SANTIAGO SAMBRANO, APPLICANT AND APPELLANT, VS. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLEE.

This
is a motion filed by the Public Service Commission praying for the
reconsideration of the decision of this court of July 27, 1938,
rendered in this case, upon the following grounds:

“1.
That the order of February 25, 1937, sought to be reviewed, was entered
by the commission in the legitimate exercise of the powers conferred
upon it by law.

“2. That the aforesaid order was issued by
the commission in accordance with the policy of nationalization of
public services enunciated by His Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, under the provisions of the Constitution.

“3.
That the decision of this Supreme Court reversing the aforesaid order
is of such a scope that it will impede, if not defeat, the policy of
nationalization of public services to be adopted by the government.

“4.
That the aforesaid order does not prejudice the applicant, but on the
contrary protects his interest and, at the same time, promotes national
and not local or regional public interest.

“5. That the aforesaid order is only temporary and interlocutory and not subject to review.”

The Public Service Commission contends that under Commonwealth Act No.
146 it has ample powers to issue the order sought to be reviewed
dismissing case No. 41712 wherein Santiago Sambrano is applicant and
Northern Luzon Transportation Co., Inc. is oppositor after the said
applicant and the oppositor had presented their evidence in support of
the application and the opposition respectively.

In support
of its theory, the Public Service Commission cites sections 13, 11, 17
and 29 of the aforesaid Commonwealth Act No. 146 providing as follows:

“Sec.
13. * * * the Commission shall have general supervision and regulation
of, jurisdiction and control over, all public services, and also over
their property, property rights, equipment, facilities, and franchises
so far as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the
provisions of this Act, and in the exercise of its authority it shall
have the necessary powers * * *.

“Sec. 11. The Commission
shall have the power to make needful rules for its government and other
proceedings not inconsistent with this Act * * *.

“Sec. 17. The Commission shall have power, without previous hearing, * * *:

* * * * * * *

“(j)
To require any public service to comply with the laws of the
Philippines and with any provincial resolution or municipal ordinance
relating thereto and to conform to the duties imposed upon it thereby
or by the provisions of its own charter, whether obtained under any
general or special law of the Philippines.

“Sec. 29. All
hearing and investigations before the Commission shall be governed by
rules adopted by the Commission, and in the conduct thereof the
Commission shall not be bound by the technical rules of legal evidence
* * *.”

Upon a careful examination of the
sections of Commonwealth Act No. 146 cited by the movant in support of
the first ground of its motion for reconsideration, we find nothing
therein expressly or impliedly authorizing the Public Service
Commission to dismiss motu proprio an application for
permission to increase the hours of trip after the applicant had
adduced his evidence in support of his application and while the
oppositor is presenting evidence in support of its opposition. It is
true that section 29, cited by the movant, provides that the hearings
and investigations before the commission shall be governed by the rules
which it may promulgate and that in its proceedings it shall not be
subject to the technical rules of evidence; but we have not been
referred to any rule of the Public Service Commission authorizing it to
dismiss an application for permission to increase the hours of trip at
the stage of the proceedings in which the case before us was found when
it was dismissed. In the absence of rules promulgated by the Public
Service Commission regulating the procedure which should be followed in
the hearing of applications before it, there have been followed up to
the present the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regulating
the hearing of judicial cases. Section 127 of the aforesaid procedural
Code speaks of only one case where a court may dismiss an action motu proprio
without the petition of any party, namely, when the plaintiff fails to
prosecute his case for an unjustified period of time, permitting,
however, the plaintiff to file his complaint anew based upon the same
grounds.

In the case before us, the action of the Public
Service Commission in provisionally dismissing the application of
Santiago Sambrano that he be permitted to increase his hours of trip,
at the stage in which the proceedings were then found, is not
authorized, as we have said, either by law, by practice, or by any rule
promulgated by it.

The policy of nationalization of public
services enunciated by His Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution,
does not and cannot authorize the violation of the rules of procedure
established by the Code of Civil Procedure. Had the commission
proceeded with the trial of the case until its termination, in
accordance with the rules of procedure, it would have complied with the
policy of nationalization of public services which it invokes,
rendering the decision which the case warrants. The decision of this
court reversing the order of dismissal of the Public Service Commission
will not, therefore, impede or defeat the policy of nationalization to
be adopted by the government because it is in the power of the Public
Service Commission to comply with that policy which it can do by
following the procedure marked out by the Code of Civil Procedure.

Wherefore, finding no merit in the motion for reconsideration, the same is denied. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.