PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SALVADOR SAMSON, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the decision of the then Court of First
Instance of Cavite (now Regional Trial Court), Branch
V which convicted Salvador Samson of murder. 
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused
Salvador Samson is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder as defined and penalized in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which is qualified by treachery and
evident premeditation and with the aggravating circumstances that the offense
was committed with the aid of
armed men and with use of superior strength, and is therefore sentenced to
suffer the capital punishment of Death, to indemnify the heirs of the offended
party in the amount of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in view of the nature of the principal penalty, P2,930.00
corresponding to the funeral and mortuary expenses, and to pay the cost of the
proceeding.” (Original Record, p. 96)

The facts of the case as summarized in the People’s Brief are as follows:

“On December 23,
1978, in the evening, Benjamin Lara and Cenon
Herrera were conversing at the terrace of the house of Eugenio
Sapalasan located at the old public market of Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite.  At
about 9:30 o’clock that same evening, four (4) men, namely, Jose Jerusalem,
Felix Jerusalem, Salvador Samson, and another unidentified person, passed
by.  Benjamin asked, `Ano
ba ang dala
ninyo na nakabalot sa papel?’
but they did not answer.  Instead, they
immediately turned back and started stabbing and hacking Benjamin.  Two were armed with jungle bolos 20 inches
long, and the other two with knives 10 inches long.  They also tried to attack and hack Herrera
but he was able to run away.  After
killing Benjamin, the four ran towards the sea (Sworn statement of Cenon Herrera, Exh. H; TSN, Sept.
12, 1979, pp. 4?28;
TSN, December 11, 1979, pp. 3-4; TSN, Dec. 25, 1979, pp. 3-12). 
When Herrera returned, he found Benjamin Lara already dead (TSN, Sept.
12, 1979, p. 10).

“Pat. Miguel de Leon of the Bacoor
police department was on duty that evening. 
Having been informed of the incident, he, together
with Pat. Cabrera, proceeded to the crime
scene.  They saw Benjamin Lara prostrate
on the ground, bleeding and dead.  Cenon Herrera related to them how the incident
happened.  He informed them that there
were four persons who participated in the gruesome killing.  He specifically mentioned the names of Felix Jerusalem and Salvador Samson, appellant
herein, as among the persons who stabbed Benjamin (TSN, Dec. 17, 1979, pp. 7-8, 10-11).

“Cenon Herrera told Pat. de Leon that it was Salvador
Samson who first stabbed the deceased. 
He also said that Samson can easily be apprehended.  He volunteered to go with the policemen to
apprehend Salvador Samson.  He pointed to
the latter’s house which was just after the old public market of Zapote.  Samson was
arrested in his house that same evening or before midnight,
December 23 (Ibid, pp. 9-13).  He was
alone upstairs when arrested.  His house
was about 15 arms’ length from the place where Benjamin Lara was killed (TSN,
Dec. 17, 1979, p. 16).

“Salvador Samson smelled of liquour
(TSN, Dec. 17, 1979, p. 16).  He was
still wearing the same T-shirt and ‘maong‘ pants he
was wearing when he and his companions ganged up on Benjamin some 2 hours
before (TSN, Sept. 12, 1979, p. 28).  There
were bloodstains on his pants.  His feet
were full of mud (TSN, Dec.  17, 1979, p. 9). 
Salvador Samson explained that he fell into a ditch (Ibid. pp. 15-16).

“Salvador Samson was brought by the policemen that same night
to the municipal building of Bacoor.  Cenon Herrera went
with the group.  The taking of his (Cenon’s) sworn statement was completed at 2:20 o’clock on December 24 (See Exh. H).

“Meanwhile, the lifeless and gory body of the victim was
brought to the Perpetual Help
Hospital at about 10:00 o’clock, December 23.  The following day, the body was brought to
the NBI morgue for autopsy (TSN, July 19, 1979, pp. 2-3).

