GAUDENCIO R. MABUTOL AND ERLINDA R. MABUTOL, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. ARTURO B. PASCUAL, MANUEL R. MAZA, TEOTIMO TANGONAN, RODOLFO JARDIEL, RENATO COLOBONG, SALVADOR CAPISTRAN…

In Civil Case No. SD-623 of the defunct
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
the spouses Gaudencio and Erlinda
Mabutol sued Arturo B. Pascual,
Mayor of San Jose City, Lt. Col. Teotimo Tangonan, PC Provincial Commander of Nueva
Ecija, Manuel R. Maza, City Fiscal of San Jose, Rodolfo Jardiel,
City Engineer of San Jose, Salvador Capistrano, a representative of the
Presidential Assistant on Housing and Resettlement Agency
(PAHRA), Renato Colobong,
an official of the Department of Local Governments and Community Development,
and Apolinaria Cueto, a
representative of the Social Welfare Administration, for damages.  They claimed that the defendants who were
then members of the Ad Hoc Committee implementing Presidential
Decree No. 296 and Letter of Instructions No. 19 for the City of San Jose passed an illegal resolution for the
demolition of their 3-door apartment which was in fact demolished on September
20, 1975.  They asked for a monetary award totalling P1,210,000.00.

In a Motion dated October
16, 1975, the defendants asked that the complaint be
dismissed.  They invoked, among other
grounds, “that the complaint states no cause of action.” The motion,
which was opposed, was denied by the
trial court on February 18, 1976, “in view of the allegations of bad
faith and abuse of authority on the part of the defendants in the commission of
the acts complained of.”

The defendants filed a
Motion for Reconsideration on March 15, 1976, and this time the motion was granted in an
Order dated April 26, 1976, and which reads as follows:

“For resolution is defendants motion
for reconsideration dated March 12,
1976 which seeks to set aside the order to this Court, dated February 18, 1976, denying their
motion to dismiss.

x x
x              x
x x                 x x x

“The plaintiffs, husband and wife, were the owners of a three
(3) door commercial building measuring 12 meters wide by 12.80 meters long
constructed in 1968, along the National Highway, San Jose City, valued at
P113,000.00 and a monthly rental value of P1,085.00.  The defendants are admittedly public
officials, being the City Mayor, City Fiscal, City Engineers, an official of
the Department of Local Government and Community Development, and the representative
of the Department of Social Welfare, all of San Jose City, and the Provincial
Commander of the Philippine Constabulary, Nueva Ecija Command, all constituting the Ad Hoc Committee, ‘duly
organized as an implementing agency of Presidential Decree No. 296 x x x and Letter of Instruction No.
19, in the City of San Jose.’ (par. 4, Complaint).  On September 4, 1975, defendant City Mayor
Arturo B. Pascual, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee,
sent notice to plaintiffs for the demolition of their building fifteen (15)
days after receipt thereof.  On September
17, plaintiffs, were informed that their building will
be demolished on September 18, 1975.  For lack of material time to secure an
injunction from the courts, they immediately went to see the Provincial Commander where plaintiffs and their lawyers
made vigorous representation that their building cannot be legally demolished
for want of a clearance from the PAHRA, and because the ‘creek abutting their
building’ is not a natural creek
but a man-made creek.  The Provincial
Commander however, made it clear to the plaintiffs that the building will be
demolished, but later reconsidered to delay the demolition and called instead,
another meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, which met on September 18, but
postponed to September 20, 1975, when the plaintiffs, through their counsel,
pre­sented their evidence before the committee and argued that plaintiffs’
building could not be legally demolished for lack of clearance from the PAHRA,
and that clearance could not be validly issued because the body of water
abutting the building is man-made creek not a creek within the meaning of
Presiden­tial Decree 296, and Instruction No. 19.  To bolster their claim, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant City Engineer for falsification of public
document for making it appear that the creek is Sapang
Cumabol when it was only a man-made creek, Annex
“A”, (Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss).  The committee, however, over-ruled
plaintiffs’ objection and reiterated its order of demolition (Annex B, Complaint).  And so plaintiffs building was demolished.  Plaintiffs complain that they were
deprived of the right to avail of judicial remedies, and that the demolition
was done in bad faith, with abuse of authority and without giving them the
opportunity to remove personal belongings.

