LEONARDO D. SUARIO, PETITIONER, VS. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, DAVAO BRANCH/OR THE MANAGER/CASHIER AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

The petitioner, with himself as his own counsel, filed this
petition for review of the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) which denied his claim for damages arising from an alleged illegal
dismissal.  In addition to the separation
pay already awarded to him, the petitioner asks for P9,995.00
actual damages, P300,000.00 moral damages, P200,000.00 exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees to be determined by the Court.

On August 4, 1977, petitioner Leonardo D. Suario
filed a complaint for separation pay, damages and attorney’s fees against the
Bank of the Philippine Islands, Davao Branch/ or the
Manager and Assistant Manager/Cashier alleging:

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

“2.  That complainant
has been a loyal employee of the respondent bank since March, 1969, first
assigned as a saving clerk, then rose to become the head of the loan section in
1976 with an official designation as Credit Investigator-Appraiser-Credit
Analyst;

3.   That during the time of
the complainant’s employment with the respondent bank, he pursued his studies
of law without criticism/or adverse comments from the respondent bank but
instead praises were showered and incentives and considerations were bestowed
in view of the complainant’s determination for intellectual advancement;

4.   That sometime in March,
1976, the complainant verbally requested the then Asst. Vice-President and
Branch Manager, Mr. Armando N. Guilatco, for a
6-month leave of absence without pay purposely to take the 1976 pre-bar review in Manila and that the said Mr. Guilatco informed the complainant that there would be no
problem as regards the requested leave of absence;

5.   That sometime in May,
1976, the complainant received a verbal notice from the new Branch Manager, Mr.
Vicente Casino, that the respondent’s Head Office approved only a 30-day leave
of absence without pay but that Mr. Guilatco, then
assigned in Head Office as Vice President, advised him (Casino) to inform the
complainant to just avail of the 30-day leave of absence first and then proceed
to Manila for the review since the request would be ultimately granted;

6.   That complainant never
suspected that his application would be disapproved, much less any bad faith on
the part of the respondent bank to discriminate union member (sic), since it has been the policy of the
respondent bank to grant request of this nature as shown in the case of four
(4) former employees who were all granted leave of absence without pay.  Copies of the affidavits of Judge Juan Montejo and Atty. Bienvenido Banez and xerox copies of the
payroll of Jose Ledesma and Antonio Tan are hereto
attached as ANNEXES ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘D’ and made an integral part hereof;

7.   That on May 10, 1976,
the complainant wrote a formal letter to the President of the respondent bank,
Mr. Alberto Villa Abrille, asking for a formal
reconsideration and caused the same to be received by Mr. Vicente Casino but the latter advised instead the
complainant to address to him (Casino) a letter of mild tenor since any
reconsideration should be coursed through the proper channel; and that Mr.
Casino advised the complainant to just file his 30-day leave of absence without
pay as approved and then proceed to Manila since the request would ultimately
be granted.  A Xerox copy of the said
letter is hereto attached as ANNEX ‘E’ to be made an integral part hereof;

8.   That acting on the said
advice of Vicente Casino, the complainant, with utmost good faith, wrote a
letter addressed to Mr. Casino and at the same time, filed a 30-day leave of
absence.  Copies of the letter and
Application for Leave of Absence are hereto attached as ANNEXES ‘F’ and ‘G’ to
be made an integral part hereof;

9.   That On May 17, 1976,
the complainant proceeded to Manila for the pre-bar review and even went to the
extent of going to the respondent’s Head Office to seek an audience with the
Personnel Manager with an alternative of
working with any of the Metro-Manila Branches of the respondent bank if and
when the request would not be granted and that the Personnel Manager promised
to take up the matter with Mr. Alberto Villa Abrille;

10.  That during the first
week of August, 1976, the complainant received a letter from the Asst.
Manager/Cashier, Mr. Douglas E. Aurelio, ordering the complainant to report
back for work since the complainant’s request was allegedly disapproved and
that failure to report back for work would be a conclusive proof that the complainant is no longer interested to
continue working and therefore considered resigned.  xxxx.

11.  That upon receipt of the
letter, complainant’s review was unduly interrupted since sleepless nights were
spent in order to arrive at the proper decision and that the complainant has
decided not to report back because of the considerable expenses already
incurred in Manila after he has been led to believe that the request would
ultimately be granted;

12.  That during the last
week of August, 1976, the complainant received another letter from Douglas E.
Aurelio, attaching a xerox copy of the application
for a Clearance to terminate on the ground of resignation/ or abandonment.  xxx“

13.  That the complainant
failed to file his opposition since as above averred to, he was already in
Manila taking up the review and was then very busy since the bar examination
was only two months shy;

14.  That sometime during the
first week of December, 1976, the complainant went to the respondent bank but
was verbally informed that he was already dismissed;

15.  That on December 13,
1976, the complainant formally wrote a letter to the respondent bank requesting
for a written and formal advise as to his real status and that on December 14,
1976, the respondent bank replied that the matter was still referred to the Personnel Department at Head Office
leading again the complainant to believe that his case was not yet hopeless.  xxx.

