G.R. No. L-33906. December 21, 1983
VICTORIA ABLAZA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ASSOCIATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC LABOR ORGANIZATION (ADLO) AND ITS MEMBERS, ROSA LEONARDO, VIRGINIA ESPADILLA, THELMA Y…
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari
to declare null and void the decision, the order, and the resolution as well as
any and all proceedings of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in CIR
Case No. 2794-V entitled “Association of Democratic Labor Organizations, Bernardita Oracion, et al., v. Cerisco Blackcat Trading.”
There are 36 workers or laborers as private respondents.
The Association of Democratic Labor Organizations (hereinafter
referred to as ADLO), Bernardita Oracion,
and others filed a complaint before the Court of Industrial Relations against Cerisco Blackcat Trading for
salary differentials pursuant to the statutory minimum wage law, overtime pay,
and reinstatement with backwages.
The records show that summons with a
copy of the complaint attached thereto were served on defendant Cerisco Blackcat Trading. Subsequently, the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations caused the service of the required notice of hearing upon
defendant Cerisco Blackcat
Trading.
Cerisco Blackcat
Trading failed to file its answer or any responsive pleading within the reglementary period provided by law. Hence, the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations declared Cerisco Blackcat
Trading in default and private respondents ADLO, et al., were allowed to present their
evidence ex-parte.
After trial, respondent
Court of Industrial Relations rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Chief of the Examining Division
of this Court is hereby ordered to make a computation of the amount of salary
differentials, overtime pay for work rendered in excess of 8 hours, Sunday
premiums for work performed on Sundays and legal holidays as well as overtime
compensation for work performed by petitioners for the period August 25, 1966
up to the date of their respective dismissals due the petitioners in this case,
based at P6.00 a day in accordance with the award and disposition of the Court
as above stated, and upon termination
to submit a report to the Court immediately for further disposition.”
Acting on the following
report of the Chief of the Examining Division –
“1. The
total salary differentials, overtime and night time premiums still due the petitioners for their services
rendered from August 25, 1966 up to
their respective date of dismissals amount to TWO HUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND
NINETY EIGHT AND 4/100 (P223,098.04) PESOS distributed as follows:”
xxx xxx xxx
the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations issued an order which reads:
“It appearing in the aforesaid Report of Examiner that the
computation of the overtime compensation, night time premiums and salary differentials was based on the amount
actually received by the petitioners and appearing in their testimonies
incorporated in the decision and there
being no objection filed thereto by respondents, let said Report of Examiner
be, as it is hereby, APPROVED.”
The private respondents
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution which the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations granted against defendant Cerisco
Blackcat Trading owned and operated by petitioner Victoria Ablaza
Uy and one Chuan Uy in the
amount of P223,098.04 representing the money value of the private respondents’
wage differentials, overtime pay for
work rendered in excess of eight (8) hours, premiums for work performed on
Sundays and legal holidays as well as overtime compensation for work performed
by private respondents for the period August 25, 1966 up to the date of their
respective dismissals in accordance with the award and disposition of the
Court.
After Gilbert Lorenzo,
authorized deputy sheriff of the Court of Industrial Relations levied upon
petitioner Victoria Ablaza’s personal properties, the
latter filed an urgent petition for relief alleging inter alia
– (1) that herein petitioner was completely and totally unaware of the
existence of any suit for a sum of money against her as she has not been
lawfully summoned and informed of any such case; (2) that Cerisco
Trading is a mere trade name belonging to herein petitioner, and this tradename is not a juridical person nor entity capable of
suing or being sued in any court pursuant to sections 1 and 2 of Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court; (3) that the jurisdictional requirement of Sections 7
and 8 of Rule 14, Rules of Court were not met as petitioner was not made
a party-defendant in CIR Case No. 2794-V; (4) that petitioner was unjustifiably
included in the writ of execution since she was never made a party thereto nor
duly summoned as aforesaid; (5) that respondent Court of Industrial Relations
never acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendant Cerisco
Blackcat Trading; (6) that petitioner was never
served with and thereby was never duly informed of, any orders of respondent
Court of Industrial Relations declaring her in default; and (7) that petitioner
was never duly served with any copy of any decision against her in this case.
