G&P COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANUEL P. MONDEJAR AND CRISTINA E. MONDEJAR, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for
review on certiorari of the February 20, 1980 decision of the Court of Appeals* in CA-G.R.
No. SP-09081, entitled “Manuel P. Mondejar and
Cristina E. Mondejar
vs. Hon. Gregorio Pineda, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI, et al.” giving due course to the
petition for certiorari filed by herein private respondents and
annulling the Orders of Judge Pineda dated February 15 and March 13, 1979 in
Civil Case No. 16668.

The antecedent facts, as
gathered from the records, are as follows:

G-P and Co. (G-P, for
short) is the owner of a house and lot located at No.138 F. Manalo
St., San Juan, Metro Manila, which was leased to Manuel Mondejar way back on
December 1, 1961 for a period of two years at the rate of P275.00 per month.  The lease
contract was presumably extended, at the increased rate of P325.00 a month, and
with option to buy on the part
of Mondejar (Decision, CA, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 20-21).

On February 9, 1972,
G-P filed an ejectment suit for non-payment of
rentals from August 19, 1970 to April, 1972 with the Municipal Court of San Juan
(Civil Case No. 3369).  Judgment* was rendered
in favor of G-P and against Mondejar.  It required the latter to vacate and restore
the possession of the property and to pay the sum of P7, 297.50 as house and
telephone back rentals plus the sum of P325.00 monthly rentals until he vacates
the same.

On May 22, 1972, Mondejar appealed the said decision to the then Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXI, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 16668.  On September 26, 1972, while the case was
pending therein, G-P filed a motion to restore possession of the subject leased
property for failure of Mondejar to file a supersedeas bond and to deposit the monthly rentals during
the pendency of the appeal as required by Section 8, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court, to stay the execution of the appealed decision.

On October
15, 1972, the then
CFI of Rizal issued an order directing the issuance
of the writ of execution prayed for in the motion.  Mondejar filed a
motion for reconsideration of the said order after depositing the sum of P1,950.00 representing the accrued
monthly rentals from June to November, 1972 at P325.00 per month.  Nevertheless, said motion was denied since
“Mondejar has not complied with the mandatory
requirement of depositing the monthly rentals within the first 10 days of each
month” and the non-filing of supersedeas bond
which is likewise mandatory.

It appears that the
efficacy of the writ of execution lapsed without having been enforced, as the
implementation of the execu­tion order was held in abeyance due to the
negotiation for settlement of the case by the parties.  On May 23, 1973, G-P filed a motion for issuance of an alias
writ of execution which was granted by the then CFI of Rizal.

In the meantime, on August
2, 1974, the Clerk of Court of the court a quo informed the CFI of Rizal
taking cognizance of the appeal, that there was no transcript of stenographic
notes taken during the proceedings before it because said court “had no court
stenographer yet being employed then.” 
In view thereof, the CFI of Rizal set the case
for trial de novo (Petitioner’s Brief, p. 5; Rollo,
p. 71).  On January 16, 1975, upon the ex-parte
motion of Mondejar, the CFI of Rizal
ordered the lifting of the alias writ of
execution until after the parties shall have arrived at an ami­cable
settlement (CA Rollo, p. 65).

On February 7, 1975,
it appearing that the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, the
CFI of Rizal, upon motion of G-P, issued an order reviving the alias writ of execution (Ibid., p. 65).

On March 12, 1975,
Mondejar filed a petition to lift the writ of
execution but the same was denied in an Order dated March 18, 1975 “it appearing that the writ
of execution was issued for non-payment x
x x of the rentals
that fell due since the perfection of the appeal” (Ibid.,
p. 57).

From said order, Mondejar instituted mandamus proceedings before the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. SP 04105) to compel the CFI of Rizal to lift said order. 
However, on February 6, 1976, the Special First Division* of the same
court dismissed said petition (CA Decision, p. 6; Ibid., pp. 63-68).  Mondejar filed
several motions for reconsideration but all were subsequently denied.  The first denial was promulgated on November
18, 1976 and the
second was promulgated** on May 12, 1977.

As Mondejar’s
motions were all denied, he appealed to this Court, but the First Division of
this Court denied the petition (G.R. No. 45175) for lack of merit on August
22, 1977 (Ibid, p.
44).

