JOSE M. BAES, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LAGUNA AND PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF LAGUNA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition, for the issuance by
this court of a writ of mandamus addressed to the Honorable Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Laguna directing him to admit and give
due course to the appeal taken by the petitioner, Rev. Fr. Jose M.
Baes, from his order of September 10, 1937, denying the appeal
interposed by said petitioner from the order issued by said respondent
judge, dismissing the petitioner’s complaint against Enrique Villarosa,
Alejandro Lacbay and Bernardo del Rosario, for the crime of “offending
the religious feelings” provided for and punished in article 133 of the
Revised Penal Code.

The pertinent facts necessary for the resolution of the legal question raised in this petition are as follows:

On April 22, 1937, the petitioner, Rev. Fr. Jose M. Baes, filed a
criminal complaint in the justice of the peace court of Lumban,
Province of Laguna, which reads as follows:

“The undersigned Parish Priest of the Roman
Catholic Church of the Parish of Lumban, Province of Laguna,
Philippines, after being duly sworn, charges Enrique Villarosa,
Alejandro Lacbay and Bernardo del Rosario of the crime against
religious worship, committed as follows:

“That on April 14,
1937, at about 9 o’clock a. m., in this municipality of Lumban,
Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
court, the above-named accused, while conducting the funeral services
of a deceased person named Antonio Macabigtas, according to the rites
of a religious sect known as ‘Iglesia de Cristo’, voluntarily,
unlawfully and criminally caused said funeral to pass, as it in fact
passed, through the courtyard of the Roman Catholic Church in front
thereof, which courtyard belongs to and is devoted to the religious
worship of said church, against the opposition of the undersigned
complainant who, by means of force and threats of maltreatment, was
compelled by the above-named accused to give way to the funeral through
said courtyard. Act committed with grave profanation of the place, in
public offense to the religious feelings of the catholics of this
municipality, and in violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal
Code.”

When the complaint was called for hearing for the preliminary
investigation of the facts charged therein, and the accused having been
informed of the charges, the latter pleaded not guilty of the crime
charged and waived the preliminary investigation. After the case had
been forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Laguna and docketed
therein as criminal case No. 11189, the respondent provincial fiscal,
instead of filing an information for the trial of the accused before
said court, presented a motion for dismissal of the case, on the ground
that the act imputed to him does not constitute the crime charged,
according to the spirit of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.

On August 31, 1937, the respondent judge, deciding said motion, issued the following order:

“Upon consideration of the motion for dismissal
filed by the Provincial Fiscal and of the opposition, together with the
corresponding memoradum, filed by Attorney Crispin Oben, and the court
being of the opinion that the fiscal’s motion is well founded;

“Said petition is hereby granted, and this case is ordered dismissed,
without prejudice to the filing by the fiscal of another information
for the crime he may find to have been committed by the accused.

“It is so ordered.”

From said order, the complainant interposed an appeal to this court, which was opposed by the respondent provincial fiscal.

On September 10, 1937, the respondent judge issued the following order:

“The opposition of the Provincial Fiscal, dated
September 10, 1937, to the notice of appeal filed by Atty. Crispin
Oben, dated September 7, 1937, in representation of the offended party
in this case, being well founded;

“Said appeal cannot be allowed.

“It is so ordered.”

Having been notified of this latter order, the complainant filed a
motion for reconsideration thereof on September 13, 1937. Said motion
was denied by means of the following order:

“The motion for reconsideration presented by Atty. Crispin Oben for
the private prosecution, dated September 14, 1937, not being well
founded, is hereby denied.

“So ordered.”

The only question to be decided in this case is whether or not the
respondent judge failed to comply with his duty in refusing to admit
the appeal interposed by the complainant, the herein petitioner Rev.
Fr. Jose M. Baes, from an order to dismiss a complaint, upon petition
of the prosecuting attorney and over the opposition of said
complainant, on the ground that the act imputed to the accused does not
constitute the crime charged.

