PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RODOLFO QUIBATE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Accused Rodolfo Quibate appeals the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Capiz finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Prima Baltar-Quibate.

Around 4:00 in the early morning of July 22, 1978, the accused-appellant
stabbed his wife Prima Baltar to death in a fit of jealousy. The
couple’s ten-year old daughter, Imelda Quibate, testified that her
father stabbed her mother to death with a knife while the two were
quarreling in the balcony of their house at Aranguel, President Roxas,
Capiz. The daughter stated that the quarrel arose from her father’s
jealousy of “Gabi” their neighbor. Imelda ran to the house of her
uncle, Alberto Baltar who immediately went to his sister’s house.
Alberto saw his sister already dead, the accused-appellant drumming the
death weapon against the window sill. When the police arrived at the
scene, Quibate was still holding the knife. The accused tried to kill
himself with the knife pointed at his chest but when Corporal Calixto
Morales fired a shot with his revolver, the accused surrendered the
knife.

The wounds suffered by the deceased were stated by Dr. Manuel
Buenvenida, rural health physician of President Roxas, Capiz, in his
autopsy report as follows:

“1. Incised wound at the left side of the chest above nipple, per­forating, 1” wide.

“2. Incised wound at the right side of the chest below the nipple, perforating, 1” wide.

“3. Incised wound at the left side of abdomen, at the iliac side, 4″ below the navel, perforating, 1” wide.

“4. Incised wound at the medial and posterior aspect of the left forearm, 1 cm. wide, gapping, (sic) involving the skin.

“5. Abrasions-hematoma at the right arms and forearms.

“The deceased died of shock secondary to profuse hemorrhage.'”

The accused-appellant raised two assignments of errors in this appeal, namely –

“I. THE COURT ERRED IN MOTO PROPRIO CANCELLING THE PROMULGATION OF DECISION OF MARCH 4, 1980.

“II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF PARRICIDE.”

The trial court promulgated its decision on March 4, 1980 sentencing the
accused to an inde­terminate period of imprisonment of 12 years minimum
to 17 years maximum. However, immediately after promulgating it on
that day, the court had second thoughts and issued the following order:

“After the promulgation of this case, the court moto proprio cancels the promulgation upon noting that the regular counsel de oficio,
Atty. Antonio Bisnar was not around at the time and the accused refused
to sign receipt of a copy of the decision and upon noting that there
was a typographical error in the decision consisting of the wrong
penalty and the court noting further that the decision have not been
filed.

“Notifying accused and counsel of the new date of promulgation which is hereby set for March 20, 1980.”

It may be noted that apart from cancelling the promulgation, the court
ordered that the accused and his missing counsel be notified of the new
date of promulgation which was set for March 20, 1980.

On March 20, 1980, the counsel de oficio was again absent so
the court appointed a well-known practitioner in the area, Atty. Jose
Alovera, to assist the accused in the promulgation and to coor­dinate
with the other counsel Atty. Antonio Bisnar. Promulgation was re-set to
April 1, 1980.

On March 27, 1980, Atty. Alovera filed a motion to advance the date of
promulgation to March 31, 1980 as counsel had to leave for Iloilo City
on April 1, 1980. The motion to advance the date of promulgation was
considered on April 1, 1980. Promulgation was re-set to April 11, 1980.

On April 11, 1980, an oral motion to quash promulgation was made. No
memorandum in support of the motion was filed and the records fail to
indicate the grounds relied upon by counsel. On June 9, 1980, the
motion to quash promulgation was denied. The promulgation was reset to
June 13, 1980 on which date the questioned decision imposing reclusion perpetua instead of the earlier indeterminate period of imprisonment of 12 years as minimum and 17 years as maximum was rendered.

We resolve the second assignment of error first. The allegation that
the marriage of the accused-appellant and the deceased was not
established has no merit.

