PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS[] (THIRD DIVISION), JOSE V. PEREZ, AMADEA C. PEREZ, CIPRIANO LADINES AND FLAVIA C. VALDENOR, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner
People of the Philippines to set aside the decision of the then Court
of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate court,^[1]
which affirmed the order issued by the then City Court of Lucena,
Branch II, denying the prosecution’s motion for the exclusion of Miguel
Roncesvalles (co-accused of the private respondents herein named) from
the information in Criminal Case No. 0399 so that he may testify
there­in as a state witness.

The amended information for violation of Section 22 of Republic Act No.
720, as amended, charged that Miguel Roncesvalles, together with herein
private respondents Jose V. Perez, Amadea Consul Perez, Cipriano Ladines
and Flavia C. Valdenor, “with intent to deceive, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and illegally make false statements and
misrepresentation of material facts in the application for agricultural
loan signed by FLAVIA C. VALDENOR and in the other supporting papers,
calculated to produce semblance of compliance with the legal
requirements, making it appear that accused FLAVIA C. VALDENOR is an
eligible borrower, which misrepresentation or false statements of facts
were considered as the credit factors in the approval and the granting
of the loan to accused FLAVIA C. VALDENOR in the amount of P30,000.00,
by the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., x x x.”

All the accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After the
prosecution had already presented seven witnesses, the state prosecutors
filed a motion with the court, asking that accused Roncesvalles be
discharged from the information in order that he may be used as a state
witness against his co-defendants, alleging that Roncesvalles had not at
any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude; that
he did not appear to be the most guilty; that there was absolute
necessity for his testimony; that there was no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed and that
his testimony could be substan­tially corroborated in its material
points. The motion was set for hearing and after the parties were
heard, the trial court, issued the questioned order denying the motion
on the ground that, “x x x Miguel Roncesvalles cannot be said to be the least guilty.
He would be a principal by direct participation, or a co-principal if
he acted upon instruction of another as the prosecution alleges,” and
that, “the prosecu­tion having presented all its witnesses, the Court,
after going over their testimony, cannot see how Roncesvalles’ testimony, if ever he is discharged, would be corroborated.”^[2]

Reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with
respondent appellate court praying for the annulment and setting aside
of the trial court’s questioned orders. Respondent court sustained the
trial court’s ruling in its decision, subject of the petition at bar and
denied reconsideration thereof.

Hence, the People’s petition, which complains that “the respondent court
acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction
in sustaining the Order dated September 15, 1978 issued by the City
Court of Lucena and in holding that the petitioner failed to show that
there is ab­solute necessity for the testimony of Miguel Roncesvalles
whose discharge is requested.”

The Court finds merit in this petition and dispenses with the filing of
memoranda or briefs in the light of the facts and pleadings of record.

Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court prescribes the conditions in
order that one or several accused may be used as witnesses against their
co-accused, to wit: “(a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony
of the defendant whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no other
direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said defendant; (c) the testimony of
said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) said
defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.”

While it is true that the court has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the rule exists,^[3]
this grant of discretion is not a grant of arbitrary discretion, but
rather a sound judicial discretion to be exercised with due regard to
the proper and correct administration of justice.^[4]

The trial court manifestly erred in denying the prosecution’s motion to
discharge accused Roncesvalles on the ground that he “cannot be said to
be the least guilty.” All that the law requires, in order to discharge
an accused and to use him as a state witness is that the defendant whose
exclusion is requested does not appear to be the most guilty, not
necessarily that he is the least guilty.^[5]
The trial court’s order itself shows that Roncesvalles does not appear
to be the most guilty since it acknowledged that “he would be a
principal by direct participation or a co-principal if he acted upon
instruction of another as the prosecution alleges.”

The Rules do not disqualify an accused sought to be discharged as
witness for the state merely on the ground that he has committed a
falsification himself, or that he had actually committed the crime
charged. The Rules say that it is necessary that the “said defendant
does not appear to be the most guilty,” from which the conclusion
follows that the guilt of an accused of the crime charged is no reason
why he may not be excluded as witness for the State. As a matter of
fact, the candid admission of an accused, of his participation in a
crime, is a guaranty that if he will testify in court he will testify
truthfully; so that even if an accused actually participated in the
offense charged in the information, he may still be made a witness.
Individuals who are candid enough to admit their guilt are expected to
testi­fy truthfully and it is from that circumstance that all the facts
involved shall be expected to be truthfully disclosed by him.^[6]

The ground underlying the rule is not to let a crime that has been
committed go unpunished; so an accused who is not the most guilty is
allowed to testify against the most guilty in order to achieve the
greater purpose of securing the conviction of the more or most guilty
and the greatest number among the accused permitted to be convicted for
the offense they have committed.^[7]
Experience, under English and American procedural methods, has shown
that without the aid of informers testifying against their
co-participants in crime, many guilty parties would escape, where the
facts which would sustain a conviction are known to the guilty parties
themselves alone.^[8]

Respondent appellate court itself sustained the People’s contention on
this score, simply stating that “respondent Court erred when it ruled
that it could not grant the motion for the discharge of Roncesvalles
because it does not appear that he is the least guilty of the accused.
What Section 9, Rule 119 requires as one of the conditions for the
discharge of one of the accused to testify as a witness for the
Govern­ment is that said ‘defendant does not appear to be the most
guilty.'”