The Court of Industrial Relations denied the petition for relief. A motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Petitioner Ablaza now raises the
following issues in her brief:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS EVER ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF PETITIONER HEREIN VICTORIA ABLAZA WHO WAS NEVER IMPLEADED AS A
PARTY RESPONDENT IN CIR CASE NO. 2794-V.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE MERE COMBINATION OF A TRADEMARK ‘BLACKCAT’ AND A
BUSINESS NAME ‘CERISCO TRADING’ WITHOUT IMPLEADING ANY NATURAL OR JURIDICAL
PERSON CAN CONSTITUTE THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST CAPABLE OF SUING OR BEING SUED
IN A CIVIL ACTION AS REQUIRED UNDER THE RULES OF COURT.
III
WHETHER OR NOT
A PETITION OR COMPLAINT CAN BE AMENDED ORALLY TO INCLUDE NEW CAUSES OF ACTION
WITHOUT ANY FORMAL AMENDED PETITION OR COMPLAINT BEING FILED AND NO NEW SUMMONS
BEING ISSUED ON THE AMENDED PETITION OR COMPLAINT.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT FRAUD AND FATAL IRREGULARITIES IN
SERVICES OF SUMMONS, COURT PROCESSES AND ORDERS WHICH DEPRIVE A PARTY OF DUE
NOTICE AND RIGHT TO BE HEARD CONSTITUTE VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW
GUARANTY OF THE CONSTITUTION.
V
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING A WRIT OF EXECUTION AGAINST PETITIONER VICTORIA ABLAZA WHO WAS NOT IMPLEADED AS A PARTY
RESPONDENT IN CIR CASE NO. 2794-V.
The main issue raised is jurisdiction. The petitioner
maintains that since the complaint filed with the respondent court was against Cerisco Blackcat Trading as sole
respondent and the body of the complaint makes no mention whatsoever of
Victoria Ablaza, the petitioner was not duly served
with summons.
Jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired
either by his voluntary appearance
in court and his submission to its authority or by service
of summons.
Petitioner Ablaza relies on the case of Heath v. Steamer San
Nicolas (7 Phil. 532) where we held
that it is absolutely indispensable for the maintenance of a contentious action
in the courts of justice to have as defendant some natural or juridical
person. Petitioner argues that since the name “CERISCO TRADING” is a mere
business name while “BLACKCAT” is a mere trademark, the combination CERISCO BLACKCAT TRADING is neither
a natural or a juridical person, and as such, can neither sue nor be sued.
The petitioner’s
contentions have no merit. Section
9, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that when persons associated in business are sued under a common
name, service may be effected upon all the defendants
by serving upon any one of them or upon the person in charge of the office or
place of business maintained the common
name. Since petitioner Ablaza Uy and Chuan Uy were doing business under the common name Cerisco Blackcat Trading, the
service of summons made upon the person in charge of the office or place of
business maintained in the common name was adequate. This is specially
true in this case where the
plaintiffs are poor laborers who are entitled under the Constitution to State
protection and who are only seeking the legitimate fruits of their employment
from an employer.
The petitioner always
transacted business as Cerisco Blackcat
Trading. All papers, documents,
products, and receipts issued by
the petitioner’s business bore
the name Cerisco Blackcat
Trading. Since the laborers were working
for a firm known as Cerisco Blackcat
Trading, it was natural and understandable why they should sue their employer
through the common name used by the owners in their business. The controlling principle in the
interpretation of procedural rules is one of liberality that they may promote
their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.
(Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court.) When the rules are
applied to labor cases, the
interpretation must proceed in accordance with the liberal spirit of the labor
laws. (See Malate Taxicab and Garage, Inc. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, et al., 99 Phil. 41).
The Court of Industrial Relations was created as an instrument to carry
out the legislative policies embodied in the Industrial Peace Act pursuant to
the constitutional mandates in Section 5, Article II on social justice and
Section 6, Article XIV on protection to labor, both sections in the then
applicable 1935 Constitution. Without in
any way depriving the employer of his legal rights, the thrust of statutes and
rules governing CIR cases has been to benefit laborers and workers and avoid
subjecting them to greater delays and hardships. (Permanent Concrete Products Inc., et al., v.
