FRANCISCO CUIZON, ROSITA CUIZON, PURIFICACION C. GUIDO MARRIED TO TEODORO GUIDO, AND JUAN ARCHE, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST IN…

The sole issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or
not a probate court has jurisdiction over parcels of land already
covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title issued in favor of owners who
are not parties to the intestate proceedings if the said parcels have
been included in the inventory of properties of the estate prepared by
the administrator.

For a clearer understanding of the present case, the background facts
may be appreciated. As far back as 1961, Marciano Cuizon applied for the
registration of several parcels of land located at Opao, Mandaue City
then covered by Certificates of Tax Declaration in Land Registration
Case No. N-179. In 1970, he distributed his property bet­ween his two
children, Rufina and Irene. Part of the property given to Irene
consisted largely of salt beds which eventually became the subject of
this controversy.

On December 29, 1971, Irene Cuizon executed a Deed of Sale with
Reservation of Usufruct involving the said salt beds in favor of the
petitioners Francisco, Rosita and Purificacion, all surnamed Cuizon. At
that time, Francisco and Rosita were minors and assisted by their
mother, Rufina, only sister of Irene. However, the sale was not
registered because the petitioners felt it was unnecessary due to the
lifetime usufructuary rights of Irene.

Although the decision in L.R. Case No. N-179 was rendered way back in
1962, the decree of registration No. N-161246 and the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title No. 0171 was issued only in 1976 in the
name of Marciano Cuizon. In that same year, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 10477 covering the property in question was issued by the
Register of Deeds to Irene Cuizon. The latter died in 1978. In the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate, her alleged half sister and sole
heir Rufina adjudicated to herself all the property of the decedent
including the property in question. After the notice of the
extrajudicial settlement was duly published in a newspaper of general
circulation, Rufina thereafter, executed a deed of Confirmation of Sale
wherein she confirmed and ratified the deed of sale of December 29, 1971
executed by the late Irene and renounced and waived whatever rights,
interest, and participation she may have in the property in question in
favor of the petitioners. The deed was duly registered with the Registry
of Deeds and annotated at the back of TCT No. 10477. Subsequently, TCT
No. 12665 was issued in favor of the petitioners.

On September 28, 1978, a petition for letters of administration was
filed before the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 3864-R)
by respondent Domingo Antigua, allegedly selected by the heirs of Irene
numbering seventeen (17) in all to act as administrator of the estate of
the decedent. The petition was granted.

Respondent Antigua as administrator filed an inventory of the estate of
Irene. He included in the inventory the property in question which was
being administered by Juan Arche, one of the petitioners. On June 27,
1979, respondent Antigua filed a motion asking the court for authority
to sell the salt from the property and praying that petitioner Arche be
ordered to deliver the salt to the administrator. The motion was granted
and respondent court issued the following order:

“The administrator, thru this motion, informs the Court that the
estate owns some beds and fish pond located in Opao, Mandaue City; that
these salt beds are producing salt which are now in the warehouse in
Mandaue City, under the custody of Juan Arche; that the value of the
salt in the warehouse is estimated to be worth P5,000.00 are beginning
to melt and, unless they are sold as soon as possible, they may
depricate in value. It is likewise prayed in this motion that Juan Arche
be ordered to deliver the salt in question to the administ­rator such
other products of the land now in his (Juan Arche) possession.

xxx                                           xxx                                           xxx

“Let this motion be, as it is hereby GRANTED. The administrator is
hereby authorized to sell the salt now in the custody of Juan Arche and
the latter (Juan Arche) is hereby ordered to deliver the salt in
question to the administrator in order to effect the sale thereof and he
is likewise directed to deliver such other products of the land to the
administrator.’

Subsequently, on three different occasions, respondent Segundo Zambo
with the aid of several men, sought to enforce the order of the
respondent court, compelling the petitioners to come to us on
certiorari. On September 14, 1979, we issued a restraining order
enjoining the respondents from enforcing the above order of the
respondent court and from further interfering with the petitioners in
their peaceful possession and cultivation of the property in question.