“On the other hand, defendants contend that in issuing the
order of demolition, the Ad Hoc Committee took into consideration the
revocation on June 15, 1968, of the building permit granted the plaintiff on
May 24, 1968, on the ground that a portion of the building then under
construction occupied the creek bed, and that it exceeded the area granted in
the permit which was 8 meters by 10 meters (Annexes 2 and 1).  On October
10, 1972, defendant City
Mayor promulgated his Executive Order No. 16, (Annex 3), and on October 26, 1972, defendant
City Fiscal upon instruction of
said City Mayor, sent notices to all persons concerned, among them the
plaintiff Gaudencio Mabutol,
to demolish their buildings. 
Furthermore, in a relocation made by defendant
City Engineer, on instruction of
the City Mayor (Annex 6) and it was found that the building occupied a ninety-six (96) square meters area
of the creek-bed.  Defendants, likewise,
took into consideration the petition of Adolfo Enrile
together with others, with the military authorities (Annex 7), which prompted
the holding of an ocular inspection and the submission of the report by the
Provincial Commander with the Secretary of National Defense (Annex 7), and on
the basis of which the Secretary rendered a decision, the last paragraph of
which reads:

‘After a study of the report of the Provincial Commander, this
Office sees the need for sacrifice of a few for the good of the greatest
number.  The Mayor should be given a
chance to exercise his sound and judicious discretion in the interest of his
constituents’. (Annex 9).

On March
23, 1973, plaintiff Gaudencio Mabutol wrote the City Mayor to allow him to excavate the
property on the other side of the creek and have it deposited on the bank
adjacent to his building, (Annex 10), but the same was objected to by the defendant
City Engineer, (Annex 12).  Failing in these administrative remedies to
prevent demolition, Gaudencio Mabutol,
on April 2, 1973, filed with
this Court a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the
City, docketed as Civil Case No. SD-489,
(Annex 13), and on May 19, 1973, this Court dismissed the complaint, (Annex
14).

x x x                      x
x x                 x x x

“The Court of Appeals in denying the petition for a writ of Preliminary Injunction against
defendant City Mayor, ruled:

‘It is significant to note that the appealed judgment rendered by
the trial court in the present action for prohibition with preliminary injunction,
lifting the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued and dismissing the
case for prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction is immediately executory and cannot be stayed even if an appeal has been
taken therefrom x x x.  Evidently, the
right of petitioner sought to be protected did not exist as his permit to
construct said building has been revoked. 
And more the acts against which the injunction is to be directed cannot
be considered in relation to any right. 
On the other hand, when the respondent City Mayor issued the order
decreeing the removal of construction, buildings, structures over public
properties, or along streams etc., he was merely implementing the Letter of
Instructions No. 19 of the President enjoining the public officials concerned
to remove all illegal constructions or buildings on or along esteros and river banks for the protection of public
health, safety and peace and order. 
Considering the very aim and purpose of Letter of Instruction No. 19 of
the President, we are prepared not to put up a barrier in form of a restraining
order to the imple­mentation of the aforesaid Letter of Instruction (pp. 3, 4,
and 5, Annex 15).

“The facts further show that defendant City Mayor, upon being
officially informed of the resolution of the Court of Appeals on September 28,
1973 sought the City Fiscal’s legal opinion on his
next course of action, and on the basis of said opinion, (Annex 17), defendant
Mayor wrote a demand letter to plaintiff Gaudencio Mabutol, (Annex 16), to remove his building within thirty
(30) days from receipt thereof. 
Plaintiff Mabutol, instead of objecting to the
demand, or availing of any judicial remedies with the courts or other
administrative or executive authorities to enjoin the Mayor from carrying out his order to demolish,
wrote in reply that he be given a period of fifteen (15) days extension within
which to undertake personally the demolition (Annex 20).  He further wrote that –

‘My inability to demolish the building within the period granted me
was not a sign of defiance to your orders or the lawful order of the Court but
because of lack of funds to finance the demolition.’ (Annex 20).

The
extension sought for was promptly granted (Annex 21), but plaintiffs’
offer to undertake the
demolition was not complied with by plaintiffs’ claim
that they were without funds to
undertake the demolition (Annex 22).

“The facts as alleged in the complaint, and which the
defendants are deemed to have admitted for purposes of the motion to dismiss
and motion for reconsideration (Lim vs. delos Santos,
8 SCRA, 798), pose the issues as to whether (a) defendants ordered the
demolition in their official capacities as members of the Ad Hoc Committee, (b)
acted in bad faith and abuse of authority, (c) as to whether they are possessed
with a corporate power to sue or be sued, (d) whether defendants acted without
authority when it caused the demolition of the building without prior clearance
from the PAHRA.

