DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PETITIONER, VS. IGLESIA NI KRISTO AND HON. DOMIN­GO D. PANIS, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBALES AND OLONGA­PO, BR. III, RESPONDENTS.

Application of the
doctrine laid down in 1986 in Director of Lands v. I.A.C.^[1] is all that is necessary to resolve the
issue presented in the appeal at bar.

The petitioner takes no
issue with the factual findings of the Registration Court.  In
its petition,^[2] it makes the following recitation of the
relevant facts, viz.:

“Respondent Iglesia ni Kristo filed an application
for the registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land, with an
area of 280 sq. meters, situated at Barrio Consuelo Sur,
Municipality of San Marcelino, Province
of Zambales.  The application ** was docketed in the Court
of First Instance of Zambales & Olongapo, Branch III (presided by respondent Judge) as LRC
No. N-187-O.

Petitioner (Republic) opposed the application on the ground that
the ** Iglesia ni Kristo is a private corporation, and that under Art.  XIV, sec. 11, of the Constitution, private
corporations cannot acquire lands of the public domain but can only hold them by lease in an area not
exceeding 1,000 hectares.  ** It appears
that the applicant acquired the property in question from Gregorio Rolls and Romualdo Rolls (both of San Marcelino,
Zambales) on May 23, 1946, as shown by the Deed of Sale (Exhibit
‘I’).  After acquiring the land,
applicant had it declared for taxation purposes.  ** ** The latest tax declaration of this same
parcel of land starts with the year 1974 as per Tax Dec. No. 4763 **.  The land is exempt from payment of Realty Tax,
being devoted primarily for religious purposes (Exhibit N).

Without passing upon the
Government’s contention that respondent Iglesia ni Kristo was disqualified from
acquiring the land in question, the trial court rendered judgment on June 2,
1980 decreeing the
registration of the land in the name of the respondent (Iglesia).  The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered registering and confirming
the title of the applicant, Iglesia ni Kristo with its Executive
Minister Eraño G. Manalo as
corporation sole with office and postal address at corner of Central and Don
Mariano Marcos Avenues, Diliman, Quezon
City, over the parcel of land situated at Barrio Consuelo Sur,
Municipality of San Marcelino, Province of Zambales, with an area of 280 sq. m. covered by Plan
PSU-03-000947.  (Exhibit ‘F’).

SO ORDERED.”

(N.B.  The decision
also makes the finding that since acquiring the land, the Iglesia
ni Kristo “has been in
open, public, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession in the concept of an
owner thereof to the present time,” having in fact “put up a chapel
made of concrete materials and galvanized iron for its roofing;” and that
the “land is not also within any military or naval reservation.”)

It is this decision of June 2,
1980 that is subject
of the Government’s petition for review on certiorari at bar.

The petition will have to
be denied, in accordance with the judgment of this Court en banc
in Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court handed
down on December 29, 1986,^[3] involving
substantially similar facts.  That
judgment reconsidered and declared “no longer …. binding
precedent,” Manila Electric Company v. Castro-Bartolome, et al., promulgated on June 29, 1982,^[4] and instead adopted the dissenting opinion
therein^[5] (based on a line of cases beginning with Carino v. Insular Government in 1909^[6] thru Susi
v. Razon
in 1925^[7] down to Herico
v. Dar in 1980.^[8]

In that case, Director
of Lands v. I.A.C., a private
corporation, Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. purchased a tract of
land in 1962 from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, two members of the Dumagat
tribe, but applied with the Court for registration of its title over the land
under the Torrens Act only in July, 1981, long after the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution — which inter
alia
prohibits private corporations from holding alienable lands of the
public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not
found in the 1935 Constitution, in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the land
in question).  There being no question
that Acme and its predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied the land
for more than the required 30-year period prescribed in Section 48 of the
Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended),^[9]
the question presented to the Court en
banc was whether or
not the title that Acme had acquired in 1962 could be confirmed in its favor in
proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in
effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations
holdings lands of the public domain. 
That question the Court en
banc answered in this
wise:

” ** (The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or
other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.  **

” ** ** **

“Herico (supra), in
particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:

‘ *** Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942,
which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner’s case,
with the latter’s proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years
since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the
lands has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of
public land.  Thereafter, it is no
longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent.  * * * .

‘As interpreted in several
cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued.  The
land, therefore, ceased to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of
the Director of Lands to dispose of.  The
application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent
and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.

“Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical
inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the
character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express
grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 (b) of
C.A. No. 141) that the possessor(s) ‘ * * shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title * * .’ No proof being admissible to overcome
a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth, be little
more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the
possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested. 
The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to
private land, but only confirm such a conversion already effected by operation
of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. 
As was so well put in Cariño, ‘ * * (T)here
are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.  The effect of the proof, wherever made, was
not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law.’

” ** ** **

” ** The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation
proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids
corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right
already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions
then perfectly valid and proper.  This
Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution
cannot impair vested rights.”

The substantial identity
of the facts and issues between the case at bar and Director of Lands
v. I.A.C. being undeniable, and being cited to no
persuasive reason to decline to apply the doctrine in the latter to the former,
the Court, as aforesaid, has no alternative except to rule adversely to the
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of
the respondent Court dated June 2, 1980 in LRC No. N-187-0 entitled, “Iglesia ni Kristo, etc. v. Director of Lands, et al.,” is AFFIRMED. 
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino,
and Medialdea,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
146 SCRA 509, 521-522, citing Ayog v. Cusi, 118 SCRA 492

^[2]
At pp. 17, 19-21, 27

^[3]
146 SCRA 509

^[4]
114 SCRA 799

^[5]
per Teehankee, J. (later
Chief Justice of the Court) (at pp. 524-530)

^[6]
41 Phil. 935, 944

^[7]
48 Phil. 424

^[8]
95 SCRA 437

^[9]
The section pertinently reads:  “The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:  * * (b) Those
who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.  These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.”