VIRGINIA YUMUL, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. CAYETANO RIVERA AND JULIA RITA DIZON, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

By this action the plaintiff seeks to
compel the defendants to convey to her two parcels of land described in
the amended complaint (B. E., p. 36) or, in default thereof, to pay to
her the sum of P50,000 in damages for wrongful registration by the
defendants of said parcels of land. The plaintiff further prays that
the defendants be required to render an accounting of their
administration of said lands from the year 1905 to the present.

The defendants answered by a general and special denial and, as
special defense, alleged that they were the absolute owners of the
parcels of land claimed by the plaintiff, their ownership being
evidenced by transfer certificates of title duly issued in their favor.

The trial court rendered judgment absolving the defendants from the
complaint. Plaintiff has appealed to this court by bill of exceptions
duly presented and approved.

The contention of. the appellant is that the appellees had obtained
decrees of registration through fraud, to the prejudice of the
appellant who was the true owner thereof; that the appellee, Cayetano
Rivera, was a mere encargado or administrator of the
appellant, and that, the existence of such fiduciary relation justifies
the reconveyance to her of the lands wrongfully registered in the name
of the appellees.

The two parcels of land in question are indicated with red pencil
marks in sketches, Exhibits Z and Z-l, and are situated in the
municipality of Concepcion, Province of Tarlac, the first parcel,
measuring 87 hectares, 49 ares and 4 centiares, being a portion of lot
No. 1241 (plan Psu-2112) and the other parcel, measuring 74 hectares, 6
ares and 22 centiares, being a portion of lot No. 1303 (plan Psu-6609).
The legal title to the whole of lots Nos. 1241 and 1303, in which are
included the portions claimed by the appellant, had twice been
adjudicated in favor of the.appellees, at first in the voluntary
registration proceedings, instituted by them (Expediente No, 8114, defunct Court of Land Registration and Expediente
No. 429, Court of First Instance of Tarlac), and then in the cadastral
proceedings for the registration of lands in the municipality of
Concepcion, Province of Tarlac (Cadastral Case No. 9, G. L. R. O. Rec.
No. 187). In the voluntary registration proceedings, original
certificates of title Nos. 213 and 2286 covering the two lots were
separately issued to the appellees on November 29,1912 and August
14,1919, respectively (Exhibits 17 and 19). These original certificates
of title were substituted, as a result of the cadastral proceedings, by
transfer certificates of title Nos. 1371 and 1402 issued to the
appellees on October 22 and November 22, 1926, respectively (Exhibits
18 and 20). The appellant presented no adverse claim of ownership over
any portion of lots Nos. 1241 and 1303 m the registration proceedings
above-mentioned.

It results that the legal title of the appellees over lots Nos.
1241 and 1303, which include the portions now claimed by the appellant,
became absolute and irrevocable upon the expiration of one year counted
from the entry of the final decrees of registration in their favor
(sec. 38, Act No. 496, as amended; Broce v$. Apurado [1914], 26 Phil.,
581; Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby [1915], 31 Phil., 590, 596; Mariano Velasco & Co. vs. Gochuico & Co. [1916], 33 Phil., 363, 367; Bias vs. De la Cruz and Melendres [1917], 37 Phil., 1; Calimbas vs. Paguio [1924], 46 Phil., 566, 571; Rivera vs. Moran [1926], 48 Phil., 836, 840; Sugayan vs.
Solis and Paredes [1931], 56 Phil., 276, 279). The registration by the
appellees freed the lands from claims and liens of whatever character,
which existed against the lands prior to the issuance of the
certificates of title, except those noted on said certificates and
certain other liens specially mentioned in the law, such as taxes, etc,
(see. 39, Act No. 496, as amended; Escueta vs. Director of Lands [1910], 16 Phil., 482, 486; De Jesus vs. City of Manila. [1914], 29 Phil., 73; Manila Railroad Co. vs. Del Carmen Rodriguez [1915], 29 Phil., 336, 340; Reyes and Nadres vs. Borbon and Director of Lands [1927], 50 Phil., 791; Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Del Rosario and Tiangco [1929], 54 Phil., 138, 143). Neither the
alleged mental insanity of the appellant nor the existence of fraud in
the registration can vitiate the legal title acquired by the appellees
after the lapse of over ten years since the Torrens certificates of
title were issued to them (see. 38, Act No. 496, as amended). A
certificate of title is conclusive evidence of the ownership of the
land referred to therein (sec. 47, Act No. 496; Aldecoa & Co. vs. Warner, Barnes & Co. [1915], 30 Phil., 153, 209).

The appellant, however, claims that the legal title of the
appellees inured to her benefit, for the reason that the appellees came
into the possession of the parcels in question as encargados
or administrators of the appellant., Were this fiduciary relation
between the parties and the breach thereof by the appellees established
by sufficient evidence this court, in line with adjudicated cases,
would order the reconveyance of the lands held in trust to the
appellant cestui que trust, or compel the appellees as encargados to make reparation in damages for the injury occasioned by their wrong (Consunji vs. Tison [1910], 15 Phil., 81, 84; Uy Aloe vs. Cho Jan Ling [1911], 19 Phil., 202, 205; Camacho vs. Municipality of Baliuag [1914], 28 Phil., 466, 468; Sy-Juco and Viardo vs. Sy-Jueo [1920], 40 Phil., 632, 6S4; Severino vs. Severino [1923], 44 Phil., 343, 350; Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres vs.
Municipality of Tabaco [1924], 46 Phil., 271, 276). Indeed, “* * * No
reasons of public policy demand that a person guilty of fraud or breach
of trust be permitted to use his certificate of title as a shield
against the consequences of his own wrong” (Severino vs. Severino, supra,
at page 358). But a strong presumption exists that Torrens certificates
of title have been regularly issued and are valid and, in order to
maintain an action in personam for reconveyance such as the
present, the “* * * proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties
and of the breach of trust must be clear and convincing. * * *”
(Severino vs. Severino, supra, at page 357). In the
present case, the parol evidence introduced by the appellant was not
sufficient to establish the fiduciary relation between the parties. On
the contrary, the preponderance of the evidence shows that the
appellees came into the possession of the lands by purchase from other
persons and from the appellant herself (Exhibit 4), and not by virtue
of an oral agreement that the appellees wetfe to administer the lands as encargados of said appellant. The trial court, whose findings of fact are entitled to due credit and weight (People vs. Garcia [1936], 63 Phil., 296 and cases cited), arrived at the same conclusion.

It is obvious that the appellees, being the owners of the two
parcels of land in question, need not account for their administration
thereof.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Avancena, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.