow as closely as possible the procedure prescribed for inferior
courts in Rule 5, Rules of Court.  The
decision of the city or municipal court shall be appealable
pursuant to the Rules of Court to the Court of First Instance whose decision
shall be final on questions of facts.” (last
paragraph).

The aforequoted
last paragraph of section 8 of the Revised Barangay
Charter was taken from the following provisions of the Barrio Autonomy Law,
Republic Act No. 2370, which provides:

“SEC. 7.  Election of the barrio
council. – x x x

x x
x                                  x x x                             x x x                             x
x x

“All disputes over barrio elections shall be brought before
the justice of the peace court of the municipality concerned; in the determination and decision
thereof, the court shall follow as closely as possible the procedure prescribed
for inferior courts in Rule 4, Rules of Court. 
The decision of the justice of the peace court shall be appealable pursuant to the Rules of Court to the court of
first instance whose decision shall be final on questions of fact.” (Penultimate paragraph).

This provision was
construed as “too absolute to admit distinctions, and evidences
legislative intent to confer extraordinary
jurisdiction upon justice of the
peace courts for the sake of prompt and inexpensive solutions to the
controversies arising from barrio elections” (Palma vs. Mandocdoc, 116 Phil. 924, 929).

The theory is that
disputes over barangay elections are not important
enough to demand the immediate attention of the Comelec
or the Regional Trial Court which is already saddled with relatively more vital
cases.  This view appears plausible
considering the great number of existing barangays.

The Palma case was styled as quo warranto case. 
In that case an election of barrio officials for Labac,
Cuenca, Batangas was held
on January 17, 1960.  Ernesto Palma was elected
barrio lieutenant, together with other barrio officials.  They took their oaths of office on January
21, 1960.  They belonged to the Liberal Party.

However, at about four o’clock in the afternoon of that same day, Gabriel Jaen, former barrio lieutenant, called a meeting of the
barrio assembly during which meeting a set of election tellers, all Nacionalistas, was formed and another election of barrio
officials was held from eight o’clock in the evening up to ten o’clock on the following morning.  Jose Mandocdoc was
elected barrio lieutenant together with others as barrio officials.

On April
11, 1960, Palma and his colleagues filed a complaint for quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of Batangas against Mandocdoc and his set of barrio officials and prayed that he (Palma) and his co-petitioners be declared the duly
elected and qualified members of the Labac barrio
council.  Mandocdoc
et al. moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that it falls within the
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court of Cuenca
because of section 7 of the Barrio Charter already quoted.

Judge Barcelona sustained
the motion.  On appeal this Court held
that the controversy was within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace
court.

In the instant case, Regatcho acted correctly in filing a case in the municipal circuit trial
court of Labrador-Sual contesting Clemente’s
election.  He was mistaken in abandoning
that case and refiling it in the Court of First
Instance.  He acted in good faith.

“Mistake
upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good
faith” (Art. 526, Civil Code). 
In the interest of justice, he should be allowed to revive the said case in the municipal circuit
trial court of Labrador-Sual.

But Regatcho’s
prayer that should Clemente be held ineligible (see
Gregorio vs. De Jesus, 65 Phil. 332) he be declared the duly elected barangay captain, cannot be granted because he did not
obtain a plurality of votes (Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 654; Ferrer
vs. Liamoso, 84 Phil. 490)

WHEREFORE, the dismissal order of the lower court is
reversed and set aside.  Regatcho is granted twenty (20) days from notice of the
finality of this judgment within which to continue Election Case No. 2-S of the
municipal circuit trial court of Labrador-Sual,
Pangasinan.  No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Concepcion, Jr.,
Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

Makasiar, J., in the result.

Abad Santos, J., no part.