A.M. No. MTJ-89-300. August 16, 1991
HERMAN REY. SANTOS, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE EDMUNDO M. ISIDRO, RESPONDENT.
PER CURIAM:
The Court has before it a verified letter-complaint dated 31 May
1989[1]
filed by complainant Herman Rey. Santos, charging
respondent Judge Edmundo M. Isidro, Municipal Trial
Court (“MTC”), Plaridel, Bulacan, with neglect of duty, grave abuse of power and gross
ignorance of the law.
On 20 February 1988, complainant filed before the Barangay Captain
of Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan a complaint against therein defendant Exequiel Garcia for reimbursement of expenses incurred by
complainant in his capacity as administrator of Garcia’s mango orchard arising
from several cases involving said land.
After several hearings, the parties executed an amicable settlement or
compromise agreement, dated 30 April 1988, entitled “KASUNDUAN SA
PAGBABAYAD”[2]
which provided:
“1. Na si G. Herman Rey. Santos ay naghain ng Sumbong sa
Tanggapan ng Kapitan ng Barangay
dito sa Parulan,
Plaridel, Bulacan, laban kay G. Exequiel
P. Garcia, hinggil sa pagbabayad ng
mga gugol sa mga asuntong
kinasnungan ng nagsumbong at ng mga kasama ukol
sa pangangalaga at pangangasiwa sa lupang manggahan ni G. Garcia na may 18 asuntong lahat.
x x
x x
x x x x
x
3. Na noong magharap ang magkabilang
panig sa Tanggapan ng Barangay
ay nangako si G. Exequiel P. Garcia na kanyang babayaran ang lahat ng
gugol at paluwal ni G. Santos para sa mga asuntong
nabanggit, at sa mga gugugulin
pa ng mga asunto, hanggang saan man ito humantong. Ito ay ginawa sa paghaharap noong
Marso 9, 1988.
x x
x x
x x x x
x
5. Muli itong itinakda ngayong ika-30 ng Abril, 1988, at upang bigyang-linaw ang pangakong pagbabayad ng gugol sa
mga asunto, ang magkabilang panig ay nagkasundong mag-ayos sa mga
sumusunod na tuntunin:
(a)
Na si Exequiel P. Garcia ay magbabayad ng halagang DALAWAMPU’T LIMANG
LIBONG PISO (P25,000.00), salaping Pilipino, sa kay G. Herman Rey. Santos para sa mga
ginugol at ipinaluwal nito sa mga
asunto.
(b)
Ang halagang ito ay babayaran ni Exequiel
P. Garcia sa o bago dumating ang Hunyo
15, 1988, at ilalagak sa kay G. Quintin Ignacio na kagawad ng
Barangay.
x x
x x
x x x x
x
Ten (10) days from the date of its execution passed and neither
of the parties repudiated or sought to repudiate the settlement agreement.
Garcia failed to pay his obligation under the amicable settlement
and hence complainant filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Plaridel, Bulacan a motion for
issuance of writ of execution.[3]
Respondent Judge thereupon issued an Order dated 5 August 1988[4]
enjoining both parties to comply with the terms of the amicable settlement.
Since Garcia failed to comply with the 5 August 1988 Order, complainant filed on 15 September 1988 a motion to enforce
writ of execution[5]
praying that the court issue an
order directing the provincial sheriff of Bulacan to
enforce the 5 August 1988
Order. The MTC, finding the motion to be
well-taken, granted it. On 7 November 1988, a writ of execution
was thereupon issued.[6]
A Notice of Garnishment addressed to the Sandigan
Savings and Loan Bank Inc. was also issued.
On 15 December 1988, Atty. Maniquis,
counsel for Garcia, filed an undated and unverified motion[7]
before the MTC praying for the setting aside of the Order dated 5 August 1988
and the recall of the writ of execution on the ground that the court was
“misled” into issuing said Order.
Garcia alleged that the amicable settlement may not be executed because,
contrary to what was stipulated in the amicable settlement, only six (6), not
eighteen (18), cases had been filed and that Garcia’s obligation under the
amicable settlement had been fully satisfied because he had already delivered
to complainant 300 cavans of palay
as payment for said obligation.
Complainant filed his Opposition on 21 December 1988.[8]
He alleged, among others, that Garcia’s motion, not having being duly verified,
was a mere scrap of paper; that since the amicable settlement had already
acquired the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, it was the
ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of execution. Complainant also denied having received 300 cavans of palay from Garcia as
payment of the latter’s obligation.