16.  That on December 21,
1976, the complainant wrote another letter pressing for a categorical answer
and on December 23, 1976, the lawyers of the respondent bank replied that as
far as the bank is concerned the services of the complainant was considered
terminated effective July 19, 1976 contrary to the respondent bank’s
manifestation that his case was still pending before the Personnel
Department.  xxx“

17.  That the dismissal of
the complainant was clearly illegal and without just cause, being
discriminatory in character he being an active union member and in fact the Vice President of the ALU-BPI Chapter
until his dismissal in view of the uneven application of the respondent’s
policy;

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

(Rollo, pp.
15-19)

The case was set for conciliation but since the parties could not
agree on any settlement, the case was certified to the Labor Arbiter.  Thereafter, the Executive Labor Arbiter
required the parties to submit their position papers.

Based on the position papers submitted, a decision was rendered
on December 7, 1977.  The dispositive
portion reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby ordered
to pay complainant’s claim for separation pay in the amount of P11,813.36.  His claim
for moral, actual, and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees are hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.” (Rollo, p. 46)

The decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter was affirmed on
appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission on October 9, 1978. 
A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.  Hence, this petition.

The petitioner alleges that the public respondent committed the
following:

I

“THAT THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION IN ITS DECISION DATED OCTOBER 9, 1978 (ANNEX F OF THE PETITION)
ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE CLAIM OF
DAMAGES PRAYED FOR BY PETITIONER DESPITE FINDINGS THAT THE DISMISSAL WAS
CLEARLY ILLEGAL; and

II

“THAT THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BASED
MAINLY ON PD NOS. 1367 AND 1391 IN ITS DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 9, 1979. 
(Rollo, p. 139).

The main issue in this case is whether or not the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner’s claim for actual, moral
and exemplary damages plus attorney’s fees in addition to his separation pay.

On the matter of NLRC jurisdiction over claims for damages, it
clearly appears that the complaint was filed on August 4, 1977 and decided by the Labor Arbiter on December 7, 1977; hence, the
applicable law is Article 217 of the Labor Code which took effect on October 1, 1974, and which provides:

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

“ART. 217.  Jurisdiction
of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. – (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non- agricultural:

‘(1) Unfair labor practice cases;

‘(2) Unresolved issues in collective bargaining including those
which involve wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of
employment duly indorsed by the Bureau
in accordance with the provisions of this Code;

‘(3) All money claims of workers involving non-payment or
underpayment of wages, overtime or premium compensation, maternity or service
incentive leave, separation pay and other money claims arising from
employer-employee relation, except
claims for employee’s compensation, social security and medicare
benefits and as otherwise provided in Article 128 of this Code;

(4) Cases involving household services; and

(5) All other cases arising from employer-employee relation unless expressly excluded by this Code.

“(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters, compulsory arbitrators, and voluntary
arbitrators in appropriate cases provided in Article 263 of this Code.”

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

The contention of private respondent that the NLRC is not clothed
with authority to entertain claims for moral and other forms of damages is
based on PD 1367 which took effect on May 1, 1979 and which amended Article 217
by specifically providing that “Regional Directors shall not indorse and
Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of
damages.”

This limitation on jurisdiction did not last long.  This Court in the case of Ebon v.
De Guzman (113 SCRA 52 [1982]) explained:

“Evidently, the lawmaking authority had second thoughts about
depriving the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award damages
in labor cases because that set up would mean duplicity of suits, splitting the
cause of action and possible conflicting findings and conclusions by two
tribunals on one and the same claim.

“So, on May 1, 1980, Presidential Decree No. 1691 (which
substantially reenacted Article 217 in its original form) nullified Presidential
Decree No. 1367 and restored to the
Labor Arbiters and the NLRC their jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in
cases arising from employer-employee relations (Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company            of the Philippines v. Martinez, G.R.
No., 58877).”

It is now well settled that money claims of workers provided by
law over which the labor arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction are
comprehensive enough to include claims for moral damages of a dismissed
employee against his employer.  (Vargas v. Akai Phil. Inc., 156 SCRA 531 [1987]).

