JUSTINIANO CAJIUAT, MARCIAL LARA, JOSE NUNEZ, LEONOR AMACIO, ETERIO SOTIANGCO, OTILIO DE GUZMAN, OSCAR INDUCTIVO, DONATO ABELARDO, CECILIO CUNANAN, CONSTANTE QUITORIANO, RAYMUND…

The claim of petitioners, which was denied by the then Acting
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Ismael Mathay, Sr., is based on par. 3, Section 26 of Presidential
Decree No. 4.  It reads as follows:  “Permanent officials and employees of
the Rice and Corn Administration * * * who prefer to retire, if qualified for retirement, shall be given gratuity
equivalent to one month salary for every year of service but in no case more
than twenty-four months salary, in addition to all other benefits to which they
are entitled under existing laws and regulations.”^[1] There is no dispute that petitioners were,
prior to their retire­ment, permanent officials and employees of the
then Rice and Corn Administration abolished under Presi­dential Decree No. 4.  They being retirable, they exercised the option to do so under the
Optional Retire­ment Law.^[2] They had, therefore, by virtue thereof,
received the gratuity under such law.  With the issuance of the aforesaid
Presidential Decree, however, they were led to hope that a claim for separation
gratuity would likewise be justified. 
Respondent, the then Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit was of a
different mind.  For him, there was no
legal basis for allowing them double gratuity. 
He rendered such a decision.  In
view of such refusal to give due course to their plea, they filed this petition
before this Court.

It is their submission
that to deny them separation gratuity “would render the clause under
consideration meaningless as if it is (sic) never written in the decree.  This would be contrary to the rules on
statutory con­struction and interpretation that every part of the statute
should be carried into effect.”^[3] The Solicitor General, in his memorandum for
respondent, rejected such an argument. 
Thus:  “It is respectfully
submitted that since the petitioners herein have already retired and were paid
the gratuity under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by Republic Act No.
1616, they are no longer entitled to the gratuity provided under paragraph 3,
Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 4.”^[4] After referring to the gratuity as “a
free gift, a present, or any benefits of pecuniary value bestowed without claim
or demand, or without consideration,”^[5] he pointed out that from its very nature,
“there seems to be no apparent reason for granting to the herein petitioners
the gratuity provided for under paragraph 3, Section 26, of Presidential Decree
No. 4, in addition to the gratuity which they have already received under
Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by Republic Act No.
1616.  This is so because to assume
otherwise would not only be an act of “over-liberality” on the part
of the State but likewise inconsistent with its policy against double pension
or gratuity for the same service.”^[6]

To bolster his
submission, he cited the ruling in
Borromeo v. Government Service Insurance System:^[7] “The gratuity received by petitioner
under Act 2589 was obviously in consideration of his services to the government
as of his retirement in December 15, 1949.  It
is similarly obvious that the retirement benefits he was found to be entitled to receive under the provisions of Act 910, as
amended, were in consideration of the same services to the
government.  Therefore, for petitioner to
receive full benefits under the law, in addition to the gratuity he had already
received under Act 2589, would amount to allowing him to
receive double pension for exactly the same services as consideration.  The rule in construing or applying pension
and gratuity laws is that, in the absence of express provisions to
the contrary, they will be so interpreted as to prevent any person from
receiving double compensation.”^[8] It was further stressed that the enactment
of later legislations after the retirement of a public official “is not a
circumstance of sufficient weight to justify our ignoring the
general policy of the State – expressed both in Act 2589 as well as in Act 910
– against double pensions for the same services.  To the contrary, the fact that even after
petitioner’s retirement under Act 2589 another pension law was enacted under
which he could claim greater benefits affords a greater reason for the
application of the general policy against double pensions, unless the contrary
was expressly and clearly provided in the later enactment.”^[9]

This Court, after a careful
consideration, arrives at the same conclusion. 
There must be a provision, clear and unequivocal, to justify a double
pension.  The general language employed
in paragraph 3, Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 4 fails to meet that
test.  All that it states is that
permanent employees of the Rice and Corn Administration who are retirable are entitled to gratuity equivalent to one month salary for every year of service but in no case more than
twenty-four months salary in addition to other benefits to which they are
entitled under existing laws and regulations. 
To grant double gratuity then is unwarranted.  No reliance can be placed to the use of the
term “other benefits” found in the paragraph relied upon.  As clearly stated in the memorandum of the
Solicitor General, they refer to “those receivable by a retiree under the
general retirement laws, like the refund of contributions to the retirement
fund and the money value of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves of said
official employee.  The clause ‘in
addition to all other benefits to which they are entitled under existing laws
and regulations,’ was inserted to insure the payment to the retiree of the
refund of the contributions to the retirement fund and the money value of the
accumulated vacation and sick leaves of said official or
employee.”^[10]

That is all it can
plausibly signify.  To go further would
make it a fruitful parent of injustice. 
It would set at naught a state policy dictated by reason and fairness
alike.  Petitioners seek to claim the
status of an exempt class.  The burden of
proof is on them.  That they failed to
meet, relying as they do on words hardly indicative of their being accorded a
favored status.  To justify such a result, it is imperative that the language employed be of the clearest and most
satisfactory character.  The paragraph
relied upon in Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 4, to repeat, cannot be so
characterized.

One last word.  It is to be added that the rule against
double compensation is nothing new.  It
was so held in Peralta v. Auditor General.^[11]
While the question involved is not identical, its ratio decidendi applies to the instant situation, namely,
to allow what petitioners seek “would be a clear disregard of the prohibition to receive both the compensation and the pension, annuity, or
gratuity.”^[12]
Peralta was cited with approval in a later case, San Diego
v. Auditor General.^[13]
A recent decision, Chavez v. Auditor General,^[14]
puts the matter tersely but emphatically. 
Thus:  “Appeal from a decision of the
Auditor General, in which we reaffirm the Court’s doctrine against the payment
to retirees from the government service of double pension for exactly the same
services.”^[15]
We do so again.

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is
denied for lack of merit and the decision of respondent, the then Auditor
General, denying due course to the claim of petitioner for double
gratuity affirmed.  No costs.

Makasiar, Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, and Escolin, JJ.,
concur.

Abad Santos, J., did not take part.

De Castro, J., on sick leave.

^[1]
Section 26, par. 3 of Presidential Decree No. 4.

^[2]
Commonwealth Act No. 186.

^[3]
Memorandum for the Petitioners, 11.

^[4]
Memorandum of Solicitor General for Respondent, 1-2.  Solicitor General Mendoza was assisted by then Assistant Solicitor General Reynato Puno and then Solicitor
Ramon Barcelona.

^[5]
Ibid, 2.

^[6]
Ibid.

^[7]
110 Phil. 1 (1960).

^[8]
Ibid, 3.

^[9]
Ibid, 4.

^[10]
Memorandum for the Respondent, 5.

^[11]
100 Phil. 1951 (1957).

^[12]
Ibid, 1055.

^[13]
119 Phil. 335 (1964).

^[14]
L-29311, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA
776.

^[15]
Ibid, 777. 
Cf. Espejo v. Auditor
General, 97 Phil. 216 (1955).