THE PROVINCE OF TAYABAS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. SIMEON PEREZ ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Among
the various property owners against whom the plaintiff filed its
complaint for expropriation in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas,
were Florentino San Gil, who died in the course of the trial and was
substituted by Josefa R. Oppus, Jose Cabrera, Josefa Villareal de
Meric, Hilarion Castor, Rafaela Martinez, Enrica Malubag and Bernardino
Maaño. After it had been proven that the plaintiff had a perfect right
to the expropriation sought by it, the lower court rendered judgment
granting it said expropriation and ordering it to pay to the
above-named defendants, by way of indemnity, the following sums:

(1) To Josefa R. Oppus, for her building known as “Esperanza Hotel”,
P1,500, the value thereof, plus P700 for its removal and reconstruction
in a different place;

(2) To Jose Cabrera, for his house,
P800, the value thereof, plus P200 for expenses of removing and
reconstructing it in a different place;

(3) To Josefa
Villareal de Meric, for her house, P400, the value thereof, plus P150
for expenses of removing and reconstructing it in another place;

(4) To Hilarion Castor, P40, the value of his expropriated house, plus
P25 for expenses of removing and reconstructing it in another place;

(5) To Rafaela Martinez, P20, the value of her house, plus P10 for expenses of removing and reconstructing it in another place;

(6) To Enrica Malubag, P100, the value of her house, plus P50, also for removing and reconstructing it in another place;

(7) To Bernardino Maaño, P25, the value of his house, plus P20 for its removal and reconstruction in another place.

Not satisfied with the judgment rendered as above-stated, the plaintiff
appealed therefrom, raising, by means of its sole assignment of alleged
error, the question whether or not the above-named defendants, in
addition to recovering the price of their respective houses, are
entitled to the additional compensation granted them in said judgment,
for the transfer and reconstruction of said houses in other places.

The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the
property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should
be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the
assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just
compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to
suffer by reason of the expropriation (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Velasquez, 32 Phil., 286).

Now then, it appears from reading the decision of the lower court that,
to arrive at the conclusion reached by it, said court has taken into
consideration the recommendation of the commissioners on assessment
who, to arrive in turn at the conclusion reached by them, not only
relied upon the evidence presented to them but also inspected each and
every one of the houses expropriated in order to know in detail their
respective conditions and extent of conservation. It was by basing
their opinion upon their knowledge of the facts obtained as
above-stated, that they decided that the expropriated houses of the
appellees had, at the time of the expropriation, such values as those
stated in their report, which are the same ones fixed by the lower
court in its judgment, to wit:

The house “Esperanza Hotel” of Josefa R. Oppus, P1,500;
The house of Jose Cabrera, P800;
The house of Josefa Villareal de Meric, P400;
The house of Hilarion Castor, P40;
The house of Rafaela Martinez, P20;
The house of Enrica Malubag, P100; and

The house of Bernardino Maaño, P25.

The foregoing sums were considered as the prices of the appellees’
houses purchased by the appellant, and like in any other case of
purchase, the purchaser, that is, the appellant, may well be said to
have acquired the expropriated houses. The truth, however, is that it
was not the intention of the appellant to acquire them in order to
become the owner thereof, but in order to have them removed from the
expropriated place, because they did not and do not answer the purpose
for which the expropriation case was instituted. Instead of keeping the
houses or all or part of the materials employed in their construction,
it waives that right and allows the owners thereof to take them to
another place. After considering the question from this angle, it
appears clearly unjust to compel the appellant to defray the expenses
incurred in their transfer and reconstruction in another place by the
owners of said houses, who, strictly speaking, already cease to be so
from the time they are paid the price thereof. To do so would mean
double compensation, or in other words, it would be equivalent to
giving the appellees, for their expropriated houses, more than the
money value thereof. The appellees have no right to collect at the same
time the just prices of their houses and the cost of their transfer and
reconstruction in another place. At most, they are entitled to either
one or the other, and nothing more.

For the foregoing
considerations, the judgment appealed from is modified, by eliminating
therefrom that part granting the appellees the right to collect from
the appellant the expenses for the transfer and reconstruction of their
respective houses, and it is affirmed in all other respects, without
special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, and Laurel, JJ., concur.