“There can be no dispute that the defendants are members of
the Ad Hoc Committee, duly appointed to implement the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 296 and Letter
of Instruction No. 19, (Annex 25).  In
fact, this is admitted by the plaintiffs, (par. 4, Complaint) being the public
officials called upon by the Presidential Decree and Instruction ‘to
implement the policy embodied in the said decree in the manner prescribed
therein,’ (par. 4, Complaint).  The
complaint further alleged, (par. 6), that defendant Mayor, as Chairman of the
Ad Hoc Committee, notified the plaintiffs of the intended demolition fifteen
(15) days after notice thereof which falls on September 18, 1975, (par. 7;
Complaint).  The authority and power of
the Ad Hoc Committee to implement the law, that is, to order the demolition was
indeed acknowledged and recognized by the plaintiffs when they appeared, by
themselves and counsel, first, before the Provincial Commander as Co-Chairman,
(par. 7, Complaint) and later, before the committee itself, (par. 10 to 19,
Complaint).

“This Court, out of plaintiffs’ own admission in their
complaint, therefore, finds that the order of demolition was issued by the
defendants in their official capacities as members of the Ad Hoc
Committee.  This is supported by the
Committee’s resolutions of September 2, 1975 (Annex 28), and its resolution of
September 20, 1975 (Annex 20).

“Now, as to whether defendants acted in bad faith and abuse of
authority.  Among the facts forming the
basis of defendants’ good faith are documentary evidence, most of which are
public documents, and not denied by plaintiffs in their opposition, enumerated
chronologically in the report of the chairman, dated October 3, 1975 (Annex 33,
pp. 3-5, Motion for Reconsideration), the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija,
Branch VI, in Civil Case No. SD-48 (Annex 14), the resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52911-R,
(Annex 15), the Legal Opinion No. 98 of the City Fiscal (Annex 17), the
certification of the City Engineer that plaintiffs’ building occupied a 96
square meters area of the creek bed
(Annex 18), the letters of Gaudencio Mabutol requesting for an extension of time to demolish the
building by himself (Annexes 20 and 22), and the fact that plaintiffs are
affluent, (Annex 30).

“For the same set of facts for which plaintiffs’ building was
demolished, he (Gaudencio Mabutol)
was charged before and convicted by Military Commission No. 6, as a result of
which plaintiff already deposited P9,000.00 with the City Treasurer’s Office in
compliance with the order of the military commission (Annexes 34, 35 and
36).  The Secretary of National Defense,
the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeals and the Military Commission,
in separate and independent proceedings, uniformly sustained the defendants in
their conclusion that plaintiffs’ building was constructed in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 296.

“The Court, after a
very careful and painstaking review of the attendant facts and circumstances,
is persuaded that indeed the defendants acted and performed their official
duties in consonance with law, with caution, fairness and due process.  They acted strictly in furtherance of the
policies enunciated by His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos under
Pres. Decree No. 296, and in accordance with Letter of Instruction No. 19,
fully bearing in mind the sad and unfortunate experience of our people as a
consequence of floods, the evil intended to be remedied, and the object sought
to be accomplished.  It also took into
consideration the judicial and administra­tive precedents on the matter.

x x
x              x
x x                 x x x

“Plaintiffs contend that no clearance having been issued by the
Presidential Assistance on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency (PAHRA) which is a
legal require­ment under Letter of Instruction No. 19, the Committee’s order of
demolition itself was illegal thus giving rise to a cause of action for
damages.  Plaintiffs’ contention is based
on the letter opinion of Assistant Executive Secretary Ronaldo
B. Zamora, dated May 8, 1974 (Annex C, Opposi­tion to Motion to Dismiss),
wherein the Assistant Executive Secretary held the opinion that –

‘In fine, it is believed that prior PAHRA Clearance is required for
the demolition of illegal constructions contemplated by both Presidential Decree No. 296 and LOI No. 19.’

“In answer to this, defendants rely on the memo­randum of
Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor dated November
13, 1972 (Annex 5), the pertinent portion of which reads:

‘1. Not all
squatters shall be classified as eligible to the concern and help of the government.  There should be no mercy for which rich
and/or professional squatters and they should be removed bodily and left to
their own devices, if they refuse to remove their illegal constructions
voluntarily within the period prescribed or allotted to them.’

Defendants, likewise, rely on the opinion
of the Secretary of Justice of October 9, 1974 (Annex 33, of the Reply to the
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss), wherein the Secretary wrote:

‘As I see it, this Letter of Instruction cannot be any more
explicit in authorizing the officials to whom it is directed to remove summarily
encroachments or illegal constructions on and along esteros,
and river banks, such as those in
question, and as to the need for judicial proceedings before such removal be
made, this has been answered in the negative by the court in the case of Guinto vs. Lacson.’ (108 Phil. 460).

