FRANCISCO B. ASUNCION, JR., PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE ROSALIO C. SEGUNDO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, BRANCH V, VILLASIS PAN…

The infirmity, fatal in character, that argues against the
reversal of an order of dismissal by respondent Judge, Rosalio
C. Segundo, of a quo warranto suit on the ground of
ineligibility, is quite apparent from the motion to dismiss of private
respondent Laureano S. Perez.  It was alleged, and correctly so, that the
action, if any, had prescribed.  The
concluding paragraph of such order of respondent Judge speaks for itself:  “The Court, after considering all the
issues raised by the pleadings of both petitioner and respondent and after
hearing their arguments pro and con, is of the considered opinion that the
instant case was, indeed, filed out of time and that this Court has no
jurisdiction over the case.”^[1]
The facts, as hereinafter disclosed, justify such a conclusion.  Moreover, the applicable law is on the side
of private respondent.  This certiorari
petition lacks merit.

The facts are clear.  On July 15, 1981, petitioner filed a
special civil action docketed in the sala of
respondent Judge against private respondent.^[2]
Then on July 29, 1981,
private respondent filed a motion to dismiss with petitioner filing his
opposition to such motion on August 12, 1981.^[3]
On September 8, 1981 the
assailed order of respondent Judge was issued, dismissing such quo warranto suit.^[4]
There was a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.^[5]
In the motion to dismiss, it was
pointed out that the proclamation of private respondent having been made on February 1, 1980, the period for
filing a quo warranto suit on the ground of
ineligibility should be within ten days from such a date.^[6]
As admitted in the petition, it was not until July 15, 1981 that this case was filed in the sala of respondent Judge. 
As pointed out in such order of dismissal:  “Obviously, the petition should have been filed with the Commission on
Elections and this should have been done within
ten (10) days after proclamation of
the election of the respondent on February 1, 1980.”^[7]

The law is equally clear.  The Election Code grants the right to a voter
“contesting the election of any officer on the ground of ineligibility or
of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines
[to] file a petition for quo warranto with the
Commission within ten days after the proclamation of his election.”^[8]
There is no getting away from the explicit mandate of the law.  A
ten-day period is set forth.  It must be obeyed. 
This Court has reiterated time and time again the principle that when the statute speaks clearly and unequivocally, there
is no room for interpretation.  It must be applied as worded.^[9] It is to be noted that there is a distinction between an election protest and a quo warranto suit on ground of ineligibility.^[10] This Court has even gone as far as holding
that an action for quo warranto cannot be converted
into an election protest.^[11]
It may not be amiss to state that under the
former Election Code,^[12]
the period granted is limited one week or seven days,^[13]
not ten days as now provided.  Then as well as now, however, whatever period is prescribed be followed to
the letter.  It is as simple as that.

WHEREFORE, this certiorari petition is dismissed
for lack of merit, and the order of dismissal issued by respondent Judge in
Special Civil Case No. U-3667 dated September
8, 1981 is affirmed.  No
costs.

Makasiar, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Escolin, Relova, and Gutierrez,
Jr., JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., no part.

Abad Santos, J., concurs on the basis of
Sec. 190 of the 1978 Election Code.

De Castro, J., on sick leave.

^[1] Order
of respondent Judge, Annex D to Petition, 3.

^[2]
Petition, par. 2 and Annex A to Petition.

^[3] Ibid, pars. 3 and 4, and Annexes B and C to Petition.

^[4] Ibid, par. 5 and Annex D to Petition.

^[5] Ibid, pars. 6 and 7, and Annex E and F to Petition.

^[6] In the motion to dismiss, the 10-day
period was counted up to February 10, 1980.  That
is a mistake.  It should be February
11, 1980.

^[7] Order of respondent Judge, Annex D to
Petition, 2.

^[8] Section 189 of the 1978 Election Code.

^[9] Cf. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila
Railroad Co., L-25316, Feb. 28, 1979, 88 SCRA 616.  The opinion cited 13 cases starting from People v. Mapa, L-22301, Aug. 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164 to Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, L-27455, June 28, 1973,
51 SCRA 381.  After the Manggagawa decision came two later cases of the same
tenor:  Banawa v.
Mirano, L-24750, May 16, 1980, 97 SCRA 517; Insular
Lumber Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, L-31057, May 29, 1981, 104 SCRA 710.

^[10] Cf. De la Rosa v. Yanson, 62 Phil. 446 (1928); Pacal v. Ramos, 81 Phil. 30 (1948); Gorospe v. Peñaflorida,
101 Phil. 886 (1957).

^[11]
Cf. Luison v. Garcia, 103 Phil. 453 (1958);
Sanchez v. del Rosario, 111 Phil. 733 (1961); Republic v. Corpin, 104 Phil. 49 (1958); Campus and Oroc
v. Degamo and Palarca,
116 Phil. 541 (1962).

^[12] Section 173, Republic Act No. 180 (1947).

^[13] Section 189, Election Code of 1978.