LUZVIMINDA V. LIPATA, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE EDUARDO C. TUTAAN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, QUEZON CITY BRANCH V (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AT QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 84), JOCELYN O…

This is a contempt incident against Luzviminda
V. Lipata for not obeying an alias writ of
execution.  Judge Eduardo C. Tutaan in his decision of September 24, 1981 ordered Luzviminda (married to Leonardo G. Lipata) and her stepmother to
deliver to the alleged vendees,
the spouses Jocelyn O. Agcaoili and
Jose J. Agcaoili, the two-storey house of strong materials, eight by nine
meters, located at 1884 Obisis Street, Pandacan,
Manila (the issue of improper venue was not raised) and to pay the
latter P800 a month as rental from July 1, 1980 and P4,500 as damages and attorney’s fees.

That decision became final and executory.  Judge Tutaan
dismissed the appeal of Luzviminda and her stepmother
because their record on appeal, due on Decem­ber
26, 1981, was filed on January
4, 1982.  Their two petitions
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, assailing the disallowance of
their appeal, were dismissed
(CA-G.R. Nos. 13657-Sp and 14608-Sp, August 23, 1982).

In a 2nd indorsement to Deputy Court
Administrator Arturo B. Buena dated June 17, 1982,
Judge Tutaan justified his decision and the writ of
execution.

In an unverified
motion dated June 7,
1982, the Agcaoili spouses prayed that Luzviminda and her step­mother be cited or declared in
contempt of court and committed to prison until they complied with the decision
because, according to the deputy sheriff’s return of the alias writ of execution, they failed to obey the decision of Judge Tutaan.  The
motion was set for hear­ing on June 11, 1982.

It was resolved in Judge Tutaan’s order of August 2, 1982 wherein he adjudged Luzviminda in contempt of court because she failed to comply with
the writ of execution.  She was
“sentenced to be confined to the city
jail of Quezon City until she shall have complied with the
decision” that she should vacate her Pandacan
residence and surrender the same to the Agcaoili
spouses.  Petrolman Valle was directed to
serve the warrant of arrest not
later than five o’clock in the afternoon of that same day, August 2.

She was arrested but released allegedly upon her oral request for an extension.  She was re-arrested on September 1, 1982 and confined in jail.

On September 8, 1982, Luzviminda filed
her petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court.  A mandatory
restraining order was issued to enjoin the enforcement of the Order of
August 2, 1982.

We hold that the contempt order is void.  It is not sanctioned by the Rules of
Court.  It is not contempt of court for a
judgment debtor to disobey the writ of execution.  It was the sheriff’s duty to enforce the
writ.  He did not perform his duty, as
ordained in Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides:

“SEC. 8.  Issuance, form and
contents of a writ of execution. – The writ of execution must issue
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines from the court in which the
judgment or order is entered; must intelligently refer to such judgment or
order, stating the court, province, and municipality where it is of record, and
the amount actually due thereon if it be for money; and must require the
sheriff or other proper officer to whom it is directed substantially as
follows:

x x x                          x x
x                             x
x x

“(d)  If it be for the delivery of the possession of
real or personal property, to deliver the possession of the same,
describing it, to the party entitled there­to, and to satisfy any costs,
damages, rents, or profits covered by the judgment out of the personal property
of the person against whom it was rendered, and if suffi­cient personal
property cannot be found, then out of the real property.”

Thus, “a person cannot be punished for contempt because of
his alleged disobedience of an order of court not addressed to him.  A writ of execution issued by a justice of
the peace to the sheriff, directing the latter to place the plaintiff in
possession of property held by the defendant, is not an order addressed to the
defendant.” The delivery of the real property pertains to the sheriff
alone to whom the law entrusts the execution
of judgments.  (U. S. vs. Ramayrat,
22 Phil. 183).  Same holding in Quizon vs. Philippine National Bank, 85 Phil. 459; Mendoza
vs. Alano and Salceda, 112
Phil. 445; Gatchalian vs. Arlegui
and Tan Tee vs. Arlegui, L-36515 and L-41360,
February 17, 1977, 75 SCRA 234 and Fuentes vs. Leviste,
L-47363, October 28, 1982, 117 SCRA 958.

“Courts should be slow in jailing people for noncompliance
with their orders.  Only in cases of
clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be
exercised”.  The power to punish for
contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, on the corrective and not on the retaliatory idea of punishment (Gamboa vs. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 270;
People vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265).

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge’s contempt order is reversed
and set aside.  The temporary restraining
order is made permanent.  Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad
Santos, and Escolin,  JJ., concur.

De Castro. J., sick leave.