The marriage contract (Exhibit B) evidencing the marriage solemnized on
May 16, 1954 was intro­duced in evidence. Father Gaudioso Tropico of
the Roman Catholic church testified that he solemnized the marriage of
the accused and Prima Baltar and that the newly married couple, the
witnesses, and himself signed the said marriage contract in each others
presence. True, the contract shows that Prima Baltar was married to
“Teodulfo” Quibate but defense witness Atty. Jose Azarraga testified
that the accused used the name “Teodulfo” when they were classmates.
The accused himself admitted that he used to be called “Teodulfo”. On
the fact of marriage, Alberto Baltar testified that he was present in
church when his sister and the accused were married. Father Gaudioso
Tropico, on re-direct examination was asked to go around the courtroom
and identify the “Teodulfo Quibate” whose marriage he solemnized. He
did so and picked out the accused-appellant. The accused-appellant did
not deny the marriage but admitted during trial that he and his late
wife were married, that they were married by Father Tropico who
testi­fied in the case.

The appellant raises no issue in this appeal regarding his main defense
during the trial below that he acted in self-defense. We have
nonetheless examined the records on this point because of the serious
nature of the crime. We find no error in the court’s rejecting this
defense. The allegation of self-defense has no basis.

The accused-appellant testified that two months before the fatal
incident, he caught his wife having sexual intercourse with their
neighbor “Gabi” or “Gabe” and that he called her to come up their house.
He was so angry that he boxed her. Gabi was not only bigger than the
accused, but he also had a gun. Yet when he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she refused. When he insisted, she still
refused. According to the accused, he begged for almost two hours to
have sex with his wife but she refused. Later on, he noticed that she
took a knife from a “baul” or clothes trunk by her side and tried to
stab him. They grappled for the knife and she was hit. The trial court
found the story of self-defense not believable. We agree. The
accused-appellant, in a fit of jealousy, stabbed his wife inflicting the
four separate incised wounds described in the autopsy report, which
resulted in shock, profuse hemorrhage, and death.

The appellant states in his first assignment of error that the lower
court erred in cancelling the March 4, 1980 promulgation because the
grounds given by the court do not warrant such a cancellation.

The appellant questions the cancellation and resetting of promulgation
stating that the counsel did not have to be present during the
promulgation of judgment and that there was no need to nullify a
pro­mulgation already effected simply because the accused refused to
sign. According to the appellant’s brief, the appellant refused to sign
because he did not know how to write.

It is not required that counsel for the accused must be present when
judgment is promulgated for it to be valid and effective. However,
considering the level of intelligence of the accused and the serious
nature of the offense, the Court had reason to require counsel’s
presence during promulgation. The court, however, followed a manifestly
strange procedure when it pronounced the sentence of conviction and
then immediately afterwards, reconsidered and cancelled the whole thing
on the ground, among others, that the lawyer was not present. On
noticing that there was no lawyer for the accused, the Court should have
deferred the promulga­tion of the decision if it wanted counsel to be
around.

It is obvious from the appealed decision that the presiding Judge had
conflicting feelings in his mind when the date for promulgation arrived.
If so, he should have resolved them before going ahead.

The decision reads, in part:

“The Court finds in accordance with Art. 13, of the Revised Penal
Code, mental weakness, and voluntary surrender. Likewise, the Court
considers the history of infidelity of the victim’s wife, coupled with
her refusal to perform her marital duties, after accused had begged for
two (2) hours, immediately preceding the stabbing, as analogous to an
aggression and should also be considered mitigating. The Court believes
that the attitude and behaviour of the accused, such as the tenderness
he showed to his daughter Imelda after the latter’s testimony, shows
remorse and lack of real malice.

“In view thereof, the Court recom­mends Executive Clemency, such as would reduce the imprisonment to a lesser period.”

The procedure followed by the lower court is not the most appropriate
under the circumstances but it does not constitute a ground to nullify
the decision later promulgated.

The second reason about the refusal to sign may have been insufficient
to warrant postponement of promulgation of judgment but, under the
circumstances, it is not a basis to set aside or modify the appealed
decision.

