G.R. No. 54135. November 21, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. POLICARPIO RAFANAN, JR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
FELICIANO, J.:
Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan convicting him of the
crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua to
indemnify complainant Estelita Ronaya in the amount of P10,000.00 by way of
moral damages, and to pay the costs.
The facts were summarized by the trial court in the following manner:
“The prosecution’s evidence shows that on February 27, 1976,
complainant Estelita Ronaya who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a
househelper by the mother of the accused, Ines Rafanan alias ‘Baket Ines’ with
a salary of P30.00 a month.
The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother
in the same house at Barangay San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was then married and had two
children.
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya
was sent by the mother of the accused to help in their store which was located
in front of their house about six (6) meters away. Attending to the store at the time was the accused. At 11:00 o’clock in the evening, the accused
called the complainant to help him close the door of the store and as the
latter complied and went near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside
the store and said, ‘Come, let us have sexual intercourse,’ to which Estelita
replied, ‘I do not like,’ and struggled to free herself and cried. The accused
held a bolo measuring 1-1/2 feet including the handle which he pointed to the
throat of the complainant threatening her with said bolo should she
resist. Then, he forced her to lie down
on a bamboo bed, removed her pants and after unfastening the zipper of his own
pants, went on top of the complainant and succeeded having carnal knowledge of
her inspite of her resistance and struggle. After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not
to report the matter to her mother or to anybody in the house, otherwise he
would kill her.
Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately report the
matter and did not leave the house of the accused that same evening. In fact,
she slept in the house of the accused that evening and the following morning
she scrubbed the floor and did her daily routine work in the house. She only left the house in the evening of
March 17, 1976.
Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused
learned what happened the night before in the store between Policarpio and
Estelita and a quarrel ensued among them prompting Estelita Ronaya to go back
to her house. When Estelita’s mother
confronted her and asked her why she went home that evening, the complainant
could not answer but cried and cried. It was only the following morning on March 18, 1976 that the complainant
told her mother that she was raped by the accused. Upon knowing what happened to her daughter, the mother Alejandra
Ronaya, immediately accompanied her to the house of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina
of the Villasis Police Force who lives in Barrio San Nicolas, Villasis,
Pangasinan. Patrolman Mairina is a
cousin of the father of the complainant. He advised them to proceed to the municipal building while he went to
fetch the accused. The accused was
later brought to the police headquarter with the bolo, Exhibit ‘E’, which the
accused allegedly used in threatening the complainant.”[1]
At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial and in due
course of time, the trial court, as already noted, convicted the appellant.
The instant appeal is anchored on the following
“Assignment
of Errors
1. The lower court erred in basing its decision
of conviction of appellant solely on the testimony of the complainant and her
mother.
2. The lower court erred in considering the
hearsay evidence for the prosecution, ‘Exhibits B and C’.
3. The lower court erred in not believing the
testimony of the expert witnesses, as to the mental condition of the
accused-appellant at the time of the alleged commission of the crime of rape.
4. The lower court erred in convicting
appellant who at the time of the alleged rape was suffering from
insanity.”[2]
Appellant first assails the credibility of complainant as well as
of her mother whose testimonies he contends are contradictory. It is
claimed by appellant that the testimony of complainant on direct examination
that she immediately went home
after the rape incident, is at variance with her testimony on cross examination
to the effect that she had stayed in the house of appellant until the following
day. Complainant, in saying that she
left the house of appellant by herself, is also alleged to have contradicted
her mother who stated that she (the mother) went to the store in the evening of
17 March 1979 and brought Estelita home.
The apparently inconsistent statements made by complainant were
clarified by her on cross examination. In any case, the inconsistencies related to minor and inconsequential
details which do not touch upon the manner in which the crime had been
committed and therefore did not in any way impair the credibility of the
complainant.[3]
The commission of the crime was not seriously disputed by
appellant. The testimony of complainant
in this respect is clear and convincing:
“Fiscal Guillermo:
Q: Now,
we go back to that time when according to you the accused pulled you from the
door and brought you inside the store after you helped him closed the
store. Now, after the accused pulled
you from the door and brought you inside the store what happened then?
A: ‘You
come and we will have sexual intercourse,’ he said.
Q: And
what did you say?
A: ‘I
do not like,’ I said.
Q: And
what did you do, if any, when you said you do not like to have sexual
intercourse with him?
A: I
struggled and cried.
Q: What
did the accused do after that?
