PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND RODOLFO YANGUAS, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition to review the resolution of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) dated January 20, 1982, which dismissed the
petitioner’s appeal on the ground that it was filed beyond the
reglementary period.

Private respondent Rodolfo Yanguas started working with respondent
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company on January 22, 1951. He rose
from the ranks until he reached the position of Cable Foreman SJG-2
sometime in July, 1972.

On September 20, 1980, private respondent Yanguas was informed that he
would be placed under preventive suspension effective October 1, 1980,
leading to dismis­sal, pending clearance from the Ministry of Labor and
Employment for incompetence and inefficiency in the performance of
assigned duties.

On September 23, 1980, petitioner company filed with the Ministry of
Labor and Employment an application to terminate the services of private
respondent on the above-mentioned grounds.

The facts and incidents which led the employer to file an application to
terminate Yangua’s employment are summarized in the Labor Arbiter’s
decision as follows:

“As Cable Foreman SJ-2, complainant herein had employees under his
supervision. One of these PLDT employees was Vicente Rebong, who,
along with other three co-workers were (sic) arrested and detained for
qualified theft.

“After due investigation conducted by respondent Company, it was
found out that Vicente Rebong was able to engage in the buying and
selling of stolen PLDT communications materials and equipment by leaving
his job and work assignments almost everyday.

“Respondent Company now alleges that complainant, instead of
stopping Vicente Rebong and calling the latter’s attention to these
absences, he openly credited Vicente Rebong with full and complete
attendance on those days when Rebong was, in truth, absent from his work
assignment.

“Respondent further alleges that “by such gross and criminal
negligence in the performance of his supervisory duties and functions,
complainant, in effect, collaborated with Vicente Rebong in: (1) giving
the latter the opportunity to buy and sell stolen company property and
equipment during official work hours; and (2) falsifying the time
records of Vicente Rebong by crediting him with full attendance in the
latter’s daily time report when the truth is Vicente Rebong was absent
from his place of work assignment.

“Complainant Yanguas, on the other hand, maintains that the
respondent has no legal and moral basis in branding him as incompetent
and inefficient in the performance of his assigned duties; that it is
sufficient to consider the period he had worked with respondent P.L.D.T.
and the performance of his duties as a Cable Foreman SJG- 2 for several
years, in order to negate the claim of the respondent; and that the
dismissal was anchored on some other motive or motives, particularly,
avoidance of payment of retirements pay and/or other benefits to the
complainant on the part of the respondent.”

On October 15, 1980, the private respondent, in turn, filed with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. IV a complaint
against petitioner company for illegal dismissal and illegal suspension.
This complaint also served as an opposition to the peti­tioner’s
application for clearance to terminate him.

On March 16, 1981 Labor Arbiter Mirasol Corleto rendered a decision
finding “that the negligence of the complainant is not a sufficient
cause of this dismissal and that such penalty of dismissal is too harsh
and too severe”. The Labor Arbiter further ruled that since Yanguas is
no longer seeking reinstatement but only payment of his retirement
benefits and considering that he had been with petitioner company for
twenty nine (29) years and eight (8), and four (4) more months, and
therefore, would have been eligible for optional retirement under
company rules and policies, it is but fair and just that Yanguas be
allowed to retire with retirement benefits. Under Article 6 of the
Benefit Plan of the petitioner company, an employee who had completed
twenty five (25) years of service, is entitled to benefits computed as
provided in the plan.

Consequently, the Labor Arbiter issued the clearance for petitioner
company to terminate the services of Yanguas but ordered the petitioner
within ten (10) working days from receipt of the decision to pay the sum
of Ninety Four Thousand Fifty Pesos (P94,050.00) retirement benefits to
Rodolfo Yanguas.

On March 23, 1981, notice was served upon petitioner at its Makati Main
Office by leaving a copy of the decision with the clerk at the
corporation’s receiving section who acknowledged receipt thereof. It
was only on March 26, 1981 that petitioner company’s counsel on record,
Atty. Jesus F. Villarroya, received notice when the copy of the decision
was given to the receiving clerk of the Legal Services Division of the
petitioner company.

On April 10, 1981, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
appealed to the respondent NLRC only with respect to that portion of the
decision awarding retirement benefits to the private respondent.

On January 20, 1982, the respondent NLRC dismissed the petitioner’s
appeal on the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period of
appeal. The Commission ruled that the tenth working day within which
to file the subject appeal fell on April 8, 1981 since the March 16,
1981 decision of the Labor Arbiter was received by the petitioner on
March 23, 1981.

Petitioner assigns a lone error for the grant of this petition, alleging that:

“RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED PETITIONER’S APPEAL FOR ALLEGED
FAILURE FILE THE SAID APPEAL WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THE DECISION WHICH WAS CITED AS THE BASIS FOR
THE DENIAL OF THE APPEAL WAS NOT PROPERLY SERVED ON THE PETITIONER.”

The only issue is the timeliness of the appeal filed with the respondent
National Labor Relations Commission. From what date should the ten
(10) days period to appeal be computed.

