POLLY CAYETANO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRE­SIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH XXXVIII; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA AND NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, RE…

This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul
the order of the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and allowed the probate of the
last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte
presentation of evidence by herein private respondent.

On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father,
petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita
C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving
heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed
an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of
Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire
estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.

Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a
petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos,
which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her
appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.

In her petition Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American
citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633
Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix
died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her
sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the
testatrix made her last will and testament on July 10, 1975, according
to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New
Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix’ death, her last will and
testament was presented, probated, allowed, and registered with the
Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L.
McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had
declined and waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former,
is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, there is
an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to administer
and eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the
Philippines.

On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was
filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things, that he has
every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the
intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if
pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same
could not apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.

On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty.
Franco Loyola, filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of
Rights or Interests) stating that he “has been able to verify the
veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the
probated will of his daughter Adoracion.” Hence, an ex-parte
presentation of evidence for the reprobate of the questioned will was
made.

On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:

“At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that
Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States
of America with a permanent residence at 4633 Ditman Street,
Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D); that when alive, Adoracion C.
Campos executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to
E-3-b); that while in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C.
Campos died in the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both in
the Philippines and in the United States of America; that the Last Will
and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted
probate by the Orphan’s Court Division of the Court of Carmon Pleas, the
probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in favor
of Clement J. McLaughlin, all in accordance with the laws of the said
foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to
E-10); and that the petitioner is not suffering from any
disqualification which would render her unfit as administratrix of the
estate in the Philippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos.

“WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C.
Canpos is hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and
Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate
of said decedent; let Letters of Administration with the Will annexed
issue in favor of said Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the
amount of P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of Section I, Rule
81 of the Rules of Court.

Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979,
confirming the withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the same to
be his voluntary act and deed.

On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying
that the order allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the
withdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured through fraudulent
means. According to him, the “Motion to Dismiss Opposition” was
inserted among the papers which he signed in connection with two Deeds
of Conditional Sales which he executed with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that
the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the opposition was not his
counsel-of-record in the special proceedings case.

The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to
appear. He made several motions for postponement until the hearing was
set on May 29, 1980.

On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled “Motion to
Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the notice of
hearing provided:

“Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May
29, 1980 at 8:30 in the morning for submission for reconsideration and
resolution of the Honorable Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may I
also request for the future setting of the case for hearing on the
Oppositor’s motion to set aside previously filed.”

The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980.
When the case was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for
petitioner tried to argue his motion to Vacate instead of adducing
evidence in sup port of the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent
judge issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure to
present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent
judge also denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition.

Meanwhile, on June 6, 1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a
will, which, incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his
children and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null and void, and a
fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last
will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute
herself as petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the court
on September 13, 1982.

A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the
petitioner Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the rights of
the respondent and her sisters, I only remaining children and forced
heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.

Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when:

“1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived
the Right to Notice (sic) upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss
opposition with waiver of rights or interests against the estate of
deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for the ex-parte
hearing of the petition for the probate of decedent will.

“2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate
(not made in a public or authenticated instrument, or by way of a
petition presented to the court but by way of a motion presented prior
to an order for the distribution of the estate – the law especially
providing that repudiation of an inheritance must be presented, within
30 days after it has issued an order for the distribution of the estate
in accordance with the rules of Court.

“3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can
be divested by a decree admitting a will to probate in which no
provision is made for the forced heir in complete disregard of Law of
Succession.

“4) He denied petitioner’s petition for Relief on the ground that
no evidence was adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no
Notice nor hearing was set to afford petitioner to prove the merit of
his petition – a denial of the due process and a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

“5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact
that the Testator at the time of death was a usual resident of
Dasmariñas, Cavite, consequently Cavite Court of First Instance has
exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792,
July 1955).”

The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the
allegation that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner’s opposition
to the reprobate of the will.

We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
judge. No proof was adduced to support petitioner’s contention that the
motion to withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and that Atty.
Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that
after the filing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later
date, filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion to
Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the
time the motion was filed, the petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Jose
P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and had been substituted by
Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present
petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man’s attorney of
record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the
withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing
the probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other opposition to
the same.

The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the
will. As a general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only
to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the
testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites
or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will
normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been
duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that
the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang v. Court of
Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).

In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent
judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion’s will, Hermogenes C. Campos
was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.

This contention is without merit.

Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the
petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its
reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently
established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American
citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil which
respectively provide:

Art. 16 par. (2).

xxx    xxx       xxx

“However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.”‘

Art. 1039.

“Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.”

the law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the
parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes
and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete
stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because
it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and
would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16 (2) and 1039 of
the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply, This was
squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRN 358) wherein we ruled:

“It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For
it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent’s national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.

xxx    xxx       xxx

“The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A. and under the law of Texas, there
are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.”

As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for
relief, the records will bear the fact that what was repeatedly
scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the
petitioner’s petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order
of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should have
been led to believe otherwise. The court even admonished the
petitioner’s failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was
repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due process. The
fact that he requested “for the future setting of the case for hearing
xxx” did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would
be heard and given preference in lieu of the petition for relief.
Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and not in a
mere notice of hearing.

Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of
jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the
Rules of Court, it is provided that:

“SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.
-If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the tine of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court
of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record.”

Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was
correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had
an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of
her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United
States of America and not a “usual resident of Cavite” as alleged by the
petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a
settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See
Saulog Transit, Inc. v. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G.R. No. 63284,
April 4, 1984).

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, and De La Fuente, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, (Chairman), J., no part.