A: He
got a knife and pointed it at my throat so I was frightened and he could do
what he wanted to do. He was able to do
what he wanted to do.
Q: This
‘kutsilyo’ you were referring to or knife, how big is that knife? Will you please demonstrate, if any?
A: This
length, sir. (Which parties agreed to
be about one and one-half [1-1/2] feet long.)
x x x x x x x x x
Fiscal Guillermo:
Q: Now,
you said that the accused was able to have sexual intercourse with you after he
placed the bolo or that knife [at] your throat. Now, will you please tell the court what did the accused do
immediately after placing that bolo at your throat and before having sexual
intercourse with you?
A: He
had sexual intercourse with me.
Q: What
was your wearing apparel that
evening?
A: I
was wearing pants, sir.
Q: Aside
from the pants, do you have any underwear?
A Yes,
sir, I have a panty.
Q: Now,
before the accused have sexual intercourse with you what, if any, did he do
with respect to your pants and your panty?
A: He
removed them, sir.
Q: Now,
while he was removing your pants and your panty what, if any, did you do?
A: I
continued to struggle so that he could not remove my pants but he was stronger
that’s why he succeeded.
Q: Now,
after he had removed your panty and your pants or pantsuit what else happened?
A: He
went on top of me, sir.
Q: At
the time what was the accused wearing by
way of apparel?
A: He
was wearing pants.
Q: When
you said he went on top of you after he has removed your pantsuit and your
panty, was he still wearing his pants?
A: He
unbuttoned his pants and unfastened the zipper of his pants.
Q: And
after he unbuttoned and unfastened his pants what did you see which he opened?
A: I
saw his penis.
Q: Now,
you said that after the accused has unzipped his pants and brought out his
penis which you saw, he went on top of you. When he was already on top of you what did you do, if any?
A: I
struggled.
Q: Now,
you said that you struggled. What
happened then when you struggled against the accused when he was on top of you?
A: Since
he was stronger, he succeeded doing what he wanted to get.
x x x x x x x x x
COURT:
Alright, what do you
mean by he was able to succeed in getting what he wanted to get?
Fiscal
Guillermo:
Considering the
condition of the witness, your honor, with tears, may we just be allowed to ask
a leading question which is a follow-up question?
Witness:
A: He
inserted his private part inside my vagina.
Fiscal Guillermo:
Q: Now,
when he inserted his private parts inside your vagina what did you feel, if any?
A: I
felt something that came out from his inside.
Q: Now,
how long, if you remember, did the accused have his penis inside your vagina?
A: Around
five (5) minutes maybe, sir.
Q: After
that what happened then?
A: He
removed it.
Q: After
the accused has removed his penis from your vagina what else happened?
A: No
more, sir, he sat down.
Q: What,
if any, did he tell you?
A: There
was, sir. He told me not to report the
matter to my mother and to
anybody in their house.
Q: What
else did he tell you?
A: He
told me that if I told anyone what happened, he will kill me.
Q: After
that where did you go?
A: I
went home already, sir.”[4]
The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering
from a mental aberration characterized as schizophrenia when he inflicted his
violent intentions upon Estelita. At
the urging of his counsel, the trial court suspended the trial and ordered
appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for
observation and treatment. In the
meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed
there until 26 June 1978.
During his confinement, the hospital prepared four (4) clinical
reports on the mental and physical condition of the appellant, all signed by Dr. Simplicio N. Masikip and Dr. Arturo E. Nerit, physician-in-charge
and chief, Forensic Psychiatry Service, respectively.
In the first report dated 27 January 1977, the following
observations concerning appellant’s mental condition were set forth:
“On admission he was sluggish in movements, indifferent to
interview, would just look up whenever questioned but refused to answer.
On subsequent examinations and observations he was carelessly
attired, with dishevelled hair, would stare vacuously through the window, or
look at people around him. He was
indifferent and when questioned, he would just smile inappropriately. He refused to verbalize, even when
persuaded, and was emotionally dull and mentally inaccessible. He is generally seclusive, at times would
pace the floor, seemingly in deep thought. Later on when questioned his frequent answers are ‘Aywan ko, hindi ko
alam.’ His affect is dull, he claimed to hear strange voices ‘parang ibon,
tinig ng ibon,’ but cannot elaborate. He is disoriented to 3 spheres and has no idea why he was brought
here.”
