THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GENEROSO QUINLOB AND LORETO QUINLOB, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

In the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, GENEROSO QUINLOB
and LORETO QUINLOB were accused of murder in Criminal Case No. 1612.  According to the information the crime was
committed as follows:

“That in the evening on or about the 4th day of July, 1975, in
the municipality of Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a gun and a bolo,
conspiring, confederating together and helping one another and with intent to
kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, shot, stab and hack one DOMINGO
QUINLOB, their own brother, thereby in­flicting upon him multiple gunshot and
lacerated wounds in the different vital parts of his body which caused his
instantaneous death; that as a result of the commission of the said crime the
heirs of the herein victim suffered the following damages, viz:

“CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery and evident premeditation.” (Expediente, p. 1)

Judge Dimalanes D. Buissan rendered a decision which reads in
part as follows:

“These circumstances enumerated above and reinforced or
bolstered by the dying statement of the victim – which is considered part of
the res gestae – heard by his wife Carmen, his son Rogelio, and
their sister Filomena, leave no iota of doubt in the mind of the Court that the
deceased Domingo Quinlob was killed by his own brothers, the herein accused
Generoso Quinlob and Loreto Quinlob.

“The accused are charged with the crime of murder defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by treachery
as evidenced by the fatal wounds on the back and neck of the victim.  The prosecution has not proved any
aggravating circumstances.  Likewise, the
defense did not prove any mitigating cir­cumstance.  The penalty, therefore, should be imposed in
its medium period.

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GENEROSO QUINLOB and
LORETO QUINLOB GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, charged
against them in the Informa­tion. 
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the accused Generoso Quinlob and Loreto Quinlob are
hereby sentenced each to suffer the penalty of an indeterminate imprisonment
ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum to
TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.

“They are likewise jointly and severally sentenced to
indemnify the heirs of Domingo Quinlob in the total sum of P37,000.00, with­out
any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency as provided for by law.

“They are likewise sentenced to suffer all the accessory
penalties provided for by law.

“They are finally sentenced each to pay one-half of the
costs.” (Expediente, pp. 415-416.)

It should be noted that under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code the penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death.  Accordingly, if the penalty is
to be imposed in its medium period, as Judge Buissan said, it should be reclusion
perpetua.  It, therefore, passes
understanding why the judge imposed an indeterminate sentence considering that
the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply if the penalty is life
imprisonment.  (Act No. 4103, as amended
by Act No. 4225.)

Generoso and Loreto appealed their conviction and since the
penalty imposed on them is less than reclusion perpetua, the appeal was
correctly directed to the Court of Appeals. 
(Expediente, p. 417.)

In the brief which the Solicitor General filed in the Court of
Appeals, We encounter a statement which also passes understanding, to wit:

“However, as regards the penalty imposed, murder being
punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, (Art. 248,
Revised Penal Code) in the absence of any miti­gating or aggravating
circumstance, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.  Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in
relation to Art. 61 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should
be within the range of prision mayor maximum to reclusion perpetua.  Hence, the indeterminate sentence that should
be imposed should be from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion perpetua as maximum.

“It is respectfully recommended that the decision of the trial
court, being in accordance with law and evidence, be affirmed, except as to the
penalty imposed, which should be modified to 10 years and 1 day to 20 years and
1 day.” (Pp. 15-16.)

In the Court of Appeals, Justices Mariano A. Zosa (ponente), Mama
D. Busran and Jorge R. Coquia found that the appellants were indeed guilty of
murder but in the decision We find still another state­ment which passes
understanding:

“With regards the penalty imposed by the lower court, We found
the same incorrect.  Murder is punishable
by reclusion temporal to death. 
In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circums­tance (Art.
64(1)) the penalty imposable is reclusion temporal.

“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
modified.  Accused-appellants Generoso
Quinlob and Loreto Quinlob are sentenced to reclusion perpetua.  As We find no reversible error except on the
penalty imposed, the decision is hereby affirmed in all other respects.”
(Rollo, p. 40.)

