PATRICIO PEBEAUCO, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, OPPOSITOR, PRUDENCIO AUSTRIA, ET AL., OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS.

Patricio Pebeauco applied for the registration, under Act 496, as
amended, of a parcel of land with an area of 229.4531 hectares, situated at
Borac-Marcella, Coron, Palawan.  Some of
the oppositors were the Director of Lands, represented by the Provincial Fiscal,
and herein sixty-one (61) appellants, Prudencio Austria, et al., who claimed
that sometime in September 1959 they were told by then Governor Alfredo Abueg
that the land sought to be registered in the name of herein petitioner is a
public land; that because of the information given by the governor, they
entered, occupied, cultivated and developed the portions they have been
occupying since then continuously, openly and notoriously; and that they are
destitute farmers and do not have land of their own except the ones applied for
registration by applicant Pebeauco and which they are now actually occupying
and have been paying taxes therefor.

Trial was held on January 18, 1966 when applicant Patricio
Pebeauco presented his evidence until the follow­ing day when he rested his
case.

On the date scheduled for the presentation of evidence for herein
oppositors-appellants, they failed to appear because the M/V Basilan, which was
and still is the only boat that plies between Coron and Puerto Princesa,
Palawan where the hearing was held, had been suddenly suspended in operation
for that week and there was no other means of transportation available.  When appellants failed to appear, the
Honorable Judge Tranquilino Tividad considered the case submitted for decision
despite the motion for postponement made orally in open court by their counsel.

On May 30, 1966, Judge Tividad rendered the decision in the case
declaring applicant Patricio Pebeauco as owner of the land.  Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration
but the same was denied in an order dated September 10, 1966.

Hence, this appeal.

The only issue here is whether the trial court erred in denying
appellants’ motion to postpone the hearing, thereby depriving them of their
chance to present their case to the court.

The distance between Coron where appellants live and Puerto
Princesa where trial was held is more than 200 kilometers, which distance could
be travelled only by water.  Failure then
on the part of the appellants to go to Puerto Princesa on the date of trial was
due to accident because their failure to travel from their place of residence
to the place of trial was beyond their control and definitely the same was not
intended for delay.

While it is true that motions for postponements are addressed to
the sound discretion of the courts, the dis­cretion must be exercised wisely,
considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and with a view
of doing substantial justice (People vs. Martinez, 105 Phil. 200).  It should always be predicated on the
consideration that more than the convenience of the courts or of the parties of
the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby (Zubiri vs.
Zubiri, 18 SCRA 1157).  Thus, in
considering motions for postponement, two (2) things should be taken into
consideration, namely:  (1) the
reasonableness of the postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the
movant.

In the case at bar, failure on the part of the appel­lants to
come to trial was reasonable and something beyond their control.  The trial judge rather adhered to the
technical and rigid enforcement of the rules thereby defeating the purpose
thereof which is to help and secure to the parties substantial justice.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated May 30,
1966 is hereby SET ASIDE, and the case is remanded to the court a quo
so that appellants can present their evidence.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Acting C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.