Petitioner argues that the receipt of the decision on March 23, 1981,
cannot form the basis for the computation of the period to appeal
because the copy of the decision was served on the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company itself, and not on its counsel on record,
Atty. Jesus F. Villarroya. Petitioner submits that the decision of the
Labor Arbiter was served only on March 26, 1981 thru the receiving clerk
of the Legal Services Division where the counsel works. Computed from
March 26, 1981, the petitioner’s ten (10) working days within which to
perfect its appeal to the respondent Commission expired on April 13,
1981.

Respondents on the other hand argue that since the petitioner company
received the said notice of the decision on March 23, 1981, and the
petitioner’s counsel works in the same building, the ten (10) day
reglementary period for appeal started from March 23, 1981. Respondents
submit that service of the notice of the decision of the Labor Arbiter
with a copy of the decision addressed to “Atty Jesus F. Villarroya,
counsel for respondent, 9th Floor PLDT Building, Makati, Metro Manila”,
at the petitioner’s receiving section, at the ground floor of the said
PLDT building was valid service for purposes of computing the period to
appeal.

Section 2, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

“SEC. 2. PAPERS TO BE FILED AND SERVED. – Every order
required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the
complaint, every writ­ten motion other than one which may be heard ex parte,
and every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment or
similar papers shall be filed with the Court, and served upon the
parties affected thereby. If any of such parties has appeared by an attorney or attorneys, service upon him shall be made upon his attorneys or one of them, unless service upon the himself is ordered by the Court.” xxx. (Italics is supplied)

Under the above provision, it is clear that service of notice,
pleadings, orders, and the like, should be made on the party, if not
represented by counsel (Elli v. Ditan, 1 SCRA 503) and when a party is
represented by counsel, notice should be made upon the counsel. Notice
upon the party himself, is not considered in law unless service upon the
party is ordered by the Court. The term “every written notice”
includes notice of decisions or orders.’ (Jalover v. Ytoriaga, 80 SCRA 100).

The notice of the decision dated March 20, 1981 signed by Virgel R.
Velasco, Stenographic Reporter was served by the Bailiff upon
petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company at the ground
floor of its building on March 23, 1981. The bailiff’s return dated
March 24, 1981 reads:

PLDT MAKATI

Mar. 23. RECD.

and below the words “Mar. 23 RECD” is the signature of the receiving
clerk. The said notice of decision clearly shows that the address of
record of Atty. Villarroya, petitioner’s counsel is “9th Floor PLDT
Bldg., Makati, Metro Manila.” (Annex A-1, Reply).

The bailiff, instead of serving the notice of the decision at the lawyer
on the ninth floor which is clearly indicated in the notice of
decision, left the notice at the ground floor of the petitioner’s main
building. We have held time and again that notices to counsel should
properly be sent to the address of record in the absence of due notice
to the court of change of address (Phil. Suburban Dev. Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
100 SCRA 109). Hence, practical considerations and the realities of
the situation dictate that the service made by the bailiff on March 23,
1981 at the ground floor of the petitioner’s building and not at the
address of record of petitioner’s counsel on record at the 9th floor of
the PLDT building cannot be considered a valid service. It was only
when the Legal Services Division actually received a copy of the
decision on March 26, 1981 that a proper and valid service may be deemed
to have been made. The notice of decision received by the Legal
Services Division of peti­tioner company has the following markings:

LEGAL SERVICES DIVISION

RECEIVED

cpp 3/26/81

PLDTCo.

In Alimpoos v. Court of Appeals, (106 SCRA 159), we held:

“x x x under the circumstances therefore, reliance may be placed
on the assertion of counsel that the offended party, Eliseo Alimpoos,
had given him a copy of the ORDER only on April 4, 1966, which must be
deemed as the date of notice to said counsel of the order.”

The purpose of the rule is obviously to maintain a uniform procedure
calculated to place in competent hands the orderly prosecution of a
party’s case.

“x x x This rule is not a mere technical­ity, but one founded on
considerations of fair play. A party engages an attorney of record
precisely because it does not feel competent to deal with the
intri­cacies of law and procedure. Furthermore, as the party directly
served would have to communicate with its attorney and turn over to him
the notice received, the net result would be to noticeably shorten the
usable period for taking the proper steps required to protect the
party’s interests.” (J.M. Javier Logging Corporation v. Mardo, 24 SCRA 776).

In modern multistoried buildings, there may be several hundred rooms
with hundreds of different employees discharging different functions. A
receiving clerk in a given mailing section may not know the difference
between a notice to a lawyer and the thousands of other communications
received by her either by mail or through personal or commercial
messengers and may not act accordingly. Service upon a lawyer must be
effected at the exact given address of the lawyer and not in the
vicinity or at a general receiving section for an entire multi-storied
building with many offices.

It is apparent therefore that respondent National Labor Relations
Commission committed error in holding that the appeal was interposed
beyond the reglementary period. The March 23, 1981 service cannot be
deemed as notice in law to petitioner. The ten (10) working days within
which to perfect an appeal should be com­puted from March 26, 1981.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission dated March 16, 1981 is hereby set aside and the respondent
Commission is ordered to give due course to the petitioner company’s
appeal in NLRC Case No. 10-8864-80. The temporary restraining order
issued on April 14, 1982 enjoining the respondents from enforcing the
resolution dated January 20, 1982 is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Acting Chairman), Plana, Relova and De La Fuente, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., on leave.