We have here again a situation where three pairs of eyes failed
to discern the difference between reclusion temporal and reclusion
perpetua.

The People’s version of the facts is as follows:

“At about 7:00 o’clock in the evening of July 4, 1975,
accused-appellant Generoso Quinlob dropped by Domingo Quinlob’s home, bringing
tuba with him.  (p. 26 TSN Jan. 11, 1977;
p. 2 TSN May 9, 1977) Appellant Generoso Quinlob asked Domingo to come with him
and they left Domingo’s home together. 
(p. 6 TSN Jan. 11, 1977; p. 2 TSN, May 9, 1977) Before leaving Domingo’s
house, they stayed there for a while drinking tuba.  (p. 6 TSN, Jan. 11, 1977; p. 2 TSN May 9,
1977)

At about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, a gunshot was fired very
near Domingo Quinlob’s home, awakening the residents therein.  (p. 15 TSN Jan. 11, 1977; p. 2 TSN May 9,
1977) Immediately, thereafter, the voice of Domingo Quinlob saying that, ‘Meng
help me because I was shot by Generoso Quinlob and Loreto Quinlob,’ was heard
by Rogelio and Carmen Quinlob.  (p. 410,
Record; pp. 8-9, Appellants’ brief; p. 8, TSN Jan. 11, 1977)

Rogelio Quinlob, together with his mother, Carmen Quinlob, went
downstairs, lighted the place, and found Domingo Quinlob at a distance of about
5 meters from their home lying on his belly, dead.  (p. 9 TSN Jan. 11, 1977; p. 3 TSN May 9,
1977)

The deceased had suffered multiple wounds caused by sharp and
bladed weapons, and gunshots.  (p. 3, 4-6
A TSN Sept. 9, 1976; Exhs. “A, A-1 to A-4, A-4a to A-4b, A-5”).  The deceased suffered fatal multiple wounds
all throughout his entire body.  (Exhs.
“B, B-1 to B-4”) The multiple wounds inflicted on the deceased were
the latter’s immediate cause of death. 
(Exhs. “C, C-1 to C-2”) The location, character, and gravity
of the wounds inflicted, point to no other conclusion, but to a treacherous and
pre­meditated attack insuring the deceased demise.

Finding her husband dead, Carmen Quinlob shouted for help.  Loreto and Generoso Quinlob then appeared,
the latter bringing a bolo.  Both
appellants showed no pity on their deceased brother.  (p. 3 TSN May 9, 1977) On seeing the
deceased, Generoso Quinlob commented ‘Oy, it is already dead’.  (pp. 10, 18, 19 TSN Jan. 11, 1977) When the
appellants came, they were not accompanied by anyone.  (p. 17 TSN Jan. 11, 1977)

The killing was, thereafter, reported to the barrio councilman and
the barrio captain.

Appellants did not attend the ninth day prayer of the
deceased.  Nor did they extend help
during the deceased’s interment.  (p. 23
TSN Jan. 11, 1977)

Before Domingo Quinlob was killed, or in the morning of that
fateful day on July 4, 1975, appellant Generoso Quinlob accosted Rogelio
Quinlob, while the latter was on his way to wash clothes in Gumay river, asking
Rogelio this: ‘Ne, dili kaba malooy kon among patyon an imong amahan, ‘
(meaning, Ne, will you not pity if we kill your father) to which query Rogelio
replied: ‘Ayaw ninyong patya ang akong amahan kay inyo ra man nang igsoon. ‘
(meaning, do not kill my father because that [he] is also your brother (pp. 4-5
TSN Jan. 11, 1977)

The appellants harbored enmity against the deceased because the
latter had purchased from their sister, Anita [Nenita], a lot for P1,000.00,
which very same lot the appellants had wanted to sell to another buyer for P3,
500. 00, thus depriving them of a profit. 
(pp. 12-13 TSN Jan. 11, 1977; p. 4 TSN May 9, 1977) Since boyhood days,
Generoso Quinlob had always quarrelled with the deceased and even promised to
kill the latter.  (pp. 3-4 TSN May 9,
1977.” (Brief, pp. 3-6.)

