SATURNINO OCAMPO, ANTONIO LIAO, RAMON ISBERTO, ESTER CENIZA-ISBERTO, AND EVELYN SARMIENTO, PETITIONERS, VS. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 25; TRIAL COUNSEL OF MILITARY COMMISSION NO. …

Petition for habeas corpus
and prohibition or mandamus with preliminary injunction or restraining
order, seeking the following relief:

“WHEREFORE, your petitioners respectfully pray the Honorable
Court:

1)     
To issue a Writ
of Habeas Corpus with respect to the petitioners who are detained as indi­cated
in paragraph 1;

2)     
To issue a Writ of Prohibition enjoining
respondents and all persons acting in their name or in their behalf or under
their orders, to desist from proceeding with petitioners’ trial;

3)     
In the event that the Honorable Court should
rule that prohibition does not lie, to issue a Writ of Mandamus ordering
respondents to transfer the case of petitioners to a civil court; to amend the
charge sheet so that petitioners would not be charged under P.D. 885 for acts
allegedly committed before 3 Feb­ruary 1976, and to particularize the charges
therein as indicated in paragraph 12.7; and to nullify the summary preliminary
investigation of petitioners where their statements obtained in their custodial
interroga­tion without the assistance of counsel were utilized against them;

4)     
Pending the issuance of Writ of Prohibition
and/or Mandamus, to issue a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order directing the respondent Commission to cease and desist from
proceeding with the trial of petitioners, without bond; and

5)     
To grant petitioners such other and further
relief as may be just or equitable in the premises.”^[1]

The record shows that the herein petitioners Saturnino Ocampo,
Antonio Liao, Ramon Isberto, Ester Ceniza-Isberto, and Evelyn Sarmiento, and a
number of other accused, are on trial for subversion before the respondent
Military Commission No. 25 in Criminal Case No. MC-25-113, entitled:  “People of the Philippines,
plaintiff, versus Jose Ma. Sison, et al., accused“; under the
following:

“SPECIFICATION:

In that the above-named accused, persons subject to trial by the
Military Tribunals, on or about the year 1968 and for sometime prior and
subsequent there­to, and continuously up to the present, in Capas, Tar­lac, and
elsewhere in the Philippines, knowingly, wil­fully and by overt acts, did
organize, join and remain as officers and/or ranking members of the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CCP) and/or the New People’s Army, the latter being
the military arm of the former for the purpose of overthrowing the government
of the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions through
armed revolution, force, violence, deceit, subversion, and other illegal means
with the covert assistance and support of a foreign power in order to establish
therein a totalitarian regime sub­ject to alien control and domination.”^[2]

The petitioners Saturnino Ocampo, Antonio Liao, and Ramon Isberto
are presently detained at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro-Manila, while the
petitioners Ester Ceniza-Isberto and Evelyn Sarmiento are on temporary
release.  The said Saturnino Ocampo was
arrested and detained on January 14, 1976 by virtue of the Arrest, Search and
Seizure Order (ASSO) No. 589, issued by the Secretary of National Defense,
while Antonio Liao and Ramon Isberto were arrested and detained on February 9,
1977 and November 10, 1977, by ASSO Nos. 76-124 and 4391, respectively,
likewise issued by the Secretary of National Defense.^[3]

The case against the herein petitioners was initially set for
arraignment and hearing on January 24, 1979, but in view of the motion of the
accused for deferment on the ground that they had no sufficient time to prepare
their case, the respondent Military Com­mission reset the hearing to February
23, 1979.  At the hearing of February 23,
1979, the herein petitioners filed a (1) Motion to Quash, on the grounds of
alleged denial of equal protection of the laws in that Letter of Instruction
No. 772, dated November 27, 1978, which directed the filing henceforth of all
criminal cases with the civil courts, was not applied in their case; alleged ex
post facto application of Presidential Decree No. 885; and alleged
duplicity of charges with respect to Saturnino Ocampo who had been accused of
rebellion in another case; (2) Motion for Bill of Particulars; and (3) Motion
for Discovery.

The said motions were opposed by the prosecution and thereafter,
the respondent “Commission, in closed session, with the members consulting
with one another, after giving due consideration to the arguments in support of
the three motions of the defense, as well as the arguments in opposition
thereo,” denied the said three motions.^[4]

Subsequently, the herein petitioners and their co-accused were
ordered arraigned.  But, the said
petitioners refused to plead so that a plea of “Not Guilty” was
ordered entered for each of them by the Commission.  The trial of the case, however, was postponed
to a later date to afford the accused therein the opportunity to challenge the
rulings of the respondent military commission before this Honorable Court.

