SUNRIPE COCONUT PRODUCTS CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND SUNRIPE COCONUT WORKERS’ UNION (CLO), RESPONDENTS.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations holding that the “parers” and “shellers” of the petitioner, Sunripe
Coconut Products Co., Inc., are its laborers entitled to twelve days sick leave
(one day for each month of service), notwithstanding the fact that they are
piece-workers under the “pakiao” system. The contention of the petitioner is
that said “parers” and “shellers” are independent contractors and do not fall
within the category of employees or laborers.

The Court of Industrial Relations has relied upon the rule laid
down in the case of Philadelphia Record Company, 69 N.L.R.B., 1232 (1946), to
the effect that when a worker possesses some attributes of an employee and
others of an independent contractor, which make him fall within an intermediate
area, he may be classified under the category of an employee when the economic
facts, of the relation make it more nearly one of employment than one of
independent business enterprise with respect to the ends sought to be
accomplished. Counsel for the petitioner does not dispute the correctness or
applicability of the rule, but it is vigorously contended that, in the case at
bar, the economic facts characteristic of the independent contractor far
outweigh the economic facts indicative of an employee. We are not called upon to
rule on the accuracy of petitioner’s contention, since the conclusion of the
Court of Industrial Relations on the matter is binding on this Court. In other
words, the ruling that the “parers” and “shellers” have the status of empoyees
or laborers, carries the factual verdict that the economic facts showing such
status outweigh those indicative of an independent contractor. Some facts
expressly invoked by the Court of Industrial Relations are: That the “parers”
and “shellers” work under some degree of control or supervision of the company,
if not under its absolute direction; that said “parers” and “shellers” form
stable groups composed of matured men and women who regularly work at shelling
and paring nuts; that for the most part they depend on their work in the Sunripe
Coconut Products Co., Inc. for their livelihood; that they are admittedly
working in the factory of said company, alongside persons who are indisputably
employed by said company. As already stated, whether these specific facts are
outweighed, as contended by the petitioner, by facts demonstrative of the status
of an independent contractor, is a question decided adversely to the petitioner
when the Court of Industrial Relations held that the “parers” and “shellers” are
laborers or employees.

It is also pretended for the petitioner that the Court of
Industrial Relations departed from the definition of the word “employee” or
“laborer” found in the Workmen’s Compensation Law, namely: ” ‘Laborer’ is used
as a synonym of ’employee’, and it means every person who has entered the
employment of, or works under a service or apprenticeship contract for, an
employer. * * *” (Section 39 [b], Workmen’s Compensation Law, as amended.) The
Court of Industrial Relations of course adverted to the following definition:
“An employee is any person in the service of another under a contract for hire,
express or implied, oral or written.” (Section 7, Labor Unions by Dangle and
Scriber, p. 7, citing Mcdermott’s Case, 283 Mass. 74; Werner vs. Industrial
Comm., 212 Wis., 76.) In essence, however, the ruling of the Court of Industrial
Relations does not run counter to the definition given in the Workmen’s
Compensation Law.

Counsel for the petitioner have stressed the argument that the
principal test in determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent
contractor is the employer’s right of control over the work, and not merely the
right to control the result, it being intimated that the “parers” and “shellers”
are controlled by the petitioner only to the extent “that the nuts are pared
whole or that there is not much meat wasted.” Even under the criterion adopted
by the petitioner, it would not be amiss to state that the requirement imposed
on the “parers” and “shellers” to the effect that “the nuts are pared whole or
that there is not much meat wasted,” in effect limits or controls the means or
details by which said workers are to accomplish their services. It is
inconceivable that the “parers” and “shellers”, in order to meet the requirement
of the petitioner, would not follow a uniform standard in the performance of
their work.

Petitioner also insists that the “parers” and “shellers” are
piece-workers under the “pakiao” system. In answer, suffice it to observe that
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, expressly provides that “A minimum wage or
share shall be determined and fixed for laborers working by the hours, day or
month, or by piece-work, and for tenants sharing in the crop or paid by
measurement unit. * * *” (Section 5.) The organic law of the Court of Industrial
Relations, therefore, even orders that laborers may be paid by piece-work; and
for tenants are paid a fixed amount for a fixed number of nuts pared or shelled,
does, not certainly take them out of the purview of Commonwealth Act No.
103.

It is unnecessary to discuss at length the other facts pointed
out by the petitioner in support of the proposition that said “parers” and
“shellers” are independent contractors, because a ruling on the matter would
necessarily involve a factual inquiry which we are not authorised to make. Even
so, we would undertake to advance the general remark that in cases of this kind,
wherein laborers are usually compelled to work under conditions and terms
dictated by the employer, a reasonably wide lattitude of action and judgment
should be given to the Court of Industrial Relations with a view to settling
industrial disputes conformably to the intents and purposes of its organic law.
Without in the least intimating that the relation between the “parers” and
“shellers” on the one hand and the petitioner on the other, as planned but by
the latter, was conceived knowingly to deprive said workers of the benefits
accruing to workers who are admittedly employees or laborers under Commonwealth
Act 103 or the Workmen’s Compensation Law, it is not difficult to surmise that a
contrary decision is likely to set a precedent that may tend to encourage the
adoption of a similar scheme by many other or even all employers.

