ALFREDO COPIACO ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. LUZON BROKERAGE CO., INC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

In criminal case No. 49898 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Pedro Morales was accused of quadruple homicide through reckless
imprudence. It was alleged in the amended information filed by the
assistant fiscal that: “The undersigned accuses Pedro Morales of the
crime of multiple homicide thru reckless imprudence, committed as
follows: That on or about the 24th day of April, 1935, in the City of
Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused being then the chauffeur
and person in charge of truck No. T-1179, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and imprudently drive and manage the same along Rizal Avenue
Extension in said city, in a careless, reckless and imprudent manner by
then and there driving it at a speed greater than was reasonable and
proper without taking the necessary precautions to avoid accident to
persons and damage to property, thereby causing by such carelessness,
recklessness and imprudence the said truck so operated and managed by
him to strike and bump, as in effect it struck and bumped against a
carretela, as a result of which Fidel Copiaco, Delfin Copiaco, Leonardo
Reyes and Juan Reyes, the passengers of the said carretela, were thrown
violently to the ground and sustained serious physical injuries which
were the direct and immediate cause of their deaths. Contrary to law.”
After trial, the court found him guilty of a violation of section 67
(d) of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, No. 3992, and sentenced him to
the indeterminate penalty of from three to six years of imprisonment,
to indemnify the family of each of the deceased in the sum of P500, and
to pay the costs. The dispositive part of the judgment reads as
follows: “In view of what has been said, the defendant is found guilty
of the offense with which he is charged and, in conformity with section
67 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, No. 3992, he is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from the
minimum of three years to the maximum of six years, to indemnify each
family of the deceased Juan Reyes, Leonardo Reyes, Delfin Copiaco and
Fidel Copiaco in the sum of P500, and to pay the costs of trial. No
award is made as to the damages caused to the rig and the horse because
no evidence was submitted with respect to their value. So ordered.”

There being no appeal, the condemnatory judgment became final. The same
was executed and the convict began to serve the sentence. When the
judgment as regard the civil liability was to be executed, it turned
out that the convict was insolvent and the sheriff returned the writ
unsatisfied.

As the convict was insolvent and the
indemnities allowed in the condemnatory judgment were not paid, the
heirs of the four deceased instituted civil actions against Luzon
Brokerage Co., Inc., as the corporation or company which employed the
accused Morales and as owner of truck No. T-1179 which caused the
accident and was driven by said accused. Alfredo Copiaco and Nieves
Alarcon, plaintiffs-appellees in case G. R. No. 46135, filed an action
against Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc., the defendant-appellant in the
municipal court of Manila, and in their complaint they alleged that
they were, as the legitimate parents of the deceased Fidel Copiaco, the
latter’s only legitimate heirs, and prayed that said defendant be
sentenced to pay the sum of P500, the indemnity awarded in the judgment
rendered in the criminal case, with legal interest, and the costs, on
the ground that it was the employer of the accused Morales and that by
reason of the latter’s insolvency said indemnity had not been
collected. The municipal court rendered judgment sentencing Luzon
Brokerage Co., Inc., to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P500, with legal
interest from July 31, 1935 until full payment, and the costs. This
judgment was appealed by the defendant to the Court of First Instance
of the City of Manila. The same Copiaco spouses, plaintiffs-appellees
in case G. R. No. 46136, filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against the same defendant-appellant Luzon Brokerage
Co., Inc., and, alleging the same facts and that, as legitimate parents
of Delfin Copiaco, they are the latter’s sole legitimate heirs, they
prayed for the first cause of action that the defendant be sentenced to
pay the sum of P500, the indemnity awarded in the judgment rendered in
the criminal case, with legal interest, and the costs. For the second
cause of action, they also prayed that the same defendant be sentenced
to pay the sum of P8,000 as indemnity for the damages caused by the
death of their children Fidel Copiaco and Delfin Copiaco. The spouses
Jesus Reyes and Victoria Reyes, plaintiffs-appellees in case G. R. No.
46137, instituted an action in the municipal court of Manila against
the defendant-appellant Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc., and in their
complaint they alleged that they are the sole legitimate heirs of
Leonardo Reyes, another deceased, as the latter’s legitimate parents,
and prayed that said defendant be sentenced to pay the sum of P500, the
indemnity awarded in the judgment rendered in the criminal case, on the
ground that it was the employer of the accused Morales who turned out
to be insolvent. The municipal court sentenced the defendant to pay
P500, with legal interest from October 26, 1935, and the costs. From
this judgment the defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Benita Pelagio, Juliana Reyes, Victoria Reyes, Flora Reyes and
Asuncion Reyes, plaintiffs-appellees in case G. R. No. 46138, likewise
instituted an action in the municipal court of the City of Manila
against the defendant-appellant Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc., and,
alleging that they are the sole legitimate heirs of Juan Reyes, the
last of the four deceased persons, for the reason that they are
respectively his widow and his children, prayed that said defendant be
sentenced to pay the sum of P500, the indemnity awarded in the judgment
rendered in the criminal case, plus legal interest and costs, on the
ground that it was the employer of the accused Morales who was
insolvent; The municipal court rendered judgment against the defendant
which was sentenced to pay the sum, of P500, with legal interest from
October 26, 1935, and the costs, from which judgment the said defendant
appealed to the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila. The four
civil actions thus filed against Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc., were
jointly tried in the Court of First Instance of Manila which, in one
decision, sentenced said defendant to pay the plaintiffs in each case
the sum of P500, with legal interest and the costs. From the latter
judgment Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc., appealed.