The appellants have a different version as follows:

“Accused-appellants herein are the brothers of the late
Domingo Quinlob who died on July 4, 1975 at Dionum, Piñan, Zamboanga del
Norte.  As to why and what was the cause
of the death of said Domingo Quinlob and why and how come that his brothers,
accused-appellants herein, were charged with ‘Murder’. . . this we will relate in
the following narration of facts based on the evidence presented during the
trials of this case.

In the morning of July 4, 1975, accused-appellants herein, together
with Jose Lumatap, were having a baya­nihan locally known as ‘SAOD’ in cutting
bamboos owned by the father-in-law of Generoso Quinlob.  These bamboos being cut were to be sold by
Generoso Quinlob to Atty. Alfredo Tenorio of Mutia, Zamboanga del Norte, at P3.
00 each bamboo.  The accused-appellants
and Jose Lumatap were able to finish cutting bamboos at about 6:00 o’clock in
the afternoon and after hauling them across the river, part of Dionum, they
went to the house of Loreto Quinlob, one of the accused-appellants in this
case.  Together with the
accused-appellants was Jose Lumatap. 
After eating their supper and after a few minutes of rest, they went to
sleep.  Loreto Quinlob and his wife were
sleeping in their room and Jose Lumatap and accused-appellant Generoso Quinlob
were sleeping at the sala of the house.

While they were already asleep, about 10:00 o’clock p.m. more or
less, Lolita Quinlob, the wife of Loreto Quinlob, was awaken due to the call
for help made by Carmen Quinlob, the wife of Domingo Quinlob.  Lolita suddenly awakened her husband, Loreto
Quinlob, and then the couple awakened Jose Lumatap and Generoso Quinlob informing
the latter about the shout made by the wife of Domingo Quinlob.

Without losing any time, the accused-appellants, together with Jose
Lumatap and the wife of Loreto Quinlob, Lolita, went down and proceeded to
Domingo Quinlob’s house to verify the matter and there, in the yard of the
house of Domingo Quimlob, they saw the latter laying dead.  The wife of Domingo Quinlob as well as his
children were already there crying while looking at the deceased.  Upon arrival, Generoso Quinlob then inquired
from Carmen, the wife of Domingo Quinlob, who killed the latter and Carmen
answered that she did not know.  She kept
crying.  With that, the accused herein,
together with the wife of Domingo Quinlob, her son Rogelio Quinlob and Jose
Lumatap reported the incident, first to councilman Anastacio Miti who, in turn,
accompanied them to the Barangay Captain of Dionum, Raymundo Baguinat.

It is to be noted here, however, that during the time that when the
brothers of the deceased, the ac­cused herein, inquired from the wife of
Domingo Quinlob as to who killed the latter, she said she did not know the
killer.  And it should be noted here
further that the instant case has been filed against the accused basing mainly
on the alleged incident in the morning of July 4, 1975, wherein the son of the
deceased Rogelio Quinlob was allegedly told by Generoso Quinlob that the latter
would kill the father of the former and he was even told what would Rogelio
feel and secondly, allegedly due to the shout of the deceased, Domingo Quinlob,
right after he was shot and stab wherein he mentioned his assailants to be his
brothers, the accused-appellants herein. 
These alleged incidents were made the basis of the prosecution in filing
the instant case against the accused-appellants.” (Brief, pp. 3-5.)

The appellants have made the following assignment of errors:

“I.   THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DES­PITE OF LACK OF IDENTITY AND THE ALLEGED MOTIVE OF THE
KILLING.

II.   THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PRO­SECUTION WITNESSES THAT THE DECEASED ALLEGEDLY SHOUTED THE
NAMES OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WHO STABBED HIM.

