G.R. No. L-48241. June 11, 1987
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE P. ARRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, BR. III, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO, ISABELO I. PACQUING AND CARMEN B. …
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus,
Prohibition and Injunction, seeking the nullification of the Orders of March 9,
1978 and April 21, 1978 of the Court of First Instance of Davao
in Civil Case No. 6509, the resolution of which revolves on whether the
negligence of counsel who went abroad and practically abandoned a case can bind
his client.
On May 16, 1969,
the petitioner filed a complaint entitled “Republic of the Philippines
vs. Isabelo I. Pacquing and
Carmen B. Pacquing“, for the collection of
deficiency taxes[1]
based on the income tax returns filed by the respondents-spouses, for the years
1956, 1957 and 1958. After private
respondents filed their answer to the original complaint through the assistance
of their counsel, Atty. Vicente Garcia, petitioner filed, with leave of court[2]
an amended complaint,[3]
increasing the income tax deficiency sought.[4]
Private respondents moved to dismiss the amended complaint.[5]
On June 7, 1973, respondent
court denied the motion to dismiss.
Private respondents’ Answer to the original complaint was adopted as
their Answer to the amended complaint.
After trial on the merits and the submission of the memorandum of
the parties a decision was rendered on October
10, 1977, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
“‘IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff:
UNDER THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. The sum of P26,819.90 as sales and percentage taxes from 1954 to 1957;
UNDER THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
2. The sum of P260,071.22 as deficiency income taxes for 1956, 1957 and 1958,
plus 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest from August 6, 1962 until fully paid, pursuant to Section 5(a)
of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 2343.
COMMON TO BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION
The sum of P25,000.00 is hereby directed
to be deducted from the total liability ordered to be paid to the plaintiff
under the above first and second causes
of actions, defendants’ unauthorized payments under the tax amnesty.
Without special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.’”[6]
On December
19, 1977, notice and
a copy of the decision was delivered at the office of Atty. Vicente Garcia,
which was received by his clerk. On January
19, 1978, there
being no appeal taken,[7] petitioner filed a motion for execution of
the judgment.[8] Meanwhile, on January 23, 1978, private respondents, thru another counsel,
Atty. Alberto Lumakang, filed a Notice of Appeal with
a motion for extension of time[9] to submit record on appeal. Petitioner filed an opposition on the ground
that the copy of the decision was duly received by Atty. Garcia’s clerk
and that from the date of said receipt thereof[10]
the thirty (30) day period for appeal[11]
had already lapsed. In the Order of March 9, 1978[12]
the trial court gave due course to the appeal and granted the motion for
extension of time of twenty (20) days to file the record on appeal. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
petitioner. On April 21, 1978, the respondent court issued an
Order[13]
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration[14]
as well as the motion for Writ of Execution.
Hence, the present petition.
The pertinent rules on appeal is found
in Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court as follows:
SEC. 3.
How appeal is taken. – Appeal may be taken by serving upon the adverse
party and filing with the trial court with in thirty (30) days from notice of
order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on
appeal. The time during which a motion
to set aside the judgment or order or for a new trial has been pending shall be
deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.
x x x.
SEC. 5.
Appeal bond. – The appeal bond shall answer for the payment of
costs. It shall be in the amount of one
hundred and twenty pesos (P120) unless the court shall fix a different
amount. If the appeal bond is not in
cash it must be approved by the court before the transmittal of the record on
appeal to the appellate court.
SEC. 9.
When appeal deemed perfected; effect thereof. – If the notice of
appeal, the appeal bond and the record on appeal have been filed in due time,
the appeal is deemed perfected upon the approval of the record on appeal and of
the appeal bond other than a cash bond, and thereafter the trial court loses
its jurisdiction over the case, except to issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the
appeal, to approve compromises offered by the parties prior to the transmittal
of the record on appeal to the appellate court, and to permit the prosecution
of pauper’s appeals.
