PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALEJANDRO IBASAN, SR., ALIAS “LORING”; ALEJANDRO IBASAN, JR., ALIAS “INTSIK”; ALEJANDRO IBASAN II, ALIAS “BOY”; AND ALEJANDRO …

Before us, on appeal is a decision of the Circuit Criminal Court,
Dagupan City, Third Judicial District, convicting Alejandro Ibasan, Sr.,
alias “Loring”; Alejandro Ibasan, Jr. alias “Intsik”; Alejandro Ibasan
II alias “Boy” and Alejandro Ibasan III alias “Tito” of the crime of murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds all the four (4) accused,
namely: Alejandro Ibasan, Sr., alias ‘Loring’, Alejandro Ibasan, Jr.,
alias ‘Intsik’, Alejandro Ibasan II, alias ‘Boy’, and Alejandro Ibasan
III, alias ‘Tito’, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the, crime of
murder, and pursuant to law, hereby sentences each of them to suffer the
medium penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment), to indemnify
the heirs of the victim, Leoncio Balolong in the amount of P12,000.00,
plus P12,000.00 as moral damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of in solvency, and to pay the costs.

“Let this case be archived as against accused Juan Ibasan, alias
‘John’, who is presently confined in the National Mental Hospital,
without prejudice to its reinstatement as against said accused, upon
motion of the prosecution and return to sanity of said accused.”

The original information dated June 8, 1978 charged the appellants with
the crime of homicide, together with two others, Juan Ibasan, alias
“John” and Demetrio Ibasan alias “Etring”. However, upon a finding that
accused Juan Ibasan alias “John” was mentally unfit to stand trial,
proceedings as against him were suspended pending the recovery of his
sanity, hence, his non-inclusion in these proceedings. On the other
hand, Demetrio Ibasan alias “Etring” died prior to final judgment in the
lower court and the case against him was accordingly dismissed.

After the information was filed but before the accused could be
arraigned, a motion to amend the charges to murder and for the
presentation of additional evidence convinced the Fiscal to conduct a
reinvestigation. A notice of reinvestigation was issued by the District
State Prosecutor, upon proper authority of the Dagupan City Fiscal, with
the advice that he “will conduct a reinvestigation of the
above-entitled case on Wednesday, August 9, 1978, x x x.”

On July 27, 1978, pending reinvestigation of the case, accused Alejandro
Ibasan, Jr., alias “Intsik” filed a motion to be arraigned ahead of his
co-accused to enable him to leave for employment abroad as seaman for a
period of ten (10) months. He assured the court that his departure was
not intended to avoid the case and that he needed employment badly as
the only source of livelihood to sustain his family. The following day,
July 28, 1978, he filed a written manifestation and waiver to wit:

“COMES NOW the accused Alejandro Ibasan, Jr. in the above-entitled
case through counsel and to this Honorable Court most respectfully
manifests:

“‘1. That he filed a motion dated July 27, 1978 for an early
arraignment as to him alone, ahead of his other co-accused based upon
the grounds stated in said motion;

“‘2. That he is aware of the move of the Fiscal to reinvestigate
this case to determine whether there is basis to amend the charge from HOMICIDE to MURDER;

“‘3. That in case his motion is granted and is arraigned ahead
of his co-accused, he is willing to withdraw his plea on the charge of HOMICIDE and will enter a plea of NOT GUILTY to the charge of MURDER in case the Fiscal finally decide to amend the charge;

“‘4. That he is expressly waiving the defense of double jeopardy
which otherwise will be available to him in case the charge is amended
from HOMICIDE to MURDER in view of his early arraignment.’

“‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that this manifestation be favorably acted upon.'”

The same was filed through counsel Benigno M. Gubatan. The motion was
granted and accused Alejandro Ibasan, Jr. alias “Intsik” was accordingly
arraigned on July 28, 1978 with a plea of NOT GUILTY to homicide.
Subsequently, he left for abroad after waiving his right to be present
during the proceedings.