1. The
   court sentenced the defendant-appellant to pay the indemnities awarded
   in the condemnatory judgment rendered in the criminal case, because it
   was held subsidiarily liable therefor in accordance with the provisions
   of articles 10 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code which read as follows:

   “Art. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code.—Offenses
   which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not
   subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
   supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide
   the contrary.”

   “Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons.
   — The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
   shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
   engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
   servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge
   of their duties.”

   It is admitted that the indemnities awarded in the judgment
   rendered in the criminal case had not been paid because of the
   insolvency of the accused; that the defendant-appellant was the owner
   of the truck driven by the accused Morales, was the one who employed
   him as chauffeur, and is a corporation at the time engaged in the
   business of land transportation; and that Morales, upon the occurrence
   of the accident, was an employee or chauffeur of the defendant. Upon
   these facts, the court held the defendant-appellant subsidiarily liable
   for said indemnities. In its first assignment of error the
   defendant-appellant maintains that the court erred in making these
   conclusions. It contends that it is not civilly and subsidiarily
   liable; first, because article 103 of the Revised Penal Code is not
   applicable, as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law is not a special law
   within the meaning of article 10 of the aforesaid Code; and, secondly,
   because Morales was convicted, not under the Revised Penal Code, but
   under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, section 67 (d) of which does not authorize the allowance of indemnity as an accessory penalty.

   The question whether Act No. 3992, known as the Revised Motor Vehicle
   Law, is a special law under article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, has
   already been decided in the affirmative by this court in the case of
   People vs.
   Moreno (60 Phil., 712). In that case the same point was raised and,
   after careful consideration, resolved’ in the manner indicated.
   Therefore, if the provisions of article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
   have application in the case at bar by virtue of its article 10 which
   provides that the provisions of said Code are supplementary to the
   special laws penal in nature, unless the latter specially provide the
   contrary, it is obvious that the defendant-appellant is civilly and
   subsidiarily liable for the indemnities which the accused Pedro Morales
   was sentenced in the criminal case to pay, because the evidence shows
   that it had employed the said accused as chauffeur, that the latter was
   acting in such capacity when the accident took place, and that the
   indemnities were not paid because of his insolvency.

   Under the second argument, it is contended that the defendant-appellant
   should not be held subsidiarily liable for the indemnities on the
   ground that the accused Morales was convicted under the Revised Motor
   Vehicle Law and not under the Revised Penal Code. Section 67 (d) of Act No. 3992, under which the accused was convicted, reads as follows:

   “Sec. 67. Violation and penalties. —The following penalties shall be imposed for violations of this Act.

   *******

   “(d)
   If, as the result of negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast
   driving any accident occurs resulting in death or serious bodily injury
   to any person, the motor vehicle driver or operator at fault shall,
   upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fifteen
   days nor more than six years in the discretion of the court.”

   It is clear that this section does not authorize the allowance of
   indemnity as a penalty accessory or additional to imprisonment; but the
   provisions of the Revised Penal Code being supplementarily applicable,
   the contention becomes untenable since, according to article 100 of
   said Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
   liable and, under article 104, every person convicted of a felony,
   misdemeanor or offense should also be sentenced to pay indemnity.
   Furthermore, the argument would have force if the actions instituted by
   the herein plaintiffs-appellees were exclusively founded on the
   judgment rendered in the criminal case which awarded the indemnities.
   According to the allegations of the complaints filed, the actions were
   based by the plaintiffs-appellees both upon the judgment rendered in
   the criminal case and upon article 1092 of the Civil Code which
   provides that “civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors
   shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.” There can be no
   doubt that the actions filed by the plaintiffs-appellees were designed
   to obtain the fulfillment of civil obligations arising from the offense
   committed by Morales. It results that, even supposing the allowance of
   the indemnities in the judgment in the criminal case to be invalid
   because it is not authorized by Act No. 3992, the actions brought by
   the plaintiffs-appellees can still prosper under article 1092 of the
   Civil Code, and the indemnities should be awarded in conformity with
   the provisions of article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. No specific
   proof was adduced with reference to the amount of damages caused to the
   heirs of the victim, but in this jurisdiction the rule already laid
   down by many decisions is to award by way of damages, in criminal
   cases, the sum of from P500 to P1,000 for the death of a person. The
   amounts fixed by the court are within the limits of this rule.

2. The appealed judgment sentences the
   defendant-appellant to pay P500 for the death of each of the victims,
   or a total of P2,000, plus legal interest. In its second assignment of
   error the defendant contends that, at the most, it should have been
   sentenced to pay the total sum of P1,500, at the rate of P500 for each
   family of the deceased. The argument is based upon the language of the
   judgment rendered in the criminal case wherein the court sentenced the
   accused to pay, by way of indemnity, P500 to each family of the
   victims. It is true that there are only three families, because the
   deceased Delfin Copiaco and Fidel Copiaco are both children of the
   spouses Alfredo Copiaco and Nieves Alarcon. However, we do not believe
   that the court committed the error assigned. Article 107 of the Revised
   Penal Code provides that the indemnization for damages includes not
   only those caused the injured party but also those suffered by his
   family or by a third person. In the present case it is undoubted that
   the family or the heirs of the deceased Delfin Copiaco and Fidel
   Copiaco have suffered double damage by reason of the death of their two
   children, with the consequence that it is just to indemnify them in the
   same measure for the death of each of the two members of the family.

3. We find no merit in the third and last assignment of error under which
   the defendant-appellant alleges that the court erred in denying its
   motion for new trial. Conformably to the conclusions set forth by us,
   it is civilly and subsidiarily liable for the indemnities to which the
   plaintiffs-appellees are entitled.

For the
reasons expressed herein, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs
of this instance against the defendant-appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.