Hence, the present petition for habeas
corpus and prohibition or mandamus with preliminary injunction or
restraining order.  As prayed for,
the corresponding summons and a temporary restraining order were issued by the
Court and the respondents were restrained from proceeding further with the
trial of the herein petitioners.^[5]

The issues raised by the petitioners are as follows:

“1.  Whether or not petitioners are entitled to be
released on account of the public statements made by the President of the Philippines
on three separate occasions;

2.    Whether or not petitioner Saturnino Ocampo
has been denied the right to speedy trial;

3.    Whether or not the non-application in the
case of petitioners of Letter of Instruction No. 772 consti­tutes a denial of
their right to equal protection of the law;

 4.   Whether
or not the charge sheet in the case of petitioners amount to an ex post
facto application of Presidential Decree No. 885 which amended the
Anti-Subversion Act on February 3, 1976;

5.    Whether or not petitioners are entitled to a
bill of particulars; and

6.    Whether or not petitioners have been denied
their right to counsel during the custodial investiga­tion conducted after
their arrest.”^[6]

The main issues presented by the petitioners have been pre­viously
raised by petitioner Saturnino Ocampo and ruled upon by the Court in the cases
of Luneta, et al. vs. Special Military
Commission No. 1, et al.,^[7]
so that this petition has no merit and hence, should be dismissed.  The Court therein said:

“The important issues raised by petitioners are succinctly
stated in the memorandum of the respondents thus:

“QUESTIONS
PRESENTED

“Petitioners’ several actions raise the following questions:

In L-49473

“Habeas Corpus (to
obtain the release of some of the petitioners):

1.   Whether the petitioners concerned have been
denied speedy trial and should thus be ordered released from detention via
a writ of habeas corpus;

2.   Whether petitioners are entitled to be
released on the basis of certain statements made by the President of the Philippines
in speeches delivered by him;

“Prohibition
(to enjoin further pro­ceedings in SMC-1-1):

3.   Whether respondent special Mili­tary
Commission No. 1 has jurisdiction to hear the case of rebellion against peti­tioners;

4.   Whether the petitioners who are not under
detention have been denied the right to speedy trial;

5.   Whether petitioners have been denied the
equal protection of the law by the non-application in their case of Letter of
Instruction No. 772 dated November
27, 1978;

“Mandamus (to compel respondent Commission to
grant their various motions):

6.   Whether the reference in the charge sheet to
petitioners as being officers and leaders of the CPP/NPA at the time of the
commission of the rebellion makes the charge sheet invalid for duplicity;

7.   Whether petitioners are entitled to a bill of
particulars;

8.   Whether petitioners are entitled to make a
discovery;

9.   Whether petitioners are entitled to a
pre-hearing on the voluntariness of their sworn statements;

10. As an incidental issue raised
during the oral argument, whether the right to coun­sel in a custodial
investigation imposes a duty on the part of the state to provide counsel where
the person under investigation could not obtain one.

“(Petitioners raise in their supplemental petitions the
matters of their challenge against the Law Member of respondent Commission, Lt.
Col. Igualdad Cunanan, as well as the alleged absence of a preliminary
investigation in the case of petitioner Romeo Enriquez.  But in view of respondents’ manifestation
that, in the interest of aid­ing the resolution of the cases at bar, Lt. Col.
Cunanan was willing to withdraw from the respondent Commission, as in fact he
has been relieved, at his request, of his duties in the Commission per
respondents’ manifestation dated February 14, 1979, and that respondents were
will­ing to conduct another preliminary investigation of the case of petitioner
Enriquez, the two issues in question may be deemed moot and academic.)

In L-49571

“Certiorari and Prohibition (to enjoin
further proceedings against the petitioners):

11. Whether the filing of
Criminal Case SMC-1-1 for rebellion placed the petitioners concerned in
jeopardy of conviction for the same offense a second time.” (pp. 2023, Respondents’ Memorandum.)

“At this stage of our jurisprudence governing the issues thus
presented by petitioners, a lengthy disquisi­tion, demonstrating the
implausibility of their conten­tions seems superfluous.  The matters discussed and vigo­rously
insisted upon by counsel are already settled ones, not only in Aquino vs. Enrile, L-35546, September
17, 1974, 59 SCRA 183
but also in a number of subsequent cases of the same nature.  Suffice it to say here that with the
proclamation of martial law and the concomitant suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, at least as a rule, claims of denial of
speedy trial are unavailing, what with the recognized authority of the
government or the administrator of the martial law to detain persons even only
for preventive purposes.  As to how long
such preventive detention can last would necessarily
depend on the circumstances and the sound discretion of the ad­ministrator,
even if there are members of the Court who hold the view that the Supreme Court
may in cases of demonstrated grave and palpable abuse of discretion
intervene.  The petitioners who are
detained (some of them are not) have been apprehended on suspicion, if not
charges of rebellion and subversion by virtue of arrest, search
and seizure orders issued by the Minister of National Defense under authority
of the President, and it is, therefore, with more reason that they cannot
invoke habeas corpus.

