G.R. No. 49167. April 30, 1949

CO TAO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JOAQUIN CHAN CHICO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions April 30, 1949 MORAN, C.J.:


MORAN, C.J.:


This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court
of Appeals.

According to the findings of said Court, in 1927 respondent
Joaquin Chan Chico built a house on his lot No. 7, described in transfer
certificate of title No. 24239. When that house was constructed, Prudencia
Rodriguez was yet the owner of the adjoining lot No. 6 belonging now to
petitioner Co Tao. About a year after petitioner bought lot No. 6, he built a
house thereon and he used lumber that butted in respondent’s house. Respondent
protested and his protest was resented by petitioner. Hence, the present
suit.

It is now claimed by petitioner that the respondent’s house
took a portion of petitioner’s land. The Court of Appeals, after examining the
evidence, found that respondent’s house occupies 6.97 square meters of
petioner’s lot, but that respondent acted in good faith. Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals declared “that the plaintiff (petitioner) has the right to elect to
purchase that portion of the defendant’s (respondent’s) house which protrudes
into the plaintiff’s property, or to sell to the defendant the land upon which
the said portion of the defendants house is built.” And the case was remanded to
the Court of First Instance “with direction to require the plaintiff to make the
election as herein provided, within the time that the Court shall fix, and
thereafter to reset the case for the admission of the evidence on the value of
the improvement, in case the plaintiff elects to buy the same, or the value of
the land, in case he elects to sell it, and to render decision as the result of
the new trial shall warrant.” From this decision petitioner appealed by
certiorari to this Court.

All the questions raised by the petitioner are unmeritorious.
He alleges, for instance, that respondent could not have acted in good faith in
building a portion of his house beyond the limits of his land, because he ought
to know the metes and bounds of his property as stated in his certificate of
title. But, as rightly stated by the Court of Appeals: “It is but stating the
obvious to say that outside of the individuals versed in the science of
surveying, and this is already going far, no one can determine the precise
extent or location of his property by merely examining his paper title. The fact
is even surveyors cannot with exactitude do so. The disagreement among the three
surveyors in the case at hand who have made a resurvey of the ground with the
aid of scientific devices and of their experience and knowledge of surveying, is
a graphic and concrete illustration of this truth.”

And there is another circumstance showing respondent’s good
faith. The Court of Appeals found that “the defendant’s title dated back to
March 12, 1923, and he built his house as early as 1927. When this was done, it
has also been shown, there was a stone wall which had existed since as early as
1902, and inside which the defendant’s house is constructed. Prudencia Rodriguez
herself, who was still the owner of the adjoining land when the defendant built
his house in 1927, must have been under the same impression, since, as has been
stated, she allowed the construction without making any protest during or after
the construction.”

Petitioner alleges that it is not fair for him to pay for the
building erected on his lot which is not only prejudicial but is certainly a
nuissance to his property. The petitioner is indeed overlooking the circumstance
that he is not being forced to buy the building for he has the option to sell
the portion of his lot occupied by that building. The provisions of article 361
of the Civil Code admit of no distinction.

Wherefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed
with costs against the petitioner.

Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.


DISSENTING

FERIA, J.:

I dissent.

Under Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, appeal by certiorari from
a judgment or decision of the Court of Appeals under said Rule lies only in
cases in which question or questions of law are involved, because only questions
of law may be raised therein, and consequently this Court can not review the
findings of fact of said court.

In all judicial cases, the justiciable question is always
either one of fact and law, or of law only if the facts on which it is
predicated are admitted or not in issue. It can never be a question of fact
only, because the administration of justice consists in the application of the
law to the facts of each case submitted to the Court for decision. The facts are
the minor premise of the sylogism, the law applicable to them the major premise,
and the conclusion drawn from the sylogism is the conclusion or finding of law
necessary for the decision of cases or lawsuits by the courts.

If the facts as found by the Court of Appeals are not
questioned or in issue, and only the law applicable to the case or the
conclusion of law to be drawn from such application is in issue in an appeal,
the question involved is of law and the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review
and pass upon the conclusions or findings of law of the Court of Appeals,
however, if not only the law applicable and, consequently, the inference or
conclusion to be drawn from the application thereof, but the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are in issue, the question involved in the appeal is not of
law but of fact; because no question of law may arise before the facts to which
the law may be applied have been finally determined or found.

In the present appeal, the questions involved are of fact
because the issue is whether or not the findings of fact of the Court of
Industrial Relations discussed and passed upon by the majority in the decision
are supported by the evidence in the record, that is, whether or not the
respondent acted in good faith in building his house on part of the lot claimed
by the petitioners, which depends upon whether or not the respondent knew then
that part of the lot on which he erected the building belonged to the
petitioner.

The question whether or not it is fair for the petitioners to
pay for the building erected on his lot, depends also on the question of fact
whether the building was erected on it by the respondent in good or bad
faith.

This Supreme Court has, therefore, no jurisdiction to review
the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case, because the appeal
does involve not a question of law but of fact, and this Court has no power to
review the findings of fact in the decision of the said Court of Appeals, as
already stated above. A decision of the said Court on questions of fact is final
and not appealable.

We should have dismissed the petition for certiorari by way of
appeal from the start filed in this case, but the fact that we have given it due
course in order to determine whether appeal lies after hearing the adverse
party, does not necessarily authorize us to pass upon the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals and affirm or referse the decision appealed from. To affirm
or reverse a judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case presupposes a review
by us of the findings of fact on which it is based, which we have power to
do.

Petition for certiorari by way of appeal is therefore
dismissed. We can not review and affirm or reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals in this case. So ordered.