It is a requirement under the aforequoted
provisions that a notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal should be
filed in court and served upon the adverse party within thirty (30) days from
notice of judgment.[15]
This is mandatory and jurisdictional.[16]
When a party appears by attorney in an action or proceeding in
court, all notices required to be given therein must be given to the attorney
and not to the client. Hence a notice
given to the client and not to his
attorney is not a notice in law.[17]
The rule in this jurisdiction is that the client is bound by the
negligence or failings of counsel.[18]
It is the duty of an attorney to himself and to his clients to invariably adopt
a system whereby he can be sure of receiving promptly all judicial notices
during his absence from his address of record.[19]
The attorney must so arrange matters that communications sent by mail,
addressed to his office or residence, may reach him promptly.[20]
The negligence of a counsel’s secretary in failing to note down the trial date
on his desk calendar is negligence and failings of counsel in having a
negligent secretary – said circumstances not constituting excusable negligence.[21]
This rule, however, is not without exception. In the case of an irresponsible lawyer who
totally forgot about the case and failed to inform his client of the decision,
this Court held that the client should not be bound by the negligence of the counsel.[22]
Under the peculiar circumstances of the instant case the
negligence of the counsel is far from excusable. Atty. Vicente Garcia who was the counsel of
private respondents went to the United States of
America but had a clerk in-charge of his
office. The copy of the decision was
received on December 19, 1977
by said clerk. He did not do anything
about the same so the reglementary period of appeal
lapsed. It can be assumed that said
clerk received appropriate instructions from Atty. Garcia as to what to do with
any processes, orders or notices that maybe received or otherwise that no such
instruction were given. In either case
there is inexcusable negligence. Private
respondents have no one to blame except their lawyer. They are bound by the negligence and failings
of their lawyer. And the appeal not
having been interposed within the reglementary
period, the decision has now become final and executory.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, the Orders of
March 9, 1978 and April 21, 1978 of the Court of First Instance of Davao in Civil Case No. 6509 are hereby set aside for being
null and void, and the decision of the trial court in said case of October 10,
1977 is hereby declared final and executory with
costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, (Chairman), Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
[1]
Inclusively for P260,070.72.
[2]
June 27, 1970.
[3]
Dated June 9, 1970.
[4]
Sales tax for 1954, 1956 & 1957 — P
26,819.90
Deficiency
income tax for 1956 to 1958 — 260,071.22
Total ———– P 286,891.12
[5]
Invoking P.D. 23 in relation to P.D. 67 and the unfinished reinvestigation
conducted by the plaintiff at the request of the defendants.
Petitioner vehemently opposed the motion
to dismiss on the ground that the motion involves a very delicate question of
law in that there is yet no clear jurisprudence on the matter, it being of a
first impression in our jurisdiction.
[6]
Page 3, Petition.
[7]
Counting from December
19, 1977, the thirty
(30) day period of appeal expired on January 18, 1978.
[8]
Annex A,
Petition, pages 27-29, Rollo.
[9]
Dated January 21, 1978, Saturday.
[10]
Supra.
[11]
Now reduced to 15 days, Sec. 39, B.P. 129,
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
[12]
Annex D, Petition, pages 36-38, Rollo.
[13]
Annex E, Petition, page 39, Rollo.
[14]
Annex D, Petition, pages 36-38, Rollo.
[15]
Exporters vs. Ladaw, G.R.
No. L-5181, February 24, 1953, 49 Official Gaz, 1439.
[16]
Remorin vs. Valles,
92 Phil. 989.
[17]
Palad vs.
Cui, 28 Phil. 44, Notor vs. Daza, 76 Phil. 850, Santiago vs.
CA, et al., 105 Phil. 1260. Section 2, Rule 13, Rules of Court.
[18]
Macavinta, Jr. vs. People, 54 SCRA 420; Malipol vs. Tan, 55 SCRA 202; Gutierrez & Sons vs. Court of Appeals, 61 SCRA 87; Cason Vda.
de Carretero vs. Tarca, 87 Phil. 689.
[19]
Enriquez vs. Bautista, 79 Phil. 220.
[20]
Islas vs.
Platon, 47 Phil. 662; Yanyee
vs. Millan, 57 Phil. 761; Enriquez vs.
Bautista, supra.
[21]
Antonio vs. Ramos, 2 SCRA 731.
[22]
PHHC vs. Tiongco, November 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 471.