III.   THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN BELIEVING THE
ALLEGED SHOUT FOR HELP’ AS PART OF THE RES GESTAE.

IV. THAT THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AND PROVED THAT THE DECEASED
HAD ENEMIES AND ONE OF THEM IS RICARDO MANDAO.

V.  THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BY RELYING MUCH ON THE ALLEGED WEAKNESS OF DEFENSE’S EVIDENCE
INSTEAD OF THAT OF THE PROSECUTION’S.

VI.  THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE OF THE CLEAR SHOWING IN THE RECORDS OF THIS CASE
THAT THE PROSECUTION MISERABLY FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.” (Brief, p. 1.)

All of the assignment of errors concern the credibility of
witnesses.  For this reason no useful
purpose can be served by discussing them one at a time.  They can be lumped together for even the
appellants combine some of them in their brief.

Appellants are the brothers of the victim, Domingo Quinlob;
brothers-in-law of prosecution witness Carmen Quinlob; and uncles of witness
Rogelio Quinlob.  These prosecution
witnesses testified that before the killing of Domingo, appellants passed by
their house and invited the victim to drink tuba with them; that after a while,
they asked the victim to go with them to the copra dryer (landahan) near the
house of appellant Loreto, to drink more tuba there; that at about 10:00 o’clock
they heard a gunfire followed by the shout of Domingo, saying: “Meng, help
me because I was shot by Generoso Quinlob and Loreto Quinlob”; and when
they found Domingo, he was already dead. 
Appellants were the only persons who were with the deceased immediately
before the incident took place and he identified them as his assailants.

As to the motive of the killing, Rogelio Quinlob testified that
in the morning of July 4, 1975, he went to Gumay River to wash his father’s and
his own clothes and when he was near the house of Loreto Quinlob, he was
overtaken by his uncle Generoso Quinlob who asked him: “Noy, di ka ba
malooy kon among patyon ang imong amahan”, which was translated in the
decision of the trial court, as follows: “Noy, will you not pity your
father if we kill him”, to which, Rogelio answered: “ayaw intawon
ninyo ug patya kanang akong amahan kay inyo ra man kana siyang igsoon”,
which means “please do not kill my father because he is also your
brother”.

Rogelio further testified that before the death of his father,
Generoso and Loreto had an argument with his father Domingo over a one hectare
parcel of land belonging to their sister Nenita Quinlob, which his father had
bought for only P1, 000. 00 but which Generoso and Loreto wanted to sell to
Gregorio (Gorio) Bustaliño for P3,500.00. 
Thereby depriving appellants of the profits which they could have
obtained by selling the land to Bustaliño. 
Domingo, being the elder brother, had insisted of having his way which
appellants resented.  Carmen Quinlob testified
that both Generoso and Loreto had often quarreled with her husband, in
particular when her husband bought the land of her sister-in-law, Nenita
Quinlob, for P1, 000.00, which Generoso and Loreto wanted to sell for P3, 500.
00.  The frustrated land deal was a
motive for the killing.

Appellants claim that the lower court erred in “concluding
(sic)” the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that the deceased
shouted the names of his assailants thus: “Meng, help me because I was
shot by Generoso Quinlob and Loreto Quinlob“.  (Underlining supplied.) Appellants contend
that the statement is unusual and un-natural because in the ordinary course,
their nicknames should have been mentioned but not their full names because
Generoso and Loreto were brothers of the deceased.

This contention is untenable. 
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General:

“It is submitted that the deceased statement calling out his
assailants’ full names considering they were his brothers, does not make this
impro­bable.  At any rate, it is not
uncommon for a man, who is on the brink of death, to call out his assail­ants’
full names, to remove any doubt as to their identities.  Nor was there any reason for the de­ceased to
call out the assailants’ nicknames.  When
the deceased was attacked treacherously by the ap­pellants, any love or
attachment the former may have to the latter was completely destroyed.  From that moment on, to the deceased, the
appellants ceased to be his brothers.  In
the natural course of human conduct, it is not uncommon to name hated persons
in their full names.” (Brief, p. 8.)