However, one day before complainant’s Opposition was filed, or on
20 December 1988, an Order[9]
was issued by respondent judge temporarily setting aside the 5 August 1988 Order and recalling the
writ of execution. This Order also
commanded the parties to appear in court for a conference. Complainant called the attention of the court
to his Opposition (to Garcia’s motion) which had not been taken into
consideration. On 26 January 1989, respondent Judge issued an Order[10]
stating that since the opposition had been filed after the order suspending the
execution had been issued, the opposition had been rendered moot and academic
and that in any case the court would not hesitate to discard technicalities if
it strongly believed that an injustice had been committed.
After the instant complaint was filed before the Supreme Court,
complainant filed before the MTC a Manifestation, dated 21 August 1989[11]
praying that the Municipal Court reinstate the writ of execution or issue an
alias writ of execution. In an Order
dated 24 October 1989[12]
respondent Judge ordered the issuance of an alias writ of execution. On the same day, the alias writ of execution[13]
was issued. Two parcels of land were
then levied upon and scheduled for auction sale.
Garcia, through Atty. Maniquis, filed
another unverified motion[14]
praying that the alias writ of execution dated 24 October 1989 be recalled and the deputy sheriff be
restrained from conducting the sale. In
an Order dated 1 March 1990[15]
respondent Judge once more recalled the writ of execution and set the case for
oral argument. On the date set for oral
argument, complainant filed a ManifestaÂtion[16]
alleging that recall of the writ of execution for a second time invited
suspicion as to possible motives of respondent Judge and that the Order
recalling the writ amounted to dereliction of respondent Judge’s duty to
enforce execution of the amicable settlement.
By that time another judge, the Hon. Nestor S. Duran, had been
designated to take over the case. Judge
Duran issued an Order dated 22 May
1990[17]
finding the writ of execution, as well as the alias writ of execution dated 7 November 1988 and 24 October 1989, respectively, to be
valid and enforceable.
This Court required respondent Judge to comment on the sworn
complaint. In his Comment,[18]
respondent Judge expressed his apprehension over the implementation of P.D.
1508 because he believed that the barangay
conciliators/arbitrators mandated to implement said law could not be expected
to understand fully the ramifications of said law on account of their “low
education;” and that the courts of law are in a better position to
ascertain the facts surrounding amicable settlements executed under P.D. No.
1508.
In a Resolution dated 22
January 1991,[19]
the Court referred this case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Malolos, Bulacan for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On 17 April 1991,
Executive Judge Natividad Dizon
issued an Order[20]
notifying the parties of the
commencement of the formal investigation.
On 30 April 1991,
respondent Judge filed a Manifestation[21]
stating that he deemed it unnecessary
to present further evidence in his defense and would submit the case for
decision on the basis of the Comment he had filed in the Supreme Court pursuant
to its Resolution dated 19 July 1990. He admitted that he had deviated from the
regular procedure, not because of incompetence or ignorance of the law but out
of a desire to settle the matter amicably.
He further stated that at the time the present complaint was filed
against him, he had already voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing
the case.
On 6 May 1991,
complainant filed a Manifestation and Comment to respondent Judge’s
manifestation.[22]
Complainant countered that respondent’s Manifestation was absurd considering
that the case had precisely already been amicably settled at the barangay level; and that at the time respondent Judge
inhibited himself from further hearing the case sometime in March 1990, the
instant administrative complaint had already been taken cognizance of by the
Supreme Court.
In his Report and Recommendation,[23]
the Executive Judge held that respondent Judge should not have suspended
execution of the amicable settlement agreement on the basis of the unverified
motion filed by Atty. Maniquis. That motion being insufficient in form and
substance, should have been denied forthwith.
The Executive Judge found no merit in respondent Judge’s contention that
he had merely wanted to mediate between the parties in order to effect an
amicable settlement. He observed that respondent
Judge had shown unusual interest in this case to the point that he failed to discharge his ministerial duty to
enforce the amicable settlement, which failure
had inevitably “opened him [respondent Judge] up to public suspicion.” In the view of the Executive
Judge, respondent Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when he twice ordered recall of the writ of execution.
We agree with the conclusion of the Investigating Executive
Judge. Under Section 11 of P.D. No.
1508, the amicable settlement here had “the force and effect of a final
judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from the date
thereof,” no repudiation of that settlement having been made during that
period. It was, therefore, the clear
ministerial duty of respondent Judge to implement and enforce the amicable
settlement agreement.[24]
Enforcement of writ of execution may, of course, be suspended in certain
exceptional circumstances. In PhilipÂpine
Veterans Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[25]
the Court held:
“The rule that once a decision has become final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to order
its execution, admits of certain exceptions as in cases of special and
exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of
justice to direct the suspension of its execution; or whenever it is necessary
to accomplish the aims of justice; or when certain facts and circumstances
transpired after the judgment became final which would render the
execution of the judgment unjust.” (UnderÂscoring supplied)
In the instant case, no exceptional
circumstance existed. Respondent Judge’s
contention that he had suspended execution of the amicable settlement because
he merely wanted to mediate between the parties, is completely devoid of merit
and quite incomprehensible for the parties had already amicably settled their
case on the barangay level, which settlement had
resulted in the preparation and execution of the amicable settlement agreement.
