BALTAZAR ALUNEN AND EMMA ALUNEN, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. TILAN (PAGAN), DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

By
reason of the appeal taken by the plaintiffs from the judgment of the
lower court, declaring the defendant the owner of the land described in
the complaint, by purchase from Vicenta Sumaoi who, it was held, had
inherited the same from her deceased husband Raymundo Baobaoen, the
question now to be decided in this instance, taking into account the
evidence presented during the trial, is whether or not Vicenta Sumaoi
could have validly inherited the land in question from her said
deceased husband Raymundo Baobaoen. To this, in fact, may be condensed
the questions raised by the appellants by means of the errors
attributed by them to the lower court, as follows:

“1. The lower court erred in holding that the defendant acquired a valid title to the property in question.

“2.
The lower court erred in assuming that the property in question was
given to Vicenta Sumaoi as the money value of her usufruct.

“3.
The lower court erred in not declaring the plaintiffs to be the owners
of the land in dispute, in not ordering its delivery to them and in not
awarding damages to the amount of P500.

“4. The lower court erred in denying the motion for new trial of the plaintiffs.”

There is not the least disagreement between the parties as to the
following facts: Raymundo Baobaoen died on October 16, 1928. During his
first marriage, he had only one child, Ursula Baobaoen, who died on
January 30, 1934, leaving her two children Baltazar Alunen and Emma
Alunen, the two appellants herein. A few years after Raymundo Baobaoen
became a widower, he contracted a second marriage with Vicenta Sumaoi,
who died about the year 1930. Before his said second marriage, he was
already the owner, and it was so admitted by Vicenta Sumaoi herself
during her lifetime, of the lands described in Exhibit A, whose
translation from Spanish is Exhibit A-1, as well as of the land now in
question, which is no other than that declared for land tax purposes by
Vicenta Sumaoi in Exhibit G, on August 1, 1929, as having been
inherited by her from her deceased husband Raymundo Baobaoen. Some
months before she died, Vicenta Sumaoi sold the land in question to the
defendant-appellee who, from the time he purchased it by paying
therefor the sum of P500 on account, occupied and continues to occupy
it to this date. Neither is there any disagreement between the parties
as to the fact that Raymundo Baobaoen and Vicenta Sumaoi had no
children during their marriage union.

No competent evidence
has been presented during the trial to show that said deceased Vicenta
Sumaoi had, during her lifetime, inherited the land sold by her to the
defendant-appellee in 1929, Exhibit G not being by its own nature such
evidence, because it is but a declaration of ownership executed by
Vicenta Sumaoi in compliance with the real estate tax law. It does not
appear that Raymundo Baobaoen has left any will at all, or that any
court has declared that his widow has succeeded him, as his heiress, to
some specific property. The only thing that may be presumed and even
admitted in favor of Vicenta Sumaoi is that from the death of her
husband Raymundo Baobaoen, she was entitled during her lifetime to the
usufruct of the third portion available for the betterment of Ursula
Baobaoen, the mother of the appellants (article 834 of the Civil Code).
However, there is no evidence of record that Ursula Baobaoen, in her
lifetime, or her surviving children, that is, the herein appellants,
after her death, have satisfied Vicenta Sumaoi’s hereditary portion as
surviving spouse, either by the settlement upon her of a life annuity
or the income from some specific property, or by paying her some money
by way of compensation for her usufructuary interest, with or without
judicial intervention (article 838 of the Civil Code). It is inferred
from the foregoing that Vicenta Sumaoi did not inherit and could not
have inherited the land in question from her deceased husband Raymundo
Baobaoen, and that the same had not been assigned to her by the heirs
of Raymundo Baobaoen in payment of her usufructuary rights as the widow
of the latter, because it is only when there are neither forced heirs
nor brothers and nephews, that a surviving spouse, who has not been
separated from the deceased spouse, inherits and succeeds to the entire
estate of the latter (articles 807, and 930 to 952 of the Civil Code).
Therefore, when Vicenta Sumaoi sold the land in question to the
defendant-appellee, she did so without any right or title thereto.

However, the appellee, in purchasing the land in question, did so in
the best of faith, and was fully convinced that the person from whom be
purchased it was the real owner thereof, and therefore could transmit
to him the title thereto. Consequently, his possession from the moment
of the purchase up to the date on which he was served with summons in
connection with the complaint, was and should be considered as one in
good faith (articles 1950 and 433 of the Civil Code), and, under such
circumstances, he had a perfect right to keep and enjoy the fruits of
said land, at least until he was served with summons in connection with
the present case, on November 3, 1934, by virtue of the complaint filed
by the plaintiffs against him for the recovery of the possession and
ownership thereof (articles 451 and 1945 of the Civil Code).

The evidence shows that when the harvest is good, the land under
consideration yields a crop of palay worth P100 annually, and that
one-half of said crop belongs to the owner of the land and the other
half thereof belongs to the person who cultivated it. Therefore, the
plaintiffs-appellants are entitled to an indemnity in the sum of P40 a
year, allowing, of course, a reasonable margin for bad harvests, from
November 3, 1934, up to the time the land is returned to them by the
defendant-appellee.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is
hereby reversed, declaring the appellants to be the owner of the land
in question and sentencing the appellee to pay to said appellants, by
way of indemnity, the sum of P40 for every agricultural year counting
from November 3, 1934, until the possession of said property has been
restored to them; and the appellee is ordered to restore the same to
the appellants immediately after this judgment becomes final, with
costs to the appellee. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, and Laurel, JJ., concur.