The thrust of the petitioners’ argument is that the respondent court, as
a court handling only the intestate proceedings, had neither the
authority to adjudicate con­troverted rights nor to divest them of their
possession and ownership of the property in question and hand over the
same to the administrator. Petitioners further contend that the proper
remedy of the respondent administrator is to file a separate civil
action to recover the same.

On the other hand, the respondent administrator banked on the failure of
the petitioners to first apply for relief in the court of origin before
filing the present petition. According to him this was a fatal defect.
In addition, the administrator stated that the deed of sale of December
29, 1971 lost its efficacy upon the rendition of judgment and issuance
of the decree in favor of Irene Cuizon.

It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and
good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate
court cannot do so (Mallari v. Mallari, 92 Phil. 694; Baquial v. Amihan,
92 Phil. 501).

Similarly, in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. C.A., (91 SCRA 540)
we held that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may
pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding
ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran’s Comments on
the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448-9 and 473; Lachenal v.
Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).

In the instant case, the property involved is not only claimed by
outside parties but it was sold seven years before the death of the
decedent and is duly titled in the name of the vendees who are not party
to the proceedings. In Bolisay v. Alcid, (85 SCRA 213), this
Court was confronted with a similar situation. The petitioners therein
sought to annul the order of the respondent court in a special
proceeding which in effect ruled that notwithstanding that the subject
property was duly titled in the name of petitioners, the administratrix
of the intestate estate involved in said proceeding had the right to
collect the rentals of said property over the objection of the titled
owners just because it was included in the inventory of said estate and
there was an ordinary action in the regular court over the ownership
thereof and the estate was one of the parties therein. This Court viewed
the petition as one seeking for a prima facie determination and not a final resolution of the claim of ownership.

We held that:

“xxx Considering that as aforestated the said property is titled
under the Torrens System in the names of the petitioners, it does appear
strange, in the light of the probate court’s own ruling that it has no
jurisdiction to pass on the issue of ownership, that the same court
deemed the same as part of the estate under administration just because
the administratrix, alleges it is still owned by the estate and has in
fact listed it in the inventory submitted by her to the court.

“It does not matter that respondent administratrix has evidence
purporting to support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand,
petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is
endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the
manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include,
bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. In other words, in Our
considered view, the mere inclusion in the inventory submitted by the
administrator of the estate of a deceased person of a given property
does not of itself deprive the probate court of authority to inquire
into the property of such inclusion in case an heir or a third party
claims adverse title thereto. To hold otherwise would render inutile the
power of that court to make a prima facie determination of the
issue of ownership recognized in the above quoted precedents. The
correct rule is that the probate court should resolve the issue before
it provisionally, as basis for its inclusion in or exclusion from the
inventory. It does not even matter that the issue is raised after
approval of the inventory because “ap­parently, it is not necessary that
the inventory and appraisal be approved by the Court.” (Francisco on
the Rules of Court Vol. V-B, p. 99, citing Siy Chong Keng v. Collector
of Internal Revenue, 60 Phil. 494)

“In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold
that if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the
absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder
thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy
until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary
action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the
property itself is in the persons named in the title.”

Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in
the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a
transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties,
the respon­dent court should have denied the motion of the respondent
administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory
of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third
persons of their possession and ownership of the property. Respondent
court was clearly without jurisdiction to issue the order of June 27,
1979. Thus, it was unnecessary for the petitioners to first apply for
relief with the intestate court.

Even assuming the truth of the private respondents’ allegations that the
sale of December 29, 1971 was effected under suspicious circumstances
and tainted with fraud and that the right of Rufina as alleged
half-sister and sole heir of Irene remains open to question, these
issues may only be threshed out in a separate civil action filed by the
respondent administrator against the petitioners and not in the
intestate proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the
respondent court’s order dated June 27, 1979 is hereby set aside and
declared void as issued in excess of its jurisdiction. Our restraining
order enjoining the enforcement of the June 27, 1979 order and the
respondents from further interfering, through the intestate proceedings,
in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land in question by
the petitioners is hereby made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.