Respondent Judge’s other reason for recalling the writ of
execution was that he harbored apprehensions concerning implementation of P.D.
No. 1508 because he believed that the barangay
conciliators and arbitrators did not fully understand that statute and that
courts are in a better position to ascertain the facts concerning amicable
settlement than the barangay officials. We find such “apprehensions”
presumptuous on the one hand, and incomprehensible on the other. Respondent Judge’s legal duty was to enforce
the amicable settlement agreement. What
he was doing was in fact to allow one of the parties to re-open the agreement
and litigate the underlying dispute which had in fact been terminated by the
conclusion of the compromise agreement.
In Abelardo Cruz v. Judge Jaime N. Nicolas,[26] this Court said:
“From the foregoing, it is clear to this Court that respondent
judge was remiss in the performance of his duties in entertaining the Motion to
Quash Alias Writ of Execution which the defendants in the original ejectment case filed on 11 August 1987, long after the
decision of the MTC on 3 September 1984 ordering defendants to vacate the
premises involved had been reinstated by the Court of Appeals and had become
final and executory.
Respondent judge should have known that questions like those raised by
the defendants in their Motion to Quash Alias Writ of Execution were totally
inappropriate and unwarranted at that stage.
Respondent judge’s acts seemed almost designed to re-open the MTC judgment
that had become final by inviting defendants to submit any pleading they wished
to support their Motion to Quash Alias Writ and thereafter requiring both
parties to submit Memoranda on the Motion and Supplemental Motion to Quash
Alias Writ. Upon the finality of the decision of the MTC, respondent judge
lost all jurisdiction in respect of the case, save only to enforce that
decision. This is elementary, so
elementary that not to know it, or to act as if he did not know it, constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.
x x
x x
x x x
x x
The party which prevails after going through the full course of
litigation is entitled to a writ of execution and to the energetic service and
enforcement thereof upon the losing party.
To impose oppressive delays upon the issuance, service and enforcement
of a writ of execution is unjustly to deprive the prevailing party of the
fruits of his labor before the courts and can only bring black suspicion and
disrepute upon the judge, the court and the judicial process generally. Respondent judge cannot be allowed to pass on
the blame to the deputy sheriffs who were officers of his court and subject to
his orders and control.”
Respondent Judge totally disregarded his ministerial duty to
enforce the amicable settlement agreement by execution. We agree with the Investigating Executive
Judge that respondent Judge was guilty of ignorance of the law and dereliction
of duty and misconduct in the carrying out of his duties.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to IMPOSE a fine of
P10,000.00 upon respondent Judge with a
warning that commission of the same or similar acts in the future
will result in imposition of a harsher penalty.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 1-13.
[2]
Annex “A” of the Complaint, Rollo,
p. 16.
[3]
Annex “B” of the Complaint, Rollo,
pp. 17-19.
[4]
Annex “D” of the Complaint, Rollo,
pp. 21-22.
[5]
Annex “E” of the Complaint, Rollo,
pp. 23-24.
[6]
Annex “F-1” of the Complaint, Rollo,
p. 26.
[7]
Annex “H” of the Complaint, Rollo,
pp. 28-29.
[8]
Annex “I” of the Complaint, Rollo,
pp. 30-32.
[9]
Annex “J” of the Complaint, Rollo,
p. 33.
[10]
Annex “K” of the Complaint, Rollo,
p. 34.
[11]
Annex “L” of the Complaint, Rollo,
pp. 36-38.
[12]
Annex “M” of the Complaint, Rollo, p 59.
[13]
Annex “M-1” of the Complaint, Rollo,
p. 60.
[14]
Annex “P” of the Complaint, Rollo, pp. 63-65.
[15]
Annex “Q” of the Complaint, Rollo,
p. 66.
[16]
Annex “R” of the Complaint, Rollo,
pp. 67-70.
[17]
Rollo, p. 72.
[18]
Id., pp. 80-85.
[19]
Id.,
p. 135.
[20]
Id., p. 137.
[21]
Id., pp. 142-143.
[22]
Id., pp. 144-148.
[23]
Id., pp. 149-152.
[24]
Church Assistance Program, Inc. v. Subido, 171
SCRA 408 (1989); Esquivel v. Alegre, 172 SCRA
315 (1989); Estoesta, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,
179 SCRA 203 (1989).
[25]
178 SCRA 645 (1989).
[26]
A.M. No. MTJ-89-286, promulgated 5
March 1991.