LUZ LATAGAN, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (PHILIPPINE NAVY), RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner, a pauper litigant,^[1] seeks
compensation benefits under P.D. 626 for the death of her husband, T/Sgt. Josue A. Latagan, who
was employed in the Philippine Navy from 1949 up to the time he died in 1978. She claims that his fatal ailment known as bronchogenic carcinoma was caused by his employment, and
that the risk of contracting the disease was aggravated by the working
conditions attendant to his duties as gunnersmate in the Philippine Navy.

The medical history of the deceased is narrated in the medical
summary report^[2]
issued by his attending physician thus-

“This is the case of Josue A. Latagan x x x who was admitted
for the first time on February 23, 1976 because of chest pains x x x x started 3 months prior to admission as
cough, chest pains and body weakness x x x x associated with loss of weight and
insomnia x x x x having low
grade afternoon fevers x x x x asthmatic and hypertensive since 1955 x x x x A chest X-ray x x x revealed
findings consistent with Bronchogenic Ca with metastasis x x x x referred to the EENR Service for several
times because of Otitis Media x x x x transferred from Ward 10B (Tumor Service)
to Ward 21, where patient expired after almost 2 years of stay in the hospital
x x x x Laboratory: x x x x Scalene node biopsy: Fibro-Collagenous tissue with slight evidence
of fibrosis.

“Serial Chest X-ray, February 23, 1976: Homogenous density involving the medial
segment of the right lobes as well as multiple rounded densities seen on both
intraclavicular regions. These were the
same findings on repeat Chest X-ray done May, 1976. Impression then was Bronchogenic Carcinoma with metastasis lung
lesion. A repeat Chest X-ray done March
‘77 revealed progression of the parenchymal lesions in the left lung
field. The right hemithorax was now
homogenously dense throughout without significant shift on the mediatinal
shadow. Impression then was
hydrothorax, right, with probable concommitant atelectatic lobes or segments,
probably secondary to bronchogenic Ca with involvement of the left lung. A repeat Chest X-ray done in July ‘77
revealed same findings, this time with pleural effusion, massive, right.”

Petitioner’s husband died on 29 January 1978. Subsequently, she filed a claim for death
benefits with the Survivorship Benefits
Department, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). On 14 March 1978, GSIS denied her claim, and
on 15 December 1978 her motion for reconsideration. On 27 September 1979, respondent Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), in ECC Case No. 1221,
rendered a decision on appeal^[3] affirming the denial by GSIS, thus –

“After a careful perusal of the records, we find no reason to
reverse the decision of the respondent System. When the illness is admittedly not an occupational disease, the law
requires proof that the risk of contracting the illness is increased by the
working conditions. As already ruled by
the respondent System, substantial evidence must show that the development of
the ailment which caused the death of appellant’s husband was brought about largely
by the conditions present in the decedent’s employment. The evidence, however, failed to warrant a
reversal of the respondent
System’s denial decision x x x x”

Petitioner now assails the denial of her claim for death benefits
on the ground that respondent ECC committed reversible error in sustaining the
position of GSIS that the fatal ailment of her husband was not an occupational
disease, hence, not compensable, and in affirming the denial sans formal
hearing.

It is the position of petitioner that bronchogenic carcinoma, otherwise known as lung cancer, is
regarded as an occupational disease. She invokes Avendaño v.
ECC^[4]
which held:

“The respondent ECC itself, in its comment dated January 5,
1978 in the case of Cristobal v. ECC, et al. (No. L-49280, April 30, 1980),
admitted that it has expanded its list of occupational diseases, including
certain types of cancer, and, while considering that such types of cancer have
no known etiology, still they are regarded as occupational, thus: ‘It may not be amiss to mention that the ECC has time and again expanded the
list of occupational diseases. This
comes about after continuing studies made by the ECC. Indeed, cancer has already
been included as a qualified occupational disease in certain cases –
Occupational Disease: x x x x 17. Cancer of the lungs, liver and brain; Nature
of Employment x x x x Vinyl
chloride workers, plastic workers. Worth noting is the fact that the above types of cancer have no known
etiology. Yet, they are regarded as
occupational. The clear implication is
that the law merely requires a reasonable work connection.’”

Unfortunately for
petitioner, the Avendaño
doctrine is not availing in the case at bar since the ruling applied the old
Workmen’s Compensation Act. The illness
therein was contracted prior to the effectivity of the New Labor Code. Under the old law, once it was established that the illness
supervened during employment, there existed a rebuttable presumption that such
illness arose out of the employment or was at least aggravated by it. Consequently, the employer assumed, by force
of this presumption, the burden of establishing the contrary by substantial
evidence.^[5]
But this rule has been abandoned under the compensation scheme in the present
Labor Code, which took effect 1 January 1975.

Article 167, par. (1), of the Labor Code, as amended, defines a
compensable sickness as “illness definitely accepted as an occupational
disease listed by the Commission or any illness caused by employment subject to
proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine
and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be
considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment.” Thus, in Tanedo v. Employees’ Compensation Commission,^[6]
this Court ruled:

“Neither may an award in petitioner’s favor be justified upon any
presumption that illness causing death or disability arose out of the
employment or was at least aggravated by such employment. That presumption was laid down by the old statute. It is however now a thing of the past,
abolished on effectivity of the new law on January 1, 1975. Awards of compensation benefits for death or
disability can now no longer be made to rest on presumption, but on a showing
that the causative disease is among those listed by ECC, or on substantial
evidence that the risk of contracting said disease is increased by the
employee’s working conditions.”