The PAHRA, by its name and function, is to
assist and rehabilitate those who could be classified as eligible to the
concern and help of the government.  As
embodied in the memorandum of the Executive Secretary, ‘there should be no
mercy for the rich and professional squatters, and they should be removed
bodily and left to their own devices. . . 
Measured in terms of the value of their properties declared for taxation
purposes (Annex 30), the plaintiffs are relatively rich, and certainly not poor
or indigent to be classified as eligible to the concern and help of the
government.  And even on the assumption
that defendants committed error in ordering the demolition of plaintiffs’
building as they did so, without first securing the clearance from the PAHRA, a
legal requirement as plaintiffs would want it to appear, yet, under the
circumstances they could not be held liable for damages.  In the case of Cabungcal,
et. al., vs. City Mayor of Bacolod
City, 11 SCRA 584, the Supreme Court ruled:

‘An erroneous interpretation of the meaning of the provisions of an
ordinance by a City Mayor does not amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award for damages against an official.’

A city official who performed a duty
required by law, there being no showing that he acted in bad faith, is not
liable for damages.  Thus in the case of
San Miguel Brewery, Inc. vs. Magno, 21 SCRA 292, the
Supreme Court held:

‘In the case at bar, since there is no dispute that appellee issued the warrant of distraint
and levy against the delivery truck of
the appellant on January 9, 1961, in his capacity as City
Treasurer of Butuan and as there is no disagreement
that defendant appellee issued warrant by virtue of
Ordinance No. 26, of the City of Butuan, and not having been shown that
defendant either as a private citizen or as City Treasurer of Butuan, had acted in bad faith there can be no question
that appellee, who was merely performing a duty
enjoined by law to be performed when he issued the warrant of distraint and levy, cannot be made to answer personally for
damages to appellant.’

It
was likewise held in the case of Laurel Manila, et al. vs. Galvan, et
al., 20 SCRA 198 that a person cannot be held liable for damages if an act is
‘apparently based on an honest mistake in the appreciation or interpretation of
the applicable law or jurisprudence.’

“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing and for want of cause
of action and/or jurisdiction; this Court is constrained to set aside its order
dated February 18, 1976, and hereby orders the dismissal of this case without
pronouncement as to costs.”

The plaintiffs appealed the order of dismissal to the defunct
Court of Appeals as being contrary to law and facts.  The Court of Appeals in a resolution dated
May 20, 1982, found that the appeal involved no question of fact but only one
of law.  Pursuant to the relevant
provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948, the case was certified to this Court
for final adjudication.  None of the parties litigants took exception to the certification of the Court of Appeals.  On June 21, 1982, We
accepted and docketed the case.

Although the parties filed a Record on Appeal and submitted their
respective briefs, this case which involves only a question of law shall be
considered as if it has come before Us on a petition
for review under R.A. No. 5440.

In their briefs the appellants make two assignments of errors but
they can be stated in one simple proposition: 
Did the trial court err in dismissing the complaint?

The rule is well-settled that a public official(s) is not liable
for damages for performing a duty required by law and absent bad faith.  (San Miguel Brewery, Inc.
vs. Magno, L-21879, Sept. 29, 1967; 21 SCRA 292.  See also Cabungcal vs. Cordova, L-16934, July 31, 1964; 11 SCRA
584.)

In this particular case, the plaintiffs themselves stated in
their complaint that the defendants are all public officials and that they
ordered the demolition of the apartment building in the discharge of their
official function.  There remains only
the question as to whether or not they acted in bad faith and the answer is in
the negative.  For as the trial court
said in its Order of dismissal:

“Now, as to whether defendants acted in bad faith and abuse of
authority.  Among the facts forming the
basis of defendants’ good faith are documentary evidence, most of which are
public documents, and not denied by plaintiffs in their opposition, enumerated
chronologically in the report of the chairman, dated October 3, 1975 (Annex 33,
pp. 3-5, Motion for Reconsideration), the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija,
Branch VI, in Civil Case No. SD-48 (Annex 14), the resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52911-R, (Annex 15), the Legal Opinion No. 98 of the
City Fiscal (Annex 17), the certification of the City Engineer that plaintiffs’
building occupied a 96 square meters area of the creek bed (Annex 18), the
letters of Gaudencio Mabutol
requesting for an extension of time to demolish the building by himself
(Annexes 20 and 22), and the fact that plaintiffs are affluent, (Annex
30).” (RA, pp. 329-330.)

In view of this, the appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.  Costs against
the plaintiffs-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Guerrero, De Castro, and Escolin, JJ., concur.