But respondent appellate court nevertheless sustained the questioned
orders “since the petition failed to show that there was absolute
necessity for the testimony of Roncesvalles”. The trial court had
denied discharge on the ground that “the prosecution having presented
all its witnesses, the Court, after going over their testimony, can not
see how Roncesvalles testimony, if ever he is discharged, would be
corroborated.” This conjecture of the trial court has no sound basis, as
is readily shown by respondent appellate court’s contrary evaluation
that “the most that petitioner could say was that the testimony of
Roncesvalles would be corroborative of the testimony of the witnesses
already presented by the Government as well as the document­ary evidence
presented during the hearing, among them, the Rural Bank Examiner and
NBI agents.” Sufficient corroborative evidence exists of record.

The Court therefore overrules respondent court’s finding that there is
no absolute necessity for the testimony of Roncesvalles. A careful
examination of the records of the case supports the prosecution’s stand
to discharge Roncesval­les in order that he may testify for the
government. The testimony of Roncesvalles is absolutely necessary to
prove conspiracy among the accused who are charged of conspiring and
confederating with each other in defrauding the Lucena Rural Bank in the
amount of P30,000.00 under the pretext of an agricultural loan granted
to accused Flavia N. Valdenor. Roncesvalles was the Assistant Chief
Inspector of the Lucena Rural Bank and he was the one who signed the
investigation report which contained false information as to the credit
standing of accused Flavia Valdenor. Nobody is in a better position to
testify and prove the existence of conspiracy than accused Roncesvalles,
because he is an officer of the bank. There is ample basis for the
Solicitor General’s submittal that “considering the foregoing
circumstances and inasmuch as the other accused cannot be compelled to
testify, certain facts necessary for the conviction of the accused would
not be revealed unless accused Roncesvalles is allowed to testify for
the State”; “unless accused Roncesvalles is allowed to testify for the
government, there is no other dir­ect evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense charged, i.e., the role or participation of
his co-accused in the preparation and accomplishment of the falsified
loan application and its supporting papers. The testi­mony of accused
Roncesvalles will prove conspiracy among the perpetrators of the crime
charged”; and “unless this petition is given due course and granted, the
accused in Criminal Case No. 0399 may be acquitted and the State
irretrievably prejudiced. Because of the Rule on double jeopardy, the
State has no other remedy except the instant petition.”^[9]

It is noteworthy that these assertions appear to be based on solid
ground for the prosecutors presented their motion for discharge of
Roncesvalles as a state witness only after they had presented seven
witnesses and could then show the absolute necessity for his testimony
in consonance with what was to be held by the Court in Flores vs. Sandiganbayan that
the trial court should act on said discharge motion when the
prosecution has presented all its other evidence and it could then
“fully determine whether the requisites prescribed in Section 9, Rule
119 of the New Rules of Court, are fully complied with.”^[10]

A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with
absolute certainty at the very outset of the trial as to everything
which may be developed in the course of the trial in regard to the
guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the crime
charged in the com­plaint. If that were practicable or possible, there
would be little need for the formality of a trial. In coming to his
conclusion as to the ‘necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested’; as to the ‘availability or non-availability of
other direct or corroborative evidence’; as to which of the accused is
the ‘most guilty’; and the like, the judge must rely in a large part
upon the suggestions and information furnished by the state
prosecu­tors.^[11]

ACCORDINGLY, respondent appellate court’s decision affirming the trial
court’s questioned orders denying the discharge of Miguel Roncesvalles
as a state witness is hereby SET ASIDE. As prayed for, the trial court
is ORDERED to allow the discharge of said accused Miguel Roncesvalles
from the information before it in Criminal Case No. 0399 so that he may
testify therein as a state witness.

This decision is immediately executory.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De La Fuente, JJ., concur.

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^[*] Special Third Division composed of JJ. Coquia, German, and Patajo, ponente.

^[1] In CA-G.R. No. SA19687-R entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel A. Patron, presiding judge the City Court of Laguna, etc , et al

^[2] Emphasis supplied.

^[3] People vs. Ibañez, 92 Phil. 844.

^[4] U. S. vs. Abanzado, 37 Phil. 658; People vs. de Atras, 28 SCRA 389.

^[5] People vs. Faltado, 84 Phil. 89.

^[6] People vs. Bayona, 108 Phil. 104.

^[7] Ibid.

^[8] U. S. vs. de Guzman, 30 Phil. 416.

^[9] Record, pp. 28-31.

^[10] 124 SCRA 109 (1983).

^[11] People vs. Velazco, 42 Phil. 75; U. S. vs. de Guzman, supra; People vs. Cañete, 43 SCRA 14.