On the basis of the fiscal’s reinvestigation, an amended information
dated August 30, 1978 was filed charging all accused with the crime of
murder as follows:

“That on or about May 31, 1978 at Bonuan Gueset, Dagupan City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, and
taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, maul and hit Leoncio
Balolong at the back of his head and other vital parts of his body with a
piece of bamboo, stones, empty bottles of beer, pepsi cola, coke,
dagger, hollow block and wooden bench, which caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of his heirs in the sum of P12,000.00.

The crime was committed by a band.”

The remaining accused were arraigned under the above information and all
entered their plea of “not guilty” to the charge of MURDER.

Upon his return and with the aid of a new counsel, Atty. Salvador
Vedaña, Alejandro Ibasan, Jr., filed a motion to quash the information
on the ground that the filing of the amended information constituted
double jeopardy, as he had already been arraigned and had pleaded not
guilty under the original information for HOMICIDE, and the same had
been dismissed without his consent when the new information was filed
for the graver offense of MURDER. He further maintained that his earlier
waiver of the defense of double jeopardy was of no moment, the same
having been done prior to arraignment. He stated that it was not
possible then for him to waive jeopardy which had not yet attached.

Denying said motion, the court reasoned that by his own acts the accused
was estopped to interpose the defense of double jeopardy and that his
manifestation was express consent on his part to the amendment of the
original information. The court stated that the defense of double
jeopardy was never intended to be a tool for the benefit of one who had
intentionally misled and confused the court for his own escape to go
abroad. Furthermore, there being no plea under the amended information,
double jeopardy had not yet attached. Accused’s motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.

Subsequently, accused Juan Ibasan alias “John”, through his own counsel,
also filed a motion to quash the amended information on the ground of
accused’s insanity. The motion was denied and, as earlier stated,
accused Juan Ibasan was committed to the National Mental Hospital for
observation and treatment. The trial as against him was suspended until
such time as he is certified mentally fit to stand trial.

Trial proceeded against the rest of the accused except Demetrio Ibasan
alias “Etring” the case against him having been dismissed after his
death.

The prosecution evidence tended to prove that:

“x x x On May 31, 1978, at about 6:00 P.M., while Leoncio Balolong
was walking (with his cousin Alberto Balolong) along the road towards
Balolong Street, at Bonuan Gueset, Dagupan City Juan Ibasan, alias
‘John’, who was armed with a baseball bat (1 meter long), hit Leoncio
Balolong (who was then unarmed) suddenly with said bat once on top of
his head, holding the bat with both hands. Upon being hit by the
baseball bat, Leoncio ran away, but he was pursued by Alejandro Ibasan
III, alias ‘Tito’, who then struck Leoncio with a baseball bat (1 meter
long) hitting him on the left leg, causing Leoncio to fall to the
ground. Upon seeing his cousin Leoncio fall to the ground, Alberto
Balolong ran away.

“After Leoncio fell to the ground after being hit on the leg by
accused Alejandro Ibasan III, alias ‘Tito’, accused Alejandro Ibasan II,
alias ‘Boy’, who was armed with the dagger (Exh. J), which is double
bladed, sharp pointed and about 8″ long with 4″ handle and a leather
scabbard, stabbed Leoncio several times with said dagger on the breast,
causing him (Leoncio) to gasp for breath and disabling him. All the six
(6) accused threw stones (bigger than the size of a fist) at Leoncio,
then accused Alejandro Ibasan, alias ‘Boy’ and Juan Ibasan, alias
‘John’, held the hands of Leoncio and dragged him inside their
(Ibasan’s) yard, passing through the steel gate fronting the Ibasan’s
residence, adjacent to their sari-sari store (Exh. E). Inside the yard,
all the six (6) accused again hit Leoncio several times with bottles of
beer, coke and with a wooden leg of a bench hitting him on the head,
breast and abdomen (57 tsn., Sept. 8, 1981). A few minutes later,
Dagupan City policemen arrived at the place and they brought Leoncio to
the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital. At the time of the arrival of said
policemen, all the six (6) accused were no longer at the crime scene as
they have already fled.”