Regarding the last ground for the first assign­ment of error, it is
unlikely that the imposition of a sentence of 12 to 17 years
imprisonment instead of reclusion perpetua would be a
typographical error. It was not. It was an error of hasty judgment
based on a misapprehension of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
applicable to the facts of the case. The lower court made a mistake and
it should have taken immediate steps to rectify it instead of waiting
for more than three months.

The more serious questions arising from the facts of this case are not
raised in the appellant’s brief but the Court has decided to resolve
them considering that a man’s liberty is at stake and the lower court
itself has recommended executive clemency for the appellant.

What was the effect of the cancellation of promulgation on March 4,
1980? Did the decision whose promulgation was cancelled become final
and executory fifteen days later on March 19, 1980? Did the court have
jurisdiction to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua on June 13, 1980?

Under Section 7 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, a judgment of
conviction may be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before
the judgment becomes final or an appeal is perfected. In the instant
case, no appeal had been perfected when the trial court set aside its
judgment and cancelled its promulgation. But had the judgment become
final? The cited section provides:

“A judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of
the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly
waived in writing his right to appeal.”

In the case at bar, the judgment of conviction and its promulgation were
set aside on the very day that the judgment was promulgated. At that
time, the period for perfecting an appeal had not lapsed; and the
accused had not waived his right to appeal. Only if he were deemed to
have commenced service of his sentence could the judgment be deemed
final.

The law gives the accused 15 days after promulgation of a judgment of
conviction within which to decide whether he will take an appeal or not;
and unless he has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal or
has voluntarily commenced service of his sentence, the accused may yet
take an appeal within the 15-day period. (See People vs. Valle, 7 SCRA
1025; Mabuhay Insurance and Guaranty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA
245). The accused was returned to the same detention cell where he was
confined pending trial. He never intimated acceptance of the judgment
or that he would no longer appeal.

From the above considerations, it follows that when the trial court
cancelled the promulgation it had just concluded, it were as if no
decision had been rendered and no judgment had been imposed. The
promulgation or the entire process had been set aside to be effected on a
future date. The decision promulgated on June 13, 1980 would not
merely be an amendment of the sentence imposed earlier but would be the
decision itself being promulgated in the case. Consequently, there was
no judgment to become final and executory except from June 13, 1980. If
the court had decided to commit the accused to jail on March 19, 1980,
there would have been no basis for the execution of judgment and the
commitment as the decision promulgated earlier had been cancelled and
set aside. The accused could not have accepted a judgment or commenced
to serve a sentence based on a cancelled and, therefore, non-existent
promulgation.

We find in this case an opportune occasion to remind all trial courts to
devote a little more time to the study of the penalty provisions of the
Revised Penal Code immediately before promulgating each decision, to
obviate the necessity of issuing amended or “repromulgated” decisions
increasing sentences of imprisonment. Trial courts should likewise note
the dictum in Flores v. Dalisay (84 SCRA 46, 48).

“What the trial court should have done was to have categorically asked the counsel de oficio of the accused (who was not the counsel de oficio
who handled the defense of the accused) whether or not he would appeal.
Because the accused did not file any notice of appeal immediately
after the judgment was promulgated, the trial court jumped to the
conclusion that he had no intention of taking an appeal. x x x x x x x
x x.”

Considering the factual circumstances of this case, the low intelligence
of the accused, and the gravity of the offense of parricide, it was the
duty of the lower court on March 4, 1980 to ascertain whether or not
the detention prisoner whose sentence of convic­tion had just been read
intended to appeal. Upon the answer would have defended its power to
modify the deci­sion but within the period for the taking of an appeal.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Capiz finding
the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
per­petua is hereby AFFIRMED. The accused-appellant is also ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Prima Baltar Quibate in the sum of THIRTY
THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, De La Fuente, and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., joins JJ. Makasiar and Escolin in their dissenting opinion.

Aquino, J., see concurrence.

Makasiar and Escolin, JJ., dissent.

