PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALEJANDRO IBASAN, SR., ALIAS “LORING”; ALEJANDRO IBASAN, JR., ALIAS “INTSIK”; ALEJANDRO IBASAN II, ALIAS “BOY”; AND ALEJANDRO …

People versus Ibasan

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Alejandro Ibasan, Senior, and his sons for the killing of Leoncio Balolong in Dagupan City. The trial court convicted all four accused of murder and sentenced each to reclusion perpetua. The case matters to a reviewee for two reasons: it is a clean teaching case on when double jeopardy attaches, and it shows how a waiver of that defense made before arraignment is a waiver of nothing at all. It also offers a measured statement on the limits of a trial judge's clarificatory questioning.

Procedural History

The original information charged the accused with homicide. After reinvestigation, the fiscal filed an amended information charging murder. Alejandro Ibasan, Junior, who had been arraigned ahead of his co-accused on the homicide charge and had pleaded not guilty, moved to quash the amended information on the ground of double jeopardy. The trial court, the Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, denied the motion, holding that he was estopped by his own acts and that no jeopardy had attached under the amended information. After trial, the court convicted all four accused of murder and sentenced each to reclusion perpetua, to pay an indemnity of 12,000 pesos and moral damages of 12,000 pesos, and the costs. The case against Juan Ibasan was archived because he was confined in the National Mental Hospital; the case against Demetrio Ibasan was dismissed after his death. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court. Pending appeal, Alejandro Ibasan, Senior, died in the New Bilibid Prisons, and the case against him was dismissed as to his criminal liability.

Facts

On the afternoon of May 31, 1978, in Bonuan Gueset, Dagupan City, Leoncio Balolong and his cousin Alberto Balolong went to the store of the Ibasan family looking for Alejandro Ibasan, Senior. The prosecution's version is that Juan Ibasan struck Leoncio on the head with a baseball bat; that Alejandro Ibasan the Third struck him on the leg as he fled, causing him to fall; that Alejandro Ibasan the Second stabbed him several times with a dagger; and that all six accused threw stones at him and dragged him inside the Ibasan yard, where they beat him with beer and soft drink bottles and the wooden leg of a bench. Two eyewitnesses, Domingo Paras and Agustina Redoban, positively identified all the accused. Redoban testified that she pleaded with the accused to stop, and that Alejandro Ibasan, Junior, said that whoever would testify in the case should be killed.

The defense told a different story. It claimed that Leoncio was the aggressor, that he had drawn a balisong, and that Demetrio Ibasan hit him with a stone and an empty bottle in self-defense. It further claimed that Alejandro Ibasan, Senior, struck Leoncio with a piece of wood only after Leoncio was already dead. The other accused set up alibi: Alejandro Ibasan, Junior, said he was at the Perpetual Help Novena and mass with his wife; Alejandro Ibasan the Second and the Third said they were at the house of their uncle feeding and watching his poultry.

The procedural facts are what drive the first issue. Before arraignment, a motion to amend the charge from homicide to murder led the fiscal to reinvestigate. On July 27, 1978, Alejandro Ibasan, Junior, moved to be arraigned ahead of his co-accused so that he could leave for employment abroad as a seaman. The next day he filed a written manifestation expressly waiving the defense of double jeopardy in case the charge was amended from homicide to murder. He was arraigned that day and pleaded not guilty to homicide, then left the country after waiving his right to be present at the proceedings. An amended information for murder was later filed, and upon his return, with new counsel, he moved to quash on the ground of double jeopardy.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in not dismissing the case against Alejandro Ibasan, Junior, on the ground of double jeopardy.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in actively participating in the examination of witnesses as though it were the prosecution, and in depriving the defense of the opportunity to present other material witnesses.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in its appreciation of the facts and in making conclusions not supported by the evidence.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in not dismissing the case against all the accused after the prosecution rested its case, upon the defense's motion to dismiss.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in not acquitting the four remaining accused on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the four convicted accused their right to bail, their right to have the case transferred to another court, and their right to be detained in the local jail pending appeal.

Applicable Provisions

The decision states the fourth requisite of double jeopardy in the language of the rule:

"(4) That the defendant had been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent."

This requisite is the hinge of the first issue, because the Court asks whether the dismissal of the original homicide charge came with the accused's express consent.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there was no double jeopardy. Jeopardy attaches only upon a valid indictment, before a competent court, after arraignment, and after plea. When Alejandro Ibasan, Junior, signed his waiver, he had not yet been arraigned and had not yet pleaded, so there was nothing to waive. The Court put the rule plainly: there could have been no valid waiver for there was nothing to waive. The Court also faulted the fiscal and the trial court for allowing an advance arraignment for homicide while the possibility of amending the charge to murder was still being reinvestigated. The proper course was to arraign him for murder, after which he could be convicted of homicide, an offense necessarily included in the charge. The consequence is significant: because he was never arraigned for murder, the proceedings against him were only for homicide, and treachery qualified the crime as murder only as an aggravating circumstance. No mitigating circumstance was proved.

On the second issue, the Court found no merit. A judge is not a mere referee; he may intervene to promote expedition, avoid waste of time, and clear up obscurity. The trial judge's questions merely clarified points and confirmed statements, and the number of interventions is not itself proof of bias. The Court did call the judge's emotional outburst against two defense counsel unfortunate, and reminded judges to avoid unseemly displays of temper. But it found that the defense was given every opportunity to present its evidence, and that the appealed decision rested on no improperly elicited matter.

On the remaining issues, the Court found that the evidence supported the conviction and that the assigned errors on the appreciation of facts and on bail and detention were without merit. The judgment of conviction was affirmed, subject to the modification arising from the death of Alejandro Ibasan, Senior, and from the fact that Alejandro Ibasan, Junior, could be held liable only for homicide.

Doctrine

First, double jeopardy attaches only upon a valid indictment, before a competent court, after arraignment, and after plea. Before arraignment and plea, the accused is not in danger of being validly convicted, and so he is not yet in jeopardy.

Second, a waiver of the defense of double jeopardy made before arraignment produces no legal effect, because there is no jeopardy yet to waive. The express consent that removes the case from the fourth requisite must come after the plea.

Third, where the accused was arraigned only for homicide and never for murder, he may be convicted only of homicide; treachery operates merely as an aggravating circumstance as to him.

Fourth, a trial judge may propound clarificatory questions to promote expedition and clear up obscurity, and the number of such questions does not by itself show bias.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, with the case against Alejandro Ibasan, Senior, dismissed because of his death, and with Alejandro Ibasan, Junior, held liable only for homicide.

Remember This

Memorize the line: there could have been no valid waiver for there was nothing to waive, because jeopardy attaches only after arraignment and plea. Examiners use this case to test the timing of the fourth requisite of double jeopardy and the rule that an accused arraigned only for homicide cannot be convicted of murder.