The prosecution relied on the testimony of two eyewitnesses, Domingo
Paris and Agustina Redoban, both of whom positively identified all the
accused. Domingo Paras testified that while all the six (6) accused were
mauling Leoncio Balolong, they shouted “Vulva of your mother, we are
going to kill you” and that accused Alejandro Ibasan, Sr., alias
“Loring” addressed accused Juan Ibasan, alias “John”, Alejandro Ibasan
II alias “Boy”, Alejandro Ibasan III alias “Tito” and shouted “You
finish him” while the accused continued mauling Leoncio.

Prosecution witness Agustina Redoban corroborated the testimony of
Domingo Paras in all its material points and furthermore, declared that
upon seeing Leoncio Balolong already prostrate on the ground, she told
the six (6) accused to stop beating him but they refused to heed her
plea. She also heard Alejandro Ibasan, Jr., alias “Intsik” state that
“Whoever will testify in this case should be killed.”

For its part, the defense introduced evidence to prove the following: On
May 31, 1978, at about 5:00 p.m., Leoncio Balolong and his cousin,
Alberto Balolong, came looking for accused Alejandro Ibasan, Sr., alias
“Loring” at the latter’s store. Leoncio was asking Loring to come out in
a loud voice. Leoncio was carrying with him a balisong tucked on his
right waist. Accused Demetrio Ibasan, alias “Etring” told Leoncio that
his father was asleep. This made Leoncio angry. Leoncio then told
Demetrio “Vulva of your mother”, “let your father come out.” Demetrio
then picked up a stone and thereupon, Leoncio drew his balisong (Exh.
J). Demetrio Ibasan, sensing the presence of an imminent danger,
immediately got hold of an empty bottle and with it hit Leoncio again,
this time hitting the latter on the center forehead, as a result of
which blood oozed from his head (tsn., March 15, 1982, p. 175).

During the altercation between Demetrio Ibasan and Leoncio Balolong,
Alberto Balolong fled and he did so at the moment Leoncio Balolong fell
down. Felisa Ibasan, wife of accused Alejandro Ibasan, Sr., and Linda
Ibasan, his daughter, scurried upstairs to the house where they cried,
and woke up Loring Ibasan (tsn., March 15, 1982, pp. 178-179). Soon
Loring Ibasan came out of the house and told his son, Demetrio Ibasan to
kill Leoncio Balolong probably because the latter might kill them all
if he survives. Loring Ibasan, in order to insure the death of Leoncio
Balolong, himself got a 2 feet long and 2 inches thick piece of wood and
with it, hit said Leoncio Balolong who was already lying flat, several
times (tsn., March 15, 1982, pp. 100-101). At that moment when Alejandro
Ibasan began to hit Leoncio several times, the latter was not moving
anymore and it was difficult to say whether he was already dead
according to their eyewitness Angel Paras (tsn., March 15, 1982, pp.
181-182). This same eyewitness stated that he left the place after
Alejandro Ibasan, alias “Loring” hit Leoncio Balolong with a piece of
wood (tsn., March 15, 1982, p. 182). He then went to the other side of
the road and that he did not bother to report the incident to the police
for fear that he might get involved (tsn., March 15, 1982, p. 183).

Not long after, two policemen arrived. The two policemen went inside the
yard of the Ibasans, and thereafter brought the bleeding body of
Leoncio Balolong and put him down immediately in front of the steel gate
while the said policemen waited for a ride (tsn., March 16, 1982, p.
171). After about five minutes, the policemen were able to get a ride, a
passenger jeepney, on which they loaded the body of Leoncio Balolong
and left (tsn., March 16, 1982, p. 172) for the Pangasinan Provincial
Hospital (tsn., October 12, 1981, p. 75; tsn., October 23, 1981, p. 87).