Appellants further contend that when Domingo allegedly shouted
for help, the prosecution witnesses, Carmen and Rogelio Quinlob, were already
asleep.

On this point, Rogelio Quinlob testified as follows:

“Q.  On
July 4, 1975, at about 10:00 o’clock on the evening you, your mother and your
brothers were already lying down asleep in your house?

A.    Yes, sir, already lying down.”

(TSN, Jan. 11, 1979,
p. 18.)

Considering the above testimony, it shows that the Quinlobs were
not yet asleep.  They were only lying
down preparatory to sleep.  Nevertheless,
granting for the sake of argument, that they were already asleep, it is not
disputed that there was a gunfire. 
Considering that the gun explosion was nearby, the occupants of the
house must have been awakened by the gun report.  Therefore, it is not improbable that Carmen
and Rogelio Quinlob heard the shout for help of Domingo Quinlob.

Appellants also contend that the lower court erred in not appreciating
the evidence presented which showed that the deceased had enemies and one of
them is Ricardo Mandao.  They advance the
argument that the culprit is either Ricardo Mandao or Cesar Sumacal.

This imputation is purely conjectural.  The record shows that Mandao and Sumacal were
indeed arrested and investigated.  But
eventually they were released for lack of prima facie evidence to warrant the
filing of charges against them.  No evidence
was presented to show that Mandao was somewhere near the place of the killing.

Appellants interpose the defense of alibi.  They testified that they were at home and
asleep when the incident happened.

This defense cannot be sustained. 
Alibi is the weakest of all defenses because it can be easily
concocted.  To sustain the defense of
alibi, the accused must not only show that he was at some other place at the
time the crime happened, but also, that it was phy­sically impossible for him
to have been at the place where the crime was committed.

The distance between the house of the deceased and that of Loreto
Quinlob’s is only 200 meters.  It was
even admitted by the defense that the shouts of Carmen Quinlob for help could
be heard in Loreto’s house.  In fact,
appellants allege that after hearing the shout of Carmen Quinlob, Lolita
Quinlob roused her husband Loreto and the couple in turn informed Generoso and
Jose Lumatap and they all proceeded to Domingo’s house to verify the
matter.  The scene of the crime therefore
is very near the house of Loreto Quinlob where the appellants were said to be
sleeping.

The third assignment of error – that the lower court erred in
believing the alleged “shout for help” as part of the res gestae –
gives the impression that it raises a legal issue.  It does not. 
Anent this assignment of error, appellants say this and nothing more, to
wit:

“[T]he lower court gravely erred in believing the testimonies
of the deceased’s wife and son, to the effect that the deceased was able to
allegedly name the full names of his brothers, accused-appellants herein, and
in declaring that the same is a part of res gestae.  This is so because, as adverted to earlier,
the said shout has not been clearly proved and established that it was indeed
uttered.  In declaring, then, that the
said alleged shout is a part of res gestae, the lower court has acted
arbitrarily on this score.” (Brief, p. 11.)

It is evident that the admissibility of the cry for help and the
naming of his assailants by the deceased as part of the res gestae is not put
in issue.  Indeed, appellants cannot do
so because a victim’s revelation to a witness of the identity of the assailants
immediately after receiving the wounds, is part of the res gestae.  (People vs. Miranda, L-18508, February 29,
1964, 10 SCRA 385. ) And res gestae is an exception to the hearsay rule.

What is put in issue in respect of the third assignment of error
is the credibility of the witnesses who testified on what the deceased had
uttered before he died.  On this score
the assignment of error must fail not only because of what We have already
stated above but also because of the well settled practice that an appellate
court, except in a well-defined exception, will not disturb the factual
findings of the trial court which was in an advantageous position to do so
because it had the opportunity to hear the witnesses and to observe their
demeanor.  The instant case does not fall
within the exception because there is nothing in the record to indicate that
the trial court overlooked or misinterpreted a fact or circumstance of weight
and influence which would justify disturbing its findings.