The appealed decision of the Court of Industrial Relations is
therefore affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.

Tuason, J., concurs in the result.

Montemayor, J., I reserve my vote.

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CONCURRING

PERFECTO, J.:

We concur in the decision as penned by Mr. Justice Paras.

We believe that judicial notice can be taken of the fact that
the so-called “pakyaw” system mentioned in this case, as generally practiced in
our country, is, in fact, a labor contract between employers and employees,
between capitalists and laborers. Under this system, the workers continue in the
economic category of contract laborers. They do not acquire the character of
owners or managers of an independent enterprise. The system is practiced only in
labor contracts.

The “parers” and “shellers” in this case, according to the
record, are subject to some degree of control or supervision by the company for
which they are working, and that very fact characterizes them as employees or
laborers, entering into the service of the company under a contract of hire or
lease of services.

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CONFORME

BRIONES, M.:

Estoy conforme con la ponencia. Aunque los obreros interesados
en este asunto trabajan bajo la forma de contrato Ilamada “pakyaw”, esto es, se
les paga la compensasion de su trabajo no mediante jornal sino a razon de la
cuantia de la labor realizada, esto, sin embargo, es meramente incidental y se
refiere solo a la forma de pago. Para todos los demas efectos y fines los
obreros de que se trata forman parte de la organizacion de trabajadores afectos
a la industria de la compañia recurrente. Si se tratase de obreros contratados
bajo “pakyaw” de cuando en cuando, casualmente, seguh lo requieran la emergencia
y las necesidades incidentales de la compañia, probablemente se podria sostener
que no son obreros en el sentido legal de la palabra y, por tanto, sin derecho a
reclamar los titulos y privilegios anejos a la condicion de obrero. Pero el
presente caso es diferente. Aqui los obreros tienen una colocacion mas o menos
permanente y forman parte, como digo, de la organizacion de la compañia al igual
que los asalariados.

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DISSENTING

FERIA, J.:

I dissent.

Under section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, and Rule 44 of
the Rules of Court, appeal by certiorari from the decrees, orders or decisions
of the Court of Industrial Relations to the Supreme Court lies only in cases in
which questions of law are involved in the appeal, and consequently this Court
can not review said decrees, orders or decisions on questions of fact.

In all judicial cases, the justiciable question is always
either one of fact and law, or of law only if the facts on which it is
predicated are admitted or not in issue. It can never be a question of fact
only, because the administration of justice consists in the application of the
law to the facts of each case submitted to the Court for decision. The facts are
the minor premise of the sylogism, the law applicable to them the major premise,
and the conclusion drawn from the sylogism is the conclusion or finding of law,
necessary for the decision of cases or lawsuit by the courts.

If the facts are admitted, and only the law applicable to the
case and the conclusion of law to be drawn from such application is in issue in
an appeal, the question involved is purely of law, and the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to review and pass upon the conclusions of law or findings of the
Court of Industrial Relations. However, if not only the law applicable and,
consequently, the inference or conclusion to be drawn from the application
thereof, but the facts of the case as shown by the evidence are in issue, the
question involved in an appeal is not of law but of fact, because no question of
law may arise before the facts to which the law may be applied have been finally
determined or found.

In the present appeal there is no question of law involved,
because the question whether the “parers” or “shellers” have the status of
employees or laborer in view of the facts of the case or the work they were
bound to do, or the control the principal may or may not have over their work is
a question of fact, or which “would necessarily involve a factual inquiry which
we are not authorized to do,” according to the very decision of the
majority.

This Supreme Court has therefore no jurisdiction to review the
decision of the Court of Industrial Relations because the appeal does involve
not a question of law but of fact, and this Court has no power to review the
findings of fact in the decision of the said Court of Industrial Relations. A
decision of the said Court on questions of fact is final and not appealable.

We should have dismissed the petition for certiorari by way of
appeal filed in this case from the start, and the fact that we have given it due
course in order to determine whether or not appeal lies after hearing the
adverse party, does not necessarily empower us to pass upon the merits of the
appeal and affirm or reverse the decision appealed from. To affirm or reverse a
judgment of the Court of Industrial Relations presupposes a review by us of the
findings of fact on which it is based, which we have power to do in the present
case.

Petition for certiorari by way of appeal is therefore
dismissed. We can not review and affirm or reverse the decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations in this case. So ordered.