After bringing the body of Leoncio Balolong to the Pangasinan Provincial
Hospital, the two policemen hurriedly went back to the scene of the
crime to make their investigation. Later, Demetrio Ibasan, who is
actually one of the accused, (but whose case had been previously
dismissed because of his death), voluntarily and willingly went along
with the police and submitted himself for their investiga­tion (tsn.,
November 9, 1981, p. 107). In fact, at the police sub-station, he
admitted to Patrolman Rolando Coquia in the presence of Patrolman
Rolando Valdez, that he was the one who killed Leoncio Balolong and that
no one else was responsible for it (tsn., November 9, 1981, p. 108).

Thus, the defense tried to show that the aggressor was Leoncio Balolong
and that, in self-defense, Demetrio Ibasan, alias “Etring”, now
deceased, had to hit Leoncio with a stone and an empty bottle. Likewise,
Alejandro Ibasan, Sr., alias “Loring” had to hit Leoncio with a piece
of wood, but Leoncio was, by then dead from Etring’s blows.

The other accused-appellants interposed the defense of alibi. Alejandro
Ibasan, Jr. alias “Intsik” alleged that at the time of the commission of
the crime, he was attending the Perpetual Help Novena and mass, it
being a Wednesday, with his wife. His alibi was reiterated by two of his
friends who testified in his behalf. Alejandro Ibasan II, alias “Boy”
and Alejandro Ibasan III alias “Tito” alleged that at the time of the
incident, they were at the house of their uncle, Juan Ibasan alias
“John” feeding and watching his poultry and that they had attended to
their duties therein without leaving said premises.

After the trial, the court found the four appellants guilty as charged. Hence, this appeal.

The accused-appellants interposed the following assign­ments of errors:

I. – THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE AS AGAINST
THE ACCUSED ALEJANDRO IBASAN, JR., ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

II. – THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN AND/OR
CONDUCTING THE EXAMI­NATION OF WITNESSES AS THOUGH IT WERE THE
PROSECUTION, AND IN DEPRIVING THE DEFENSE FROM PRESENTING OTHER MATERIAL
WITNESSES BY GIVING HOPE AND IMPRESSIONS WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE FALSE
AFTER ALL.

III. – THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS AS
PRESENTED, AND IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AS
ADDUCED.

IV. – THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE AS AGAINST
ALL THE ACCUSED AFTER THE PROSECUTION HAD RESTED ITS CASE AND UPON
MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY DEFENSE BASED ON THREE VALID GROUNDS.

V. – THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE FOUR REMAINING
ACCUSED AFTER THE TERMINATION OF THE TRIAL ON THE GROUND THAT THE
PROSECUTION UTTERLY FAILED TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

VI. – THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE FOUR CONVICTED ACCUSED OF
THEIR RIGHT TO BAIL, THEIR RIGHT TO HAVE THEIR CASE TRANSFERRED TO
ANOTHER SALA OR OTHER COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION, AND THEIR RIGHT
TO BE DETAINED IN THE LOCAL JAIL PENDING THEIR APPEAL INSTEAD OF IN THE
NATIONAL PENITENTIARY AT MUNTINGLUPA.

Pending appeal, notice was received by this Court about the death of
accused Alejandro Ibasan, Sr., alias “Loring” while confined in the New
Bilibid Prisons in Muntinglupa. The case against him was dismissed
insofar as his criminal liability was concerned.

At the outset, it is important to note the very peculiar facts which had
given rise to the first issue. First of all, we find quite unusual that
the accused Alejandro Ibasan, Jr., alias “Intsik” was allowed to leave
the country while standing charged with the serious crime of homicide.
His claim of innocence did not preclude the possibility of his jumping
bail while abroad and not returning to answer the charges against him.
The accused was allowed to be arraigned earlier than his co-accused even
as the circumstances of murder were being reinvestigated.

Second, it was error for the court to allow the advance arraignment of
Intsik for homicide when the prosecution was still re-investigating the
case to determine the possibility of amending the information to murder.
Intsik should have been arraigned for murder and afterwards could have
been convicted either of homicide or murder as may be proven, the former
being an offense necessarily included in the crime charged.