Upon the finality of the
resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the mandamus
proceedings, G-P, on January 9, 1979, filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal a motion for the issuance of
another alias writ of execution since the alias writ previously issued had
already expired (Petitioner’s Brief, pp. 6-7).

On February
15, 1979, the CFI of
Rizal issued an order grant­ing G-P’s motion.  Accordingly, a second alias writ of execution
was issued for the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Court of San Juan
(CA Rollo, p. 7). 
Mondejar filed a motion to set aside the said order but the same was denied in an order dated March 13, 1979 (Ibid., p. 8).  By reason thereof, on March
29, 1979, Mondejar, joined by private respondent Cristina Mondejar, again instituted a certiorari proceeding
with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 09081 to annul the said order of February 15, 1979 as well as the order of March
13, 1979 (Ibid., pp.
1-6).

On February
20, 1980, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby given due course and the
questioned orders dated February 15, and March 13, 1979 are hereby annulled and set aside, with
costs against the private respondents.

The temporary restraining order issued in this case is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.” (CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 24).

From said decision, a motion for reconsideration was filed by G-P
on February 26, 1980, but
in the resolution of March 18, 1980,
the Court of Appeals denied said motion.

Hence, this petition praying for reinstatement of the dis­puted
orders of the CFI of Rizal dated February 15 and March 13, 1979.

In the resolution of January
19, 1981, the petition was given due course.  The brief for G-P was filed on March 13, 1981, while the Mondejars, in their manifestation dated July 7, 1981 stated that their comment
filed on August 6, 1980 be
considered as their answer to the petition and brief of petitioner (Rollo, p. 78).

It is significant to note that during the pendency
of the case, G-P filed on May 28, 1984
a motion to set the case for trial on the merits in the same Civil Case No.
16668 with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch
CLX (CA Rollo, p. 209).  The case was set for trial on the merits on July 25, 1984 during which Mondejar appeared without counsel.  The case was reset for hearing on Sep­tember 24, 1984 but Mondejar failed to appear. 
Upon motion, G-P was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.

On September 9, 1985,
judgment* was rendered in favor of G-P and against Mondejar ordering the latter to vacate the subject leased property and surrender
the possession thereof to G-P (RTC Decision, p. 3; CA Rollo,
p. 220).  In an order dated November 22, 1985, the motion for
issuance of a writ of execution was granted (Order, p. 2; Ibid., p. 228) and a
writ of execution was corres­pondingly issued to Deputy Sheriff Romeo de la
Cruz (Ibid., p. 231).  On April 3 and 4,
1986, Deputy Sheriff de la Cruz levied the prop­erties of Mondejar
(Ibid., p. 267), and the Mondejars were subse­quently
ejected from the leased property.

Considering therefore
that the raison d’etre of this peti­tion has already been resolved, i.e.,
private respondent Mondejar has already been ejected
from the subject property, it is evident that the same has become moot and
academic.

Under similar circumstances,
this Court held that a case becomes moot and academic and should be dismissed
where the tenant had already vacated the premises and possession thereof had
already been delivered to the owner (Tinio v. Castro,
136 SCRA 658 [1985] ).  A case is
likewise dismissed as moot and academic where a related case had resolved all
the varied issues raised between the parties (GSIS v. CA, 149 SCRA 379 [1987] ). 

It is a settled rule that
a court will not determine moot questions or abstract propositions nor express
an opinion in a case in which no practical relief can be granted (Meralco Workers Union v. Yatco,
19 SCRA 177 [1967] ; Bongat v. Bureau of Labor
Relations, 136 SCRA 225 [1985] ; Lomo v. Mabelin, 146 SCRA 473 [1986] ). 

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for
having become moot and academic. 

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Gutierrez,
Jr., Davide, Jr., and
Romero, JJ., concur.

* Penned by Associate Justice Milagros
A. German, concurred in by Associate Justices B.S. de la Fuente
and Pedro D. Cenzon.

* Penned by Judge Alfredo N. Gorgonio

* Penned by Associate Justice Sixto A. Domondon and concurred in by Associate Justices Lourdes San
Diego and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera.

** Penned by Associate Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera and
concurred in by Associate Justices Lourdes P. San Diego and Crisolito
Pascual.

* Penned by Judge Rafael de la Cruz