G.R. No. L-29577. March 27, 1984

PASTORA ANDAL MANIGBAS, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) INC. AND THE LIVERPOOL & LONDON & GLOBE INSURANCE CO., INC., RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions March 27, 1984 FIRST DIVISION PLANA, J.:
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PLANA, J.:


The basic issue in this petition is whether or not the death due to
gastroenteritis of Melquiades Manigbas, a mechanic of private respondent
CALTEX (Phil.) Inc., is compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act.

The fatal incident here involved occurred during the effectivity of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act No. 3428, as amended), when Melquiades
Manigbas one day went to work and took his lunch at the cafeteria of
private respondent. After two hours or so, he felt abdominal pain.
Later, he began vomiting and excreting. He was taken to a hospital
where his sickness was diagnosed as acute gastroenteritis, of which he
died three days later.

The surviving spouse, herein appellant Pastora Andal Manigbas, filed a
claim for death benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Her
claim was denied by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission which
sustained the contention of respondent Caltex that “since the respondent
Caltex is neither under obligation to supply food nor to specify the
food to be eaten by its employees, Manigbas’ death caused by an acute
gastroenteritis could not legally be attributed to his employment.”
Elaborating, the Commission said:

“. . . In the United States after whose workmen’s compensation
laws ours was patterned, the overwhelming weight of authority is to the
effect that an employer may only be held liable for the illness
contracted by its employee on account of the food eaten where such food
is given as part of the salary or wage, or where a part of the cost of
such food is by agreement borne by the employer.” (Rollo, p. 36.)

From the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, the petitioner has taken this appeal.

The appeal must fail. Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, when an
employee suffers personal injury from an accident arising out of and in
the course of his employment, or contracts an illness directly caused by
such employment, or such illness was either aggravated by or the result
of the nature of such employment, his employer is liable for
compensation benefits. (Act No. 3428, as amended, Sec. 2.) The law,
moreover, provides that in any proceeding for the enforcement of any
claim for compensation thereunder, it shall be presumed that “the claim
comes within the provisions of this Act.” (Sec. 44.) Nevertheless, a
preliminary link must be shown to exist between the injury/illness and
the employment. This link is sufficiently established by proof that the
injury/illness occurred or was contracted during the period of
employment, at a place where the performance of his work requires him to
be, and while he was fulfilling his duties or was engaged in doing
something incidental thereto.

“Considering the philosophy behind the requirement that to be
compensable the death must occur while the worker is performing some
work in the course of his employment or doing something arising out of
his employment, the authorities are to the effect that to come within
the purview of such requirement three things must concur: the injury
must be received during the period covered by the employment, the worker
must be shown to have been injured at the time and place where the
performance of his work requires him to be, and the worker must have
been doing something in pursuance of his work. And so it has been held
that a wound received by a worker outside the per­formance of his duties
and in a place other than where the performance of his work requires
him to be is injury not ‘arising out of or in the course of his
employment’ (Sunga v. City of Manila, 57 Phil. 869).”

xxx                    xxx                    xxx

“It is true that at the time of his assault the deceased was still
an employee of the company for he has not yet severed his employment
with it, but the fact that he was then on leave of absence is clear
proof that he was not then performing his usual duties as inspector, nor
doing anything in relation thereto, to come within the purview of the
phrase ‘arising out of and in the course of employment.’ The
presumption, therefore, of the law that the claim is deemed to be valid
unless the contrary is shown does not here apply, mainly for the reason
that the deceased’s leave of absence takes this case out of its
purview.” (A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, 12 SCRA 27, at 30-31.)

In the case at bar, it does not appear that Melquiades Manigbas was
engaged in the performance of his official duties when he was stricken
ill. Indeed, there is no indication as to the circumstances that led to
the ailment of the deceased, which could be the basis for concluding
that the same arose out of and in the course of his employment. As
stated in the decision penned by Associate Commissioner Cesario Perez of
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission –

“. . . there is really nothing in the record which will indicate
that it was the food he ate, if he ever did, at the cafeteria during
lunch time and not the food he took for breakfast at his house early in
the morning that ultimately caused the intestinal disease.” (Rollo, p. 37.)

Moreover, the nature of the illness (gastroenteritis) which caused the
death of Manigbas negates its causal connection with his employment as
mechanic.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Acting Chairman), Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De La Fuente, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., (Chairman), on official leave.