We cannot sanction the conduct of the fiscal and the court. They should
be more prudent and cautious in the performance of their duties.

Appellant Alejandro Ibasan, Jr. would have us dismiss the case against him for murder on the ground of double jeopardy.

The prosecution, sustained by the court a quo, contended that the requisite of double jeopardy to wit:

xxx                xxx                   xxx

“(4) That the defendant had been convicted or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.”

is not present under the circumstances of the case. It argued that since
the accused had earlier filed a written manifestation and waiver of his
right to be present as well as his right to the defense of double
jeopardy, the first information had been amended with the accused’s
express consent.

The appellant maintains otherwise. He states that the element of time
plays an important role in considering when such “express consent”
should be given. He submits that the express consent must be given after the accused had already entered a plea and not before. Was there double jeopardy?

At the time that the accused executed his waiver, the right to the
defense of double jeopardy for murder did not yet exist. For jeopardy to
attach, it is necessary that the defendant has been arraigned and has
pleaded to the charge because it is from that moment that the issues for
trial are deemed joined. Before that, the accused is not in danger of
being validly convicted, hence he is not yet in jeopardy (People v.
Turla, 50 Phil. 1001). If the accused has not yet been arraigned for
either homicide or murder, a motion to quash and a waiver of the right
to the defense of double jeopardy would be premature. Jeopardy attaches –
(a) upon valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment and (d) after plea (People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The
defendant, not having been arraigned and not having pleaded to either
charge when the waiver of his right to the defense of double jeopardy
was made, the same pro­duces no legal effect. There could have been no
valid waiver for there was nothing to waive. There is no double jeopardy
in this case.

Appellant Alejandro Ibasan, Jr. was arraigned and he pleaded “NOT
GUILTY” under the original information for homicide. He was never
arraigned for Murder. Hence, the proceedings below, while for the charge
of murder insofar as the other accused were concerned, were only for
homicide as regards Alejandro Ibasan, Jr. The treachery which qualified
the crime to murder was, for him, an aggravating circumstance. No
mitigating circums­tance was proved during trial.

Coming now to the appellants’ second assignment of error, we find the
same to be without merit. It is not denied that the court had at certain
points conducted its own questioning during the proceedings. The
records, however, show that the court’s questions did not amount to
interference as to make the case for the prosecution and deprive the
accused of their defense. The questions of the judge addressed to the
witnesses and the accused were merely to clarify certain points and
confirm cer­tain statements. The number of times that a judge intervenes
is not necessarily an indication of bias. It cannot be taken against a
judge if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal
certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.

As held in the case of Ventura v. Yatco (105 Phil. 287) “Judges
are not mere referees like those of a boxing bout, only to watch and
decide the results of a game; they should have as much interest as
counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence, calling
attention of counsel to points at issue that are overlooked, directing
them to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues
involved, clarifying ambiguous remarks by witnesses, etc.”

A judge may properly intervene in the trial of a case to promote
expedition and avoid unnecessary waste of time or to clear up some
obscurity (People v. Catindihan, 97 SCRA 196; Par. 14 Canons of Judicial
Ethics; Administrative Order No. 162 dated August 1, 1946, 42 O.G.
1803). In this respect, the record shows no irregularity in the conduct
of the trial judge.

As to the alleged deprivation of the appellants’ right to present other
material witnesses, we find the same without basis. The appellants
alleged that they had intended to present two witnesses, namely: Atty.
Gubatan and Atty. Esteves. However, the judge had expressed displeasure
against the appearance of the two witnesses when the defense requested
that they be subpoenaed, to wit:

“COURT

“You know, Esteves is a persona non grata in this court. He filed a
case against me in Lingayen. I don’t like to see his face. Never,
forever, never in my whole life. Gubatan, Ancheta, Esteves, as far as I
am concerned, they are already buried a long time. (con’t. of order)
Subpoena the following: Erlinda Reloseman, Bonuan Gueset, Dr. Dominador
Gutierrez, c/o GSIS Dagupan City.” (tsn., March 16, 1982, p. 196).