On the issue whether or not the petitioner is entitled to his
claim for moral damages, we are constrained to decide in the negative.  The case of Primero
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, (156 SCRA 435
[1987]) expounded on this matter, to wit:

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

“The legislative intent appears clear to allow recovery in
proceedings before Labor Arbiters of moral and other forms of damages, in all
cases or matters arising from employer?employee relations.  This would no doubt include, particularly, instances where an employee has been unlawfully
dismissed.  In such a case the Labor
Arbiter has jurisdiction to award to the dismissed employee not only the reliefs specifically provided by labor laws, but also moral
and the forms of damages governed by the Civil Code.  Moral damages would be recoverable, for
example, where the the dismissal
of the employee was not only effected
without authorized cause and/or due process
– for which relief is granted by the Labor Code – but was attended
by bad faith or fraud, or constituted
an act oppressive to labor, or was
done in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy – for
which the obtainable relief is determined
by `the Civil Code (not the Labor Code).  Stated otherwise, if the evidence adduced by
the employee before the Labor Arbiter should establish that the employer did
indeed terminate the employee’s services without just cause
or without according him due process,
the Labor Arbiter’s judgment shall be
for the employer to reinstate the employee
and pay him his back wages, or
exceptionally, for the employee simply to
receive separation pay. 
These are reliefs explicitly prescribed by the
Labor Code.  But any award of moral
damages by the Labor Arbiter obviously cannot be based on the Labor Code but
should be grounded on the Civil Code. 
Such an award cannot be justified solely upon the premise (otherwise
sufficient for redress under the Labor Code) that the employer fired his
employee without just cause or due process. 
Additional facts must be pleaded and
proven to warrant the grant of moral
damages under the Civil Code, these being,
to repeat, that the act of dismissal
was attended by bad faith or fraud,
or was oppressive to labor, or done
in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy; and, of course,
that social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave
anxiety, etc., resulted therefrom.  (pp. 443-444, underlining supplied)

The case of Primero v. IAC
states the distinction between the two seemingly disparate causes of action, to
wit:

“It is clear that the question of the legality of the act of
dismissal is intimately related to the issue of the legality of the manner by
which that act of dismissal was performed.  But while the Labor Code treats of the nature of, and the remedy available as
regards the first – the employee’s separation from employment – it does not at
all deal with the second – the manner of that separation – which is governed
exclusively by the Civil Code.  In
addressing the first issue, the Labor Arbiter applies the Labor Code; in
addressing the second, the Civil Code. 
And this appears to be the plain and patent intendment of the law.  For apart from the reliefs
expressly set out in the Labor Code flowing from illegal dismissal from
employment, no other damages may be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee
other than those specified by the Civil Code. 
Hence, the fact that the issue – of whether or not moral or other damages were suffered by an employee
and in the affirmative, the amount that should properly be awarded to
him in the circumstances – is
determined under the provisions of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code, x x x x x.” (p. 445)

In the case of Guita v. Court
of Appeals (139 SCRA 576 [1985]), we stated that:

“Moral damages may be awarded to compensate one for diverse
injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and
social humiliation.  It is however not
enough that such injuries have arisen; it is essential that they have sprung
from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was the proximate
cause thereof.

`Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury.  Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.’
(Civil Code, Article 2217).

‘In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that in
the `absence of a wrongful act or
omission or of fraud or bad faith,
moral damages cannot be awarded...’ (R
& B Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. IAC, 129 SCRA 736, 743.)” (p. 580)

We do not find any bad faith or fraud on the part of the bank
officials who denied the petitioner’s request for a six months’ leave of
absence without pay.  If the petitioner
was made to believe that his request would be granted, we can not fault the
branch manager or his subsequent replacement for giving their assurances.  They were merely personal assurances which
could be reconsidered on the basis of later developments or upon consultation
with higher authorities and which are not binding.  Certainly, the bank officials who gave their
verbal assurances had only the petitioner’s paramount welfare in their
minds.  There is no evidence to show that
they meant to deceive the petitioner. 
They themselves thought that such a request would be granted.  Unfortunately, company policy had to be
followed.  The fact that the petitioner’s
request for six months’ leave of absence was denied does not ipso facto
entitle him to damages.

As held in the case of Rubio v. Court of
Appeals (141 SCRA 488 [1986]):

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

“In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that in
the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral
damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per
se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to have payment of damages,
for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate.  xxx.”
(p. 516)

It is incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that there was
malice or bad faith on the part of the private respondents in terminating
him.  On the contrary, the records of this
petition show that the private respondent acted in accordance with law before
effecting the dismissal.  The records
also show that there was a prior application with the Ministry of Labor to
terminate the petitioner’s employment.  A
copy of said application was furnished to the petitioner.  The petitioner, however, did not oppose such
application nor did he do anything to preserve his right.

More pertinent is the fact that the petitioner knew as early as May 6, 1976 that he was granted only a
one month study leave (rollo,
p. 98).  He may have asked for a reconsideration but notwithstanding its denial, the
petitioner proceeded with his review. 
Whether or not his request for six months’ leave without pay would be
granted, the petitioner was set on continuing with his review.

Neither can we consider the private respondents’ response to the
petitioner’s query regarding his status as having given him false hopes.  The referral to the personnel department was
merely a part of the formal procedure undertaken by the bank.  Such referral does not show that the bank
acted in a wanton or wilful manner.

In the light of the foregoing, we sustain the Labor Arbiter’s
finding that the petitioner’s claim for damages must be dismissed for lack of
sufficient basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C. J., (Chairman), No part – formerly counsel for Bank of P.I. Cebu.