The report then concluded:
“In view of the foregoing examinations and observations,
Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is found suffering from a mental disorder
called schizophrenia, manifested by carelessness in grooming, sluggishness in
movements, staring vacuously, indifferen[ce], smiling inappropriately, refusal
to verbalize, emotional dullness, mental inaccessibility, seclusiveness,
preoccupation, disorientation, and perceptual aberrations of hearing strange
sounds. He is psychotic or insane,
hence cannot stand court trial. He
needs further hospitalization and treatment.”[5]
The second report, dated 21 June 1977, contained the following
description of appellant’s mental condition:
“At present he is still seclusive, undertalkative and retarded
in his responses. There is dullness of
his affect and he appeared preoccupied. He is observed to mumble alone by himself and would show periods of
being irritable saying – ‘oki naman’ with nobody in particular. He claim he does not know whether or not he
was placed in jail and does not know if he has a case in court. Said he does not remember having committed
any wrong act”
and the following conclusions:
“In view of the foregoing examinations and observations
Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is at present time still psychotic or insane,
manifested by periods of irritability – cursing nobody in particular,
seclusive, underactive, undertalkative, retarded in his responses, dullness of
his affect, mumbles alone by himself, preoccupied and lack of insight.
He is not yet in a condition to stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and
treatment.”[6]
In the third report, dated 5 October 1977, appellant was
described as having become “better behaved, responsive” and
“neat in person,” and “adequate in his emotional tone, in touch
with his surroundings and x x x free from hallucinatory experiences.”
During the preceding period, appellant had been allowed to leave the hospital
temporarily; he stayed with a relative in Manila while coming periodically to
the hospital for check-ups. During this
period, he was said to have been helpful in the doing of household chores,
conversed and associated freely with other members of the household and slept
well, although, occasionally, appellant smiled while alone. Appellant complained that at times he heard
voices of small children, talking in a language
he could not understand. The report
concluded by saying that while appellant had improved in his mental condition,
he was not yet in a position to stand trial since he needed further treatment,
medication and check-ups.[7]
In the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as
behaved, helpful in household chores and no longer talking while alone. He was said to be “fairly groomed”
and “oriented” and as denying having hallucinations. The report concluded that he was in a
“much improved condition” and “in a mental condition to stand
court trial.”[8]
Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who suggested that
appellant was sick one or two years before his admission into the hospital, in
effect implying that appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia when he
raped complainant.[9]
The defense next presented Dr. Raquel Jovellano, a psychiatrist engaged in
private practice, who testified that he had examined and treated the appellant.
Appellant’s plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides:
“Art. 12. Circumstances
which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the
latter has acted during a lucid interval.
Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which
the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his
confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the
permission of the same court.
x x x x x x x x x.”
Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the
insanity defense, it was only in People vs. Formigones[10]
that the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity, quoting
extensively from the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the Revised
Penal Code, thus:
“The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this
exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be
a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that
the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility
for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment;
(Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur. Crim.
413.) that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, (Decision of
the Supreme Court of Spain of April 29, 1916; 96 Jur. Crim. 239) or that
there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
April 9, 1872; 6 Jur. Crim. 239) For this reason, it was held that the imbecility
or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive
a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his
mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 20, 1911; 86
Jur. Crim. 94, 97.)
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot
be [equated with] imbecility or insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly
proved. Without positive evidence that
the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few
moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed
that he was in a normal condition. Acts
penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to
conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from
liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and
absence of will are proved.” (Underscoring supplied.)
The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted
in subsequent cases.[11] A
linguistic or grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones
established two (2) distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition — “complete deprivation of intelligence
in committing the [criminal] act,” and (b) the test of volition —
“or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will.” But
our caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition rather than on a
test relating to “freedom of the will;” examination of our caselaw
has failed to turn up any case where this Court has exempted an accused on the sole
ground that he was totally deprived of “freedom of the will,” i.e.,
without an accompanying “complete deprivation of intelligence.” This
is perhaps to be expected since a person’s volition naturally reaches out only
towards that which is presented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that
intelligence be diseased or healthy. In
any case, where the accused failed to show complete impairment or loss of
intelligence, the Court has recognized at most a mitigating, not an exempting,
circumstance in accord with Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code: “Such illness of the offender as would
diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however
depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.”[12]
Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a
chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between
fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is said to be the most common form of
psychosis and usually develops between the ages 15 and 30.[13]
A standard textbook in psychiatry describes some of the symptoms of
schizophrenia in the following manner:
“Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms
of schizophrenia: a disturbance of
association, a disturbance of affect, and a disturbance of activity. Bleuler also stressed the dereistic attitude
of the schizophrenic — that is, his detachment from reality and his consequent
autism and the ambivalence that expresses itself in his uncertain effectivity
and initiative. Thus, Bleuler’s system
of schizophrenia is often referred to as the four A’s: association, affect, autism, and
ambivalence.