Frivaldo, 109 Phil. 404).
The purpose of summons is
to give notice to the defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced
against him. The defendant or respondent
is thus put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiffs or petitioners.
The records indicate
beyond doubt that the respondent in the case before the CIR was adequately
given the necessary notice and that the owners of Cerisco
Blackcat Trading deliberately avoided acknowledgment
of the service of summons. The officer’s
return at the back of the summons reads:
“On Sept. 8, 1969 a.m. the undersigned went to the given
address to serve this Summon to the President/Owner/and Gen. Manager of the Cerisco Blackcat Trading, I met a certain Mr. R. Cruz (Mechanic of the
respondent company) and I introduced myself as representative of the Court
(CIR) and I asked the whereabouts of the president/manager/owner of the respondent company. He (R. Cruz) told me that Miss/Mrs. Ablaza is out. And also I asked him (Mr. R. Cruz) who is
taking over just in case the owner/president/gen.
manager is out and he told me that he is the one taking over, and I gave this
Summons to him (Mr. R. Cruz) for and in behalf of the president/owner/gen. manager of the Cerisco Blackcat Trading.” (Rollo,
p. 68)
The officer’s return
annotated at the back of the Notice of Hearing reads:
“On November 13, 1969 undersigned went at Cerisco
Blackcat Trading at 2956 Jose Abad
Santos, Manila to serve this Notice
of Hearing but nobody wants to receive.
A certain Mr. Rodolfo Cruz
alleged that the President and/or Manager of the company is out of the town and the incharge of said company is out of the office, he also refused to receive said notice. Undersigned left Notice of Hearing at the table inside the company in the presence of Mr. Rodolfo
Cruz to be given to the President and/or
Manager or the officer incharge but Mr. Rodolfo Cruz
threw said notice outside the company.” (Rollo,
p. 69;
The
officer’s return annotated at the back of the notice of the order of default
reads:
“1. THE PRESIDENT/MANAGER, CERISCO BLACKCAT TRADING served last November 29, 1969 undersigned have refused
to enter premises people inside Establishment refused to receive said order,
for the reason that said Gen. Manager is in Bulacan
province, Return for further disposition of the Sala
Concerned.” (Rollo, p. 119)
The
officer’s return annotated at the back of the notice of the decision of the
Court of Industrial Relations reads:
“1. THE OWNER OR GENERAL MANAGER, CERISCO BLACKCAT
TRADING rec’d. by MR. ERNESTO K. CALUB on July 11, 1970, Bldg., Caretaker at J.
Abad Santos Ave., Tondo.” (Rollo, p. 129)
The
officer’s return annotated at the back of the notice of the Examiner’s Report
reads:
“BAILIFF’S
RETURN
“DULY SERVED TO:
“1. The Owner or Manager, Cerisco
Blackcat Trading, copy given to the building caretaker
who refused to sign and give his name this 27th day of July, 1970.
xxx xxx xxx
“NOTE: NO LONGER STAYING AT ABAD SANTOS,
TONDO, MANILA. SERVED AT ITS NEW ADDRESS, 14
CHRISTIAN ST., GRACE
VILLAGE, QUEZON CITY.” (Rollo, p. 134)
The
officer’s return annotated at the back of the order approving the examiner’s
report reads:
“BAILIFF’S
RETURN
“Duly Served to:
“1. The owner or General Manager, Cerisco Quezon City, copy of
Order given to Mr. Reyes this 2nd day of December 1970;
“2. The Owner or General Manager, Cerisco J. Abad Santos, copy of
order given to Mr. Murillo this 2nd day of December 1970;” (Rollo, p. 141).