“In his autopsy report (Exh. I), Dr.
Maximo Reyes noted that the victim died of
`hemorrhage, acute, profuse, secondary to multiple stab
wounds.’ All in all, there were 14 stab and hack wounds, the fatal wounds being
Nos. 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10, as shown in the report.  The last three wounds directly hit and
penetrated the vital organs that produced severe bleeding, causing death.  These wounds were caused
by sharp-pointed, single-bladed instruments wielded, according to Dr. Reyes’
testimony, by more than one (1) person (Tsn, Dec. 17,
1979, pp. 3-4)” (Appellee’s Brief, pp.
1-5)

The accused-appellant Samson, in his denial of any participation
in the killing narrates his version of the incident as follows:

“x x x on December 23,
1978, in the evening, he was at the old public Market in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite.  He heard a noise coming from the residence of Eugenio
Sapalasan.  As
he turned around, he saw somebody being stabbed, so he ran towards his house,
and later fell asleep.  He did not
recognize the victim (Tsn, Feb. 4, 1980, pp. 1-3).

“That same evening, some policemen went to his house to arrest him.  He was told that he was one of the suspects
in the killing of Benjamin Lara.  He told
the policemen that he had nothing to do
with the incident.  Just the same, he was
brought to the municipal building where he was interrogated (Ibid. pp. 3-4; TSN, Dec. 11, 1979, pp. 4-5).” (Appellee’s Brief, p. 6)

An information for murder was filed
against Salvador Samson on February 6,
1979.  It reads:

“That on or about December 23, 1978, in the Municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused SALVADOR SAMSON together with
FELIX JERUSALEM, JOSE JERUSALEM and one John Doe whose identity is still
unknown the latter three (3) accused were still at-large, with treachery and
evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and
assisting one another, being then conveniently armed with bolos and knives,
with intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault, stab
and hack with the said bolos and knives one BENJAMIN E. LARA, thereby inflicting upon him hack and  stab wounds on his body which caused his
subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said BENJAMIN E.
LARA.

 “CONTRARY TO
LAW.” (Original Record, p. 8)

Salvador Samson, assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty when
arraigned on April 11, 1979.

Trial proceeded and judgment was rendered by the lower court on July 28, 1980, finding him guilty of
the crime charged.

The accused, through his counsel, now assigns the following
errors:

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ‘THAT
SUFFICIENT AND CONVINCING PROOF HAS BEEN ADDUCED WHICH DEFINITELY AND BEYOND
ANY SCINTILLA OF DOUBT POINTS TO THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT SALVADOR SAMSON
AS A PRINCIPAL, TOGETHER WITH THE THREE OTHER ASSAILANTS, NAMELY, JOSE AND
JESUS JERUSALEM AND ONE JOHN DOE, THEY HAVING GANGED UP ON THEIR HELPLESS
VICTIM AND HACKED HIM UNTIL HE DIED.’

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE BENEFIT OF REASONABLE DOUBT.

III

GRANTING IN GRATIA ARGUMENTI
THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OR RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KILLING OF
BENJAMIN LARA, WHICH THE DEFENSE VEHEMENTLY DENIES, NEVERTHELESS, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ‘THE KILLING WAS CHARACTERIZED OR QUALIFIED BY TREACHERY
AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.'” (Brief for the
Accused-Appellant, p. 1)

In support of his first and second assigned errors, the appellant
capitalizes on the turnabout in the testimony of prosecution witness, Cenon Herrera.  Five (5) hours after the killing, Herrera gave a
detailed statement of the incident identifying the assailants, specifying their
acts, and narrating in clear and logical sequence exactly what took place.  Forty six (46) days later, he executed an
affidavit before the municipal mayor, exculpating the appellant from direct participation in the crime.  He stated that at the time of the incident,
he merely saw Salvador Samson nearby.  This subsequent statement cannot be given any
probative value not only because it was made 46 days after the incident but because
it was repudiated and the first statement reaffirmed when Herrera was placed on
the witness stand.  Exhibit H, the sworn
statement of Herrera, was
admittedly given “freely and voluntarily.” Being the companion of Lara at the time of
the incident, he could easily distinguish between the persons who hacked the
victim beside him and the persons who were merely within the vicinity of the
crime.  In his first statement which was
spontaneously given, he was positive that Samson was among those who stabbed and
hacked Lara.  This is believable
considering that he was the companion of the victim and the place was
lighted.  He even stated that he was not
in a state of shock when he made the statement. 
In contrast, the manner by which he made his recantation was doubtful,
thus, prompting the trial court to note that he was lying.  Moreover, when asked by the Fiscal whether he
was the one who personally executed the affidavit (Exh.
1), he admitted that the same was prepared by the counsel for the defense.