Dr. Isabelo T. Quicio, Rural Health Physician of Piñan, Zamboanga
del Norte, issued a Necropsy Report on July 5, 1975, which gives the following:

“F I N D I N
G S:

A.  Head – No pertinent findings noted.

B.  Neck – Lacerated wound, horizontal in
position, at the posterior portion of the neck (nape), severing the underlying
tissues and muscles, cervical column, at the level of the 2nd Cervical
Vertebra, exposing the cord.

C.  Body – Lacerated wound at the anterior chest
wall, located at the sternal region five inches in length, penetrating
laterally and anteriorly, and has it exit at the axillary region, midaxillary
line.  Wound exit is one inch in length,
clean cut.

D.  Extremities – Upper

1.  Lacerated wound at the right shoulder,
exposing the acromion and the superior head of the humerous, four inches in
length, irregularly cut.

2.  Incised wound, anterior middle thirds of the
right arm, two inches in length, penetrating downwards, and laterally with its
sharp edge at the medial anterior thirds of the arm.

3.  Incised, lacerated wound, irregularly cut,
left arm, and shoulder severing the acromio-scapular joint, and the underlying
muscles.

4.  Incised wound at the distal portion of the
left fore­arm, four inches in length cutting the underlying tissues and
muscles.

5.  Lacerated wound at the posterior aspect of
the left hand, 3 1/2 inches in length exposing the extensor tendons of the
fingers, cutting off the left thumb finger. 
Wound was oblique, with its distal end to the cut portion of the thumb.

Extremities – Lower

6.  Gunshot burn at the anterior middle aspect of
the right thigh, oblong in shape, two centimeters in diameter.

7.  Gunshot wounds at the anterior upper thirds
of the thigh, left, 1 1/2 centimeters in diameter, with its entrance wound at
the antero-medial aspect of the thigh. 
Exit is at the postero-medial aspect of the left thigh, 2 cm in
diameter.  Powder burns seen around.

8.  Gunshot wound, 1 1/2 centimeters in diameter,
at the lateral middle thirds of the left thigh, hitting the middle thirds of
the femur.  There was no exit wound.  Slug was taken thereat embedded at the muscle
tissues.

E.  Back – A severely lacerated, incised wound,
back, oblique, from the right shoulder blade down to the inferior angel of the
left scapula, severing the 3rd and 4th Thoracic Vertebrae.

CAUSE OF DEATH:

Death is probable due to Shock, due to Severe Hemorrhage due to
Gunshot wounds at the Left Thigh, and Multiple Lacerated Wounds of the Left
Arm, Left Forearm, both Shoulders, Anterior Chest, and Back.” (Exhibit A, Expediente,
pp. 10-11.)

The location, character, gravity and number of the wounds
inflicted on the deceased, the number of his assailants, and the commission of
the crime in the darkness of the evening indicate treachery.  Thus the killing was properly denominated as
murder.  However, We find no evidence of
evident premeditation.  For there is no
showing that appel­lants had planned the killing and pursued the same to its
completion after a sufficient interval.

The victim was killed by his own brothers.  It passes understanding why this significant
fact has been overlooked by the fiscal, the trial court, the Solicitor General
and the Court of Appeals.  Relationship
in the instant case is a generic aggravating circumstance.  (People vs. Palo, 101 Phil. 963 [1957].)

The result is that appellants are guilty of murder qualified by
treachery with the aggravating circumstance of relationship and with no
mitigating circumstance.  Accordingly,
the appropriate penalty is death but in view of the lack of necessary votes to
impose it, We have to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is modified as
to the penalty only but affirmed in all other respects; appellants are hereby sentenced
to suffer reclusion perpetua and each to pay one-half of the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Guerrero, De Castro,
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J. and
Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.