In opposing the appeal interposed by the complainant, the
respondent provincial fiscal based his opinion upon the decision
rendered by this court in the case of Gonzalez vs. Court of
First Instance of Bulacan (36 Off. Gaz., 2059). In said case the motion
for dismissal filed by the provincial fiscal and granted by the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, was not based on the ground that the act
imputed to the accused did not constitute the crime charged, but on the
fact that the evidence adduced at the preliminary investigation,
conducted by the said fiscal to determine whether or not the criminal
act imputed to said accused had been committed by him and whether or
not he was criminally liable therefor, was not sufficient to establish
his guilt. This court then stated what the respondent provincial fiscal
quotes in his opposition to the admission of the complainant’s appeal,
which is as follows:

“Furthermore it could not have been the intention of
‘the authors of General Orders, No. 58, to grant to the person injured
by the commission of an offense the right to appeal from an order of
dismissal issued upon petition of the promotor fiscal himself, because
the appeal would not serve its purpose which is the review of the
evidence upon which’ the motion for dismissal was based, taking into
consideration the fact that the proceeding followed in the preliminary
investigation conducted by justices of the peace for the arrest of the
accused, in. the preliminary investigation had to determine whether the
crime complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the party charged has committed it, and in that
conducted by the promotor fiscal, after the case is forwarded to the
Court of First Instance, is summary and the testimony of the witnesses
does not appear in writing. The only data relied upon by the judge in
determining whether or not the case should be dismissed are those
furnished by the promotor fiscal in his motion or those acquired by the
court itself motu proprio, which, if forwarded to this court
by virtue of an appeal, are insufficient to determine whether or not
the promotor fiscal and the lower court have erred in dismissing the
case.”

Therefore, there is no analogy between said case and the one under consideration. The question involved in the Gonzalez case, supra,
was purely one of fact the determination of which rested on the sound
discretion of the fiscal and the judge. In raid case the dismissal
thereof did not prevent the complainant from resuming his complaint for
the same offense against the same accused, by alleging the same
criminal facts, provided he adduced additional evidence to convince
said fiscal of the sufficiency thereof to establish, at least prima facie,
the existence of such facts. In the case before this court, the
question raised is one, of law, that is, the determination of whether
or not the facts alleged in the complaint constitute the crime charged.
Once the fiscal, as well as the judge, has formed the opinion that such
facts do not constitute the crime charged, the complainant is prevented
from again filing the same complaint with the same allegations of fact,
unless the fiscal, or the judge, as the case may be, changes his
opinion. Thus the qualification of a crime rests on the absolute and
final discretion of the fiscal and of the judge, rendering it
impossible for any superior court to correct whatever error they might
have committed.

The question before this court is similar to the one raised and
decided in the case of United States and Concepcion Lucia Sebastiana vs. Perez (1 Phil., 203), wherein this court, through one of its former Chief Justices, the late Don Victorino Mapa, laid down the following doctrine:

“Both the Government and the private prosecutor have
a right to perfect an appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to a
criminal complaint.”

The order issued by the respondent judge, upon petition of the
likewise respondent provincial fiscal of Laguna, dismissing the
complaint filed by the petitioner, from which the latter unsuccessfully
attempted to appeal, was based on the same legal ground on which the
order of dismissal issued in the above-cited case was based, that is,
that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute the crime
charged. If this court laid down the above-quoted doctrine in said
case, there is no reason why the same doctrine should not be followed
in this case, at least by analogy.

The American doctrine on this point is stated in 38 C. J., 610, paragraph 88, as follows:

“Where a court declines jurisdiction by mistake of
law, erroneously deciding as a matter of law and not as a decision upon
the facts that it has no jurisdiction, and either declines to proceed
or disposes of the case, the general rule is that a mandamus to proceed
will lie from any higher court having supervisory jurisdiction, unless
there is a specific and adequate remedy by appeal, writ of error, or
other method of review.”

In this case, the respondent judge refuses to admit the appeal
because he believes with the provincial fiscal, his co-respondent, that
the act imputed to the accused does not constitute the crime charged.
This is a conclusion of law reviewable by appeal which the offended
party, as a component of the people interested in the prosecution of
public crimes, may interpose before a higher court of competent
jurisdiction.

For the foregoing considerations, this court is of the opinion and
so holds that the party injured by a crime may appeal from an order of
dismissal issued by a competent judge upon motion of the prosecuting
attorney, based on the insufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint to constitute the crime charged.

Wherefore, the remedy applied for is granted and it is ordered that
a writ of mandamus be issued directing the petitioner and to give due
course thereto, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.