x x x x x x x x x
Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of
schizophrenia that he considered in no way specific for the disease but of
great pragmatic value in making a diagnosis. Schneider’s first-rank symptoms include the hearing of one’s thoughts
spoken aloud, auditory hallucinations that comment on the patient’s behavior,
somatic hallucinations, the experience of having one’s thoughts controlled, the
spreading of one’s thoughts to others, delusions, and the experience of having
one’s actions controlled or influenced from the outside.
Schizophrenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed
exclusively on the basis of second-rank symptoms, along with an otherwise
typical clinical appearances. Second-rank symptoms include other forms of hallucination, perplexity,
depressive and euphoric disorders of affect, and emotional blunting.
Perceptual Disorders
Various perceptual disorders occur in schizophrenia x x x.
Hallucinations. Sensory experiences or perceptions without corresponding external
stimuli are common symptoms of schizophrenia. Most common are auditory hallucinations, or the hearing of voices. Most characteristically, two or more voices talk about the patient, discussing him
in the third person. Frequently, the
voices address the patient, comment on what he is doing and what is going on
around him, or are threatening or obscene and very disturbing to the
patient. Many schizophrenic patients
experience the hearing of their own thoughts. When they are reading silently, for example, they may be quite disturbed
by hearing every word they are reading clearly spoken to them.
Visual hallucinations occur less frequently than auditory
hallucinations in schizophrenic patients, but they are not rare. Patients suffering from organic or affective
psychoses experience visual hallucinations primarily at night or during limited
periods of the day, but schizophrenic patients hallucinate as much during the
day as they do during the night, sometimes almost continuously. They get relief only in sleep. When visual hallucinations occur in
schizophrenia, they are usually seen nearby, clearly defined, in color, life
size, in three dimensions, and moving. Visual hallucinations almost never occur by themselves but always in
combination with hallucinations in one of the other sensory modalities.
x x x x x x x x x
Cognitive Disorders
Delusions. By
definition, delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected by reasoning,
and that are idiosyncratic for the patient — that is, not part of his cultural
environment. They are among the common
symptoms of schizophrenia.
Most frequent are delusions of persecution, which are the key
symptom in the paranoid type of schizophrenia. The conviction of being controlled by some unseen mysterious power that
exercises its influence from a distance is almost pathognomonic for
schizophrenia. It occurs in most, if
not all, schizophrenics at one time or another, and for many it is a daily
experience. The modern schizophrenic
whose delusions have kept up with the scientific times may be preoccupied with
atomic power, X-rays, or spaceships that take control over his mind and
body. Also typical for many
schizophrenics are delusional fantasies about the destruction of the
world.”[14]
In previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting circumstance,[15]
it has mostly been rejected by the Court. In each of these cases, the evidence presented tended to show that if
there was impairment of the mental faculties, such impairment was not so
complete as to deprive the
accused of intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.
The facts of the instant case exhibit much the same
situation. Dr. Jovellano declared as
follows:
“(Fiscal Guillermo:)
Q: Now,
this condition of the accused schizophrenic as you found him, would you say
doctor that he was completely devoid of any consciousness of whatever he did in
connection with the incident in this case?
A: He
is not completely devoid of consciousness.
Q: Would
you say doctor, therefore, that he was conscious of threatening the
victim at the time of the commission of the alleged rape?
A: Yes,
he was conscious.
Q: And
he was conscious of forcing the victim to lie down?
A: Yes.
Q: And
he was also conscious of removing the panty of the victim at the time?
A: Yes.
Q: And
he was also conscious and knows that the victim has a vagina upon which he
will place his penis?
A: Yeah.
Q: And
he was conscious enough to be competent and have an erection?
A: Yes.
Q: Would
you say that those acts of a person no matter whether he is
schizophrenic which you said, it deals (sic) some kind of intelligence and
consciousness of some acts that is committed?
A: Yes,
it involves the consciousness because the consciousness there in relation to
the act is what we call primitive acts of any individual. The difference only in the act of an insane
and a normal individual, a normal individual will use the power of reasoning
and consciousness within the standard of society while an insane causes (sic)
already devoid of the fact that he could no longer withstand himself in the ordinary
environment, yet his acts are within the bound of insanity or psychosis.