The records show that T/Sgt. Josue A. Latagan died on 29 January
1978, or about three years after the effectivity of the Labor Code. There is no showing that his illness was
contracted prior to the effectivity of the new law, in which case, the presumptions of compensability and aggravation
under the old law would have applied. What is clear is that the decedent was admitted to the hospital for the
first time on 23 February 1976 for chest pains, and that such condition
started, according to the attending physician, three (3) months before his admission to the hospital.

Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the cause of her husband’s
death, bronchogenic carcinoma, is not an occupational disease. Her reliance on Avendaño, where cancer of the lungs was listed as
occupational disease, is misplaced because lung cancer, as shown in the list therein, is occupational only in respect to
“vinyl chloride workers” and “plastic workers”.^[7]

Admittedly, petitioner failed to present substantial evidence to
prove that the decedent’s working conditions as gunnersmate increased the risk
of his contracting the fatal
illness. Consequently, We quote with
approval the findings of respondent ECC –

“x x x According
to medical authorities, bronchogenic carcinoma is the commonest primary
malignant tumor of the lung and it is rapidly fatal if untreated. It is predominantly a disease of the male
sex, about 90% of all tumors occurring in men. In this sex, it is the commonest cause of death from cancer. Approximately 95% of all cases occur between
the ages of 40 and 70. Etiology: The incidence of carcinoma has been reported
to be unusually high among workers in chromate, uranium, arsenic, certain
nickel and copper ores in which arsenic occurs as an impurity, and in
asbestos. Apparently all types of dust
cannot be incriminated because the incidence is not higher in miners with anthracosilicosis. Wynder and Graham in the USA and Don and Hill in England
reported a higher incidence of cancer of the lung among heavy cigarette
smokers. Shortly after this, Hammond
and Hore showed that the incidence of death rate from cancer of the lung were
higher among heavy cigarette smokers. Thus, there appears to be a definite
relationship between cigarette smoking and cancer of the lung. (Reference: C.A. Moyer: Surgery, Principles and Practice: Lippincott: P.A. 3rd ed., 1965;
p.1348).

“Based on the
aforementioned findings, it is very clear that the disease involved in
the instant case, bronchogenic carcinoma, is neither causally related to the
occupation of the deceased nor to the working conditions attendant to his
employment. It cannot also be
attributed to his duties as a
Gunnersmate and his inhalation of gunpowder in the armory. (Letter of the Surviving-spouse, dated May
8, 1979). Even his attending physician,
Dr. Rolando Villaroma, did not attempt to comment on whether the ailment of the
deceased was directly caused by his duties and conditions of work. Moreover,
the additional evidences in the form of a certification issued by Lt. Willie
Vergara, Chief Policy and Development Program Branch, N-5 Division, PN, failed
to elaborate on the factors which may have caused the contraction of the
questioned ailment. Due to the
circumstances surrounding this case which strongly militate against the claim,
particularly appellant’s failure to relate the decedent’s ailment and
employment appellant’s claim for compensation must fail.”^[8]

Indeed, a careful review of the records show that petitioner did
not present any evidence to establish work connection. She relied solely on the theory of
aggravation and presumption of compensability under the old compensation
law. In the absence of proof, and none appears on record, We cannot conclude that
the employment of the decedent increased the risk of his contracting the
disease.^[9]

As regards the contention of petitioner that she was denied a
formal hearing and thus deprived of an opportunity to present additional
substantial evidence to support her claim, Our ruling in Sulit v. ECC^[10] is enlightening –

“The filing with the GSIS of a claim for income benefits is in
its inception not an adversary proceeding. The claim is filed on a prescribed form. The claimant may present with the claim supporting papers or
proof that the disability or death was work-connected or that the risk of
contracting the disease involved in the claim was increased by the working
conditions.

“The claim is processed by the GSIS. No formal hearing is required in the processing of the claim.

“If after processing, the GSIS finds, as in this case, that on its face the claim has no
basis, then it is rejected outright. The claim becomes controversial when the claimant appeals to the
Employees’ Compensation Commission, or when an aggrieved party appeals from the
Commission to this Court (Arts. 180
and 181, Labor Code; Secs. 3 to 5, Rule
XVIII and sec. 1, Rule XVII, Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.”

Petitioner, in the instant case, was afforded the fair and
reasonable opportunity to prove that her husband’s death was
work-connected. The respondent agencies
appear to have taken into account her application for death benefits, her
supporting documents, her motion for reconsideration of the denial of her
claim, and her appeal before respondent
ECC. Unfortunately, however, We
cannot like respondents find any legal justification for a favorable award on
her claim.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit, and the decisions of respondents Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) and Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) are hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Griño-Aquino and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., (Chairman), on leave.

^[1]
Resolution of 19 December 1980; Rollo,
p. 60.

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 6-8.

^[3]
ECC Decision, pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 56-57.

^[4]
No. L-48593, 30 April 1980; 97 SCRA 464, 470-71.

^[5]
Avendaño, supra, p. 468.

^[6]
G.R. No. 62300, 25 September 1987; 154 SCRA 288, 292-293.

^[7]
See List of Occupational Diseases, Annex “A” to the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation.

^[8]
ECC Decision, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 57-58.

^[9]
Kirit, Sr. v. GSIS, No. L-48580, 6 July 1990, 187 SCRA 224, 227, citing
Vda. de Inguillo v. ECC, G.R. No. 51543, 6 June 1989.

^[10]
No. L-48602, 30 June 1980; 98
SCRA 483, 486.