Obviously, the court cannot give any weight to the retraction of
the earlier statement by the witness.

The same principle which looks with disfavor upon retractions of
testimonies previously given in court may also be applied here.  An eyewitness may be prevailed upon to either recant the first statement or tell
a different story once placed on the witness stand.  The reason is that retractions can easily be
secured from poor and ignorant witnesses usually for a monetary
consideration (Reano, et al. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 80992, September 21, 1988).  Or they may be threatened with harm.  In this case, the eyewitness told the truth
once questioned during the trial.

The defense likewise questions the reaction of one of the
prosecution witnesses who happens to be the sister of the deceased.  The defense contends that the reaction of Bumangkit was not natural for a sister.  They maintain that she should have run to her
brother’s succor.  There is nothing
unnatural about the sister’s reaction. 
She was alone and helpless so that her natural action, as would be done
by any other person in the same
situation, was to run and shout for help. 
In contrast, it was the reaction of Samson which was unnatural.  His version of the facts
reveal that when he saw that somebody was stabbed, he ran home and
slept.  In the normal course of events,
his reaction is unusual.  Moreover, he
has not successfully explained the fact that he was still wearing the same maong pants and t-shirt which he wore during the stabbing
and which pair of pants was stained with blood and full of mud.  His explanation that the
blood stains were caused by his
falling into a ditch is quite flimsy.

The difference in the number of assailants as specified by
prosecution witnesses Herrera and Bumangkit is of no
consequence considering that under
such circumstances, it is not expected that witnesses would have a clear account of
the details of the incident, such as the number of attackers.  Human instinct would dictate self-preservation.  What
is important is the fact that both positively identified Samson.  There is nothing in the records which would
show a motive or reason on the part of these witnesses to falsely implicate the
accused.  In People v. Dollantes, 151 SCRA 592 (1987),
it was held that if no motive was shown
why the prosecution witness would falsely incriminate the appellants,
identification would be given full credit.

The appellant further contends that his motive to kill has not been established.  The contention is without merit.  Proof of motive is not necessary when there
is positive identification of the assailant.

The accused-appellant assigns as the trial court’s third error,
the qualifying of the crime to murder by treachery and evident premeditation.

We agree with the defense that evident premeditation was not
clearly established.  However, we cannot
concede that treachery is likewise absent. 
The trial court committed an error in assuming that these circumstances
are inseparable.  As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, evident premeditation
and treachery are independent of each other.

In the instant case, there was treachery in the sudden,
deliberate, and unexpected attack on the victim.  He was sitting down when he was attacked and
was stabbed simultaneously by the assailants, thus insuring the accomplishment
of the crime without risk to the appellant and his group arising from the
defense which the victim might have
offered.  The case of People v.
Rojas, 147 SCRA 169
[1987] clearly enunciates the principle, thus: 
“treachery exists when the offender commits any crime against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from any defense which the offended party might make.”

On the other hand, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated as
there was no direct evidence of the planning and the preparation to kill.  We quote with approval the Solicitor General: 
“Under normal conditions, conspiracy presupposes premeditation but
in case of implied conspiracy, as where there was concerted attack, evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated.”

The defense of denial and being elsewhere made by the accused
certainly cannot prevail over the positive identification by prosecution
witnesses as author of the crime (People v. Dava, 149
SCRA, 582 [1987]).

Given the above circumstances, we find no cogent reason to depart
from the well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect because it has
the advantage of observing the demeanor of
witnesses and can discern if a witness is telling the truth (People v. Ornoza, 151 SCRA 495 [1987); People v. Pilapil,
147 SCRA 528 [1987]).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of conviction
is hereby AFFIRMED with modification that the accused shall suffer a penalty of
reclusion perpetua pursuant to the abolition of the
imposition of the death penalty in the
present Constitution.  The indemnity to
the heirs shall be increased to P30,000.00 in line
with recent decisions of the Court.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.