The emotional outburst of the presiding judge is rather unfortunate.
Even if a judge sincerely believes that a counsel is deliberately
exasperating or inciting him through the introduction of witnesses
publicly known to be personally anathema to the judge and not because
their testimony may prove or disprove matters in issue, the judge should
avoid any unseemly display of shortness of temper or other unbecoming
behaviour. A judge should not allow himself to be led by counsel or
witnesses into showing that he can be moved by pride, prejudice,
passion, or pettiness in the performance of his official functions
(Austria v. Masaquel, 20 SCRA 1247). It is precisely during such trying
moments that a judge should be stud­iously careful about his conduct and
in the measures he takes to uphold the court’s authority and dignity.
However, the actuations of the trial judge showing some impatience
against the appellants did not preclude them from adequately presenting
their case. We have examined the records carefully and we find that the
appealed decision was not based on any matters improperly elicited by
the trial judge during his examination of the witnesses nor has it been
affected by the quoted remarks. Appellants were given all the
opportunity to present their evidence.

Neither did the initial refusal of the trial judge to subpoena the two
supposed witnesses prevent their being presented in court if they were
really willing to testify for the defense. There are remedies available
to parties for such situations. In fact, the records show that, later,
the trial judge was amenable to their being present in court as
witnesses and it was the defense which found no more need for the
testimony:

“ATTY. FALLARME

“We are intending to present another witness especially Atty.
Gubatan and Atty. Esteves, but I think there is no need, so we are
closing our evidence and may we be given a chance to close tomorrow,
your Honor.” (Tsn., April 19, 1982, p. 269)

The appellants state that they did not take certain steps they
should have taken because the presiding judge had impressed upon the
accused and counsel “that the case of the prosecution was weak and that
it was not airtight nor foolproof, and that eventually he was going to
acquit the accused.”

The following statement of the trial court:

“COURT

“I would suggest to counsel that since this case have been pending
for the past 7 to 8 years and its record is about 4 to 6 inches thick,
that trial of this case will continue Mondays and Tuesdays every week so that the innocent will be set free and that the guilty will be put to jail. x x x Why prolong this agony? x x x.” (tsn., March 16, 1982, p. 195) (Italics supplied by the defense).

is no indication that the accused would eventually be acquitted. The
statement shows no bias nor intention to give false hopes to either
party. The judge merely expressed the need for a speedy trial. The
statement should not be relied upon as a suggestion that the case for
the defendants was stronger than the case for the prosecution.

Notwithstanding any remarks of any judge, a lawyer should continue
giving his client entire devotion to the latter’s interest, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of the
lawyer’s utmost learning and ability appropriate for the circumstances.
Notwithstanding any impressions that counsel may have about the
predispositions of a judge, the client is entitled to the benefit of any
remedy and defense that is authorized by law. The lawyer should assert
every such remedy or defense (Canon 15, Canons of Professional Ethics;
Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293 (1936); In re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191
(1922); In re Oliva, 103 Phil. 312 (1958); Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil.
86 (1932); Toguib v. Tomol, Jr. GR. Adm. Case No. 554, Jan. 3, 1969;
People v. Macellones, GR. No. 33639, Feb. 28, 1975; Tan Kui v. Court of
Appeals, GR. No. 36808, Nov. 29, 1973, See Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1980,
pp. 147-186.)

The second assignment of error has no merit but nonetheless we
take this opportunity to remind members of the bench that judges’ undue
interference, impatience, or participation in the examination of
witnesses or a severe attitude on the court’s part towards the
witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the unusual
circumstances of a trial may tend to prevent the proper
presentation of the cause or ascertainment of the truth in respect
thereto. (People v Catindihan, 97 SCRA 196). Thus, a judge should
exercise more care and patience in conducting a case, his right to
intervene to be used sparingly, if at all. He must bear in mind that
witnesses may be easily intimidated by an overly inqui­sitive judge
considering the unusual circumstances which they find themselves in,
especially when testifying in criminal cases.

