ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. ABELARDO SUBIDO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

There is an aspect of futility to this appeal from an
ably-written and well-reasoned decision of the then Judge Conrado M. Vasquez
ordering then respondent Commissioner of Civil Service Abelardo Subido, now
deceased, “to (a) refrain from enfor­cing and implementing the directive
contained in its letter to the City Auditor of Manila dated October 5, 1966
(Annex D); (b) making the prelimi­nary injunction issued for this purpose to be
perma­nent, and (c) commanding the respondent to note and record the
appointments of the 91 women street sweepers listed in Annex B of the
petition.”^[1]
Annex D reads as follows:  “It has
come to the knowledge of this Office that there are still women employed as
street sweepers in the City, contrary to the provisions of Memorandum Circular
No. 18, s. 1964, on the subject:  ‘Women
in Laborer Positions.’ Pursuant to said memorandum circular, this Office will
disapprove all appointments extended to females as street sweepers, when the
same are submitted to this Office.  In
view thereof, and to prevent dis­bursement of City funds for illegal employment
and to preclude injustice to these female employees who may later be required
to refund whatever they may have received as salary or wages, it is requested
that the salaries or wages of all women street sweepers or women laborers
employed as such, be withheld immediately.”^[2]
The pertinent portion of such memorandum is worded thus:  “This Office has observed that some
offices which employ women laborers make them perform work in the street along­side
men workers.  While it cannot be denied
that those occupying laborer positions should be made to perform the duties
properly belonging to such positions, it is the opinion of this Office that the
practice of making them perform manual labor outside office premises exposes
them to contempt and ridicule and constitutes a violation of the tradi­tional
dignity and respect accorded Filipino woman­hood. * * * In view of the above,
it is directed that agencies affected put a stop immediately to the practice
referred to above; otherwise, this Office shall, except for justifiable
reasons, be constrained to withhold approval of any or all appointments to
laborer positions extended to women and shall, accord­ingly, bring the matter
to the attention of the General Auditing Office.”^[3]
Upon the filing of the certiorari and mandamus petition with
preliminary injunction, the plea for preliminary injunction was set for
hearing.  It resulted in this order of
then Judge Vasquez:  “On motion of
petitioner, it appearing that the respondent’s Memorandum-Circular No. 18 dated
April 10, 1964 had already been set aside by the Office of the President of the
Philippines, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue to enjoin the
respondent from enforcing and implementing said memo­randum circular until
further orders from this Court, upon the filing of the petitioner of a bond and
its approval by the Court in the sum of P5,000.00 to answer for damages that
the respondent may sustain by reason of the issuance of said writ.”^[4]

Clearly, the lower court decision is buttressed by the law and
the applicable authorities.

1.  It was pointed out in the
petition of the then Mayor Villegas in the lower court that the memorandum on
which then respondent Commissioner would base his refusal to note the
appointments of the 91 women as street sweepers in the City government of
Manila was his Memorandum Circular No. 18 dated April 10, 1964.  It was then stated that it had been set aside
and declared without force and effect by the Office of the President under a
fifth indorsement to respondent on September 14, 1965.^[5]
All that respon­dent could allege in the answer was
that there was still a pending motion for reconsideration.  Why such a contention could not be taken
seriously was made clear in the appealed decision in this wise:  “It is of no moment that the respondent,
in a 6th Indorsement dated November 7,
1966, had requested the Office of the President to reconsider the
ruling declaring Memorandum Circular No. 18, series of 1964, as of no force and
effect.  Aside from the fact that the
attempt to secure a reconsideration of the said ruling was done more than one
year after the promulgation of the same, it is significant to note that the
respondent sought the reconsideration only after the ruling of this case on
October 28, 1966.  In any event, as the
situation stands, the memorandum circular in question may not be enforced until
and unless the Office of the President shall reconsider its disapproval of the
same.”^[6]

2.  The situation thus presented
is one akin to that found in another case between the same parties, likewise
entitled Villegas v. Subido.^[7]
There as well as here, reliance of then respondent Commissioner was not on any
law or rule but simply on his own concept of what policy to pursue, in this
instance in accordance with his own personal predilection.  Here he appeared to be unalterably convinced
that to allow women laborers to work outside their offices as street sweepers
would run counter to Filipino tradition. 
The sincerity of his conviction is conceded, but that does not
suffice.  A public official must be able
to point to a particular provision of law or rule justifying the exercise of a
challenged authority.  So it was
correctly held in the decision on appeal. 
The pertinent excerpt from the cited Villegas v. Subido decision
follows:  “One last word.  Nothing is better settled in the law than
that a public official exercises power, not rights.  The government itself is merely an agency
through which the will of the state is expressed and enforced.  Its officers therefore are likewise agents
entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions.  As such there is no presumption that they are
empowered to act.  There must be a
delegation of such authority, either express or implied.  In the absence of a valid grant, they are
devoid of power.  What they do suffers
from a fatal infirmity.  That principle
cannot be sufficiently stressed.  In the
appropriate language of Chief Justice Hughes: 
‘It must be conceded that departmental zeal may not be permitted to
outrun the authority conferred by statute.’ Neither the high dignity of the
office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable
substitute.  Otherwise the rule of law
becomes a myth.  Such an eventuality, we
must take all pains to avoid.”^[8]

3.  It might be said by way
of a concluding observation that for the past six years at least, Filipino
women have been serving in that capacity among others as Metro Aides, an
innovation introduced by the First Lady. 
They have contributed along with the male employees in keeping Metro
Manila clean, attractive, and hygienic. 
There has been no offense to the well-known Filipino tradition of
holding the women in high esteem and respect. 
Moreover, as is quite obvious in civic parades where a contingent of
them usually takes part, they take pride – and justly so – in what they are
doing.  There would even be less
justification then even from the policy standpoint for a Memorandum Circular
similar to that issued by respondent and justifiably nullified by the Office of
the President.  Moreover, the trend
towards greater and greater recog­nition of equal rights for both sexes under
the shelter of the equal protection clause argues most strongly against this
kind of discrimination.^[9]

4.  If this case had not been
decided earlier, it must have been due to the fact that with the lower court
deciding in favor of the then City Mayor and no restraining order having been
issued by this Court, the ninety-one street sweepers could continue with their
work.  Neither party then apparently
failed to manifest further interest in the outcome of this litigation.  Moreover, it was not long after this case was
submitted for decision that the late respondent Commissioner left public
office.  Apparently, his successor was of
a different mind.  Hence the case was not
disposed of sooner.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed.  No costs.

Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., no part.

^[1]
Decision of the Lower Court,
7-8.

^[2]
Annex D of Petition.

^[3]
Annex F of Petition.

^[4]
Order of Respondent Judge dated November
8, 1966.

^[5]
Petition, par. 6 and Annex F.

^[6]
Decision of the Lower Court,
6.

^[7]
L-26534, November 28, 1969, 30 SCRA
498.

^[8]
Ibid, 510-511. Cf. City of Manila and Mayor
Antonio J. Villegas v. Subido, 123 Phil. 1080 (1966) per Bengzon, C.J.

^[9]
Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution reads as follows:  “No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.”