G.R. No. 55526. June 15, 1987
FILOIL REFINERY CORPORATION, PETROPHIL CORPORATION AND FILOIL MARKETING CORPORATION, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA AND HON. MARIANO A. ZOSA, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS JUDGE…
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for the issuance of the writs of 1) CERTIORARI
to annul and set aside: (a) the order
issued on September 24, 1979, by the Court of First Instance of Cebu in Civil
Case No. R-14164, entitled “Jesus P. Garcia, et al. vs. Filoil Refinery
Corporation, et al.”, dismissing petitioners’ appeal from the decision
rendered in the same case on May 14, 1976; and (b) the order issued on October 20,
1980, in the same case denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of their appeal and 2) MANDAMUS to compel respondent Honorable
Rafael T. Mendoza, as Presiding Judge of Branch V, Court of First Instance of
Cebu, to give due course to petitioners’ appeal.
In a complaint filed by herein private respondents, the lower
court rendered on May 14, 1976, a decision rescinding the contract of lease
over a 750 square meters lot situated in Cebu City covered by TCT No. 30712
entered into between Filoil Refinery Corporation and private respondents Jesus
P. Garcia and Severina B. Garcia and ordering the petitioners herein to vacate
the leased premises. It appears that the
herein petitioners violated the terms and conditions of the lease agreement in
the sense that the signatory Filoil Refinery Corporation subleased it to Filoil
Marketing and subsequently to petitioner Petrophil Corporation and that herein
petitioners were delayed several times in the payment of the monthly rentals.
On June 11, 1976, private respondents filed their Motion for
execution of the aforementioned decision pending appeal. Petitioners opposed said motion and on July
15, 1976 petitioners filed their notice of appeal. On July 30, 1976 they filed their Record on
Appeal.
On November 10, 1976, the private respondents filed a Motion for
Execution pending appeal which was opposed by petitioners in their Motion for
Reconsideration. Said Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the lower court prompting petitioners to file a
Petition for Certiorari and Review with the Court of Appeals docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 06145-SP. On September 29,
1980, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision denying the petition for certiorari
and review to annul and set aside the order of the lower court granting the
Motion for Execution pending appeal.
Meanwhile herein private respondents filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal of petitioners in the original complaint on the ground of alleged
abandonment thereof by reason of the failure of the petitioners to amend their
record on appeal so as to include in their Record on Appeal two important
orders of the lower court dated July 30, 1975 and February 4, 1976, the
“Motion for Execution Pending Appeal”, and the “Order” of
the lower court granting said “Motion for Execution Pending Appeal.”
The lower court issued an order dismissing the appeal on
September 24, 1979 stating as follows:
“Let it be remembered that the Order of this Court of July 30,
1975, authorized the plaintiffs to implead the Filoil Marketing Corporation as
one of the defendants in this case; the Order dated February 4, 1976, contained
the agreement of the parties to submit this case for summary judgment and
listed the exhibits presented by both parties which were admitted in evidence. There is no gainsaying that the inclusion of
these orders in defendants’ record on appeal is necessary for a proper
understanding of the issues involved in the appeal. Without them, it is believed the Court of
Appeals will not be in a position to know why the case was decided on summary
judgment, what exhibits have been admitted in evidence and why Filoil Marketing
Corporation had been ordered impleaded.” (Rollo, pp. 69-70)
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the said
Order which was denied by the lower court in its Order dated October 20,
1980. Hence, the present petition for certiorari
and mandamus.
Petitioners’ contentions merit Our consideration.
The records reveal that the lower court dismissed petitioners’
appeal because of their failure to amend or to complete their record on
appeal. Such alleged failure was brought
to the attention of the lower court by private respondents in their opposition
to the approval of the Record on Appeal on the ground that petitioners failed
to include in the Record of Appeal the Motion for Execution pending appeal
dated July 30, 1975 and the Order granting the motion for execution pending
appeal dated February 4, 1976. However
it is a fact that petitioners filed their record on appeal well within the reglementary
period and that the lower court never issued an order declaring the
Record on Appeal incomplete or defective nor an order ordering petitioners to
complete or correct the same. The lower
court did not act on the record on appeal filed by petitioners despite the
opposition of the private respondents to the approval of the same. Obviously as there was no order by a
competent court requiring them to complete their record on appeal, the
petitioners were under no obligation to amend the same, petitioners having the
impression that their record on appeal was then adequate and regular. Petitioners were also under the belief that
the failure of the lower court in not acting immediately on their record on
appeal was because at the time the record on appeal was awaiting approval by
the lower court, the petition for certiorari filed with the Court of
Appeals to question the execution of the decision pending appeal was still
unresolved by the Court of Appeals; and that had the lower court approved
outright the record on appeal, or had it required petitioners to amend the same
and petitioners complied, constraining it to give its approval thereto, it
would have lost its jurisdiction to order execution of the decision pending
appeal. Petitioners cited the ruling
handed by Us in the case of De Leon
vs. De Los Santos[1]
to invoke the rule that once an appeal has been perfected, the trial court
loses jurisdiction over the case and cannot generally act anymore on any
matter raised therein. It was more for
these reasons that petitioners felt there was no need to follow up or to
inquire about the approval of their record on appeal rather than an act of
abandonment of their appeal as theorized by private respondents.
Anent petitioners’ grounds for appealing, petitioners aver that
they have good and valid grounds. In
rescinding the contract of lease between petitioner Filoil Refinery Corporation
and private respondents, the lower court found that petitioners illegally
subleased the lot to petitioner Filoil Marketing Corporation and that the
latter, in turn, assigned its sublease to petitioner Petrophil
Corporation. However an examination of
the lease contract reveals that there is no express prohibition against the
assignment of the leasehold right. Under
the law, when there is no express prohibition, the lessee may sublet the thing
leased[2]
and all rights acquired by virtue of an obligation are transmissible, if there
has been no stipulation to the contrary.[3]
Petitioners admit that on a few occasions, they were late in
paying the rentals which were due within the first 15 days of each month but
their delay was only for a few days. The
delayed rentals for the months of May, July, August and September, 1974 were
remitted to private respondents on May 21, July 19, August 19 and September 16, 1974,
respectively. Such breaches were not so
substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making
the agreement because the law is not concerned with such trifles.
All these arguments however have become moot and academic
considering that the contract of lease sought to be rescinded expired or
terminated last September 16, 1982 or almost 5 years ago by its own terms as
provided for in the Lease Contract.
Petitioners have won the case without the necessity of an order by this
Court to reverse the judgment of the respondent court and/or to grant the
petition as prayed for.
WHEREFORE premises considered the petition is hereby
DISMISSED, with the petitioners ordered to VACATE the premises.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
[1]
78 Phil. 461
[2]
Art. 1650, New Civil Code
[3]
Art, 1178, New Civil Code