We find no merit in the appellants’ third and fifth assignments of
errors. The lower court correctly appreciated the facts of the case and
the testimonies of the witnesses. The appellants’ point out alleged
inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies vis-a-vis
their sworn statements. They also seek to discredit the prosecution
witness Domingo Paras because of his relationship with Gregorio
Balolong, the deceased’s father. The appellants state that the
prosecution witnesses’ statements are conflicting, exaggerated,
perjured, prejudiced, evasive, and apparently dubious. Furthermore, the
defense relies on the alleged counter-affidavit of Agustina Redoban, an
eyewitness for the prosecution, recanting her earlier statements to the
police.

An examination of the records shows no compelling reason to
disbelieve the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The
inconsistencies to which the appellants advert are but minor
discrepancies which do not affect the weight of the witnesses
testimonies where they all coincide in the matter of identity of the
accused and in the narration of all material facts. Minor discrepan­cies
do not render testimony incredible and cannot destroy the probative
value of the consistent testimony of the witnesses on how the six (6)
perpetrators had assaulted and mauled the victim to death. (People v.
Pajenado, 69 SCRA 172; People v. Lopez, 80 SCRA 18; People v. Llanto, 88
SCRA 8; People v. dela Cruz, 91 SCRA 525; People v. Yutila, 102 SCRA
264; People v. Hinlo, 102 SCRA 472; People v. Garcia, 105 SCRA 325;
People v. Canizares, 107 SCRA 296; People v. Muñoz, 107 SCRA 313; People
v. Demate, 113 SCRA 353; People v. Millora, 119 SCRA 417; People v.
Barros, 122 SCRA 34; People v. dela Rosa, 102 SCRA 147). It is settled
that some minor inconsistencies become themselves indices of truth, a
sign of veracity of the statements of unlearned and untutored
eyewitnesses. (People v. Paculba, 124 SCRA 383; People v. Cardinas, 118
SCRA 458). According to the trial court, the prosecution witnesses
testified in a clear, positive, straightforward, truthful, and
convincing manner. The witnesses remained consistent on
cross-examination. We see no reason to doubt the lower court’s finding
that they are more credible. Having been eyewitnesses to a frightful
event as the killing of a fellow human, minor inaccurate expres­sions or
honest mistakes in observation are not fatal. Differences in some
details from nervous, rattled, and scared eyewitnesses cannot be avoided.
It cannot be expected that these witnesses under such strain and
pres­sure could pay particular attention and remember each and every
detail no matter how trivial. Thus, whether the weapon used is referred
to as a bat or a club is a matter of semantics. The fact remains that
the deceased was hit by a one meter long wooden truncheon and mauled to
death. Also, whether or not the beating of the victim had first occurred
inside or outside the fence of the Ibasans is immaterial, the fact is
the former was beaten both inside and outside of the premises of the
Ibasans’ yard. The fact is clear that the deceased was mauled and beaten
with pieces of wood, bottles, and a dagger or balisong, the weapons
used being properly established by the evidence on record. Also, the
fact remains that the victim died at the hands of the accused all of
whom were posi­tively identified.

Anent the alleged relationship of a prosecution eyewitness to the
deceased’s father, we reiterate the oft-repeated rule that relationship
of witnesses does not necessarily affect credibility. (People v. Ruiz,
93 SCRA 739; People v. Puesce, 87 SCRA 130). Relationship to the victim
by itself, does not prove that a witness is prejudiced and biased when,
as in this case, said testimony is not only clear and natural, but is
corroborated substantially by the other findings of the trial court.
There is moreover the absence of an improper motive actuating the
witness to testify falsely against the accused. (People v. Abejuela, 92
SCRA 503; People v. Veloso, 92 SCRA 515). And as to eyewitness Agustina
Redoban, her friendship with the victim standing alone is not proof of
prejudice (People v. Campana, 24 SCRA 271), the same not being a
sufficient motive for witnesses to testify falsely against an accused
(People v. Salcedo, 122 SCRA 54). As we stated in one case, the fact
that two of the prosecution’s witnesses were sheltered and fed by the
deceased father’s victim does not prove that said witnesses perjured in
recounting what they saw. It is well-known that witnesses to killings
usually do not want to undergo the trouble and inconvenience of going to
court and being exposed to reprisal. (People v. Medrana, 110 SCRA 130).