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CONCURRING OPINION

AQUINO, J.:

Judge Oscar Leviste’s decision dated March 3, 1980 was promulgated on
the following day, March 4, in the absence of accused’s counsel, Antonio
Bisnar. The accused (a registered voter who studied at the Elizalde
Academy) refused to sign on the original copy of the decision as proof
that he received a copy of the decision.

It is stated in the handwritten minutes of the incident that “when this
case was called for promulga­tion of decision, the court interpreter
read the whole decision and after which the dispositive part of the
decision was translated to the accused. The Court sentences the accused
(to) 12 years to 17 years. Later, the Court discovered that Atty.
Bisnar, counsel de oficio for the accused, was not present in court. The Court appointed Atty. Jose Brotario as counsel de oficio for the purpose of promulgation. The dispo­sitive portion of the decision was read to the accused.”

The said minutes were signed by the court inter­preter. The deputy clerk
of court executed a certi­fication as to the promulgation and the
refusal of the accused to affix his signature on the original copy.

A few hours later on that same day, March 4, 1980, Judge Leviste issued an order cancelling the promulgation (1) due to the absence of Bisnar, the regular counsel de oficio,
(2) the refusal of accused to sign as proof that he received a copy of
the decision, (3) the im­position of the wrong penalty and (4) the fact
“that the decision has not been filed”.

In fact, the said decision is in the record but it contains numerous
handwritten corrections made by Judge Leviste. It was retyped. The
retyped decision, imposing reclusion perpetua, dated March 5, 1980, and the original decision of March 3, 1980 (with corrections) were both refiled in court at 4:30 p.m. on March 5, 1980.

Later, or on April 11, 1980, there was an oral motion to quash the
second promulgation. It was denied by Judge Leviste in his order of June
9, 1980.

The corrected decision of March 5, 1980 was pro­mulgated on June 13, 1980. The accused and his counsel signed
the original copy of the said decision. The clerk of court certified to
the promulgation on June 13, 1980. This was also signed by the accused
(pp. 126-7, Record).

Written notices of the decision were sent to the fiscal, the warden and
Bisnar on June 16, 1980. Bisnar filed his notice of appeal to the Court
of Appeals.

The minutes of the proceeding on June 13, 1980 show that Bisnar objected
to the promulgation of the corrected decision and insisted that the
promulgation of the first decision was valid.

Judge Leviste had the power and jurisdiction to correct his decision of
March 3, 1980 which was not yet officially filed. He corrected it on the
same day and filed the corrected copy on March 5, 1980 together with
the original decision of March 3, 1980.

“A judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside by the
court rendering it before the judgment has become final or appeal has
been perfected. A judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the
lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has
expressly waived in writing his right to appeal.” (Sec. 7, Rule 120,
Rules of Court.)

The accused or his counsel should expressly inform the court that he
does not want to appeal or is going to start serving his sentence. In
the absence of such manifestation, the judge can change his decision
within the reglementary fifteen-day period. It is not right to
conjecture from the silence of the accused-detainee in the absence of
his counsel that he started to serve his sentence. (People vs. Español,
G. R. No. 57597-99, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 911.)

In this case, counsel de oficio‘s absence during the first
promulgation rendered it uncertain whether or not the accused was going
to appeal. The fact that he was a detention prisoner does not justify
the con­jecture that he did not appeal and that he had started the
service of his sentence on March 4, 1980.

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DISSENTING OPINION

ESCOLIN, J.:

I dissent. The records disclose that after the promulgation of the first
decision on March 4, 1980, petitioner did not manifest his desire to
appeal and was therefore committed to jail; that the 15-day period to
appeal lapsed without petitioner having perfected his appeal; and that
before the promulgation of the new decision on June 30, 1980, he
vehemently objected to the cancellation of the March 4, 1980
promulgation as well as the promul­gation of the new judgment. Surely,
any doubt as to the conclusion to be drawn from this factual setting
should be resolved in favor of the peti­tioner’s posture that he
immediately commenced service of sentence after the promulgation of the
first decision, and that therefore the same became final in accordance
with the rule that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final when the
sentence has been partially served. [Section 7, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court].