MATEO SANTOS, MATEO SABALLA AND EULOGIO HIPOLITO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

This certiorari proceeding was instituted
in the name of the three petitioners for the review of the decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals in case G. R. No. 43008 of said court,
finding them guilty of illegal detention and sentencing each of them to
an indeterminate penalty of from two years, four months and one day of prision correctional to eight years and one day of prision mayor.

It appears from the allegations contained in the petitioners’
pleading that after they had been charged with and prosecuted for
forcible abduction in the above cited case, while the case was yet in
the Court of First Instance of origin, they were convicted only of the
crime of illegal detention, the essential element of lewd designs not having been established in the opinion of the court.

Before the judgment finding them guilty of illegal detention became
final, the petitioners sought and obtained a new trial wherein other
evidence was presented, in addition to that adduced during the former
trial.

After the new trial, the court which tried the case rendered
judgment against the petitioners finding them guilty this time of the
crime of forcible abduction and not merely of illegal detention.

Upon appeal from the sentence rendered against the petitioners at
the second trial, the Court of Appeals found them guilty not of
forcible abduction but only of illegal detention, having imposed upon
them the above-stated indeterminate sentence.

The ground upon which the petitioners based their petition for
certiorari is their belief that there was committed against them a
violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting a person from
being twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense (Article
III, section 1, paragraph 20, of the Constitution), alleging that as
they had been acquitted of the crime of illegal detention in the first
instance, they could not be found guilty of the same offense in the
second instance.

The effect of the granting of a new trial is not to acquit the
accused of the crime of which the judgment finds him guilty, but
precisely, to set aside said judgment so that the case may be tried de
novo as if no trial had been had before, for the purpose of rendering a
judgment in accordance with the law, taking into consideration the
evidence to be presented during the second trial. (Del Rosario vs. Villegas, 49 Phil., 634; U. S. vs. Dacir, 26 Phil., 503; U. S. vs. Singuimuto, S Phil., 176.)

Once the new trial is granted, the case reverts to its original
status and naturally the prosecution and the defense, or the
petitioners herein, are placed in the same position as they were prior
to the first trial, it being their duty, therefore, to present evidence
so that the court may terminate the case, rendering the judgment which,
in its opinion, is in accordance with the law.

A question similar to that raised by the petitioners was adversely
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States which held that where
upon the indictment of a greater offense (murder) the one accused is
found not guilty thereof but guilty of a lower offense included therein
(assault), and upon appeal from that judgment a new trial is granted by
the appellate court, the accused can, on the new trial, be tried for
the greater offense in the indictment, and such new trial does not
amount to placing him in jeopardy a second time for the same offense
within the meaning of the Federal Constitution or of the provisions of
the Philippine Act of July 1, 1902, of which the provision of the
Constitution of the Philippines invoked by the petitioners is a
substantial copy. (Trono vs. United States, 11 Phil., 726; 199 U. S., 521.)

It cannot be reasonably stated that the petitioners have been twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense because if it were
so, we would arrive at the absurdity that whenever a new trial is
granted, the only resolution to be rendered is to afford to the
petitioner the benefits of the constitutional provision invoked; and we
would likewise arrive at the absurdity that in all cases in which an
accused appeals from the sentence imposed upon him, there can be no
other resolution than to also grant him the same privilege, which has
never been the intention of the legislator.

This court resolves to hold, and it is hereby held, that the
petitioners’ petition is without merit, and consequently, this case is
ordered dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Laurel, and Concecion, JJ., concur.