The alleged inconsistencies between witness Redoban’s testimony in
open court and her statements in pre-trial affidavits, are not marks of
untrusthworthiness or wilfull falsehood (People v. Bermoy, 105 SCRA
106). It is a matter of judicial notice and experience that, not
infrequently, affidavits are prepared in haste and are almost always
incomplete and inaccurate (People v. Gonzales, 99 SCRA 697). Greater
weight is accorded the statements given on the witness stand where both
prosecution and defense counsel could more thoroughly question the
witness.

The appellants would have us dismiss the case or acquit accused
Juan Ibasan alias “John” on the ground of insanity. They argue that the
trial court erred in denying their motion to quash. Section 2 of Rule
117 of the Rules of Court provides among the grounds for a motion to
quash: “That the defendant is insane”. When after an examination into
the mental condition of the accused, it appears that the defendant is
insane at the time of the trial, the court is under a legal duty to suspend the proceedings
and to order the commitment of the accused to an asylum. The
fundamental reason behind this may be taken from the very fact that if
the accused were insane, he would never have a fair trial; the
assistance that the law provides would be an empty ceremony (US v.
Guendia, 37 Phil. 337). The trial court acted fully in accordance with
the law.

Appellants, however, maintain that at the hearing on the motion to
quash, the evidence presented tended to show that accused Juan Ibasan
was insane before, during, and after the commission of the crime, as
well as at the time of trial, and should be exempt from criminal
liability. This is properly a matter to be considered as a matter of
defense during a full-blown trial to determine the guilt of the accused.
For the same to be properly passed upon in the motion to quash,
defendants should have invoked Subsection g, Section 2 Rule 117, to wit:

xxx                xxx                   xxx

(g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification;

xxx                xxx                   xxx

They did not do so.

The fourth assignment of error has no merit.

Defendants’ sixth assignment of error that the lower court erred in
denying – (1) bail to the accused on appeal, (2) their right to have
their case transferred to another sala or court of competent
jurisdiction, and (3) their right to be detained in the local jail
pending their appeal instead of the National Penitentiary in
Muntinglupa, cannot be sustained.

Section 4, Rule 114 provides:

“After conviction by the Court of First Instance defendant may, upon application, be bailed at the discretion of the court.”

This discretion will not be disturbed absent any showing of abuse or
arbitrariness on the part of the trial court. (Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, 83 Phil. 658) There is no such showing in the case at bar.

As for their detention at the National Penitentiary rather than the
local jail, the appellants are national prisoners and are correctly
detained at the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinglupa, Rizal, pending the
resolution of their appeal.

The transfer of the case, after judgment in the lower court, cannot be
sanctioned. No law or rule permits the same. Appeal is an adequate
remedy to correct whatever errors may have been committed by the lower
court.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED insofar as appellants Alejandro Ibasan II, alias “Boy”
and Alejandro Ibasan III alias “Tito” are concerned, with the
modification that the indemnity for the heirs of the victim, Leoncio
Balolong, is raised from Twelve Thousand (P12,000.00) to Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos in accordance with the ruling laid down by this
Court in People v. de la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518. The judgment of the court
a quo as to them is AFFIRMED in all other respects. Insofar as
appellant Alejandro Ibasan, Jr. alias “Intsik” is concerned, we find him
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and hereby
sentence him to an indeterminate penalty of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum, and order him
to indemnify the heirs of the victim jointly and solidarily with the
other accused-appellants. The resolutions dismissing the cases against
Demetrio Ibasan, Sr., alias “Loring” are reiterated. The late Alejandro
Ibasan, Sr., remains civilly liable, his death having occurred pending
appeal. He is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Leoncio
Balolong together with the other accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.