Q: Now,
Doctor, of course this person suffering that ailment which you said the
accused here is suffering is capable of planning the commission of a rape?
A: Yes,
they are also capable.
Q: He
is capable of laying in wait in order to assault?
A: Yes.
Q: And
would you say that condition that ability of a person to plan a rape and to
perform all the acts preparatory to the actual intercourse could be done by an
insane person?
A: Yes,
it could be done.
Q: Now,
you are talking of insanity in its broadest sense, is it not?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: Now,
is this insane person also capable of knowing what is right and what is wrong?
A: Well,
there is no weakness on that part of the individual. They may know what is wrong but yet there is
no inhibition on the individual.
Q: Yes,
but actually, they are mentally equipped with knowledge that an act they are
going to commit is wrong?
A: Yeah,
they are equipped but the difference is, there is what we call they lost the
inhibition. The reasoning is weak and
yet they understand but the volition
is [not] there, the drive is [not] there.”[16]
(Underscoring supplied)
The above testimony, in substance, negates complete destruction
of intelligence at the time of commission of the act charged which, in the
current state of our caselaw, is critical if the defense of insanity is to be
sustained. The fact that appellant
Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with death should she reveal she had
been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that
Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault. The defense sought to suggest, through Dr.
Jovellano’s last two (2) answers above, that a person suffering from
schizophrenia sustains not only impairment of the mental faculties but also
deprivation of the power of self-control. We do not believe that Dr. Jovellano’s testimony, by itself,
sufficiently demonstrated the truth of that proposition. In any case, as already pointed out, it is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the exempting
circumstance of insanity is to be found.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative
allegation of insanity.[17]
Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his
state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on
Estelita. It has been held that inquiry
into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately
before or at the very moment the act is committed.[18]
Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of the two (2) physicians (Dr.
Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport to characterize his
mental condition during that critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to circumstances occurring on or
immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad statements based on general
behavioral patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia. Curiously, while it was Dr. Masikip who had
actually observed and examined appellant during his confinement at the National
Mental Hospital, the defense
chose to present Dr. Nerit.
Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant
Rafanan.
In People vs. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that
schizophrenic reaction, although not exempting because it does not completely
deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts, may be considered as a mitigating circumstance under Article
13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., as
an illness which diminishes the exercise of the offender’s will-power without,
however, depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts. Appellant should have been credited with this mitigating circumstance,
although it would not have affected the penalty imposable upon him under
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code: “in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty (reclusion perpetua in this case), it shall be applied by
the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of
the deed.”
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the
amount of moral damages is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.
Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
[1]
Decision, pp. 2-4.
[2]
Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p. 12.
[3]
People vs. Veloso, 148 SCRA 60 (1987); People vs. Bautista, 147
SCRA 500 (1987); People vs. Polo, 147 SCRA 551 (1987).
[4]
TSN, 5 September 1978, pp. 10-15.
[5]
Record, pp. 69-70.
[6]
Id., p. 83.
[7]
Id., pp. 93-94.
[8]
Id., pp. 90-91.
[9]
TSN, 27 February 1979, pp. 21-23.
[10]
87 Phil. 658 (1950).
[11]
See, e.g., People v. Cruz, 177 SCRA 451 (1989); People vs. Aldemita,
145 SCRA 451 (1986); People vs. Ambal, 100 SCRA 325 (1980); People vs.
Magallano, 100 SCRA 570 (1980); People vs. Renegado, 57 SCRA 275 (1976).
[12]
E.g., People v. Amit, 82 Phil. 820 (1949); People v. Balneg, 79
Phil. 805 (1948); People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 95 (1937).
[13]
Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, Miller-Keane, p. 860
(1972).
[14]
Modern Synopsis of Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry/III, Kaplan and Sadock,
M.D. (3rd ed., 1981), pp. 309-311.
[15]
See People vs. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451 (1986); People vs. Puno,
105 SCRA 151 (1981); People vs. Fausto, 113 Phil. 841 (1961).
[16]
TSN, 28 March 1979, pp. 74-77.
[17]
People vs. Dungo, G.R. No. 89420, 31 July 1991; People vs.
Morales, 121 SCRA 426 (1983).
[18]
People vs. Aquino, 186 SCRA 851 (1990); People vs. Aldemita, 145
SCRA 451 (1986).