And
the officer’s return annotated at the back of the notice of the order approving
the issuance of a writ of execution reads:
“RETURN
OF SERVICE
xxx xxx xxx
“Note: the copy for the Owner & Gen. Manager of
the CERISCO BLACKCAT TRADING, was returned for further disposition of the sala, on the ground that the undersigned Bailiff of this
court did not allow by the Gen. Manager itself (Mrs. Ablaza),
to enter inside the premises of the
company, & denying that she is the Manager of the firm, but according to one of the personnel of the
company she is Mrs. Ablaza, that after she read the
foregoing order of the court which the undersigned tender to her (infront of the gate of the compound), threw the court
processes outside the door gate of the compound and she verbally told to the
undersigned they don’t care about this and the Gen. Manager of the firm is not
Mrs. Ablaza; This court processes was brought to them
for proper service but they refused; This was served to them last December 24,
1970, December 29, 1970; & January 4, 1971;)” (Rollo, p. 145).
No less than seven
returns of the Sheriff clearly show that there was service of the necessary
processes. It is evident from a perusal
of the records of the case at bar that efforts were made to serve summons
personally to the President/General Manager and/or Owner of defendant Cerisco Blackcat Trading. In fact the notice of the order approving the
issuance of the writ of execution was served December 24, December 29 and
January 4 or three times upon defendant Cerisco Blackcat Trading. At
no time did petitioner Ablaza, owner of Cerisco, condescend to honor or respect the summons. On the contrary, she had a contemptuous
regard for judicial process. At one instance, she verbally told the
bailiff that “they don’t care about this”, after throwing the court process outside the gate of the compound.
Since personal service of summons was made impossible by the refusal of
the owner/general manager of the defendant company to accept the same,
substituted service was availed of by the bailiff by leaving the copies at
defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.
In the execution of the
lower court’s judgment, it is natural that the persons doing business under the
common name should be the ones made to answer.
Victoria Ablaza cannot claim that since Cerisco Blackcat Trading is the respondent, she has
no responsibility whatsoever to answer for the judgment in favor of the
laborers working for her. As owner and
general manager of Cerisco, Ablaza
was properly bound.
The refusal to accept
service of processes was due to reasons other than an apparent desire to make
it difficult for the workers. As stated
by the private respondents, Ablaza was the wife of
Chuan Uy. The
two had several children. Neither Ablaza or Chuan Uy could appear openly in business because of statutory
enactments prohibiting aliens from engaging in the retail trade. Cerisco Blackcat Trading engaged in retail trade.
The other issue raised
refers to the alleged inclusion of new causes of action. The petitioner’s arguments in this respect
have no merit.
The complaint asked Cerisco Blackcat Trading to:
a. Pay petitioners the difference of their wages
pursuant to the statutory minimum wage
law;
b. Pay overtime work performed by petitioners
beyond the eight hours;
c. Reinstatement of petitioners to their former
or equivalent positions with backwages from the date
of their dismissals up to the time of their actual reinstatement without loss of seniority and other
privileges; and
d. Granting petitioners such other relief which
this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable under the premises.
The prayer asked for wage
differentials pursuant to the statutory minimum wage law, overtime pay,
reinstatement, and backwages. The payment for services rendered on Sundays
or on legal holidays is necessarily included in the prayer for overtime pay
beyond the eight hours. Likewise,
payment for maternity leave may be deemed included in the abovecited
prayer. In fact, there was no amendment
to speak of in the case at bar. All that
private respondents did was to introduce evidence tending to prove claims which
were necessarily included in their prayer.
WHEREFORE, the
instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Plana and
Relova, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., (Chairman), in the result.
Melencio-Herrera, J., see separate opinion
concurring in the result.
First Division : Concurring in the Result
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CONCURRING IN THE RESULT
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
I concur in the result.
The summons directed to Cerisco Blackcat Trading was defective in
that it did not include petitioner as defendant in the Court below. The defect, however, could have been cured by
amending the name of the defendant in the title to read “Victoria Ablaza,
doing business under the name and trademark Cerisco Blackcat Trading”,
since the intention was to sue
the owner of the business enterprise.
Amendment is allowed in cases where it appears that the plaintiff
intended, in fact, to act against the individual doing business rather than
against the business entity which the individual was operating (ALR Fed 513,
516, 530). The ownership of Cerisco
Blackcat Trading could have been verified from the proper government agency.
Nonetheless, under Section 9, Rule 14, service of summons upon
the person in charge of the place of business in the common name, as was done
in this case, was adequate.