“Whatever, We have carefully gone over the respective claims
of the parties relative to the causes for the de­lay or protraction of the
proceedings against petitioners, and We are satisfied that under existing
rulings of this Court, the circumstances revealed in the recorded proceed­ings
before and after their cases reached respondent Mili­tary Commission do not
warrant their release on habeas corpus
on the ground of denial of speedy trial, if only because in practically all
instances of postponement or transfer deplored by petitioners, the reasons were
either unavoidable or demanded by the nature of the proceedings, and in some
instances done upon direct or indirect request of petitioners themselves.

“While perhaps there might be ground to hold that official and
formal pronouncements of the President on public occasions of importance, such
as those referred to in the petition, might come within the contemplation of
the word ‘acts’ in Section 3 (2), Article XVII of the Philippine Constitution
of 1973, albeit it must be noted that the same provision refers to those
‘promulgated’ and not merely delivered orally, the point is that, as contended
and explained by the Solicitor Gen­eral, (Pp. 33-43, Respondents’ Memo) the
statements of the President before the U.P. Law Alumni Association on January
7, 1977, the Foreign Correspondence Association of the Philippines on June 3,
1977 and the 8th World Law Conference on August 21, 1977 do not include the
situation in which the petitioners find themselves.  It is to think too much bad faith on the part
of the Presi­dent to maintain that were his intention in those state­ments
invoked by petitioners was to have them released, actually he had in mind not
to do so.  Those statements of the
President must not be taken out of context to give them a meaning farthest from
the truth.  They were uttered to reassure
all and sundry of the deep regard and respect the President has for individual
rights and liberties, and to accuse him practically of duplicity and of
offering false hopes for political purposes is certainly incompatible with
intelligent and conventional knowledge.

“The jurisdiction of military commissions to hear and
determine the cases of rebellion and subversion of petitioners is now
indubitable, in the light of the existing rulings of this Court.  The mere fact that civil courts are open and
are functioning normally is of no consequence in this respect, as We shall explain later.

“For in addition to the foregoing, the Court re­serves the
preparation of a more extended opinion. 
Time constraint related to the steps needed for the earliest lifting of
martial law require that this deci­sion be released soonest.  There are indeed other considerations related
to the points above-discussed that render the plea of petitioners for the
granting of the relief they pray for unavailing, and We propose to dwell on
them soon enough in such more extended opinion, which would necessarily include
the disposition of the remain­ing points in the petitions, namely, (1)
duplicity in the charges, (2) need for a bill of particulars, (3) en­titlement
of petitioners to discovery and most important of all, (4) their claim to a
right to a preliminary hear­ing on the voluntariness of their supposed
confessions as well as their other right to counsel during custodial
investigation.  All of these issues are
worthy of fur­ther elaborate disquisition. 
We shall do so in due time, but Our conclusion
in regard to them is that petitioners have not successfully shown any
substantial breach of the fundamental law of the land nor of their inherent
right and liberties, when measured alongside the imperatives of national
security and survival.”

Whatever skepticism may exist as to the continued suspension of
the privelege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power of the respondent military commission to try the
petitioners in view of the lifting of martial law, should be dispelled by the
clear mandate of Proclamation No. 2045, dated January 17, 1981, which categorically provides, as
follows:

“x x x          x x
x          x x x

“NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President/Prime
Minister of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby revoke Procla­mation No. 1081 (Proclaiming a State of
Martial Law in the Philippines) and Proclamation No. 1104 (Declaring the
Continuation of Martial Law) and proclaim the termination of the state of
martial law throughout the Philippines; Pro­vided, that the call to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
insurrection, re­bellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and
effect; and Provided that in the two autonomous regions in Mindanao,
upon the request of the residents therein, the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus shall continue;
and in all other places the suspension of the privilege of the writ shall also
continue with re­spect to persons at present detained as well as others who may
hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or pro­posal to commit such crimes, and for all other
crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occa­sion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection there­with.

“General Order No. 8 is
also hereby revoked and the military tribunals created pursuant thereto are
hereby dissolved upon final determination of cases pending there­in which may not
be tranferred to the civil courts without irreparable prejudice to the state in
view of the rules on double jeopardy, or other circumstances which render fur­ther
prosecution of the cases difficult, if not impossible;

“Pursuant to Article XVII, Section 3, Paragraph 2 of the
Constitution, all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts
promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President constitute part of the
law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even
after lifting of martial law, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by sub­sequent
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent
President, or unless expressly and explicity modified or repealed by the
regular National Assembly.” (Italics
supplied for emphasis.)

WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby
DISMISSED.  Without
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., no part.

Teehankee, J., dissents in a
separate opinion.

Aquino, J., in the result.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 27-28.

^[2]
Id., pp. 32-34.

^[3]
Id., pp. 118, 119, 120.

^[4]
Id., pp. 63-69.

^[5]
Id., pp. 72, 73.

^[6]
Id., pp. 172-173.

^[7]
G.R. Nos. L-49473 and L-49571, prom. January 16, 1981.

170
Clean

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