LUZ LATAGAN, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (PHILIPPINE NAVY), RESPONDENTS.

Latagan versus Employees' Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System

The Case

This is a petition brought by Luz Latagan, a pauper litigant, against the Employees' Compensation Commission and the Government Service Insurance System, arising from the Philippine Navy, seeking death compensation benefits under Presidential Decree Number 626 for the death of her husband, Technical Sergeant Josue A. Latagan. The case matters because it draws the line between the old Workmen's Compensation Act and the new Labor Code compensation scheme, and because it fixes the rule that under the present law there is no longer any presumption of compensability — the claimant must show either that the disease is listed as occupational or that the working conditions increased the risk of contracting it.

Procedural History

After her husband died, Luz Latagan filed a claim for death benefits with the Survivorship Benefits Department of the Government Service Insurance System. The System denied her claim, and it also denied her motion for reconsideration. She appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission, which affirmed the denial. She then came to the Supreme Court by petition, assailing the denial on the ground that the Commission committed reversible error in sustaining the System's position that the fatal ailment was not an occupational disease and therefore not compensable, and in affirming the denial without a formal hearing. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decisions of both respondents.

Facts

Josue A. Latagan was employed in the Philippine Navy from 1949 until his death in 1978, serving as a gunnersmate. He had been asthmatic and hypertensive since 1955. He was first admitted to the hospital on 23 February 1976 for chest pains, which his attending physician said had started about three months before admission, accompanied by cough, body weakness, loss of weight, insomnia, and low grade afternoon fevers. A chest X-ray revealed findings consistent with bronchogenic carcinoma with metastasis. He was transferred to the Tumor Service and later to another ward, where he expired after almost two years of stay in the hospital. He died on 29 January 1978.

His widow then filed a claim for death benefits with the Government Service Insurance System, which denied it. Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. On appeal, the Employees' Compensation Commission affirmed the denial, holding that when the illness is admittedly not an occupational disease, the law requires proof that the risk of contracting the illness is increased by the working conditions, and that the evidence failed to show this.

Before the Supreme Court, the widow argued that bronchogenic carcinoma, or lung cancer, is regarded as an occupational disease, invoking the Avendaño case, and that she had been denied a formal hearing and thus deprived of the opportunity to present additional evidence.

Issues

• Whether or not bronchogenic carcinoma is an occupational disease for which death benefits may be awarded under the present Labor Code.
• Whether or not the deceased's working conditions as a gunnersmate increased the risk of his contracting the fatal illness, so as to make his death compensable.
• Whether or not the petitioner was denied a formal hearing and thereby deprived of the opportunity to present additional substantial evidence in support of her claim.

Applicable Provisions

Article 167, paragraph (1), of the Labor Code, as amended, defines a compensable sickness:

"Illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment."

This provision bears on the case because it supplies the two alternative grounds for compensability and abolishes any reliance on presumption, requiring proof of increased risk where the illness is not listed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that bronchogenic carcinoma is not an occupational disease. The petitioner's reliance on Avendaño was misplaced, because that ruling applied the old Workmen's Compensation Act, under which the illness was contracted before the effectivity of the New Labor Code. Under the old law, once it was established that the illness supervened during employment, a rebuttable presumption arose that the illness arose out of the employment or was at least aggravated by it, and the employer bore the burden of proving the contrary. That rule was abandoned under the compensation scheme of the present Labor Code, which took effect on 1 January 1975. The Court quoted its ruling in Tanedo:

"Neither may an award in petitioner's favor be justified upon any presumption that illness causing death or disability arose out of the employment or was at least aggravated by such employment. That presumption was laid down by the old statute. It is however now a thing of the past, abolished on effectivity of the new law on January 1, 1975. Awards of compensation benefits for death or disability can now no longer be made to rest on presumption, but on a showing that the causative disease is among those listed by ECC, or on substantial evidence that the risk of contracting said disease is increased by the employee's working conditions."

The Court noted that the decedent died about three years after the effectivity of the Labor Code, and there was no showing that his illness was contracted before the new law took effect. Even in Avendaño, lung cancer was listed as occupational only with respect to vinyl chloride workers and plastic workers, not gunnersmates.

On the second issue, the Court held that the petitioner failed to present substantial evidence that the decedent's working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness. It quoted with approval the Commission's findings that bronchogenic carcinoma is neither causally related to the occupation of the deceased nor to the working conditions of his employment, and cannot be attributed to his duties as a gunnersmate or his inhalation of gunpowder in the armory. His attending physician did not comment on whether the ailment was caused by his duties, and the certification submitted failed to elaborate on the factors that may have caused the disease. Absent proof, the Court could not conclude that the employment increased the risk.

On the third issue, the Court held that no formal hearing was required. Quoting Sulit versus Employees' Compensation Commission, it explained that the filing of a claim is in its inception not an adversary proceeding, that no formal hearing is required in the processing of the claim, and that the claim becomes controversial only when the claimant appeals to the Commission or to the Court. The petitioner was afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to prove that her husband's death was work-connected, through her application, supporting documents, motion for reconsideration, and appeal.

Doctrine

Under Article 167, paragraph (1), of the Labor Code, as amended, a sickness is compensable only if it is an illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or an illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting it is increased by working conditions. The presumption of compensability and aggravation under the old Workmen's Compensation Act was abolished upon the effectivity of the new Labor Code on 1 January 1975, so awards can no longer rest on presumption but must rest on the listing or on substantial evidence of increased risk. Where the disease is not listed, the claimant bears the burden of proving work connection by substantial evidence. Finally, the processing of a compensation claim before the System is not an adversary proceeding, and no formal hearing is required at that stage.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the decisions of the Government Service Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission, with no costs.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: since the new Labor Code took effect on 1 January 1975, there is no longer any presumption of compensability — the claimant must show the disease is listed as occupational or that the working conditions increased the risk. Examiners use this case to test the shift from the old Workmen's Compensation Act to the Labor Code scheme, and to test whether a claimant may demand a formal hearing before the System.